Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993 Mroczkowski
Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993 Mroczkowski
COVER: Civilian relief workers unload food supplies at a village near Baidoa as a Marine escort stands by. DVIC DN-ST-93-01389
Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992 - 1993 U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations by Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired) History Division United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 2005
Other Publications in the Series U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation Provide Comfort. (1995) Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. (1995) A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991 - 1996. (2003) On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990 - 2003. (2004) PCN 190 0041 3500
Foreword This story of Operation Restore Hope relates how many issues unique to operations other than war were addressed and resolved by the com- manding general of the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and his staff. Because it is written specifically from the perspective of the com- mand element and drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports made at the time or shortly thereafter, this is a study of command, limit- ed to that discrete portion of American involvement in Somalia that was the United States-led coalition under the command of Marine Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston. It does not follow the actions of the indi- vidual components or members of the units that made up the coalition force beyond how they may have affected the work and mission of UNITAF. Modern military operations other than war are, in many ways, similar to pacification operations conducted in Latin America and the Far East a century ago. In fact, the lessons learned sections of many modern after action reports are familiar to anyone who has read the Marine Corps' 1940 Small Wars Manual, a treatise of the Corps' experience in the Banana Wars, which was written before World War II. Sections of that manual emphasized that civic actions often affected mission accomplish- ment more than military actions, and stressed that Marines must both become attuned to local culture and remain aloof from domestic political squabbles to be successful. The last decade of the 20th century brought great changes to the world, many of which affected the United States military. If the years 1980 to 1989 were a time of reformulating military doctrine and inte- grating new technologies, the years from 1990 to 1999 were a time for testing those thoughts and instruments. The final defeat of communism in Europe, the fall of the Warsaw Pact, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were great ends in themselves. But they were the heralds of the new world order proclaimed shortly after by President George H. W. Bush. On the one hand, these occur- rences allowed the United States and its allies to act decisively in the Persian Gulf against Iraq in 1990 and 1991; but the loss of the Cold War counterbalance of the Soviet Union and its strategic aims meant the United States would find it easier to become involved in regional con- flicts and localized civil strife. For the remainder of the decade, United States military personnel bore a burden of increasing operational tempo rarely known in eras of peace. Following the Persian Gulf War and its related Kurdish relief opera- tion, the next major military commitment was to Somalia. The crisis in that country was such that the humanitarian mission of the United States and its coalition allies could only be met by military means. The response to the crisis was named Operation Restore Hope and was sig- nificant for its size and international support. It also provided useful les- sons for succeeding humanitarian operations. Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, one of America's foremost experts on operations other than iii
war, saw the need for the Marine Corps to train a new generation of Marines able to think in new directions to solve the problems of human- itarian operations conducted in support of sometimes obscure and limit- ed national goals. Many of the issues faced in Somalia by planners and executors (the Marines and soldiers on the ground) have resurfaced in Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other hotspots. The author, Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, retired from the United States Marine Corps Reserve on 1 March 1999, with nearly 31 years of service. During that time, he served in Vietnam as an artillery forward observer with two rifle companies, as an observer and advisor with the 37th Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, and the officer in charge of an inte- grated observation device (laser range finder) team on an outpost in the Que Son mountains. As a reservist, he later served in a variety of posi- tions at the battery level with Battery H, 3d Battalion, 14th Marines. While on the staff of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic Reserve Augmentation Unit, he served as a liaison officer with the British Army on six NATO exercises. He was the G-3 plans officer with the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade from 1988 to 1990. During the early days of the Persian Gulf War, he was recalled to active duty as a senior watch team commander in the crisis action center of the II Marine Expeditionary Force. He later received orders to proceed to Saudi Arabia as a field his- torian with the 2d Marine Division. He served with that unit throughout Operation Desert Storm. He was again recalled to active duty in December 1992 to serve as a field historian with the headquarters of the UNITAF in Somalia. In October 1994, he was recalled to active duty to serve in Haiti as the joint task force historian with the multinational force during Operation Restore Democracy. On 1 January 1996, he returned to active duty as the historian assigned to United States European Command to document Operation Joint Endeavor, during which he served in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bosnia, and Croatia. For the last years of his military career he was the officer in charge of the Field Operations Branch of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division. During this time, he served with members of the general staff of the Polish Armed Forces on three occasions in Poland and the United States in the Partners For Peace program. He was recalled from retirement dur- ing the Global War on Terror in March 2003 and served as a historian for the Special Operations Command. He served overseas with a special operations air detachment and two battalions of U.S. Army Special Forces in Kuwait and Iraq. Colonel Mroczkowski is the author of U. S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and co-author of Fort Monroe: The Key To The South. He also has written several articles on military subjects. In civil life, he is the director of the U. S. Army's museum at Fort Monroe, Virginia, a position he has held since January 1986. C.D. Melson Acting Director of Marine Corps History iv
Preface Operation Restore Hope was a complicated and unusual operation. From the initial commitment of United States Armed Forces on 9 December 1992 until the turnover to the United Nations in May 1993, there was little need for direct mili- tary action by large units, although the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) command was not loath to use force when necessary. Rather, the need to keep a neutral and balanced approach to the situation in Somalia was more important to the success of the mission. Small unit actions, patrolling, manning key points, convoy security, and crowd control were the order of the day. For a military his- torian, it has been an important task to identify the critical issues, often political in nature, which were of importance to the command and its conduct of the oper- ation, and to follow these issues as events unfolded. This is far easier in a classic military operation with well-defined missions and objectives, and in which the effects of enemy actions or capabilities are readily discernible. The history of this operation is more about the evolution of ideas and command structures than it is about the engagement of enemy forces. I have no reservations in claiming that the operation was successful; Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston and his coalition staff skillfully accomplished the mission of the Unified Task Force, which was to create a secure environment for the shipment of relief supplies and the establishment of the second United Nations force in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The Unified Task Force was able to turn over to the United Nations a country that, though still beset by problems, was beginning to recover and in which the famine had been broken. What occurred after 4 May 1993 is another story, of which Operation Restore Hope was the prologue. The narrative is drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports created at the time or shortly thereafter. As the historian assigned to UNITAF headquar- ters, I was in a notable position to have access to what was discussed and planned, but was also able to directly observe the resulting operations. I attended meetings and daily briefings and was able to travel throughout the theater, eventually reach- ing each of the humanitarian relief sectors. This gave me the opportunity to con- duct interviews in the field with commanders, staff officers, and individual sol- diers, Marines, airmen, and sailors. It also gave me the opportunity to see the diversity of action in each sector and to appreciate the complex nature and vast scope of operations: Somalia was not just Mogadishu, and Operation Restore Hope was more than the daily round of patrols and spot reports. The greatest dif- ficulty I faced was in the very size of the area of responsibility (which was itself but a small part of the entire country of Somalia.) Travel was both time consum- ing and physically demanding; it could easily take at least three days to reach some of the farther cities, conduct a few interviews, and then return. Whether going by motorized convoy or aircraft, a day would be spent in travel each way, and a full day or two would be spent on the ground. All had to be timed to trans- portation schedules that could change with little or no advance notice. Failure to connect left one stranded until the next convoy or aircraft departed. Also, since I could not presume to impose on the hospitality of others, I had to be prepared to bring everything that I might require for food, water, or accommodation. "Humping" through the dust from a dirt airfield along a desert track with a full combat load, several liters of bottled water, a full Alice pack and a cot was not
something to look forward to. But the camaraderie shown in each sector certain- ly was, and the information gathered was worth the effort. I also was fortunate to have met several persons with whom I got to work close- ly, or who helped me accomplish my mission. The first of these was Colonel Billy C. Steed, the UNITAF chief of staff, who gave me the latitude to go where I need- ed, provided me with access to meetings, and ensured that I reviewed important documents. Next was Captain David A. "Scotty" Dawson, who was the historian for the Marine Forces, and who had been overseeing the UNITAF headquarters portion as well until I arrived. He very quickly showed me around, and he was indefatigable and always full of enthusiasm. Much of my working time was spent in the operations center under the watchful eye of Colonel James B. "Irish" Egan, whose colorful manner made more bearable a daily grind in uncomfortable cir- cumstances. He also demonstrated that the more important, but less noted, part of military professionalism often lies in the attention to routine duty and detail. I was fortunate to share a cramped, hot and airless working space in UNITAF head- quarters with a distinguished civilian, Dr. Katherine A. W. McGrady, an employ- ee of the Center for Naval Analyses. She provided insight in what was going on and kept me apprised on what happened while I was out traveling. More impor- tantly, we shared the documents and information we collected, making the effort more complete than it would otherwise have been. I had the opportunity to visit on a few occasions with the 10th Mountain Division's historian, Captain Drew R. Meyerowich, USA. In addition to discussing the collection of documents and information, he spoke of his desire to get away from his desk and be more active- ly involved in the operation. He got his wish a few months later as the command- ing officer of Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, which, as part of the quick reaction force for the raid on General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's head- quarters on 3 October, fought its way through the streets of Mogadishu. Captain Meyerowich was awarded the Silver Star for his valor and leadership. Several out- standing Marine Corps combat artists also documented Operation Restore Hope. The first of these was Colonel Peter "Mike" Gish, who had an ability to see the essence of a scene and capture it in his sketchpad in just a few strokes. His good humor and endurance belied the age of a man whose service extended back to his time as an aviation cadet in the latter days of World War II, and who had seen active service during the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and in the Kurdish relief operation. He and I shared many travels and many a dinner of meals, ready to eat, atop the chancery building in Mogadishu. He was an excellent mentor who taught me how to properly use the authority of a full colonel to accomplish one's mission. The lessons came in handy in later years in Haiti, Europe, and eventual- ly back in Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Donna J. Neary also deployed to Somalia, and I had the opportunity to watch her talent in the field. A gifted artist, she also had a knack for photography that was used to create a portfolio of coalition uniforms and arms. Captain Burton Moore brought his experience as an infantry officer during Vietnam, and worked as an artist with the Marine Forces. He created some remarkable works of Marines in action. Two of these artists are represented in this volume. I was very fortunate in meeting Major Daniel M. Lizzul, who was work- ing as a liaison officer with the Italian forces. He not only assisted in interpreting interviews, but also ensured I got to accompany the Italians on some of their oper- ations. I count him as a good friend and a highly professional officer. Warrant Officer Charles G. Grow, who I had known during Desert Storm, continued his excellent performance as both a combat photographer and artist. He was an invaluable liaison with the Joint Combat Camera Team. Sergeant B. W. Beard, a writer with the Joint Information Bureau, accompanied me on a memorable jour- ney to Gialalassi in late December. His articles, written for the local coalition vi
forces' newspaper and service magazines, captured the spirit of what was hap- pening for the Marines and soldiers who were out on the streets. Finally, there were all of the officers and soldiers of the various services of the coalition forces who responded to my requests for interviews and information. These men and women were often busy with their own duties, but they managed to find time to speak with me and help me to gather a full impression of their work. Of course, not everyone who contributed to my work in the field or to this his- tory was with me in Somalia. As I left Somalia, my good friend and comrade, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, took my place. He was leading the first Joint History Team to deploy in support of an active operation, composed of five men besides himself: Commander Roger T. Zeimet, USNR; Major Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR; Major Robert L. Furu, USAR; Major Jimmy Miller, USAFR; and Sergeant Michael Eberle, USA. Lieutenant Colonel Cureton led a highly organized and thorough field history program. These officers were able to conduct scores of interviews and collect thousands of documents. Their prodigious col- lection effort has been compiled into a volume entitled Resource Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope, pub- lished by the U.S Army Center of Military History. This book has been of tremen- dous value in researching and writing this monograph. Back in the United States, I owed my position to Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. When the call came for a historian to go to Somalia with UNITAF, he selected me from a field of very qualified candidates. His deputy, Colonel Marshall B. Darling, kept me informed of what was happening back home and forwarded anything that I requested. The director of the Joint History Office, Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA (Retired), also provided me with briefings, information, and encouragement, and helped me to secure the opportunity to deploy to Somalia as a historian. I certainly wish to thank those who reviewed the draft of this history, most especially Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown. Both of these officers have been friends and comrades in the service of the histo- ry of our Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Brown, a Basic School classmate, made sev- eral recommendations that helped with the clarity of some of the more technical aspects of this history. Brigadier General Gregory Gile, USA (Retired), also reviewed the chapter that details the work of the coalition forces in the relief sec- tors. Brigadier William J. A. Mellor DSC, AM, Royal Australian Army, did the same for those portions that involved Australia's participation. I also wish to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, chief historian, Mr. Charles R. Smith, senior historian, and Mr. Scott N. Summerill, senior editor, for their thor- ough review of the final draft. My gratitude also goes to Mr. W. Stephen Hill, who designed the maps, and to Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns, who prepared the manuscript for publication, and again to Mr. Charles R. Smith for illustrating the history and preparing the index. Not everything in the field worked as planned. A rare, sudden thunderstorm caught me in an open vehicle shortly after I arrived. The water caused havoc with my tape recorder. Thereafter, I was forced to use a notebook to record conversa- tions with members of UNITAF while in the field. This is referred to as my field notebook in the pages that follow to distinguish it from my journal. In that latter volume, I recorded the information from briefings and meetings, as well as per- sonal observations about the operation. Whenever I was working in the UNITAF headquarters compound, I could use the services of the Joint Combat Camera Team to record my interviews with commanders and staff officers. Unfortunately, most of these were unavailable to me while I was writing this history. Fortunately, I kept notes of these interviews and have used these. vii
I chose to allow the materials used to guide the writing of the history and to fol- low the development of issues. I have endeavored to use sources collected by myself or by others at the time of the operation, or shortly thereafter. The views and comments presented most nearly coincide with those perceptions held by the participants at the time. Where I have used secondary sources, I have tried to use ones that gave insight into the more non-military aspects of the operation, such as Somali culture, politics, United Nations participation, etc. Here again, I have used studies that were prepared just a few years after the operation. There are now several excellent studies of the operations in Somalia, but which were not used for the preparation of this work. Many of these deal with the more dramatic events of October 1993, which is outside the scope of this monograph. Interested scholars are directed to Somalia and Operation Restore Hope by John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, and Policing The New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, edited by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg. Of importance for an understanding of the United Nations' perspective and the relationships of UNITAF with UNOSOM I and II is volume VIII of the United Nations blue book series, The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996. Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War is a moving account based on interviews with participants of the raid of 3 October 1993. It is by far the best of several that have been published in recent years. In addition, there have been many excellent articles in military journals and the mil- itary forces of several of the coalition nations have written after-action reports or official histories of their contributions to the operation. In the middle of January 1993, shortly after the death in action of Private First Class Domingo Arroyo, I was traveling by helicopter to an interview with Captain John W. Peterson, USN. While waiting at the helipad near the airport, a small group of Marines joined the party. They were members of Task Force Mogadishu. As we waited, a first lieutenant and I struck up a conversation, as Marines often will when thrown together for a short time. After explaining what we each did, he asked me, referring to Private First Class Arroyo's death, "Sir, was it worth it?" I could not answer his question then, knowing how keenly this loss had been felt. Most certainly to Arroyo's family, friends, and comrades, the price was too great. But there were also the scores of thousands of Somalis, many of them innocent children, who had been saved by the efforts of Marines, soldiers, and sailors like Private First Class Arroyo. For these and their families there could be no greater gift. If, in the end, America and her coalition partners were repaid with callous evil by some men, that does not mean the attempt ought not to have been made. Someday, perhaps, one of those children, grown-up and grateful for what had been done, will lead his country out of the fear, evil, and despair that have engulfed it. D. P. Mroczkowski Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired) Table of Contents viii
Foreword................................................................................................................................................iii Preface......................................................................................................................................................v Table of Contents..................................................................................................................................ix Part I - A Crisis in the Making Chapter 1 Descent Into Despair..........................................................................................................1 The Beginning .......................................................................................................................................1 Clans and Colonization .........................................................................................................................2 A Trust Territory....................................................................................................................................4 Unification and Independence...............................................................................................................4 A Failed State ........................................................................................................................................5 Operation Eastern Exit ..........................................................................................................................6 Civil War and Anarchy ..........................................................................................................................7 Part II - Operation Restore Hope Chapter 2 The Widening Mission ....................................................................................................11 Historic Decision to Intervene ............................................................................................................11 Initial Planning ....................................................................................................................................12 First Steps............................................................................................................................................13 Organizing Tasks .................................................................................................................................15 Support Command...............................................................................................................................18 Coalition Partners ................................................................................................................................19 Chapter 3 Plans and Preparations ....................................................................................................21 Working with Central Command ........................................................................................................21 Somali Opposition...............................................................................................................................22 Somali Terrain .....................................................................................................................................24 Specified Tasks....................................................................................................................................25 Psychological Operations....................................................................................................................27 Phases of the Operation.......................................................................................................................27 The Flow of the Force .........................................................................................................................29 Chapter 4 Coming Ashore..................................................................................................................31 Initial Landings ...................................................................................................................................31 Logistical Buildup ...............................................................................................................................35 Force Buildup ......................................................................................................................................36 Into the Interior ...................................................................................................................................42 Securing the Relief Sectors .................................................................................................................43 Chapter 5 Politics, Peace Talks, and Police.....................................................................................51 Military-Political Cooperation ............................................................................................................51 Weapons Control and the use of Force ...............................................................................................52 Reconciliation Conferences.................................................................................................................55 Somali Police Forces...........................................................................................................................58 Chapter 6 Moving to the Third Phase .............................................................................................63 Settling In and Daily Work .................................................................................................................63 Mogadishu ...........................................................................................................................................66 Bale Dogle...........................................................................................................................................76 Baidoa..................................................................................................................................................77 Bardera ................................................................................................................................................82 ix
Oddur...................................................................................................................................................83 Gialalassi .............................................................................................................................................85 Merka...................................................................................................................................................90 Belet Weyne.........................................................................................................................................91 Kismayo...............................................................................................................................................94 Morale and Restraint ...........................................................................................................................98 Chapter 7 Drawing Down the Forces ............................................................................................103 Naval Operations ...............................................................................................................................103 Air Operations ...................................................................................................................................104 End Game..........................................................................................................................................110 Restructuring and Redeployment ......................................................................................................112 UNITAF Redeployment ....................................................................................................................113 Coalition Shifts..................................................................................................................................117 Chapter 8 Normality Begins to Return..........................................................................................119 Logistics ............................................................................................................................................119 Medical Care and Health Issues........................................................................................................124 Engineering .......................................................................................................................................130 Communications................................................................................................................................134 Psychological Operations..................................................................................................................137 Civil-Military Operations ..................................................................................................................140 Part III - Getting Out Chapter 9 Transition and Return ....................................................................................................147 United Nations Relationship .............................................................................................................147 Slow Transition to U.N. Control .......................................................................................................150 Epilogue.............................................................................................................................................155 Notes.....................................................................................................................................................159 Appendices Appendix A: Unified Task Force Somalia Organization ..................................................................169 Appendix B: Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling .............................................179 Appendix C: Chronology of Events and Operations ........................................................................183 Appendix D: Citation ........................................................................................................................187 Index.....................................................................................................................................................189 x
Chapter 1 Descent Into Despair The Beginning gency food supplies to Somalia. This initial effort, named Operation Provide Relief, was based in By the summer of 1992, almost every Mombasa, Kenya, and was commanded by American was familiar with the problems of Marine Brigadier General Frank Libutti. Military Somalia. Images of sick, weak, and starving peo- and civilian aircraft were used to fly shipments of ple had been forced into the consciousness of even food to towns inside Somalia.1 From there, the the most casual observer of the news of the day. food was to be distributed to needy refugees by Television specials, photographs in magazines, humanitarian relief organizations and nongovern- newspaper articles, and even radio programs all mental organizations such as the International served to focus the attention of our nation to this Red Cross and the World Food Program. devastated land on the Horn of Africa. That peo- Unfortunately, the accomplishment of this ple were suffering and dying in the thousands was humane task was often frustrated by the condi- obvious; that something needed to be done was tions on the ground in Somalia. unquestionable. But even the best intentions are of As is so often the case with crises that seem- no consequence without identifiable goals and the ingly flash across the nation's television screens means to implement a relevant plan. In August and magazine covers, the situation that led to a 1992, the United States, responding to a great united intervention in Somalia had a long and human tragedy, was ready to act. The plan, origi- complex history that was not immediately appar- nally quite simple, was the start of what would ent. Of all of the world's areas, the Horn of Africa develop into one of the largest humanitarian relief always has been one of the most overlooked and efforts in the history of the world, Operation least understood. Yet, an appreciation of the histo- Restore Hope. ry and culture of this region is necessary to under- On 18 August 1992, President George H. W. stand what the United States-led coalition did, and Bush ordered the airlift of 145,000 tons of emer- what its accomplishments were. DVIC DF-ST-98-04803 A Somali herds his flock of goats near the village of Belet Weyne. Unlike much of postcolonial Africa, Somalia's bor- ders enclosed a single ethnic group, the Samaal, which has occupied the region since biblical times.
2 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA clan-families descend and through which all ethnic Somalis trace their ancestry. On the Sab branch, these clan-families are the Digil and Rahanweyne; from Samaal are descended the Darod, Dir, Issaq and Hawiye. Over generations, each of these clan-families was further subdivided into clans, subclans and fami- lies.2 This fracturing of the people by lines of descent produced a dichotomy not unusual in clan societies in which there is strength against an external foe, but internal national weakness. For example, while a threat to the overall structure could bring about a unified effort to combat it, the vari- ous entities could still be fiercely antagonistic to one another. In an area in which resources are scarce and competition for those resources is very great, such hereditary divisiveness can assume tremendous impor- tance. In Somalia, the Clans and Colonization scarcity of water and arable land for both nomadic herdsmen and for farmers has led to a tradition of competition among the various families and One of the most important aspects of Somali clans.3 society, and perhaps the most difficult for Western observers to understand or appreciate, are the con- A unified Somali nation did not exist until the cepts of lineage and clan affiliation. For many 20th century. In earlier times, the country was under the control of various emirates, generally Americans, the word "clan" conjures up images of centered along the coast. Cities carried on a trade Scottish or Irish ancestry. To a Somali, however, between the peoples of the hinterland and the clan relationships define individual identity and Arabian Peninsula. By the late 19th century, how- relationships to every person that he comes into ever, several other countries were colonizing or contact with. It is no exaggeration that Somali occupying parts of the Horn of Africa that would children are taught their lineages for several gen- become Somalia. The French occupied the north- erations back so that on meeting another person, ernmost sector, French Somaliland, today known each can recite his ancestry and thus understand as Djibouti. The Italians, seeking an empire in his obligations and responsibilities to the other. Africa, colonized the southern portion and called Traditionally, all Somalis trace their ancestry Italian Somaliland. The British, with an eye to the back to one man, Abu Taalib, an uncle of the protection of the Suez Canal and their trade Prophet Mohamed. His son, Aqiil, in turn had two through the Red Sea, occupied an area on the Gulf sons, Sab and Samaal. It is from these two the six of Aden known as British Somaliland. Even the
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 3 Egyptians and Ethiopians claimed portions of the cult not to see a reflection of these earlier events territory inhabited by the Somalis.4 A legacy of in those that would occur 80 years later.5 bitterness, particularly against the Egyptians, the While Great Britain, Italy, and France were Coptic Christian Ethiopians, and the Italians, was allies during World War I, the rise of the Fascist formed at this time and was still apparent during dictator Benito Mussolini was to cause a division Operation Restore Hope. among the colonial powers. The Italian invasion Life was not always tranquil for the occupying and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 placed Italy powers, and they often fought among themselves. squarely in confrontation with Great Britain. In 1896, the Italians invaded Ethiopia from British opposition to this aggression moved Eritria, their colony on the Red Sea. The army of Mussolini to join Adolf Hitler, whose policies of the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, stunningly expansion in Europe Mussolini had formerly defeated them at the Battle of Adowa. Imam opposed.6 Thus, when World War II began, the Mohamed Ibn Abdullah Hassan raised an insur- Horn of Africa was occupied by belligerents and rection in British Somaliland in 1899 in response was soon to become a battleground. to perceived threats to the Islamic religion from The Italian Fascist government recognized it foreign influences. Known to history as the "Mad had the "chance of five thousand years" to Mullah," Mohamed Abdullah waged an intermit- increase its African colonial holdings at the tent 22-year jihad against both the British and the expense of Great Britain.7 But Italy did not Ethiopians. This was a period in Somalia's histo- declare war on the British Empire until the fall of ry marked by chaos, destruction, and famine and France was imminent, in June 1940. Before the during which it is estimated that one-third of all year ended, however, the British were already males in British Somaliland died, often at the planning to attack the Italian forces in Somalia, as hands of the Mullah and his followers. It is diffi- part of an overall strategy to clear the African con- Somalia Clan Affiliations The influence of clans and sub-clans was seen in the numerous factions and political organizations, which had been strug- gling for power since the overthrow of Muhammad Siad Barre. Virtually all derived their influence from their affiliation with one of the clans or clan-families. The important clans to the work of Operation Restore Hope were: The United Somali Congress (USC). This was the largest of In the north was the Somali National Movement (SNM), the factions operating in southern Somalia, and it was one of dominated by the Issaq clan-family. Under the leadership of the first to fight against the Barre regime. Composed princi- Abdulrahman Ali Tur, this faction declared the independ- pally of the Hawiye clan-family, it was further subdivided ence of the northwestern portion of the country as the into two factions, which were in violent competition with "Somaliland Republic." each other. The first of these was the faction led by General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed. Usually referred to as USC Also in the north was the Somali Salvation Democratic Aideed, it was drawn from the Habr Gedr clan. The force Front (SSDF), composed of members of the Majertain clan under Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the USC Ali Mahdi, drew its of the Darod clan-family. The SSDF opposed the USC. support from the Abgal clan and opposed the USC Aideed faction. Both were strong in the Mogadishu area, and each The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) was affiliated had supporters in other factions in the port city of Kismayo. with the Rahanweyne clan-family and operated to the west of Mogadishu, centered on the town of Bardera and also The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Active mainly in strong in Baidoa. the south around Kismayo, this faction was drawn from the Ogadeni clan of the Darod clan-family. It also was divided The Somali National Front (SNF) was drawn from the into two rival groups. One, led by Colonel Ahmed Omar Marehan clan of the Darod clan-family and was active along Jess, was allied with General Aideed. The other was led by the border of Ethiopia near the town of Luuq. Colonel Aden Gabiyu and was allied with the forces of Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as "General Morgan." The Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) had its Morgan's forces were an independent faction of the Ogadeni center in the town of Kismayo, and was representative of the sub-clan and were active in the Kismayo area, extending to Biyemal clan of the Dir clan-family. the towns of Bardera and Baidoa. Morgan was allied with Ali Mahdi and therefore was opposed to Colonel Jess. There also were several religious-based organizations, par- ticularly in the north. These groups included al-Itihaad al- Several other factions were operating in Somalia at this Islamiya (Islamic Unity), which had fought against the time. Each had an armed militia. While these had less SSDF in the north, and Akhwaan al-Muslimiin (Muslim impact on the coalition's work, they had to be considered. Brotherhood), which had adherents throughout the country.
4 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA tinent of the enemy. Accordingly, in February in the SYL, who did not want Italy to control any 1941, British Empire forces were on the offensive of the country, they did acquiesce to the proposal. to places that would become familiar to American For the next 11 years, the country was prepared servicemen 52 years later. On 14 February, the for independence as a Trust Territory. Although port city of Kismayo was captured, followed by there was some antagonism toward the Italians in the town of Jilib on the Jubba River on 22 the early years of this period, it began to wane as February. The city of Mogadishu was attacked the country's economy and political structures next. Although it is more than 200 miles from developed. The time was one of optimism as Kismayo and Jilib, British Empire troops entered enthusiasm for the new democracy raised a Mogadishu only three days later, on 25 February. national spirit without the traditional connections With the Italian forces retreating into the interior, to the clan-families.10 British forces advanced quickly beyond the bor- ders of Italian Somaliland and into Ethiopia.8 During the 1950s, the SYL continued to be the most important and strongest of the political par- As the war moved away from Somalia, the ties. By 1956, the SYL had received the majority British assumed responsibility for the administra- of the seats in the national assembly. It followed a tion of the entire area. During this period, the program that was nationalist in outlook and Somali people began to develop their first modern sought to weaken the influence of the clans. When political organizations. The Somalia Youth Club drafting the constitution for the new nation as it was formed in 1943, including in its membership approached independence, the SYL sought a uni- native civil servants and police officers. In 1947, tary form of government. A federal form was the organization changed its name to the Somali believed to be too susceptible to the divisiveness Youth League (SYL), with the announced aims of of clan interests, and even in the SYL itself there the unification of all Somali territory, a standard- were individuals who were more interested in the ized written form of the language, and protection furtherance of their particular clan than in a pure- of Somali interests. With branches in all Somali- ly national program.11 Unification and Independence occupied territories, including areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, and with a membership from nearly all clan-families, this party represented a true national political organization. Other parties also In 1956, Britain agreed to the eventual inde- came into being at this time, but these were invari- pendence of British Somaliland and its incorpora- ably representative individual clan-families.9 tion in the new nation. Accordingly, British A Trust Territory Somaliland was granted independence on 26 June 1960, and on 1 July it joined with the Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic. During this British administration continued until the end early period of independence, the new national of the war, when the Allies decided the Italian government had to address the differences colonies seized during the war would not be between the two sections' political, economic, and returned. A commission composed of representa- social development. While clan allegiances tives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the remained important, the development of a posi- United States was formed to study the disposition tion with an appeal to the interests of both the northern and southern sections helped to bring the nation closer together.12 of these former colonies, including Somalia. The SYL proposed that all Somali territories be uni- fied and requested a trusteeship by an internation- The major issues facing the new country during al commission for 10 years to be followed by the 1960s were the improvement of social condi- complete independence. While such a proposal tions and the nation's physical infrastructure. At was agreeable to the commission, the Allied the same time, many of the nation's political lead- Council of Foreign Ministers could not decide on ers espoused the idea of "Pan-Somalism," a con- the proper method for preparing the country for cept that called for the unification of all the independence. Finally, in 1949, the General Somali peoples into one nation. Whether this Assembly of the United Nations assigned Italy the unity was to be achieved by peaceful or aggressive trusteeship with the stipulation that Somalia must means was an issue of some debate among the be entirely independent before the end of 1960. leaders, but the idea had a great appeal with the Although there were many Somalis, particularly people. Since many Somalis lived in the border
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 5 areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, this goal the nation. In this they were fairly successful, placed Somalia in confrontation with those employing a program of sending those who were nations. There were several border clashes with already educated throughout the country to teach Ethiopia during this period, as well as guerilla others. Not as successful was the attempt of the raids into Kenya. While this expansionist program government to improve the economy of the coun- may have alienated Somalia at times from its try. One of the poorest of all nations, Somalia's neighbors, the general policy did provide a broad economy was defined by the pastoral nomadic basis for agreement among nearly all of the polit- lifestyle of the majority of its people. Foreign ical leaders.13 exports were limited mainly to cattle or other The 1960s also saw the increasing dominance foodstuffs produced in the fertile river valleys. of the SYL in the government. Curiously, the Most farming, however, was of a subsistence party's great success was becoming a weakness. level. Such a fragile economy was susceptible to As candidates in national elections began to rec- the droughts that would regularly strike the ognize the SYL was the winning ticket, the party region, which left the country very dependent upon foreign assistance, particularly from the Soviet Union.16 drew persons of all political views and beliefs into its ranks. More importantly, the party became the means through which nepotism and clan alle- In this period of the Cold War, there was some giances were once again served. Ironically, the strategic significance to the position of Somalia SYL thus came to represent the very factionalism based upon the approaches to the Red Sea and the it had originally opposed. In addition, the party Suez Canal. With many of its Army officers edu- and government became corrupt as favors and per- cated in the Soviet Union, and with its commit- sonal gain took the place of public service. By the ment to a socialist form of government, Somalia end of the decade, the nation was ripe for a coup d'etat.14 A Failed State An assassin, apparently motivated by a clan grievance, killed President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke on 15 October 1969. Although the act was an isolated incident of violence, it served as the catalyst for events that quickly followed. The assassination was used as an excuse for the over- throw of the democratic government. On 21 October, when Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal tried to arrange the selection of a new president, the military moved to take over the country. Major General Mohammed Siad Barre quickly assumed leadership of the new Supreme Revolutionary Council. Members of the old government were arrested, political parties were outlawed, the National Assembly was abolished, and the consti- tution was suspended. Under the new name of the Somali Democratic Republic, the country embarked upon its own social experiment of sci- entific socialism. Specifically, the new regime wanted to end the influence of allegiance to clans Photo courtesy of the author and the corruption that had become endemic in MajGen Mohammed Siad Barre took power in late the government. Society was to be transformed in 1969 in a bloodless coup following the assassination of accordance with a political philosophy based on both the Quran and Marxism.15 country's prime minister, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke. Barre's goal of removing the clan as the primary Somali Among other projects begun by the new gov- allegiance ultimately would lead to the destruction of ernment was an attempt to raise the literacy rate of the Somali state.
6 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA eagerly accepted Soviet military and economic was active in the southern region; and the United aid. In return, the Soviets were allowed to build Somali Congress (USC), composed mainly from airfield and port facilities at Berbera, on the north the Hawiye clan and active in the central part of coast. While the ties to the Soviet Union were the country. By December these forces had never truly strong, they were to be severed perma- pushed the Somali Army back the outskirts of the nently by the pursuit of Somali foreign policy.17 capital, Mogadishu. Violence and unrest began to The concept of Pan-Somalism had continued grow within the city itself, creating a dangerous into the Barre regime. In the early years of his atmosphere for the foreign personnel and diplo- rule, this policy was pursued through peaceful mats living there. Open fighting had begun in the negotiations with neighboring countries. city by late in the month as the predominantly Especially in regard to the Ogaden region, con- Marehan-based army attempted to destroy USC trolled by Ethiopia, the Somali government dis- elements in the Hawiye enclaves. The resulting breakdown of all order unleashed even greater lawlessness.21 tanced itself from the insurgent movements that Operation Eastern Exit had previously been supported there. This changed after the 1974 overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the establishment of a Marxist government in Addis Ababa. When attempts failed at negotiating a settlement of the Ogaden On 5 December 1990, due to escalating vio- question, the Somali government recognized the lence and chaos, American Ambassador James K. Western Somali Liberation Front, which was Bishop ordered the departure of non-essential fighting to break the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Aid embassy personnel and dependents. By mid- was given to the Ethiopian People's Revolu- month, several foreign countries had joined the tionary Army, which was fighting a guerilla war United States in advising their citizens to leave. against the new Ethiopian government. Finally, in On 30 December, Ambassador Bishop brought all July 1977, the Somali Army invaded Ethiopian remaining official Americans into the embassy territory in an attempt to gain the Ogaden. In this compound, where he initially thought they could contest between two of its client states, the Soviet wait out the fighting in safety. By 1 January 1991, Union came to the aid of Ethiopia. With large attacks on foreigners, including Americans, had amounts of modern Soviet equipment and a rein- increased and the embassy itself had been hit by forcement of Cuban troops, the Ethiopians turned small arms fire. Ambassador Bishop decided the the tide of battle and drove the Somalis from their situation was too dangerous to permit embassy territory. In retaliation, Siad Barre ejected Soviet personnel to remain any longer, and on New personnel from Somalia and turned to the West for Year's Day he requested permission from the U.S. support. In 1980, an agreement was reached with State Department to evacuate the embassy. the United States whereby use was given of the Permission was granted on 2 January.22 port and airfield facilities at Berbera in exchange In a fine example of forward thinking, on 31 for military and economic aid.18 Somalia stayed December 1990, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, close to the United States throughout the remain- USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central der of the 1980s. Command, had already alerted his staff to be pre- This decade was not to be an easy one for the pared to conduct a non-combatant evacuation Barre regime, however. In spite of its attempts to operation (NEO) in Mogadishu. Even though rid the country of the influence of "tribalism," the heavily involved in Operation Desert Shield and government was increasingly identified with the the final preparations for Operation Desert Storm, Marehan, Barre's own clan.19 In addition, corrup- Central Command in Saudi Arabia began plan- tion in the government created even more dissat- ning rapidly for the evacuation. After reviewing isfaction. By 1988, armed opposition to the Barre the Central Command plan, the Joint Chiefs of regime had begun with a rebellion in the north of Staff issued an execute order for the evacuation the country.20 There were three main opposition operation late on 2 January. By that time, forces for the operation were already being assembled from those available in the Persian Gulf.23 groups forming in late 1990 around geographical and clan affiliations: the Somali National Movement (SNM), which had begun in Northern The operation was named Eastern Exit. Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), Planners had created a variety of potential scenar- which was mainly recruited from the Ogaden and ios, each tailored for a specific situation. In a
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 7 preparatory move, U.S. Air Force AC-130 Specter The 60-man evacuation force was composed 51 gunships and ground security elements deployed Marines and corpsmen from the 4th MEB, and to Nairobi, Kenya, in case the preferred option, a nine U.S. Navy special warfare personnel from peaceful evacuation through the Mogadishu air- Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Team 8F. The security ele- port, could be accomplished. This plan was not ments boarded the helicopters at 0330 on 5 pursued once Ambassador Bishop decided it was January. At 0345 they lifted off, with an expected too dangerous for embassy personnel to make the arrival time of 0620. With the in-flight refueling nearly two-mile journey to the airport. Conditions successfully completed, the helicopters crossed at the airport also had deteriorated to such an the coast just at dawn. There was some initial dif- extent that an air operation would be too risky. ficulty in identifying the embassy, but it was clear- These circumstances left an amphibious option.24 ly distinguished on the second attempt. As the hel- icopters came in for their landings, numerous Admiral Arthur chose to create an amphibious armed looters were seen positioning ladders force composed of only two ships, the amphibious against one side of the compound wall. Upon transport dock USS Trenton (APD 14) and the hel- icopter assault ship USS Guam (LPD 9).* The landing, the SEALs immediately established the security of the chancery building while the commanding general of 4th Marine Expeditionary Marines provided a perimeter defense for the Brigade (4th MEB), Major General Harry W. compound. Both helicopters were quickly filled Jenkins, Jr., designated Colonel James J. Doyle, with evacuees and they returned to the Guam by Jr., as the commander of the landing force. His 1040.27 counterpart, the commander of the amphibious Back at Mogadishu, the evacuation force and task force, was Captain Alan B. Moser, USN. the embassy security force assisted in bringing in These two officers embarked their staffs and the several citizens from other foreign countries. By task force got under way from Masirah Island, off evening, the first of four waves of Boeing-Vertol the tip of Oman, by 2330 on 2 January. Colonel CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters from the Guam Doyle and Captain Moser had been informed the arrived at the embassy landing zone. These five use of the airport was not an option, nor was an helicopters remained on the ground only 20 min- across-the-beach landing because of the distance utes, departing with an additional 75 evacuees. As inland of the embassy from any potential landing the first wave of helicopters returned to the Guam, sites. The plan with the greatest chance of success the second wave set down at the embassy. This was, therefore, to use shipborne Marine helicop- wave, also of five helicopters, departed after just ters that could land directly in the embassy com- pound.25 18 minutes on the ground, leaving only the ambassador, his staff, and the Marine Security By 3 and 4 January, the threat to the embassy Guard to be evacuated. The third wave departed at and its personnel increased. The embassy guards 2210, and the fourth wave carried the ambassador engaged in a firefight with looters, and small arms and the perimeter defense force. This final wave fire and even a rocket propelled grenade impacted took off even as looters clambered over the walls inside the embassy grounds. At that point it was and entered the compound. The last helicopter decided that a pair of Sikorsky CH-53 Super landed back on the Guam at 2323, and 20 minutes Stallion assault helicopters could be launched later the ambassador declared the operation com- when within 500 miles of Mogadishu. The time of pleted.28 Civil War and Anarchy departure would be calculated to provide an early morning arrival at the Somali coast. This long-dis- tance journey would require at least one aerial refueling and cause crew fatigue, but it would get With the completion of this highly successful the aircraft and security forces to the embassy operation, the American presence in Somalia much sooner.26 ended for nearly two years. Few in the United States noticed what was happening there because *Planning for the imminent start of Operation Desert Storm the attention of Americans and most of the world was paramount in the minds of planners at this time, and the choice was to have as many ships available as possible in the was focused on the events in Southwest Asia. By Persian Gulf area. It was not possible to forecast either how the end of January 1991, Siad Barre was forced to long Eastern Exit would take, or when ships committed to it flee Mogadishu, and the country fell deeper into would be able to return. anarchy and chaos as the various armed factions
8 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA continued to battle the forces of the old national threat of losing subsistence to armed bands of fac- government. Finally, by May 1992, Barre's forces tional militias was now added to the threat of were defeated and he was forced to flee the coun- being robbed by the increasing gangs of bandits. try altogether. This did not mean the end of fight- With violence a reality of everyday life, everyone ing, however. Instead, the various factions and had to protect himself. Individuals armed them- clans that had formerly opposed Barre now sought selves, formed local militias, or hired others for to achieve dominance in the new government. protection. Even private relief organizations When Barre was driven from Mogadishu, Ali became the targets of threats and extortion and Mahdi Mohamed of the USC was selected as the had to resort to the hiring of armed bodyguards. It new president. The USC was an instrument of the truly became a case of "every man against every Hawiye clan, however, and Ali Mahdi never man." received enough support to coalesce the rest of the By the early 1990s, the history of Somalia dis- country behind him. The fighting, which now pit- closed certain disturbing patterns. First, it showed ted the clans against one another, also led to the that tribalism or clan loyalty was still a dominant creation of new alliances and divisions. For factor in society, despite earlier efforts to remove instance, the USC itself split into two factions, it. It was a force to be understood and reckoned one led by Ali Mahdi and the other by General Mohammed Farah Hassan Aideed.29 No single with. The passage of time made no change in this central fact of life. What had changed was the group was strong enough to overcome the others general lifestyle of the people. The reforms of the in this unending fight for power. Without a central Barre regime had removed many of the old struc- government, anarchy, violence, and lawlessness tures by which Somali society had been able to reigned. keep clan rivalries and violence in check, or at To add to the suffering of the Somali people, a least within acceptable limits. In fact, it could be severe drought had devastated the region for about argued that the Barre years actually made each three years. As farmers were unable to raise crops, clan more jealous of the others and desirous of food itself became a weapon. To have it made achieving dominance, destroying the balance that one's own group strong; to deprive one's rivals of had existed before.30 In addition, the years during it weakened them as it strengthened oneself. The which Somalia was a client state of the Soviet DVIC DN-ST-93-03436 Village women gather near refugee huts outside Baidoa. The descending spiral of rape, murder, destruction of crops and water supplies, and wholesale slaughter had led to mass starvation and forced thousands of Somalis to flee their former homes.
DESCENT INTO DESPAIR 9 DVIC DD-SD-00-01008 Members of the Aerial Port Squadron from Dyess Air Force Base, Abilene, Texas, and Dover Air Force Base, Dover, Delaware, unload medical supplies from the left side of a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker's cargo bay. Off loaded at Moi International Airport, Mombasa, Kenya, the supplies were transferred to U.S. Air Force C-130s for delivery to Somalia as part of Operation Provide Relief. Union and the United States saw the accumulation ing and who now faced death by starvation. of a large amount of weapons, ranging from rifles Aircraft deliveries of relief supplies could be sent to tanks and artillery. Somalia thus had an abun- into the country, but there was no guarantee the dant supply of weapons for its factional armies aircraft would be allowed to land safely, or that and bandits. their cargoes would not be subject to extortionate Operation Provide Relief, begun so hopefully payments.* In the autumn of 1992, it had become in August 1992, soon was confronted with the obvious that merely providing the necessities of reality of the chaos and strife into which Somalia life to these victims of anarchy would not suffice. had descended. The breaking of the famine could Operation Restore Hope was about to begin. only be achieved by the safe delivery and distri- bution of the food. In November, with deaths by starvation and related diseases numbering 350,000 and expected to increase rapidly, the United States decided to * An example of the amounts which the relief organizations had to pay simply to accomplish their humanitarian goals take action. Acting on a United Nations mandate, was told to the author by Lieutenant Colonel Carol J. President Bush announced the United States Mathieu, commanding officer of the Canadian Airborne would ensure the secure environment needed for Regiment forces in Belet Weyne. The relief committee of the the safe and effective delivery of relief supplies. International Commission of the Red Cross was required to However, there was no assurance the food would provide each security guard at the airport with 85 kilograms (187 pounds) of food per month. The cost for each airplane ultimately be given to those for whom it was landing at the airport was 50,000 Somali shillings. Also, they intended, the thousands of refugees who were were forced to rent cars and trucks at the rate of $1,600 per driven from their homes by the drought and fight- month.
Chapter 2 The Widening Mission Historic Decision to Intervene preferably be under U.N. command, but if that was not feasible, a Council-authorized operation undertaken by Member States was to be consid- ered."35 On 3 December, the U.N. Security The 1992 Thanksgiving holiday brought the usual round of family visiting and celebration to the American people. Yet, perhaps especially at Council unanimously passed Resolution 794, this time, many in the United States reflected authorizing military intervention in Somalia. A upon the poignant differences between their for- multinational force led by the United States was allowed to use all necessary force to accomplish its humanitarian mission.36 It was the first time in tune and the plight of the Somali people. In Washington, D.C., the holidays were not to be a time of relaxation or conviviality for many in the history the United Nations had elected to inter- government. President George H. W. Bush was vene in the internal affairs of a country without conferring with advisers in the State Department having received a request to do so from the coun- and the Department of Defense about what could try's government. Of course, Somalia was unique be done to alleviate the suffering in Somalia. As one official put it, "the number of deaths was going up, and the number of people we were reaching was going down."31 The day before Thanksgiving, the President's advisers provided him with three military options. The first was a simple reinforcement of 3,500 troops to the 500 Pakistanis already in Mogadishu as United Nations peacekeepers. The second was to provide both air and naval support to a United Nations force that would intervene in Somalia. The third option, and the one the President quick- ly chose, was for the United States to send in a division-sized unit under United Nations aus- pices.32 On 25 November, President Bush announced to the United Nations that the United States was pre- pared to provide military forces to assist with the delivery of food and other supplies. The offer of military assistance at this point was of a "general nature," one that required a specific request from the U.N. Security Council.33 Without waiting for the Security Council to act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an alert order to the commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, Marine General DoD Photo Joseph P. Hoar. Within a week, the Joint Chiefs Gen Joseph P. Hoar, the Marine Corps' deputy for oper- provided a formal planning order to Central ations during the Gulf War, and before that, Gen Command, directing General Hoar to prepare a detailed operations plan.34 Norman Schwartzkopf's chief of staff at Central Command, in August 1991 assumed the post of The United Nations was not long in responding Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, the uni- to the American offer. On 29 November, the fied command that has planning and operational United Nations Secretary General, Boutros responsibilities for 19 countries of the Middle East, Boutros-Ghali, stated: "any forceful action should South Asia, and the Horn of Africa.
12 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA in that there was no legitimate government and the Initial Planning situation demanded swift action. The agreement allowing the United States to While political issues were being discussed, the lead the force satisfied one of the few demands military planning was already in progress. As placed by President Bush upon the offer of troops. early as 22 November 1992, Lieutenant General The American government did concede the Robert B. Johnston, commanding general of I United Nations should have a supervisory role. Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) at Camp However, it was anticipated the United Nations Pendleton, California, had received indications would send in a peacekeeping force to replace the U.S.-led force as soon as practical.37 In these early from Central Command he might have to form a days, there was even some discussion the turnover joint task force.39 On 27 November, by an oral order, General Hoar designated I MEF as the headquarters of Joint Task Force Somalia.40 could take place as early as 20 January 1993, Inauguration Day.38 DoD Photo LtGen Robert B. Johnston, a veteran of Vietnam, Lebanon, and the Gulf War during which he served as chief of staff of Central Command, commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force, the unit designated as the headquarters for the joint task force as it had trained for this type of operation.
THE WIDENING MISSION 13 Fortunately, I MEF did not have to start entire- forces at levels other than the task force head- ly from scratch in developing such a headquarters. quarters. For instance, the ground forces of the During a recent exercise, CatEx 92-3, the expedi- Marine Corps and Army would have to be placed tionary force had already organized and run the into a single ground combat element; the air assets headquarters for a joint task force. In the exercise, of the Marines, Army, Navy, and Air Force into a the expeditionary force was tasked with acting as single air combat element, and so on. But he saw a "Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Joint Task Force no need for a single commander for such ele- ... simulating bare base conditions in a nonper- ments, and he knew each service component missive environment."41 While it was admittedly could be tasked to perform discrete missions. difficult to describe all the requirements of such Besides, the experience of Desert Storm had an organization during an exercise, the work proven it was reasonable to operate with such helped validate the concept and defined some of components, so this was the manner in which the needs of such a force.42 Joint Task Force Somalia would be organized.43 The task force had an exceptionally capable In building the headquarters staff, General and qualified commanding general in Lieutenant Johnston already had the I MEF staff to serve as a General Johnston. Distinguished and inspiring in nucleus. Of course, these Marines had already appearance, he was also characterized by clarity served and worked together, and this familiarity of perception and speech rarely found in other would be an added strength for the newly forming individuals, regardless of rank. Trim and in excel- staff. As General Hoar later wrote: "designating a lent physical condition, he was able to meet the component or element headquarters as the foun- harsh demands of the equatorial desert and set a dation of the mission ... allowed an established high standard for his command. These character- service staff to transition quickly to a [joint task istics would serve both him and the joint task force] with little need for start-up time."44 force well in the months ahead as he threaded his However, the I MEF staff itself was not large way through numerous political, humanitarian, enough for the greater responsibilities that acting and operational considerations. But for the initial as a joint task force would entail. It would require planning stages, the general's greatest strength augmentation by other Marines and personnel may have been his own experience as a Marine from the other Services. For example, the need to officer. He had led a battalion to Lebanon 10 years expand the intelligence and operations sections earlier and knew what it meant to be a peacekeep- was immediately recognized; although the mis- er in a land in the midst of civil war. More recent- sion would be essentially humanitarian, the task ly, he was on the staff of Central Command dur- force would have to be prepared for an armed ing the war in the Persian Gulf. He had served in threat. Saudi Arabia as the Central Command Chief of The Service components at Central Command, Staff. Many of the principles for organizing a joint which would be providing the military units for and combined staff, which he had seen used so the force, also selected individuals who would successfully in the Persian Gulf conflict, would join the joint task force headquarters. General help him in creating his own joint task force. Johnston later said: "They sent their best play- First Steps ers. ... I got key people."45 By late November, military personnel across the nation were receiving orders to join the joint General Johnston had to first decide on the task force, or were preparing themselves for the manner of organizing his new force. Since this possibility. At Fort Hood, Texas, Colonel Sam E. was to be a joint task force, he would need to Hatton, USA, was serving as the deputy com- effectively integrate personnel and units from the mander of the 13th Corps Support Command. On other Armed Services. He had two choices by 1 December 1992, he received orders to proceed which he could accomplish this: organize along as quickly as possible to Camp Pendleton, functional lines, as with a Marine air-ground task California, for assignment as the task force logis- force, a concept familiar to all Marines; or organ- tics officer. He immediately handed over his ize the force as components, as had been done responsibilities and closed out remaining tasks. with the American forces during Desert Storm. He also placed some fast telephone calls to asso- General Johnston recognized the functional ciates and acquaintances, many of which were organization would require an integration of now general officers and key personnel at the
14 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA change. After being apprised of the task force's mission, he realized one of his first requirements would be the production of area studies, which he had but a short time to prepare. In the meantime, I MEF intelligence section's organization was expanded with members from the other Services and augmented with personnel from national intelligence assets.47 One other important member of the growing staff was Marine Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni. His background and experience suited him for a responsible position within the joint task force staff; in recent years, General Zinni had served as operations officer for the United States European Command. In 1991, he was the Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander for Operation Provide Comfort, the Kurdish relief operation at the end of the Persian Gulf War. Shortly after- ward, he served as the military coordinator for Operation Provide Hope in the Soviet Union. Now, in late 1992, he was the deputy command- ing general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. He quickly volunteered to provide assistance to the joint task force. After reporting to both the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., and Lieutenant General Johnston, he was selected to head the operations section. General Zinni joined the I MEF staff at Central DVIC DA-SD-98-00361 Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, where BGen Anthony C. Zinni, a veteran of Vietnam and sev- he received briefs on the situation in Somalia. eral humanitarian operations, provided assistance and From there he left for Camp Pendleton.48 was selected to serve as chief of operations for the joint The Surgeon General of the Navy personally task force. chose the force surgeon, Captain Michael L. Department of the Army, to gauge the situation in Cowan, USN. Captain Cowan was the surgeon Somalia. Proceeding to Camp Pendleton, Colonel with Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, when he was Hatton's first task was to organize his own sec- told of his selection on 6 December. By the 9th, he tion. Building on I MEF's logistics section, he reached Camp Pendleton, where he began to work checked the existing table of organization and the on planning with a staff that "had just met." His talent available to ensure "the right people were in first priority was setting the medical evacuation the right jobs."46 plan, which included establishing alternate routes Similarly, Colonel William M. Handley, Jr., to move the wounded out of the country.49 USA, was serving at Headquarters, United States The process continued until the entire staff of Army Forces Command, at Fort Stewart, Georgia, the MEF headquarters was transformed into the when he received a call notifying him that he had headquarters of a joint task force. Individuals of been selected to head the joint task force intelli- all ranks, be they officer or enlisted, who had any gence section. He quickly discussed the situation of the required knowledge or expertise, were with the intelligence staff and received a briefing selected from the various Services by the compo- from the Third Army. After arriving at Camp nent commanders at Central Command. They Pendleton, he met with Colonel Michael V. Brock, were quickly integrated into the appropriate staff the I MEF intelligence officer. Checking the sections. Within a short time the task force head- organization of the section, he saw little to quarters staff had developed a decidedly purple
THE WIDENING MISSION 15 DVIC DN-SC-93-04559 A port bow view of the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH 10) underway. The second ship to be named after the battle of Tripoli in 1804, she was a veteran of the Gulf War during which she was damaged by an Iraqi contact mine. complexion.* Marines accounted only for 57 per- arrive by ship. The joint task force could take cent of the total. advantage of the support provided by one of the Organizing Tasks Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons. Also, one of the MEF's organic units, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), already was embarked and in the Western Pacific and could quickly arrive in the area of operations.50 Even as the staff was coming together, the task organization of the force itself had to be config- ured. Since I MEF was providing the cornerstone Commanded by Colonel Gregory S. Newbold, of the task force headquarters, it would only be the 15th MEU had completed its special opera- natural that the MEF subordinate elements (1st tions training, and was therefore officially a Marine Division; 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Capable), or MEU (SOC). An expeditionary unit Group; and 1st Force Service Support Group) is one of the smallest of the Marine air-ground should be heavily involved in the operation. task forces. Nonetheless, the 15th MEU carried However, there also were sound operational rea- enough personnel and equipment to make it a for- sons for selecting the Marines for a large role in midable force in most situations. The ground the mission. The Marine Corps provided its own combat element was formed around 2d Battalion, special capabilities, not the least of which was its 9th Marines, reinforced by a light armored amphibious expertise. As in Operations Desert infantry platoon, a combat engineer platoon, a Shield and Desert Storm, initial supplies and platoon of amphibious assault vehicles, and a bat- heavy equipment for Restore Hope would have to tery of artillery in direct support. The air combat element was Marine Medium Helicopter * After the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Squadron (Composite) 164, nicknamed the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its requirements "Knightriders." The squadron contained a formi- for the Services to work more closely together and its empha- dable array of helicopters: Boeing CH-46E Sea sis on joint operations, the term "purple" was unofficially Knights, Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallions, Bell adopted to signify the increasing cooperation of the Service components. The color denoted a separation from the roles of AH-1W Super Cobras, and Bell UH-1N Iroquois "Hueys." The combat service support element was MEU Service Support Group 15.51 the individual Services by implying a blending of their tradi- tional colors.
16 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA With the decision for a United States-led force, it made sense the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit with the 15th MEU (SOC), already in the Pacific, would be a part of the plan. They would also be the first of the joint task force's components in place. The structure of the Marine forces assigned to the operation had to be clearly defined. With Lieutenant General Johnston, the commanding general of I MEF, now designated as the com- manding general of the joint task force, similar command changes would occur in I MEF's subor- dinate units. At first, it appeared General Johnston would act as both the commanding general of the joint task force and the commanding general of the Marine component, Marine Forces Somalia. But it was soon decided this component should be formed around the 1st Marine Division, com- manded by Major General Charles E. Wilhelm. This in turn redefined General Wilhelm's rela- tionships to the other subordinate units. The ele- ments of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the 1st Force Service Support Group assigned to Marine USS Tripoli WestPac Cruise, 1993-1994 Forces Somalia would now be subordinate to Capt John W. Peterson, USN, commander of General Wilhelm in his role as the component Amphibious Squadron 3, was a graduate of Dartmouth commander. In effect, Marine Forces Somalia College and a naval aviator who had accumulated more would work on the higher operational level of a than 4,000 hours in three generations of carrier-based Marine air-ground task force, with its own attack aircraft. ground, air, and combat service support ele- The MEU was embarked on the three ships that ments.53 * This arrangement was unusual for a comprised Amphibious Squadron 3, commanded Marine division staff, but it did have the advan- by Captain John W. Peterson, USN. These ships tage of placing Marine Forces Somalia on a simi- were the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), USS Juneau lar basis with Army Forces Somalia. (LPD 10), and the USS Rushmore (LSD 47). To The unit chosen by Third Army's XVIII provide more equipment and sustainability to the Airborne Corps to be the Army's component was MEU, one of the ships of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3, the MV 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011), was assigned to the amphibious squadron. * At its height, Marine Forces Somalia consisted of 7th The MEU and the amphibious squadron made up Marines (-) Reinforced, composed of 1st Battalion, 7th the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which already Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Battalion 11th Marines, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, and 3d was anticipating service in Somalia. In Amphibious Assault Battalion; Marine Aircraft Group 16, September, the Marines of the 11th MEU (SOC) composed of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 had assisted the United Nations by providing (HMLA-369), Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron 352 security to the 500 soldiers of the Pakistani (VMGR-352), Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 Army's 7th Battalion, Frontier Service Regiment. (HMH-363), a detachment from HMH-466, Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 (MWSS-372), and a detachment from This regiment established the United Nations Marine Aircraft Group 38 (MAG-38); the 1st Force Service Organization Somalia (UNOSOM) in Mogadishu. Support Group (Forward), composed of Combat Service The 11th MEU also provided security for United Support Group 1 and Brigade Service Support Group 7; the States Air Force personnel who flew the 30th Naval Construction Regiment, composed of Naval Pakistanis into Mogadishu International Airport. Mobile Construction Battalion 1 and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40; and the 1st Combat Engineer In November, it had appeared 11th MEU's suc- Battalion (-). At times, Marine Forces Somalia also had oper- cessor, 15th MEU, might have to provide security for the arrival of UNOSOM reinforcements.52 ational control of 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and some of the coalition forces.
THE WIDENING MISSION 17 the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Naval Forces Somalia was quickly mustered based at Fort Drum, New York. The division's from task forces in the Central Command area of commanding general, Major General Steven L. operations, or which could be ordered to the area. Arnold, USA, knew Lieutenant General Johnston The Ranger carrier battle group consisted of the from when he had served as the United States aircraft carrier USS Ranger (CV 61), the aircraft Army Central Command's operations officer dur- carrier USS Valley Forge (CG 50), and the ing Desert Storm. On the operational side, the destroyer USS Kincaid (DD 965). There also was division had recent experience in humanitarian the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which carried relief undertakings. Just a few months prior, in the 15th MEU (SOC). The ships of Maritime August 1992, the division had been sent to Florida Prepositioning Squadron 2, consisting of the MV to assist with the disaster caused by Hurricane 1st Lt Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003), the MV Pvt Andrew. Also, the division was light infantry, and Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), and the MV therefore more strategically deployable than heav- PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002) would join ier, armored units in the Army. This meant the these forces. Throughout the operation, other division was able to rapidly "go from deployment squadrons, groups and ships of the navies of the to employment."54 Their light equipment also United States and coalition partners would move made this division a good match to the Marine into the area of operations and become a part of forces. As Brigadier General Zinni later said, they Naval Forces Somalia. The position of would complement the Marines, forming "an Commander, Naval Forces Somalia was initially agile, flexible force."55 Although designated light, held by Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, such a division carries considerable firepower and but would change hands five times during the capability. The division's normal table of distribu- operation. tion and allowances included attack and transport The Air Force's contribution to the joint task helicopters, artillery, and hardened high mobility force was highly important, but required fewer multipurpose wheeled vehicles (humvees) mount- personnel than the other Services. Air transport ing antitank missiles, machine guns, or automatic would be of tremendous significance to the oper- grenade launchers. ation. While ships would carry the greatest por- DVIC DA-SC-93-00306 MajGen Steven L. Arnold, USA, right, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, discusses the Somalia deployment of the division with U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, at Fort Drum, New York.
18 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA and logistics sections of the U.S. Transportation Command, he arrived at the joint task force head- quarters on 1 December and was designated as the commander of Air Force Forces Somalia and the mobility commander. Although there would be only 500 Air Force personnel eventually working within the theater itself, there would be literally thousands aiding the operation at numerous sta- tions along the air bridge.56 The smallest of all the components would be the Special Operations Forces. This component was initially under the command of Colonel Thomas D. Smith, USA. In late November, he was the director of operations for Central Command's Special Operations Command, where he had already received briefings on Somalia. He joined the joint task force by 4 December, when General Johnston briefed his concept of operations to all component commanders. As planning progressed, coalition warfare teams were formed to resolve any operational problems between the various Services and coalition countries. Teams of six men were established to coordinate close air sup- port and medical evacuations, coordinate opera- tional boundaries, and to train some of the allies in JCCC DD-SD-00-00662 American operational techniques. Such teams BGen Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, a squadron and were requested by the joint task force for various wing commander with more than 4,000 flying hours, coalition forces, and eventually General Johnston was chosen to command the Air Force component of approved eight teams; one each for the forces the joint task force. from Pakistan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, France, Botswana, Canada, and Italy. The teams were sent to link up with these allied forces as they deployed.57 tion of the heavy equipment, most of the person- Support Command nel and much of the lighter cargo would be flown directly into the theater. Control of all these move- ments was critical, and so Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, was chosen as the commanding general of Air Force Forces There was only one exception to the compo- Somalia. General Mikolajcik's background and nent structure of the joint task force, but it was a experience suited him for the mission. His assign- very important exception. This special organiza- ment at the time was as the commanding general tion was Support Command for the joint task of the 437th Airlift Wing, based at Charleston Air force, which was formed as a functional element Force Base, South Carolina. This unit's mission rather than as a separate Service organization. was the loading and airdrop delivery of supplies, General Johnston recognized that logistics for this equipment, and troops. It was tasked to support operation would pose a critical challenge. Since special and humanitarian relief operations world- literally everything would come in from outside wide. Receiving a call on 26 November to prepare the theater, the general had to create a robust for deployment, General Mikolajcik quickly put logistics element to provide for this important together an initial team of 70 airmen to cover function. In the initial planning, it was recognized inter- and intra-theater air movements. On the that Marine Forces Somalia, which would arrive 29th he was told to proceed to Camp Pendleton, to before the Army Forces Somalia, would have to which he traveled after a quick stop at Scott Air sustain the force with the assets of 1st Force Force Base in Illinois for briefings. After dis- Service Support Group and the supplies and cussing mobility operations with the operations equipment from the maritime prepositioning force
THE WIDENING MISSION 19 ships.* The Army Forces Somalia, as they arrived, assuming the theater role until 50 days into the would carry their own logistics and support ele- operation. Until then, Marine Forces Somalia ments with them, and originally it was expected would continue to carry the burden for this sup- that Army Forces Somalia would assume the the- port, especially in the coordination of items com- ater logistics role, with a specially task-organized mon to all users. The commanding general of the unit. However, Central Command also was work- Army Forces Somalia, Major General Arnold, ing on the logistics issue, and their planners had recognized his force also needed to deploy some begun to build what would become Support of its own logistics assets quickly into the the- Command of the task force.58 At Fort Hood, ater.60 Coalition Partners Texas, the 13th Corps Support Command (CosCom) had already seen its deputy command- er selected to head up the logistics section for the joint task force. When the 10th Mountain Division The American elements of the force were com- was selected as Army Forces Somalia shortly ing together rapidly. But there remained one afterward, the 13th CosCom was notified that it, major portion that still had to be assembled. The too, would have a role to play in the operation. It United Nations had sanctioned a multinational would provide command and control for logistics force for Somalia, and so the countries that chose support in the theater. With the army planners at to be coalition partners with the United States now Central Command identifying requirements and had to come forward and make their contribu- resources available, the structure of Support tions. Central Command was the first line in Command was built around the 13th CosCom determining which countries would be accepted staff, commanded by Brigadier General Billy K. into this coalition, relieving the commander of Solomon, USA. Appropriate units were selected this administrative burden. Offers were screened from the continental United States and Europe. to ensure potential partners had self-sufficiency, The major subordinate commands were the 593d Area Support Group, the 62d Medical Group, and the 7th Transportation Group.** These were aug- mented in a building block concept in which smaller units with specialties were selected and assigned to Support Command. As the groups pre- pared to deploy, General Solomon recognized that his presence on the ground in theater would be necessary early on, even before the majority of his command would be prepared to arrive. On 14 hours notice, he prepared to leave with a small advance party.59 Support Command would pro- vide tremendous capabilities to the force. However, it was not expected to be capable of * It also was recognized this would greatly strain the capa- bilities of Marine Forces Somalia and the Maritime Prepositioning Force. A maritime prepositioning force squadron carries enough rations, supplies, and equipment to sustain a force of approximately 16,000 men for 30 days. However, these assets had to stretch to cover a force that would reach more than 23,000 by late December. For a detailed discussion of the logistical structures for the opera- tion, see Katherine McGrady's The Joint Task Force In Operation Restore Hope, published by the Center For Naval DVIC DA-SC-00-00063 Analyses. BGen Billy K. Solomon, USA, commissioned in Quartermaster Corps in 1966, served in battalion and ** Although composed entirely of United States Army units, division support command positions before being Support Command was not a part of Army Forces Somalia. assigned to lead III U.S. Army Corps' 13th Corps It was a separate command on an equal basis with the Service components. Support Command at Fort Hood, Texas.
20 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA mobility, and a "willingness to adhere to dinating authority with the UNOSOM command- American operational control and rules of engage- er, Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen of the ment."61 Pakistani Army.62 The creation of a cohesive coalition was to As units across the United States were prepar- present General Johnston with what he called "a ing for their share in Operation Restore Hope, the real challenge." But he was aided in this task by ministries of defense of many nations prepared to the large contingents eventually sent by some of give support to the United States-led effort. Some the United States' traditional allies; countries such nations, such as Canada, Australia, Belgium, as France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Australia, and Egypt, Nigeria, and Norway, already had made a Turkey were all to be key contributors around commitment to join UNOSOM and were prepar- which the coalition could be built. These larger ing to deploy forces as reinforcements.63 Those forces could also be counted on to be operational- who would be joining with the United States ly capable and to bring some of their own support. began to assemble forces and formulate plans, Many other countries would soon join in, eventu- often with their own names. Eventually, there ally raising the total number of nations in the would be French Operation Oryx, Italian coalition to 23. While the general did not have Operation Ibis, Australian Operation Solace, and much latitude in the acceptance of any nation's Canadian Operation Deliverance. offer, he did recognize that even the smallest con- How all of these allied forces could be worked tingent could be put to effective use. In these early effectively into the operation; how much logistic stages, it was thought that General Johnston support they would need; their operational effec- would be the commander of the United Nations tiveness; and when they would actually arrive forces in Somalia, but the U.N. decided that its were all questions on which General Johnston and own UNOSOM commander would retain opera- his staff would have to give very serious consider- tional control over all U.N. forces. General ation in the few days remaining before the start of Johnston would have operational control over all Operation Restore Hope; and in that short time coalition forces assigned to him, and he had coor- there was much other work to be done.
Chapter 3 Plans and Preparations Working with Central Command task force to know when it had established a secure environment and accomplished its mis- Training in amphibious warfare has taught sion? During these early planning stages, the end Marines that planning for an operation is continu- state was defined as "creation of an environment where U.N. and relief organizations can assume responsibility for security and relief operations."65 ous and concurrent. In late November 1992, as the nascent joint task force staff met with the U.S. Central Command staff at MacDill Air Force Unfortunately, this was rather vague. The need to Base, Florida, there was a great amount of work to more precisely define the operation's end state be done in a short period of time to prepare the was to be an important but difficult question for plans that would guide the operation. Throughout much of the joint task force's existence. the next several days, the two staffs would work in The Central Command order described four close cooperation to ensure the joint task force phases of the operation and set rules of engage- plan would complement the one issued by Central ment. It also formally ordered General Johnston, Command. Long hours and plenty of coffee were as commanding general of I Marine the order of the day. Expeditionary Force (I MEF), to assume duties as Central Command issued its order on 5 December. While the two staffs had worked close- ly together in the development of the order, the Central Command document gave Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston formal authority to complete and issue the final joint task force order. One of the most important points to be taken from the Central Command order was the mission, to "conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to pro- vide open and free passage of relief supplies, pro- vide security for convoys and relief organization operations and to assist in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices." The "anticipated D- Day" was set for 9 December, just four days away.* General Johnston described the Central Command order as "very broad," and he was quite comfortable with it.64 Even as it was being writ- ten, his staff had begged the United Nations to identify implied tasks that would assist in accom- plishing the mission. The most obvious of these tasks was to establish some precise way to meas- ure success. In other words, just how was the joint * The time for preparation was even shorter when the time Photo courtesy of the author zone differences are taken into account. There are eight hours Gen Mohamed Farah Aideed rose to become the difference between Somalia and the east coast of the United States. Thus, 0500 9 December in Mogadishu is 2100 8 leader of the formerly political, but now militant, United December in Washington, D.C., or MacDill Air Force Base, Somali Congress. He favored a military solution to the Florida. problems the Barre government had brought about.
22 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA commander of Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF Mahdi Mohamed]) roam the city with the Somalia) and to establish the joint task force. two opposing leaders ... exercising little con- Johnston already had been doing precisely that for trol over their activities. While Ali Mahdi some days. appears to welcome U.N. presence and But that was not all General Johnston had been assistance in Somalia, General Aideed concerned with during this time of intense activi- opposes such presence and has threatened ty. His newly assembled headquarters and staff the 500-man Pakistani force and impeded that unit from securing the port and airfield sections were busy identifying needed informa- in Mogadishu. Further, General Aideed has tion, solving problems, and coordinating the publicly stated that he will oppose any fur- preparation of the joint task force order. The final ther introduction of U.N. forces into order was to contain myriad small, but important Mogadishu. details, and there were some concerns that were of greater consequence than others that demanded a Kismayo. The security situation in Kismayo rapid understanding and resolution. is uncertain but less volatile than Somali Opposition Mogadishu. Factional fighting occurs fre- quently and the general population is known to be armed. Random shootings and violent incidents are frequent. The two factions Sound military planning begins with a consid- claiming this area have formed a loose eration of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and alliance with about 3,000 troops, many of time available. With the mission specified in the whom were former Somali National Army Central Command order, General Johnston and soldiers, reasonably well-trained and experi- his staff could now concentrate on the other ele- enced with weapons. The apparent leader, ments. The question of the enemy was a challeng- Col [Ahmed Omar] Jess, appears to be min- ing one, filled with political and diplomatic impli- imizing his ties with General Aideed and has cations. The various armed Somali factions were indicated a willingness to have a U.N. con- regarded as a great threat to the task force and its tingent deploy to Kismayo. mission, but their reactions could not be gauged in Key Assumptions. The primary threat to advance since internal Somali politics would security will be armed lawlessness and undoubtedly be involved. It was possible that one armed looters.67 faction could welcome the joint task force, while Some of these difficulties were further its rival would oppose the coalition. There was a expressed in a message regarding operations in possibility that the force might have to fight its way ashore.66 Somalia sent from Central Command in early November: The size of these factional, clan-based forces, There does not appear to be any particular in addition to the types, numbers, and condition of center of gravity, no single leader or faction their weaponry were critical elements of informa- or army whose defeat will bring stability. tion that had to be gathered. In a related matter, Nor is there any geographical center of grav- there was the existence of simple, but widespread, ity, contrary to the politicians' views about lawlessness. How was the joint task force to deal Mogadishu. ... The most assailable center of with that? In a commander's estimate of the situ- gravity appears to be the warlords' control ation dated 22 November 1992, General Joseph over the food distribution, both in terms of Hoar saw the threat as follows: amount and location. Therefore, any effort Over all, the security environment through- on our part has to defeat their control over out Somalia is volatile. The situation may food distribution, and force the warlords, should they choose to fight, to fight us on our terms.68 deteriorate further because there is no cen- tralized governmental control of Somali fac- tions. Both of these issues would be addressed in the Mogadishu. The security situation in final joint task force order. Mogadishu remains uncertain. Large num- The intelligence annex of the task force order bers of armed forces (estimated 5,000- further described the factions and their possible 10,000 aligned under General [Mohamed capabilities. The United Somali Congress (USC) Farah Hassan] Aideed and estimated 5,000- Aideed faction was estimated to have approxi- 6,000 aligned under interim President [Ali mately 20,000 fighters, and USC Ali Mahdi to
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 23 Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces Somali factional militiamen gather around a "technical," a pick-up truck with a modified antiaircraft artillery or heavy machine gun mounted in the bed. Businesses, local officials, and foreign residents were forced to hire them for pro- tection against extortion and kidnappings by freelance gunmen. have between 15,000 and 30,000.* Both factions choose the time and place of any confrontation. were known to possess artillery, tanks, and Also of importance was the knowledge these armored personnel carriers. Mohamed Said Hirsi, fighters had of the terrain in their areas, and the known as General Morgan, headed the Somali fact that any aggressive militias or clans would be National Front (SNF) and was thought to have a indistinguishable from the local inhabitants. A large number of the soldiers from the old national psychological factor that could provide another army of the Muhammad Siad Barre regime, total- strength to the factions would lie in their ability to ing about 9,000 troops. It was also known to have misrepresent the joint task force's mission and seven T-54/55 tanks and eighteen 122mm artillery actions as an invasion, thereby increasing the pieces. The rival Somali Patriotic Movement aggressiveness and tenacity of their followers. (SPM) faction under Colonel Jess was estimated Such strengths, however, were countered by to possess 15,000 fighters, of whom 2,000 were several weaknesses. The average Somali fighter trained. While well armed, they were thought to was very young, often still in his teens, and be poorly disciplined. described as "undisciplined, illiterate, and often There were strengths these factions were under the influence of the narcotic, khat." In spite assessed to have. The first among these was their of the seemingly large array of small arms and extreme unpredictability and their ability to heavy weapons and vehicles, there were indica- tions of shortages of ammunition and spare parts. * The estimates of faction strength used in this history vary Their ability to operate and maintain sophisticated greatly over time and place. This probably reflects both the weaponry also was questionably, and the weapons difficulty of acquiring timely and accurate information and systems of the Somalis were considered antiquat- the actual changes that undoubtedly occurred within these loose organizations. ed and outclassed by those of the joint task force.
24 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA The factional leadership was known to be weak in ment. The term "infrastructure" is frequently used many areas, especially in command and control.69 to refer to all of those buildings, structures, and Somali Terrain systems that can be put to use. It was in this area especially that knowledge of terrain was critical. The joint task force would be very dependent The issue of terrain was equally important to upon a transportation network that would have to define. Some pieces of information were readily bring all personnel, equipment, food, water, and available, but others were, as yet, unknown. The consumable supplies into the theater, and then be land features and climate were known quantities. able to move them rapidly and effectively to The land was described as "undulating plains that where they were needed. are interrupted occasionally by areas of dissected Intelligence gathering on this subject already terrain and isolated hills. The Webi Jubba and had begun, but it did not present an optimistic pic- Webi Shebelle are the only streams that flow year- ture of what the task force would face. An early round along most of their lengths." The climate study performed by the Defense Intelligence can be characterized as tropical, semiarid to arid, Agency described Somalia's transportation infra- with two short monsoon seasons. The southern structure in the following terms: plains are hot all year, with average temperatures Highways. Somalia's road system, which ranging from 72 to 95 degrees Fahrenheit. The has only a few high-capacity modern routes, rainy season varies by region and by year with fre- has lapsed into disrepair. Of Somalia's quent droughts. The annual mean precipitation is roughly 18,000 kilometers of roadway, almost 1,000 millimeters in Mogadishu, while it is about 3,000 are bituminous and another much drier further inland. All of which is a way of 3,000 crushed rock. The remaining 12,000 stating that Somalia would present a hot, dry, kilometers are dirt roads or tracks. ... Surface bleak desert environment that would test the quality has deteriorated because of the lack strength and endurance of both men and equip- of maintenance during two years of unrest. ment. Conditions ... are so poor that parallel trails But for a military planner, terrain encompasses available along some stretches are frequent- far more than just the ground. Of equal impor- ly used instead of the road itself. ... tance are the man-made features that help to sup- Air transportation. Somalia has 40 air- port a force in a hostile and unfamiliar environ- fields with usable runways of more than Photo courtesy of the author The flat, featureless desert terrain to the west of Oddur, filled with scrub brush and thorn trees, is typical of the coun- try's interior.
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 25 1,969 feet. C-130s can land at only 10 of ence of spores, which the boiling may not them. Three other airfields have been kill. The potential for cholera and related opened to C-130s but with restrictions. Six problems from decaying cadavers is also of the 10 C-130-capable airfields can also present.72 accommodate C-141s. C-5 aircraft can land An effective preventive medicine program only at Berbera and Mogadishu. ... Airport would be necessary to safeguard the health of the infrastructure at Somali airfields is rudimen- force. Specified Tasks tary at best. Few airfields have material-han- dling equipment or covered storage. Air traf- fic control is close to nonexistent. Although Mogadishu, [Bale Dogle], Hargeisa, and Kismayo have maintenance and service Disarmament was another important issue relating to the mission of providing a secure envi- ronment.* This topic was addressed in great detail facilities, no airfields have the maintenance capability to fully support modern aircraft. in the Marine Corps' old Small Wars Manual. Seaports. The major ports of Mogadishu, Many members of the joint task force staff were Berbera, and Kismayo ... can handle general familiar with this interesting volume. It conveys bulk and small container vessels. The opera- tional status of petroleum offloading and much of the extensive experience of the "Old storage equipment, mobile cranes, roll- Corps" in "operations undertaken under executive on/roll-off facilities, and transit sheds at authority, wherein military force is combined with each is uncertain. Relief ship crews must be diplomatic pressure in the internal or external ready to use their ship's gear to unload sup- affairs of another state whose government is plies. ... unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the Railroads. Somalia has no railroads.70 preservation of life and such interests as are deter- mined by the foreign policy of our Nation."73 This A final, but very important, effect the environ- experience had been gained in such places as ment might have on the operation was in the area Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. of health. The Horn of Africa presented medical But, because the world had changed radically planners with a wide variety of potential problems since the book was written, and much of it was no for which they would need to prepare the person- longer valid, except as a general guide.** Also, nel of the joint task force. These included a high Somalia was a unique situation, and nothing could potential for infectious disease, heat-related be accepted as a matter of form. It was determined injuries, and bites from several types of venomous by General Johnston and his staff that there could snakes and insects. Diseases were vector-borne, be no attempt to disarm Somalia.74 Virtually every such as malaria, or could be contracted from the Somali male, to include teenagers, carried a unsanitary conditions prevalent in the country. As weapon. The personnel working for the humani- was noted in the Soldier Handbook: "the major tarian relief organizations hired Somalis as infectious disease risks are from food and water- guards, and many people kept arms for their own borne diseases ... related to ... poor sanitation, protection. Weapons would have to be controlled indiscriminate disposal of waste and decomposing corpses."71 The Central Command order was even in some manner, but this was not the same as dis- more explicit: Many of the deaths and much of the human * Disarmament was initially assigned in general terms in the suffering in Somalia is directly attributable original 5 December Joint Chiefs of Staff execute order to to endemic disease, which is merely magni- Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command as: "provide a fied and made more virulent by famine. secure environment: disarm, as necessary, forces which inter- Numerous diseases, some of which are car- fere with humanitarian relief operations." This was deleted in ried by parasites (such as malaria), are pres- a modification to the order, sent by a message from the Joint Staff to Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command on 6 ent in Somalia. Among them are AIDS December 1992. [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome], tuberculosis, hepatitis, pneumonia, and ** The Small Wars Manual, the last edition of which was measles. Dysentery and gangrene are com- published in 1940, addressed such matters as civil-military mon and frequently lethal complications. relations, the role of the State Department, creation of native Virtually all water is unsafe for drinking police forces, disarmament of civilian populations, tactics, even when boiled due to the possible pres- and logistics.
26 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA cover the abundance of small arms in the hands of unstable persons and proliferation of technical vehicles. The ability to deal suc- cessfully with these and similar challenges would require a solid foundation under inter- national law."75 General Johnston and his Staff Judge Advocate, Marine Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz, worked with Central Command in developing rules of engagement so those promulgated in the Central Command order were ones that could be easily incorporated in the task force order.76 The rules of engagement, as published, were broad and focused on the protection of the force and its mission. General Johnston later said these rules were ones that "every commander would want to have on such a mission."77 Essentially, every member of the force had the right to protect himself not only against a hostile act, but also against the threat of such an act. Under such rules it was not necessary for task force personnel to be fired upon before taking action. A weapon aimed in a threatening manner was sufficient cause to fire on the individual holding it. Also, of particu- lar interest in this operation, "technicals" and crew-served weapons were considered to be threats at any time, regardless of the actual intent of their crews at the time encountered.78 * To DVIC DD-SD-00-00751 The flood of military assistance during the Barre years meant an abundance of military hardware, weapons, ensure that everyone understood his rights and and ammunition for the warring clans to use. Weapons responsibilities, cards were printed with the rules ranged from World War II era .30-caliber machine guns and distributed, and classes were held in which and rocket launchers to Soviet-made AK-47 rifles and they were explained. The cards carried the U.S.-made M16s. reminder that the United States was not at war, that all persons were to be treated with dignity, armament. The task forces' operation order would and that minimum force was to be used to carry have to address the problem clearly and effective- out the mission. ly. Another important implied task for this opera- The joint task force's office of the Staff Judge tion came from Brigadier General Anthony C. Advocate was deeply involved in a related issue. Zinni's recent experience. He knew that an opera- In this operation, international law and opera- tion of this sort would require the military to work tional law would feature prominently in how the closely with numerous humanitarian relief organ- force accomplished its mission: As each I MEF section developed implied taskings in preparation for the development of the operation plan, it became clear that * Technical vehicles, or "technicals," as they were more com- U.S. forces would be operating in an austere monly known, were a bizarre form of homemade weapons environment where the rule of law had been platform unique to Somalia. They were generally formed replaced by the law of the gun. Advice and from the body of a pick-up truck or similar vehicle, with the innovative planning in a variety of nontradi- addition of a heavy machine gun, antiaircraft weapon, or some other crew-served weapon mounted in the bed. They tional functions and activities would be were often encountered at roadblocks and were employed by needed as the ... commander entered all factions and many gangs. The term itself apparently uncharted waters. Clearly, specialized rules derived from the euphemism used for hiring armed guards of engagement would have to be drafted to for protection, or "technical assistance."
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 27 izations.* The relief organizations were a signifi- essary secure environment for the relief opera- cant part of the overall humanitarian effort. Such tions.81 Psychological Operations organizations were already working in Somalia, providing food, medical assistance, and relief services to the civilian population. But they would have requirements of their own which would have Johnston was clear on the importance of psy- to be provided by the military. In addition, the chological operations and civil affairs to the suc- work of both the military and these organizations cess of the operation. He intended to use them to required close coordination to ensure a unity of assist in disarming technicals and bandits, and to effort. In Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, create a "benevolent image" of coalition forces as General Zinni had achieved this coordination they were engaged in their humanitarian, peace- making mission.82 In the task force order, psycho- through a civil-military operations center. A cen- ter definitely would be needed for Operation Restore Hope.79 logical operations were intended to focus upon presenting the image of a "strong U.S./U.N./ The Central Command order set a specific mis- Coalition presence, capable and willing to use sion for the joint task force to conduct joint mili- force to protect the international relief effort and tary operations in Somalia to secure the major air to allay fears about U.S./U.N./Coalition inten- and sea ports, key installations, and food distribu- tions." The psychological operation's themes and tion points, and to assist in providing humanitari- objectives were to assure all factions and groups an operations and relief under U.N. auspices. The order described the conduct of the operation in of the impartiality of the conduct of the relief four phases. It also formally ordered the com- operations, and to dissuade any groups or individ- manding general of I MEF to assume the duties as uals from interfering with the relief. Major themes commander of JTF Somalia and to establish the were credibility of the joint task force in its abili- joint task force.80 ty to carry out its goals and to meet force with force if necessary, and neutrality in its dealings General Johnston had already begun this work. with all groups in its humanitarian mission. The In addition, his staff was working on completing methods to be used to get the word out to the local the task force's own order, which was issued the day after the Central Command order, 6 populace were to be "face-to-face communica- December. The mission of the joint task force tions, radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflets, posters, coloring books, and other printed prod- ucts."83 To perform this valuable work, a separate remained basically the same as in the Central Command order, with some minor changes in the wording. The commander's intent made an impor- Joint Psychological Operations Task Force was formed within the joint task force. Phases of the Operation tant distinction: "JTF Somalia will focus on secur- ing the lines of communication used for the ground movement of relief supplies by U.N. and [non-governmental organization] agencies to dis- tribution sites. JTF Somalia will not be primarily As in the Central Command order, the task involved in transporting supplies, but will assist force's concept of operations was set in four phas- relief organizations by securing their operating es. As in any properly prepared campaign, each of bases as well as the ground transportation routes these phases would lead to and set the conditions to relief distribution sites." This statement clearly for the next. In Phase I, the forces were to "estab- kept the task force out of the business of actually lish a base of operations and logistics in feeding the hungry and concentrated on the more Mogadishu," to "gain control over the flow of appropriate military mission of providing the nec- humanitarian relief supplies through the city," and to introduce other U.N. forces throughout the * Humanitarian relief organizations is a comprehensive term country. Amphibious forces would secure the port that includes non-governmental organizations, private volun- and airfield at Mogadishu and establish a lodg- tary organizations, and agencies of the United Nations and ment for follow-on troops. A maritime preposi- the International Commission of the Red Cross. During the tioning force operation would follow. Once ade- operation the term non-governmental organization usually was used when referring to any relief organization, but the quate security was established, additional forces more appropriate organization will be used when discussing would deploy into Mogadishu. A second airhead the work of the Civil-Military Operations Center. would be secured as soon as possible for the
28 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA deployment of additional forces, and the town of effort," with a "gradual relief in place of JTF Baidoa would also be secured. Phase II provided forces."84 for the expansion of operations at the major inte- The area of operations was divided into eight rior relief distribution sites to include Gialalassi, humanitarian relief sectors, so named in keeping Bardera, Belet Weyne, Oddur, and others as with the nature of the mission.85 Each sector was required. Additional forces would expand opera- centered on a major city that could serve as a dis- tions to these interior sites and establish sufficient tribution center; in fact, many of them had been security to allow unimpeded relief operations. In such centers during Operation Provide Relief. The Phase III, operations would expand through the other qualification for choosing these cities was conduct of relief convoy security operations and that each was located on a main road and had an to additional ports and airfields, to include the airfield capable of handling military cargo air- port of Kismayo. The crucial Phase IV would be a craft. The original humanitarian relief sectors "transition from a U.S.-led to a U.N.-controlled were Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Baidoa, Bardera,
PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 29 Kismayo, Oddur, Gialalassi, and Belet Weyne.86 Command (TransCom), headquartered at Scott The boundaries for the sectors were not set with Air Force Base, Illinois. A separate plan would regard to clan or tribal affiliation, but by simple have to be worked out to ensure the initial land- grid coordinates. ings could be made on time, that the follow-on Because of the close cooperation of Central forces could be brought into theater as required, Command and joint task force staffs during plan- and that enough logistical support for the force ning, General Johnston was able to sign and issue would be started on its way from the United States the task force's order on 6 December 1992; only to reach Somalia in an orderly sequence. The one day after Central Command issued its order to detailed planning for this deployment called for the joint task force. The completed document was the movement of thousands of troops from their thorough and detailed and recognized that some home bases to ports of embarkation for further key elements, such as the forces to be offered by transport halfway around the world. There would the coalition partners, still had to be identified.* have to be a sequenced timetable, employing all D-Day was now only three days away. the assets available for the movement by ship and airplane, of the cargo needed by the force. As a Another critical aspect, which joint task force supporting command, TransCom had to tailor its planners had been hurriedly working on, was the plans to the requirements the joint task force pro- development of the deployment timeline. With a vided through Central Command. These were known date for D-Day, planners were able to work made known in a formal document called a time- backward in time to determine when other critical phased force deployment and development plan. events would have to occur for the operation to Such a system works best when there is an ample begin as planned and continue in an orderly fash- amount of planning time available, so force struc- ion. A timeline published on 1 December set the tures and logistical requirements can be estimated initial actions for 4 December, with the establish- in advance and contingency plans created. There ment of the joint task force headquarters, and was no such luxury with the preparations for this worked forward 30 days, when the maritime operation; TransCom would have to react quickly prepositioning force offload was to be completed. as the needs of the joint task force were deter- mined and made known.88 The timeline called for the quick activation and deployment of many units and detachments that would have to be in place to support the impend- Since the majority of logistical support would ing operation. These included the naval support be coming by ship, a subordinate organization of element and the offload preparation party of TransCom, the Military Sealift Command, would Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, which had have the greatest capability to support the opera- to link up with those ships at Diego Garcia. The tion. Military Sealift Command divided its Marine air-ground task force had to take its posi- responsibilities into three phases, which it called a tion in the area of operations, and many other "Trident of Sea Power." First, it would employ the Marine Corps, Army, and Navy elements, and maritime prepositioning force ships that support- advance parties had to be alerted for movement ed the Marine Corps and Army to bring in the unit within a few days.87 equipment and supplies that would be immediate- The Flow of the Force ly needed by the first troops coming ashore. Next, it would employ fast sealift ships and chartered vessels to fill the surge in shipping that would bring in the heavy equipment and critical supplies. This work called for close cooperation with one Finally, a sustainment phase would provide a of the specified commands, U.S. Transpor-tation steady flow of logistical support. Because of the long transit times (even the fast sealift ships would take 14 days to reach Mogadishu from the * Some countries had already offered forces as part of the east coast of the United States), these assets had to reinforcements to the U.N. Organization Somalia. Early planning had prepared to use these units, but with the change be identified and prepared as soon as possible.89 to a United States-led force, some of these offers were with- Another TransCom subordinate was equally drawn, while other countries came forward to assist. When busy with its preparations to support the opera- the order came for the joint task force, it had not yet been determined when the various coalition forces would actually tion. The Air Mobility Command had to establish join the force. Some arrived concurrent with U.S. Forces, the air bridge by which it would fly in most of the some within a few days, and some took several weeks. U.S. forces, as well as those of many of the coali-
30 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA tion countries. The command already had some and created a plan for aerial refueling. These fac- experience in this area, having established the tors would decrease the flying time for individual plan under which the aircraft carrying the relief flights and minimize the wear on aircraft.90 supplies were being brought into Kenya for By 6 December, the forces were ready; the plan Operation Provide Relief. Now, however, it faced was prepared and issued; the physical require- a larger and more time-critical task. With the long ments and equipment needed had been deter- sailing times for the shipping, air transport would mined and identified. With a few days left before have to carry the considerable initial burden of the D-Day, it was time to set the operation in motion. earliest portions of the deployment. The com- Chapter 4 Coming Ashore mand's staff quickly provided for basing rights in nearby countries, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
Initial Landings All of the pieces of the operation came together in Somalia in the early days of December 1992. Actually, some forces were already in place. Teams from Special Operations Forces, as part of Operation Provide Relief, were providing security at airfields, as well as protecting the Air Force combat control teams that were operating at them. These special- toward the Persian Gulf. Commanded by Captain ly trained teams also were a component of John W. Peterson, USN, the ready group moved Provide Relief and were sent into the airfields to into the waters off the southern Somali coast on 3 prepare the fields for subsequent air operations December. Planning for the operation by the and to control the aircraft. Also, on 7 December, group began in earnest the week before, when a members of Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Special warning order was received. At about the same Forces Group (Airborne) provided security and time, Amphibious Squadron 5, commanded by sniper support for America's special envoy when Captain Brian Boyce, USN, based on the West he arrived in Mogadishu. Coast of the United States, received a warning The U.S. Navy and Marines were the first order that it also would support the operation. In underway. The Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group addition, Captain Boyce would be the chief of (ARG), composed of the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), staff for Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III, USN, USS Juneau (LPD 10), and USS Rushmore (LSD who would command the maritime prepositioning 47), left Singapore on 23 November and headed force. Amphibious Squadron 5 would have the DVIC DD-SD-00-00656 Marines and sailors stand at the edge of the deck of the Tripoli (LPH 10). In the background are four Marine CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters scouting the area before the landings at Mogadishu.
32 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA ities of the port could not be determined until coalition forces were on the ground. In the inter- im, U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams from the Tripoli ready group conducted beach and port hydrographic and reconnaissance surveys of potential landing sites. The amphibious group carried the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU (SOC)), commanded by Colonel Gregory S. Newbold, which would make the ini- tial landings scheduled for the early morning of the 9th. The MEU had come under the operational control of Central Command on 30 November. In accord with the joint task force order, the MEU "splashed tracks" from the Juneau at 0330 to meet an H-Hour of 0500.92 Every available means of 15th MEU, Westpac `92-93 landing was used. The SEALs swam in from off- A Colorado native and the son of a career U.S. Air shore and 170 Marines assaulted in 18 "Zodiac" Force officer, Col Gregory S. Newbold commanded the boats to secure the port facility. Amphibious 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a force in the vanguard assault vehicles carried the majority of the landing of the American commitment. force, followed by helicopters and air-cushioned responsibility for maritime prepositioning ship landing craft.93 operations and the offload.91 The condition of the The initial landings were made at 0540. The port was still a question for these officers, as was Marines and SEALs landed across the beaches of the infrastructure available. The ability to quickly Mogadishu and came out of the dark surf where offload, stage, and move equipment and supplies they were greeted by the bright lights of television would be critical to the operation, but the capabil- cameras. Ignoring the disturbing presence of the DVIC DN-ST-93-02668 A Marine 5-ton truck towing a 155mm M198 howitzer disembarks from an Assault Craft Unit 5 air-cushion landing craft at Mogadishu.
COMING ASHORE 33 media as best they could, the reconnaissance par- the first C-130 aircraft landed soon thereafter.96 ties pushed inland to their objectives, located at The Air Force Lockheed C-141 carrying members the port and the airfield. According to plan, the of the task force headquarters touched down just a prepositioning ship MV 1stLt Jack Lummus (T- few minutes later. AK 3011), which had arrived from Diego Garcia The Marines quickly passed through the city to the previous day, was brought directly to the pier the United States Embassy compound, where they to offload, expediting the movement of equip- ment.94 secured the chancery. By the end of the day, they had established their forward operations com- Other than the illuminated landing, the initial mand post at the airport.97 portions of the operation went quickly and In addition, the first of the coalition partners smoothly. Colonel Newbold had stated he wanted arrived and were incorporated into the defensive to "accomplish our mission by overwhelming any perimeter. This was a company of the 2d French opportunity for forces to oppose us. ... This is a Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which low intensity conflict environment requiring [a] arrived by airplane from their base in Djibouti.98 dramatic show of force (to create the respect that The company came under American operational will minimize opposition), mind-numbing speed control. The Legionnaires would soon be followed (so that we maintain the initiative), and a willing- by thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and ness to neutralize those who attack us (to deter further violence)."95 The strength and speed he Marines from 22 other countries. As the coalition forces moved into Mogadishu desired were in evidence as the forces moved they encountered a city that had felt the ravages of beyond their initial objectives and into the city. He two years of civil war and anarchy. There was no was able to declare the airport open at 1145 and
34 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00670 At Mogadishu airport, Marines stand guard in a light armored vehicle while cargo is unloaded from a U.S. Air Force C-141B Starlifter aircraft. electricity, no running water, and no functioning added to the troops' list of concerns, especially sanitation system. Law enforcement was nonex- around the port area. While not causing casualties, istent because there were no police or judicial sys- the desultory fire was an annoyance and an indi- tem. Public buildings had been looted and cation of what was to come. destroyed and most private homes were severely General Johnston flew into Mogadishu on 10 damaged; virtually every structure was missing its December. The combined joint task force estab- roof and had broken walls, doors, and windows. lished itself inside the American Embassy com- The commerce of the city was at a standstill. pound, with the main headquarters in the chancery Schools were closed and gangs of youths roamed building. With the arrival of coalition forces, the the streets. Crowded refugee camps seemingly joint task force became a combined joint task filled every parcel of open land, and new graves force. Later, the title would change officially to were encountered everywhere. The sound of gun- Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF). In a sym- fire could be heard throughout the city. bolic and emotional gesture for the Marines, the There had been no opposition to the landings or flag raised over the compound was one that had the subsequent movement of forces into the once flown over the Marine barracks in Beirut. American Embassy compound. However, on this The embassy compound itself was a shambles. first day, the operation's first shooting incident The buildings had literally been stripped to the took place. A vehicle containing nine Somalis ran bare walls; even the paving tiles had been pried up a checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires, and carried away. The floors of the chancery were who opened fire at the fleeing automobile, killing two and wounding seven.99 This incident was buried in trash and debris a foot deep. Bodies were found in some areas of the grounds. The staff unfortunate but within the rules of engagement. quickly went to work cleaning out work areas and By running the roadblock, the Somalis had posed living spaces to establish a camp. a threat to members of the coalition, and the Legionnaires had to react. Soon, sniper fire was
COMING ASHORE 35 were built over time. While the offload of the Lummus contin- ued, on a selective basis, the first priority was for engineer equipment and materials. Combat support vehicles and weapons like tanks and artillery were left on board.100 It was long and frustrating work. A maritime preposition- ing force squadron contains enough equipment and sup- plies for a Marine brigade of 16,000 men. To accomplish the job smoothly and efficiently there are several distinct units Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces that must participate. The first A typical street in the Italian sector of Mogadishu crowded with pedestrians, of these is the offload prepara- vehicles, and market stalls. tion party; a small group of Marines who come on board the ship while it is underway to Logistical Buildup prepare the equipment for its eventual offload and use. The next is the survey, liaison and reconnaissance party, which flies into In the critical early days, all logistical support the designated port to prepare it for the imminent for the growing coalition forces came from what operation. The next is a U.S. Navy unit, the Navy the 15th MEU was able to provide through its support element that undertakes the operation of service support group, what the allies could bring the offload of equipment and its movement themselves, and from the maritime prepositioning through the arrival and assembly area. Finally, the force shipping. The offload of these important unit that will use the gear must arrive on time to vessels was critical. The Lummus had arrived the move offloaded equipment and supplies out of the previous day and was ready to begin its offload, which was scheduled to last for four days. But first, the port area itself needed considerable attention. There was no infra- structure, not even wires left on the light poles. Everything had to be recreated while mountains of filth and trash needed to be cleaned out. To make room for the arrival and assembly area needed for the prepositioning force shipping to offload its equipment, old warehouses had to be bull- dozed. Eventually, 54 acres were cleared for this purpose. The U.S. Navy support ele- Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces ment brought in extra materi- The ravages of the civil war were evident in this neighborhood in the Italian sec- als when it arrived, and new tor of Mogadishu. Many of the buildings had no roofs and all were severely dam- barracks, galleys, and heads aged.
36 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA port to make room for what is coming off next. A scene of considerable activity as more aircraft miss in the sequence can mean congestion and arrived, bringing in more of the UNITAF head- delays. Also, during normal operations, the entire quarters and elements of Marine Forces Somalia ship will be offloaded, but Restore Hope was not (MarFor). Once again, the conditions in Somalia an ordinary operation. caused problems for planners and operators. The Every commander must balance many require- limited capacity of the Mogadishu airport meant a ments, making the best use of limited resources. strict schedule had to be maintained for arriving In this case, the conflict faced by the commander and departing aircraft. This in turn affected the was to strike the proper balance between combat scheduling of aerial refueling and the use of the forces and logisticians, which had to compete for intermediate staging bases the Air Mobility Com- limited space on aircraft. So, in placing the prior- mand had set up in Egypt and Yemen. Aircraft ity for building up the force of fighters quickly, could only be called from the staging bases once the support troops had to wait. This in turn caused there was a clear time slot at Mogadishu. Those aircraft then had to hurriedly unload passengers and cargo and depart quickly.101 In spite of com- additional delays at the already burdened port. The offloading of ships took longer than project- ed because unneeded equipment had to be moved plicated and hectic scheduling, the buildup of repeatedly or back-loaded onto the ships. coalition personnel continued at a rapid pace. Force Buildup On 7 December, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assumed MarFor commander duties. On Concurrent with the logistical buildup was the 10 December, he flew out of Camp Pendleton arrival of the forces. The airport quickly became a with a small battle staff and arrived at Mogadishu DVIC DD-SD-00-00804 This view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu shows the chancery building in the center surrounded by its own wall. Another wall, in the background, enclosed the rest of the compound. By late December 1992, the area to the top of the picture was filled with tents, mess halls, and other facilities for the UNITAF staff.
COMING ASHORE 37 DVIC DD-ST-00-00801 This aerial view of the port of Mogadishu shows three cargo ships and a number of large, medium, and small ves- sels moored to the docks. The port played an important role during the relief effort. the next day.102 MarFor would provide the basic sion's "round-out" brigade, the 27th Brigade, structure around which the task force would be New York Army National Guard. The division built. As other forces, American or coalition, helicopters were readied for use in the deserts of arrived in the theater, they would initially be Somalia with the addition of particle separators placed under the operational control of MarFor. and global positioning system equipment. Desert The largest American force after the Marines camouflage utilities (known as battle dress uni- forms or "BDUs" to the Army) were procured and issued.104 Troops were sent to the ranges to fire was the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), which would form Army Forces Somalia. Because of the manner in which such an and battle-sight their weapons, ironically often fir- Army division deploys, its movement actually had ing in the snows of a New York winter as they pre- begun on 7 December, when the first of seven pared for movement to equatorial Africa. trainloads of equipment departed Fort Drum, New The division was originally expected to start its York, for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey. Over deployment on 19 December. However, on 10 the next 10 days, 450 railcars were used to move December, a decision was made by UNITAF that more than 1,500 pieces of the division's equip- Army Forces Somalia should begin its deploy- ment to the military ocean terminal at Bayonne.103 ment much sooner. When General Wilhelm There they were loaded on board ships for the arrived in the theater, he immediately assumed long journey to the Horn of Africa. The soldiers operational control of the 15th MEU (SOC) and were preparing for their deployment at the same the French forces and focused efforts on securing time. Classes were held on the country's history, the port, the airfield, and the embassy compound. culture, terrain, and problems soldiers could With the arrival of 1st Marine Division's 1st expect. Needed equipment was brought in to fill Battalion, 7th Marines, MarFor was able to broad- recognized shortages, some of it from the divi- en the coalition's control to areas outside
38 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00747 Among the maritime prepositioning ships to dock at Mogadishu was the Algol class vehicle cargo ship, USNS Altair. Onboard cranes unload the ship's cargo of military supplies and vehicles. Mogadishu. This began at Bale Dogle, which These early successes led to criticism of UNITAF had recognized early in its planning as UNITAF by several members of the media. an important location from which to extend the Journalists openly questioned why UNITAF was force into the interior of the country. The 15th not pushing more quickly and aggressively into MEU (SOC)'s Battalion Landing Team, 2d the interior, especially to the town of Baidoa, Battalion, 9th Marines, supported by elements of described as "The City of Death," where the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, was impact of famine and suffering were at their given the mission, which it planned and accom- worst. General Johnston, however, would not be plished within 48 hours. The Marines seized the pressured into hasty action. The responsibility for airfield in a heliborne assault prior to the arrival of the accomplishment of the mission and the safety Army forces.105 of the members of the coalition force was his The first U.S. Army unit to deploy was alone, and he knew UNITAF was quickly building Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry. The sol- in strength and would soon expand into the other diers and the battalion's tactical command post planned relief sectors. He wanted this to be done loaded on board three Lockheed C-141 Starlifter in an orderly manner, without spreading the avail- troop transport aircraft on 11 December for a able forces too thinly over the ground. He direct flight into the airfield at Bale Dogle, now addressed the issue in a television interview, explaining his reasons and laying the matter to rest.107 held by the newly arrived Marines. The soldiers arrived within 24 hours and went immediately from deployment to employment as they relieved the Marines who had secured the airfield.106 * The Army assumed full control for Bale Dogle airfield on 15 December. * Due to time zone differences, the soldiers actually arrived on 13 December.
COMING ASHORE 39 Meanwhile, the country began to show the 20mm guns and missiles (the attack helicopters coalition soldiers all the facets of its character. carried tube-launched, optically tracked, wire- Marines, sailors, and soldiers were generally guided, or TOW, missiles), destroying two "tech- greeted with smiles and waves from the Somalis nicals" and damaging one American-made M113 they encountered on the streets, but there were armored personnel carrier.108 Such immediate, some who seemed determined to test the resolve overwhelming, and deadly response was precisely of UNITAF. Sniping became a routine part of what General Johnston set in his commander's daily existence; seldom more than simple harass- guidance as the best antidote for aggression by the ment, it still provided an edge to the life and work factions or bandits. of the task force. Sniping was especially a prob- Just as American forces were proceeding to lem at the port, which was overlooked by an old Somalia, so were the military contingents of sev- prison the gunmen used to cover their activities. eral coalition partners. One of the first of these Marines quickly secured the prison area and forces to begin moving were the Canadians, who ended the problem in the immediate location. But had received their own warning order to partici- throughout UNITAF's time in Somalia, sniping at pate in the U.S.-led operation on 4 December. convoys or into the various compounds would Originally, they had prepared to deploy their force remain a daily occurrence. as a part of United Nations Operation Somalia and The first direct attacks on UNITAF members had sent the auxiliary oil replenishment ship also took place during these early days. In two HMCS Preserver (510) to Somalia. Under the separate incidents on 12 December three aircraft Canadian forces' Operation Deliverance, the ship of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, one arrived at Mogadishu on 12 December. The Bell UH-1N Huey and two Bell AH-1W Super advance headquarters of the Canadian Joint Cobras, were fired upon. The UH-1N Huey Forces Somalia landed at Mogadishu on 13 received damage to its rotors. In the second inci- December and embarked on board the ship. Their dent, the attack helicopters returned fire with contribution to the forces on the ground was to be DVIC DD-SD-00-00805 The cargo from a U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft is unloaded on the flight line at Mogadishu airport while a Marine UH-1N Huey helicopter flies overhead. Beyond the main runway is the Indian Ocean shoreline.
40 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DA-SC-94-00321 An M998 high-mobility multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (humvee) is loaded onto an Air Mobility Command C-141B Starlifter at Griffis Air Force Base, New York, as equipment of the 10th Mountain Division is readied for shipment to Somalia. a Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, the Brigade in what the Italian forces called advance party of which arrived by U.S. Air Force Operation Ibis. Lockheed C-5 Galaxy aircraft at Bale Dogle on 14 December.109 Thousands of miles to the south, on 15 December, the Prime Minister of Australia, The The Italian contingent also began to arrive at Right Honorable Paul John Keating, announced about this time. Their force was initially com- that his nation would contribute forces as well. posed of two elements: two battalions of the The Australian participation would be called Folgore Airborne Brigade, a famed parachute Operation Solace and their force would be formed unit; and the San Marco Battalion, a naval infantry around a battalion group. The battalion selected unit. The Italian forces were also supported from was 1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment, the sea by the Italian Navy's 24th Naval Group, stationed in Townsville. This unit was the alert which carried heavy equipment and supplies. The battalion of the Australian Ready Deployment first elements of the brigade, a small special Force. The contingent of 930 soldiers included forces reconnaissance element of 23 men led by engineer and administrative support elements, as Major Gennaro Fusco, left Italy on 11 December. well as armored personnel carriers. The battal- They arrived in Mogadishu on 13 December and ion's artillery battery commander and forward reoccupied the Italian Embassy on 16 observers would act as liaison and provide civil December.110 The brigade would arrive in full affairs capabilities. The Australian reconnaissance force by 24 December. On the 23d, the San Marco party departed on 21 December and arrived in Battalion arrived in Somali waters with the naval Mogadishu the next day.111 group. Brigadier General Bruno Loi arrived on 20 Another of the United States' traditional allies December and took command of the Folgore was preparing to send an important contribution to
COMING ASHORE 41 the coalition. The Turkish army created a special with medical, engineer, and maintenance pla- task force built around an existing mechanized toons. Numbering up to 669 soldiers, the first infantry company, 1st Company, 1st Battalion, Saudis entered Mogadishu on 19 December, with 28th Mechanized Brigade, stationed in Ankara. their forces fully in Somalia by the end of the The company was strengthened with a quarter- month.114 For the first time in its history, master platoon, a transportation platoon, a signal Botswana sent soldiers to serve outside its bor- section, a medical section, and an engineer sec- ders. Out of an army totaling only 5,500, tion. In all, the reinforced company numbered 300 Botswana sent 300 soldiers in a composite com- soldiers. The advance party left Ankara and pany.115 Several other countries, such as Pakistan, arrived in Mogadishu on 19 December. The the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Nigeria, remainder of the Turkish force proceeded by rail Tunisia, Morocco, and Zimbabwe, all sent liaison to the port of Mersin beginning on 17 December. officers and small advance contingents in prepara- There, they boarded three Turkish Navy ships that tion for larger contributions to be made late in sailed on the 17th and brought them directly to December or in January. To add to the strength of Mogadishu on 2 January 1993.112 the air forces, the German Air Force continued to By mid-December many other forces, large and provide three C-160 Transall cargo aircraft that small, were also proceeding to join UNITAF. had been flying relief supplies out of Mombasa, Several of these came from the Middle East and Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Relief. The Africa. They included a reinforced motorized rifle British Royal Air Force did the same with two C- company from Kuwait, an all-volunteer unit that 130 Hercules transport aircraft, which it also had began arriving on 14 December.113 The Kingdom been using in Provide Relief. The Royal New of Saudi Arabia sent elements of its 5th Royal Zealand Air Force sent three Andover transport Saudi Land Forces Airborne Battalion, reinforced DVIC DF-SD-97-02528 Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, unload their packs after boarding a C-141B cargo air- craft, which will take them to Bale Dogle, Somalia.
42 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA aircraft from its Number 42 Squadron to fly trans- to secure the city. Task Force Hope was formed port within the theater. from the French 2d Foreign Legion Parachute Into the Interior Regiment, and elements of the French Special Operations Command and the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade, and 15th MEU.116 The task The arrival of all these forces, and the promise force left Mogadishu on 15 December and of others to come shortly, gave General Johnston secured the airfield the next day through a com- the strength and flexibility to push into the interi- bined ground and heliborne movement. There was or. Bale Dogle, strongly occupied by coalition no opposition. Relief convoys, escorted by coali- tion forces, began bringing supplies to Baidoa that afternoon.117 troops, would be the springboard for the next step into Baidoa. With the French forces already under the oper- The Marines and French soldiers immediately ational control of MarFor, UNITAF and MarFor established security posts and started patrols of planners decided to prepare a combined operation the city. The presence of a large number of armed
COMING ASHORE 43 The system by which these operations were ordered and controlled became fairly standard and reflected how UNITAF functioned. A series of daily fragmentary orders were issued, or more fre- quently if necessary. The orders listed objectives to be taken, forces to be employed, and dates for accomplishment of the missions. Coordinating instructions were provided as necessary and noted any support that was required along with specific force assignments. Each day, the next fragmentary orders would contain more information, adjust dates if necessary, and note the commanding gen- eral's additional orders or guidance. UNITAF headquarters operations section thus became a scene of continuous work as liaison officers from various U.S. units and coalition forces attended planning meetings within the future operations cell, run by Colonel Peter A. Dotto. All the while, ongoing operations were monitored in the current operations cell under Colonel James B. Egan. Another critical part of each operation was to prepare the local population for the arrival of UNITAF forces. This task fell to Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, who had been appointed by President George H. W. Bush because of his expe- rience in Africa as Special Envoy to Somalia. Ambassador Oakley assisted the military in DVIC DN-ST-93-01388 understanding the Somali people and cultural The day after American Marines and French soldiers nuances. He also provided insight into the tangle secured Baidoa, Marines of the 15th Marine that was Somali politics.119 For each operation, Expeditionary Unit provide security for a convoy bring- Oakley would travel to the particular city in ing food to the "City of Death." advance of military forces to meet with the local elders and leaders. He would explain in detail men was quickly noted and was a source of some what was about to happen to reduce the risk of concern. On 18 December, Somalis fired from confrontation. The following day, aircraft would inside one of their compounds upon members of drop leaflets over the city that repeated the peace- Task Force Hope. The area was quickly surround- ful intentions of the coalition members and its ed and entered and all arms were confiscated.118 humanitarian purpose. They also would warn the The incident highlighted a need, both inside the people not to interfere with UNITAF forces or relief sectors and throughout the area of opera- operations. In this manner, the coalition forces tions, for a policy concerning weapons control. would find a soft landing at each objective.120 Securing the Relief Sectors The rapid success of the Baidoa operation brought the first phase of Operation Restore Hope to a close. It also provided the basic framework by which all other operations to secure objectives With Fragmentary Order 7, UNITAF began would be organized and executed. The push to the planning to take the next objective: Kismayo. The remaining humanitarian relief sectors would Belgian forces' 1st Parachute Battalion had involve the U.S. Marines or Army in a series of arrived in Mogadishu on 13 December. Led by joint and combined operations with coalition part- Lieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin, the paratroop- ners. Wherever possible, these operations would ers would have responsibility for securing the use the forces of the coalition nations that had vol- Kismayo relief sector, then controlling it along unteered to assume responsibility for the particu- with elements of the Army's 10th Mountain lar sectors. Division. Kismayo lies approximately 200 miles
44 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-01031 American Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, speaks to a group of Somalis. Behind him is U.S. Army BGen Lawson W. Magruder III, commander of Task Force Kismayo. south of Mogadishu, on the coast just below the sance and surveillance of the beach and the equator. It is the site of Somalia's second largest Marines and Belgian paratroopers embarked on port, after Mogadishu, and it had been an impor- board the American ships.121 tant base for the Somali Navy. An airfield of Because of the presence of two warring fac- appropriate size for military cargo aircraft was tions in the city, a preparatory political and diplo- only a few miles outside the city. Holding this matic maneuver was very important. On 17 area would provide another port for the receipt December, contact was made with Colonel and onward transport of relief supplies. The Ahmed Omar Jess, leader of the Kismayo region's Belgian forces were placed under the operational Somali Patriotic Front faction, and Mohamed Said control of MarFor for this operation. Because of Hirsi, who was know as General Morgan and led its location on the coast, an amphibious operation an independent faction in the area, setting up an was chosen to secure the city and its facilities. agreement whereby Kismayo would be an open Captain John Peterson, commander of the Tripoli city. Jess and his troops would remain in the city, amphibious group, was designated as the com- and Morgan and his followers would move 20 kilometers to the north.122 mander of the amphibious task force and Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin as the commander of the landing force. The landing force was com- The Belgians already had sound experience in posed of Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, amphibious doctrine and the operation went from the 15th MEU (SOC), and two platoons of smoothly. On the morning of 20 December, the Belgian paratroopers. The amphibious task force Marines landed in amphibious assault vehicles itself consisted of the Juneau and the Rushmore while the Belgians came ashore in air-cushioned from the United States Navy, and the French ship landing craft and helicopters. There was no oppo- FS Dupleix, an antisubmarine warfare guided mis- sition to the landing and control was passed sile destroyer. Captain Peterson transferred his ashore within a few hours. Captain Peterson and flag to the Juneau, U.S. Navy SEALs embarked Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin went immediately to on the Dupleix to perform pre-landing reconnais- the center of the city, where they met with Colonel
COMING ASHORE 45 Jess, who protested the presence of the colonial Belgians. Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin quickly quieted Jess's anger and made it clear the coali- tion forces would not be intimidated.123 * By the end of that first day the overall strength of the Belgian forces in Kismayo consisted of the 11th Company and the Close Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with Scimitar tracked recon- naissance vehicles. With the arrival of additional Belgian reinforcements, the U.S. Marine compa- ny was released from tactical control and with- drew from Kismayo the next day. By 30 December, the Belgians had 550 men in the city.124 The successful completion of the Baidoa oper- ation made it possible for UNITAF to quickly plan to secure another city notorious as a scene of suf- fering and death; Bardera, located about 217 kilo- meters southwest of Baidoa, at the end of a dry and dusty track. With the arrival of more combat units from the 1st Marine Division (notably the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, fol- lowed shortly thereafter by the lead elements of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and the headquarters of the 7th Marines) there was enough power on the ground to push on to this important inland city. Colonel Emil R. Bedard, commanding officer of the 7th Marines, departed Mogadishu for Baidoa DVIC DN-ST-93-01396 with his Marines on 22 December; only three and Members of Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, of a half days after these units began arriving in the- ater.125 the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, exit from a P-7A1 amphibious assault vehicle after arriving to set up a Prior to leaving Mogadishu, the unit meshed checkpoint in Kismayo. with the attachment of amphibious assault and light armored vehicles. (The advance elements of both the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion and the ing a key bridge and the river crossings over the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion had arrived Jubba, as well as the principal road junctions. in Mogadishu on 19 December.) On Christmas Patrols were quickly sent out to provide security Eve, after a long road march choked with dust, the for the task force as well as for the people of the Marines secured the airfield at Bardera. The next city. Coordination was made with the local non- day they controlled all access to the city by hold- governmental agency to get the relief food ship- ments moving in. Another early concern was to secure the market area in the center of town so it * The issue of colonial troops was one that caused consider- could again open for business.126 able anxiety and sensitivity in the UNITAF staff. Several of The next two operations were originally the coalition allies once had colonies in Africa. France and planned to occur nearly simultaneously using Italy once had colonies in Somalia itself. Where possible, use of troops from these nations had to be done with considera- French and Italian forces to take control of the tion of the feelings of the local populace. For instance, in late humanitarian relief sectors that would become December, plans to secure the city of Merka originally called their responsibilities. Planning for the operations for the use of Italian troops. When the local population to Oddur and Gialalassi was ongoing at UNITAF protested strongly about the return of the Italians, this opera- headquarters by 16 December, concurrent with tion was given to Army Forces Somalia as well as the Italians. The issue of colonialism also was a handy rallying the planning for the Bardera operation. call for the various factions when they organized protests Oddur lies 260 kilometers northwest of against the presence or actions of UNITAF. Mogadishu, 110 kilometers north of Baidoa, and
46 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00987 An estimated 30,000 Somalis inhabited the town of Bardera. It is one of the most populated towns in the otherwise sparsely populated region of southwest Somalia. close to the Ethiopian border. Its airport contains from Mogadishu to Oddur. From there, they were a 4,000-foot runway capable of handling C-130 quickly reassigned to outlying towns: the 13th aircraft. It was noted in briefings there was a well- Demi-Brigade had responsibility for Wajid; the organized militia in the area, as well as some old 5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment for Soviet military equipment.127 The task force for Ceelgasass; and the Legion for El Berde, while the operation would consist of elements of the the headquarters, cavalry detachment (an aviation French 5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment unit), and support battalion, were at Oddur. On the and the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, 29th, Major General Rene de l'Home, the com- with logistic support, and Company C, 1st mander of French forces in Somalia, requested the Battalion, 7th Marines, which was placed under boundary of the relief sector be moved east to the tactical control of the commander of the include the town of Tiyegloo. Administratively, French forces.128 the town had always been a part of the Oddur dis- UNITAF Fragmentary Order 8, issued on 18 trict, and it was therefore proper to include it in December, called for the French forces to secure that sector. The request was approved at UNITAF. Oddur "on or about 24 December." Many of the The French forces soon dispersed themselves units to be involved, however, were still arriving. throughout the relief sector, eventually occupying 21 platoon-sized advance posts from which patrols could be made.129 Fragmentary Order 12, issued on the 21st, rescheduled the date of the operation for Christmas Day. On Christmas Eve, the same day the Marines were moving to Bardera, French forces began their road march to Oddur. They * If the road to Bardera was dusty, the road to Oddur was passed that day on the road and arrived in Oddur even worse. The fine dust was like red talc in places, explod- on 25 December.* Over the next few days, the ing underfoot with each step or billowing in clouds behind vehicles. It covered men and machines in a natural camou- remaining French forces in Somalia were brought flage.
COMING ASHORE 47 As early as 16 December, Fragmentary Order 7 Italian forces still arriving, the date for the opera- had tasked the Italian forces to secure Gialalassi. tion was changed from 26 to 27 December. Subsequent orders refined and amplified this ini- By the 26th, the Italian forces were assembling tial order. Gialalassi is about 115 kilometers north at the port. Two companies of the Folgore of Mogadishu, and is situated on the Webi Brigade, with headquarters, reconnaissance Shebelle. In intelligence briefings, this city was group, and mortar and antiarmor gun sections described as being on dry, flat ground, with a bivouacked in a warehouse, while motor transport small forest to the north. There were two airfields, and armored personnel carriers were assembled. one of which was C-130 capable. Traveling on the A convoy of relief trucks also staged at the port, roads was expected to be slow. A United Somali loading grain that had just arrived on a cargo ship. Congress faction under Ali Mahdi Mohamed held That same day, a section of U.S. Army vehicles the area and had a security force at the airfields and a platoon of U.S. Army military police with some recoilless rifles. Bandits were reported mounted in hardened humvees armed with auto- to be operating along the road.130 Fragmentary matic grenade launchers also entered the port and Orders 9 through 14, issued between 19 and 24 joined up with the Italian forces. December, assigned considerable force to the The operation began in the early morning of 27 operation. U.S. Air Force engineers were ordered December. The convoy left the port area and head- to provide support in inspecting and repairing the ed north on one of the few hard-surfaced roads. runway if necessary. Army forces would provide This was the old "Strada Imperiale," or Imperial convoy security and establish a forward arming Way, built by the Italians during the 1930s. As the and refueling point at the airfield. MarFor would task force left the city, the light of dawn revealed give helicopter, engineer, and medical evacuation a verdant countryside where the road paralleled support as necessary. Navy Forces Somalia would the Shebelle. Armed sentries guarded large tracts provide fixed-wing close air support. With the of sorghum and other crops. Helicopter gunships Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces Italian forces enter the town of Gialalassi on their way to secure the nearby airfield. One of the more flexible units of the Italian military, the Folgore Brigade could operate by means of airdrops or as a light infantry brigade.
48 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00700 Pvt Andrew Schnaubelt, USA, of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, takes a covering position on the airfield at Belet Weyne, as a Canadian C-130 Hercules cargo plane from Canadian Forces Base, Petawawa, Ontario, lands. would occasionally fly low over the length of the around the town and oversaw the unloading of the convoy. Interesting historical monuments were grain supplies at the distribution center.131 located every 10 kilometers along the roadside; The last of the originally planned relief sectors these were markers of stone, bearing the Fascist to be secured was Belet Weyne. Planning for this insignia and noting the distance from the city. The operation had initially called for Army Forces condition of the road was as bad as had been Somalia to have the responsibility for the mis- reported. Years of neglect and battle damage from sion.132 During this time, the Army troop build-up the civil war had taken their toll. The road was fre- was continuing. Major General Steven L. Arnold, quently cratered from artillery rounds, and in commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, some places the paved surface was entirely gone arrived on 22 December. At the same time, the Canadian forces were also preparing to enter the for long stretches. The convoy, already slowed by theater in large numbers. Fragmentary Order 14, the presence of the relief trucks, frequently had to issued on 23 December, placed the Canadian drive through rutted tracks on the side of the road. forces under the tactical control of Army Forces Speeds averaged only about 10 kilometers per Somalia for the operation. Upon release from tac- hour. By 1800, the assault forces in armored per- tical control, the Canadians would assume respon- sonnel carriers and trucks entered the town. sibility for the entire sector. The date for the oper- Crowds of waving, singing and smiling people ation was set for 28 December. greeted the remainder of the convoy. The Italian The city of Belet Weyne is 320 kilometers forces proceeded on to the airfield, setting securi- north of Mogadishu, and only 32 kilometers from ty around it for the night with the convoy in the the Ethiopian border. It also is situated closest of center, close to the landing strip. The next day, all the relief sectors in the northern portion of they set up platoon-sized defensive positions Somalia, which were outside UNITAF's area of
COMING ASHORE 49 operations. For these reasons, a U.S. Special departed for Bale Dogle, to prepare for another Operations Forces team would also be a part of mission.135 the operation. They would patrol along the bound- ary to keep the competing factions apart.133 In The successful completion of the Belet Weyne operation on 28 December marked the end of the staff meetings, the city was described as flat and second phase of Operation Restore Hope.136 The situated on the Shebelle River, which was the only purpose of this phase had been to secure the obstacle in the area. There were two bridges in remaining five objectives as points from which to town and one C-130 capable airfield. There was provide security throughout the area of operations only one road into the city, but it was assessed as to allow the unimpeded distribution of relief sup- good for handling traffic. The Hawadle clan con- plies. This was four to six weeks ahead of sched- trolled the city with a small security force armed ule, reflective of the amount of fast paced work with some crew-served weapons and antiaircraft artillery.134 accomplished by UNITAF and component level planners, and in execution by the multinational General Arnold gave command of the opera- forces involved. It also was indicative of the flex- tion to the 2d Brigade (Commando Brigade) of ibility of the command in the ability to prepare the 10th Mountain Division. The task force would each operation even as forces were arriving in the- be composed of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, ater. Logistics challenges were daunting and and a battalion of the Canadian Airborne required close monitoring of the time-phased Regiment Battle Group. The plan was to seize the force deployment data, but it worked. airfield with an air assault. On the 28th, the Army There was to be no letup in tempo and no time flew the assault units on board Sikorsky UH 60A for self-congratulation. As soon as the 2d "Blackhawk" helicopters, while MarFor provided Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrived back in Bale additional support with four helicopters. Almost Dogle, they were tasked with an additional mis- immediately following the securing of the airfield, sion: to secure the port of Merka, located about 70 Canadian C-130 aircraft began to land, bringing kilometers southwest of Mogadishu. It was a additional troops and vehicles. In less than two place where a corrupt mayor was acting in concert days, about 1,000 soldiers had been brought to with local bandits to prevent relief supplies from Belet Weyne. On 30 December, the Canadians getting to the humanitarian relief organizations assumed sole responsibility for the relief sector. for distribution to outlying towns. The relief The contingent from Army Forces Somalia organizations in the city had not received any sup- plies for six months. For these reasons, and also to DVIC DD-SD-00-00793 On 31 December 1992, soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, jump from a UH-60 Blackhawk helicop- ter in an air assault to take control of the airfield at Merka.
50 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA secure another port, Merka was added to main supply routes connecting the sectors. Each UNITAF's objectives and an operation to secure it was named for a different color. Subsequent was planned.137 orders tasked particular forces with the inspection, The original plan called for an amphibious clearance and repair of the roads. Of special con- operation, using the San Marco Battalion of the cern were landmines that were so often encoun- Italian forces. The date was set for 27 December. tered, thousands had been laid throughout the Unfortunately, the only good landing beaches country, and now they had to be found and were 22 kilometers south of the city. Those near removed from the roads. the city were unsuitable, with a berm at the high- The UNITAF structure was largely in place at tide mark and rocky ledges on both flanks.138 The the end of the second phase. Its rapid success was lack of adequate landing beaches close to the undoubtedly assisted by two factors. The first was objective caused a change in the initial concept of the heavy reliance on psychological operations operations. By 28 December, Fragmentary Order that General Johnston had emphasized in his ini- 19 directed the Italian forces to place the San tial orders. The visits by Ambassador Oakley, the Marco Battalion under the tactical control of use of radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the pub- Army Forces Somalia for the operation, which lication of a Somali-language newspaper all kept was scheduled for the 31st. The operation would the populace informed of what was happening and be a combined ground and air assault with the why. The second factor was the quiet reaction of Italian forces proceeding in trucks while U.S. Somali clan-based factions. While all claimed to Army forces seized the airfield. The road leading welcome the arrival of UNITAF, the coalition to the city was described as poor and very dusty forces' presence inserted an unknown quantity with a possible travel time of four to six hours. In into their political and military calculations. There addition, there were at least five bandit-run check- was some testing of UNITAF resolve in the early points on the road, each generally watched by one days, but those incidents were quickly and deci- man armed with an AK-47 rifle; machine gun sively resolved. The rules of engagement allowed positions were also reported on the town mosque and along the road.139 for protection of the coalition forces, and Somali faction leaders would be presented with an unac- Control of the operation was again given to the ceptable loss of men, arms, and prestige if they 10th Mountain Division's 2d Brigade. The multi- provoked UNITAF security elements. Such les- national task force was composed of one compa- sons kept the Somali leadership relatively quiet ny of the San Marco Battalion attached to the 2d and receptive to the requests of UNITAF. Battalion, 87th Infantry. Supported by the 10th As the third phase of the operation began, it Mountain Division's organic 10th Aviation was recognized there was still much work to be Brigade, the American soldiers conducted an air done, and many more important decisions had to assault to secure the airfield, and then immediate- be made. In this phase, the operations were to ly secured the port. They then linked up with the expand the security of the interior of the country Italian forces that were proceeding overland through the use of convoy security and the cre- escorting a convoy of relief supplies. The ation of additional distribution sites. This phase American soldiers and the Italians escorted the would set the stage for the delicate hand-off to the convoy to the outlying town of Qoryooley, the site of a refugee camp where the food was needed.140 United Nations force, generally know as UNO- SOM. As with a relay race, the smooth passing of Thus, by the end of the year, and barely within the baton is critical to success, and this is no less three weeks of the initial landings, all the human- true in military operations other than war. The itarian relief sectors had been secured by the UNITAF staff wanted to ensure the baton was coalition forces. Convoys were running smoothly, passed without difficulty. Chapter 5 but there was already a need to improve commu- nications between all the major cities. One answer Politics, Peace Talks, and to this was the establishment of an intra-theater flight schedule. Another was to establish a road Police network throughout the theater that could provide for quicker movement of convoys bearing sup- plies and troops. UNITAF Fragmentary Order 9, issued on 19 December, set up a network of nine
Military-Political Cooperation The military aspects of the operation were proceeding smoothly by the end of December 1992. The long hours of planning, bringing together a staff, and forming the coalition were producing rapid suc- cess. But there were considerations that went beyond occupying and controlling territory. There were times when military commanders, as well as the going to do something militarily that I needed Marines and soldiers in the field, had to act as diplomatic support. He [Ambassador Oakley] diplomatists, negotiators, and statesmen. "I sup- seemed to have the instincts of knowing what pose if there is a blueprint for how the diplomatic needed to be done up front. We talked a lot and and political side should work with the military on that was the important thing. It was a very coop- an operation like this, it was perfect," noted erative effort, helped a great deal by Mr. John Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston. "We rec- Hirsch, who was my political advisor, and de ognized very early that this was a very, very com- facto he became Ambassador Oakley's DCM plex environment." [deputy chief of mission]."144 Another important Carl von Clausewitz, a 17th century Prussian task for the committee was to present a clear mes- sage to the factions by ensuring the coalition spoke with one voice.145 The faction leaders soldier and philosopher, defined war as "merely a continuation of policy by other means." While Operation Restore Hope was not truly a war, as would take advantage of any confusion in aims or Clausewitz understood it, his maxim was nonethe- methods. less true. Even in this operation other than war, the The two sides of the committee brought dual commanding general and his staff officers had to pressures against the factions. Diplomatic initia- keep in mind that "the political object is the goal ... and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."141 Matching military means to political objectives drove much of what the coalition did and how it continued to structure itself. Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, the operations officer, summed this up in an inter- view: "Operations such as this become less clear as far as military objectives. They become more politically driven. The humanitarian needs force the military to work differently. Terms must change to suit the mission; military terms will not work. Marines quickly and clearly moved to the humanitarian side. The key to the operation is the people; we must respond to their hope."142 American Ambassador Robert B. Oakley rec- ognized at the start that one of his greatest respon- sibilities would be to assist the military com- manders with the myriad political issues this oper- ation brought. Accordingly, he and General Johnston established a coordinating committee in which they met daily or more frequently as neces- sary. General Johnston saw the committee's role was "to tie the diplomatic-political considerations with our military power, which allows us to pres- sure the factions to ... decrease violence."143 The two sides of the committee got along very well, DVIC DD-SD-00-00755 with their mutual work seeming to progress from LtGen Robert B. Johnston, commander of the joint task a quick understanding of each other's needs. "We force, stands on the tarmac of Mogadishu airport with simply ... didn't sit down and say `here is our joint Ambassador Robert B. Oakley. strategy.' It just seemed like I knew when I was
52 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA tives were begun to get the sides talking to resolve mission was security of the force ... and clearly, it their differences, while the military might of the was required to disarm those elements that would Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) made the directly threaten our forces; i.e., the `technicals' Somali factions take these steps seriously. To that were in Mogadishu or Baidoa or Bardera or reduce the violence and bring the nation together, anywhere on the road map."147 In a meeting with a series of reconciliation talks were scheduled in Ambassador Oakley, the start of the weapons con- Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was hoped these talks, trol program was laid out. "There were so-called held on neutral ground, would instill the faction technicals in almost every block and this was leaders with a sense of responsibility for the obviously a serious threat to the Somali people. It future of their country. Only those who were will- is a significant threat to our forces and it symbol- ing to put down their arms and control their fol- izes the power of the warlords, both military and lowers would take part in these talks; those who political, in the eyes of the Somali people. We did not would have neither voice in the talks nor a decided the number one objective was to get these place in the Somalia to come. As Ambassador dangerous things out of town and at the first meet- Oakley later said about General Morgan: "My ing between [General Mohamed Farah Hassan] officers and UNITAF officers have met with him Aideed and Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] that took place on several occasions and told him that the way here with General Johnston and myself present we Somalia is going today, the way to get into the ... got them to agree and to issue a public statement future is not by using the gun. As a matter of fact, that they would remove their heavy weapons from those who persist in taking the political power [by Mogadishu."148 By 22 December, reports at staff force] are losing out in the political future of meetings noted the turn-in of technicals and heavy Somalia. Nothing bars him from participating in weapons was proceeding well; Aideed had the peace process except his own behavior."146 already moved his, and Ali Mahdi was in the Getting the faction leaders to accept their respon- process of moving his to a site east of the city. The sibilities and to give up their weapons would take actual cantonment of all these weapons took many a deliberate plan and a lot of coercion. Ultimately, days to complete, but was undoubtedly hurried by there was a long and logical process of thought the knowledge that coalition forces would consid- and action by which all of these ends were to be er the weapons fair game.149 accomplished. It involved the issue of disarma- This initial agreement by the two major faction ment; defining the secure environment required leaders was used by UNITAF as the lever to get all by the mission; the use of overwhelming force heavy weapons and technicals in the country out when necessary; the assistance to the humanitari- of circulation. The initial ceasefire agreement, an organizations; the furtherance of the peace signed by all faction leaders in early January, process among the faction leaders; and the specified these weapons would be voluntarily rebuilding of Somali civil institutions. Each of impounded in cantonments.150 The owning faction these was a thread in a tapestry of peacemaking. Weapons Control and the use of Force would identify these cantonments for UNITAF so movement of weapons into or out of them could be monitored. These were known as authorized weapons storage sites. There was a noticeable ini- One of the first points that had to be settled was tial reluctance by some elements, especially the issue of disarmament. As explained earlier, Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess and Mohamed Said disarmament of Somalia was neither a specified part of the mission nor an implied task. However, something had to be done to reduce the number of * The correctness and efficacy of this decision for control as arms. The program decided on was one of opposed to disarmament is made in Somalia Operations: weapons collection or weapons control rather than Lessons Learned by Colonel Kenneth Allard, published by total disarmament.* Of course, from the point of the National Defense University Press in January 1995. In discussing UNITAF and its successor, UNOSOM II, Colonel security, there were so many weapons in Allard states: "There is a basic conceptual difference Mogadishu and elsewhere that their very presence between arms control and disarmament. Removing or limit- posed a threat. General Johnston turned his atten- ing the major weapons of an inferior or defeated military tion to this matter immediately on his arrival. "At force can be thought of as a form of arms control, but to com- mit military forces to the mission of forcibly disarming a that point [11 December] we were trying to populace is to commit those forces to a combat situation that reduce any threat to the U.S. forces. My primary may thereafter involve them as an active belligerent."
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 53 Hirsi, known as General Morgan, in Kismayo, to The question of small arms thus came down to participate. Eventually, even they complied, authorized versus unauthorized weapons. General spurred on by pressure applied by Belgian para- Johnston recognized that with the elimination of troopers and American soldiers in the city. These the technicals and other heavy weapons, relief coalition forces in Task Force Kismayo confiscat- organizations' security personnel did not have to ed several technicals, demonstrating the serious possess heavy machine guns or similar armament. intent and strong resolve of UNITAF.151 Rifles, such as the ubiquitous AK-47s, would now The actions against the heavy weapons and be adequate protection against the bandits, but technicals soon noticeably decreased their num- would not give the guards so much firepower they bers.* There was still, however, a large number of would become a threat to others. small arms available in the country that had to be A system of identity cards was developed.155 controlled. Again, there were no simple solutions These were permits to carry firearms. Their pur- to the issue. The sheer volume of weapons made pose was to ensure that only those who were total disarmament impossible. There also were employed as guards could openly carry such some legitimate organizations that needed to be weapons. The cards would be issued to the relief able to protect themselves. In many towns and vil- organizations, not to the Somalis who were in lages, local militias were formed for the protec- their employ. The card system went into effect on tion of the populace from bandits. To disarm these 8 January 1993. groups would leave them prey to the lawless ele- The first cards were colored pink, with no pro- ments or rival factions. Also, as General Johnston vision for photographs. This led to attempts to cir- recognized, disarming them would convey the cumvent the system by some Somalis. A second erroneous assumption that UNITAF would pick up the burden of their security.152 He emphasized set of blue cards, with photographs, was put into place by late February. These cards provided this point to his commanders in a meeting on 5 greater access for the Somalis for whom they were January, when Canadian forces in Belet Weyne issued, but there were still some problems. voiced concern about taking weapons from a valid Soldiers or Marines who interpreted the rules too militia brigade. General Johnston responded there stringently sometimes still confiscated weapons was no intent to disarm legitimate militias. The from legitimate guards, much to the discomfort of weapons should be inventoried and local com- the relief staff and their guards. In April, UNITAF manders should work with the militias, but addressed this problem by issuing a card to all UNITAF could not undertake the full security responsibility for the relief sectors.153 coalition troops that explained the weapons con- fiscation policy and the identification card sys- Similarly, the various relief organizations had tem.156 armed guards for the protection of their personnel The most effective instrument to get the faction or work sites. These were often moonlighting sol- leaders to cooperate with UNITAF's demands was diers of one of the factions, which presented a the willingness to use force when necessary. From source of extra income for the faction leaders. the earliest days of the operation, the coalition Simply disarming these guards posed several partners demonstrated they would meet any problems. First of all, to take away their rifles and aggression or threat with an overwhelming machine guns and dismiss them would cause response. UNITAF controlled the skies and the relief personnel to be uneasy, as they could become targets of their former guards.* Second, seas along the coast, and the patrols and convoys of its Marines and soldiers demonstrated a strong the relief organizations did have legitimate securi- and professional presence. Coalition leaders were ty requirements in their work places and while therefore taken seriously, and if a local coalition traveling. Finally, as with the local militias, UNITAF did not have the resources to take up this large security mission, not withstanding the polit- ical pressure to protect these organizations.154 ** * During the course of the operation there were instances of members of humanitarian relief organizations being wound- ed or killed by guards over disagreements about employment or pay. * This was especially true in Mogadishu. There continued to be reports, however, that technicals had been sent to outlying ** UNITAF provided security to food convoys, coordinating districts, where they were out of sight but ready for use as such work with relief organizations. These actions were needed. within UNITAF's explicit mission.
54 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA commander said he would take a certain action, he The need to define this end state was recog- was believed. This credibility allowed General nized from the earliest days. If the mission was to Johnston to implement the policy of arms control produce a secure environment, how could that be in a more gradual way than might have been oth- measured? In the original Joint Task Force erwise possible; as he later stated: "We have Somalia operation order, issued 6 December, the incrementally ratcheted up what we've been commander's intent stated: "The end state desired removing to get every weapon off the streets. To is to create an environment in which the U.N. and try to take them all right away was unrealistic. We [nongovernmental organizations] can assume full could have imposed this militarily, but it would responsibility for the security and operation of the have impaired the important role of getting the Somali humanitarian relief efforts." As military Somali people to take charge of their own sys- forces spread throughout the area of operations, tem."157 Ambassador Oakley also saw the advan- UNITAF planners sought a quantifiable definition tages of this system of credibility through of security. General Johnston saw the definition strength: "We've been remarkably successful and refinement of the end state as an implied task, because we come from a position of force. It's an although a difficult one. As he said: "[We] now area [in] which you have to figure what, in our need a precise measure for success; how do you know when a secure environment is established? [We] need an objective measure."159 By Christmas judgment is fair, and then tell them ... what they should do. If you negotiate, you quite frequently find yourself ending up at a disadvantage because Day, the UNITAF staff was still searching for this precise measurement of security, recognizing that they're very good at negotiations, twisting it around different ways."158 reducing the number of technicals and other arms was certainly a contributing factor.160 The diplomatic negotiations and the reduction Discussion of the secure environment turned to of weapons on the streets began to make Somalia an appreciation of the relativity of the term. Some relatively safer, but there was a need to be able to members of the staff noted there were cities in the say just how much more secure the country actu- United States that had problems with violent ally was. Nearly every Marine serving with crime. Did that mean they were not secure? At UNITAF had also served in Operation Desert what point was violence at an acceptable level? Storm: the same was true for many of the When was any place secure for its citizens? American soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and some Taking that line of thought, could Mogadishu be of the other coalition troops. A concept that had considered secure if its level of violent crime met become familiar during that earlier conflict was that of a major American city, such as Detroit? the definition of the end state. The internal exam- Interesting as these discussions were, they led to ination that had occurred in the American armed the recognition that the problem in Mogadishu forces during the 1980s reinforced the idea that and throughout Somalia was unique in being commanders had to know how an operation twofold. Here, violence was brought to the people should come to its conclusion and what the result- by both the warring factions and by renegade ing dynamic between the opponents should be criminal elements. The first could be controlled, like. The Marine Corps' FMFM 1-1, because it was organized and its leaders had their Campaigning, published in 1989, defined the end own political goals that could be addressed. The state as "the military conditions we must realize in other was a problem of the greater society, and order to reach that destination, those necessary while that problem might be reduced, it would conditions which we expect by their existence will always exist. Ultimately, then, the end state of provide us our established aim." It also stated: "in establishing the secure environment would be the main, the more general the conflict, the more reached with the end of organized, as opposed to predominant are the military factors, and the eas- criminal, violence.161 ier it is to translate aims into military terms. But By 7 January 1993, UNITAF planners, led by the more limited the aims of conflict, the less pre- Colonel Peter A. Dotto, had developed a transition dominantly military is the conduct of the war, and matrix, which included indicators of the stability the more difficult it is to translate those aims into of relief sectors. This matrix was presented to the military conditions." UNITAF was engaged in one commanders and published in a letter of instruc- of these limited operations, with all of the uncer- tion on the 15th. The indicators included quantifi- tainty that could entail. able criteria in five categories. These were resist-
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 55 DVIC DD-SD-00-00863 Representatives of the Magadishu clan leaders dismantle a roadblock along the "Green Line," the border that sep- Reconciliation Conferences arated both the city's north and south sections and members of opposing clans. ance, humanitarian relief, infrastructure, popu- lace, and transition actions. The objective criteria included such concepts as the numbers of techni- The weapons control policies and the actions of cals and crew-served weapons in the sector; the the commanders in the relief sectors were some of the building blocks to secure the environment. numbers of roadblocks encountered and the visi- The series of peace conferences was another. The bility of weapons; breaches of agreements and United Nations sponsored these with the support actions against UNITAF; conditions of airfields, of UNITAF leaders. If the faction leaders could be ports, and main supply routes; the establishment kept talking to each other, with a purpose of of local councils and civil-military coordination reconstructing their nation, they would be less teams; food shortages and numbers of unescorted inclined to fight each other. Of course, such a plan convoys; and the state of security for relief ware- presupposed the willingness of these leaders to accept the diminution of their power to secure the houses. With each sector commander reporting on common good. Such a proposition was tenuous at these indicators each week, UNITAF could take best, as events eventually showed. Nevertheless, an objective view of how its actions were aiding the talks were necessary and proper if peaceful the accomplishment of the mission.162 progress was to be made.
56 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Only two days after the arrival of UNITAF of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. Members headquarters, General Johnston and Ambassador of UNITAF and United Nations Organization Oakley had already begun a first round of talks Somalia (UNOSOM I) also attended. The setting and achieved some agreements among the faction in the capitol of Ethiopia was a good choice for leaders. At that time, General Aideed and Ali two reasons. First, it was close enough that partic- Mahdi "met face to face for the first time, and ipants could travel there quickly with UNITAF reached an agreement to respect the ceasefire to and UNOSOM support. Also, Ethiopia had just which they had agreed earlier in the year, and to come out of its own civil war, and its president, remove their heavy weapons from the streets of Meles Zenawi, was an advocate of the peace Mogadishu."163 Two weeks later, in a dramatic process. The talks would receive his strong sup- and well-publicized event, these two leaders met port. along the "Green Line" that divided the city into Three additional factions eventually joined factional areas, pledging, "on this occasion the these first rounds of talks.** Although intelligence abolition of the artificial demarcation lines in the assessments indicated not all faction leaders were city that resulted from the civil war will be declared."164 enthusiastic about the talks, none wanted to be left out. This was especially true of Aideed, who was To help with these kinds of issues, and to pre- at first reluctant to attend because of a mistrust of pare for the more formal talks that would come the United Nations and Boutros-Ghali, but he later at Addis Ababa, Ambassador Oakley and the eventually realized the only way to further his UNITAF staff formed two committees. The first own aims and protect his political agenda was by was strictly political. It was headed by Ambas- taking part in the discussions.*** Perhaps because sador Oakley himself, and was intended to bring of mutual jealousy and mistrust, and perhaps part- the faction leaders together so they could go over ly from a desire by each faction to not be seen as their differences point by point. In this manner, the spoiler of national unity, surprising progress they moved incrementally along toward a peace- was made at these initial talks. Another factor was ful political resolution. The second committee American determination. "Most Somali factions was for security. It was essentially a military-to- appeared ready to take the disarmament process military organization headed by General Zinni, seriously, in large part because they understood the UNITAF operations officer. Its members the U.S. expectation that the process would move included the leaders of the factional militias. forward. At General Johnston's insistence, the General Zinni described the committee's work: U.N. organized and convened early February fol- "We worked security issues and concerns. ... We tried to prevent problems and confrontations. It was our way of issuing ultimatums and that sort of * The original invitees were Mohamed Farah Abdullahi of thing. It was a good forum for military-to-military the Somali Democratic Alliance; Mohamed Qanyare Afrah kinds of issues. We were working toward a cease of the United Somali Congress; Abdurahman Dualeh Ali of fire, disarmament, cantonment of weapons, all the United Somali Front; General Mohamed Farah Aideed of that kind of thing ... and laying the ground work the Somali National Alliance; Haji Mahmoud Barbar of the for a bigger discussion."165 Somali Democratic Movement; Mahmud Khalif-Shire of the Somali National Front; Haji Aden Hussein Mohamed of the The bigger discussion was a series of national Somali Africans Muki Organization; General Mohamed reconciliation talks. On 11 December 1992, the Abshir Musse of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front; Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros General Aden Abdillahi Noor of the Somali Patriotic Movement; Ibrahim Meigag Samatar of the Somali National Boutros-Ghali, formally invited 11 political fac- Movement; and Abdi Dahir Warsame of the United Somali tion leaders to "participate in an informal prepara- Party. tory meeting for a conference of national recon- ciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory ** These were Ali Ismael Abdi of the Somali National meeting, which I will personally chair, will be Democratic Union; Mohamed Ragis Mohamed of the Somali held at the headquarters of the United Nations National Union; and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess of the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa Somali Patriotic Movement. on 4 January 1993."166 * Also invited were repre- sentatives of the Organization of African Unity, *** Boutros-Ghali worked under a triple suspicion in the the League of Arab States, the Organization of the eyes of General Aideed; he was not only the Secretary General of the United Nations, he also was Egyptian and a Islamic Conference, and the Standing Committee Coptic Christian.
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 57 Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz Col Peter Dotto, UNITAF operations future plans officer, along the Green Line in Mongadishu during a route recon- naissance for a food convoy. low-up meetings in Mogadishu with representa- on 15 January, provided specific agreements on tives of all the factions, who were asked to identi- disarmament. First, all heavy weapons under the fy specific cantonment and transition sites and to control of the political factions were to be handed establish a time table for implementation."167 over to a ceasefire-monitoring group. The militias Between 8 and 15 January 1993 all participants of the factions were themselves to be encamped in signed three sets of agreements. These were areas outside the cities and towns where they broad, far-reaching, and significant. The first set would not threaten the peace. There they would be called for "an immediate and binding ceasefire in disarmed, and with the help of the international all parts of the country under the control of the community they would be retrained in civilian concerned warring factions;" for "the immediate skills in preparation for demobilization. The cessation of all hostile propaganda against each ceasefire-monitoring group would be comprised other;" for "cooperation with all international of troops from UNITAF and UNOSOM and organizations working inside and outside Somalia would have a committee made up of representa- to distribute humanitarian relief;" and for "the tives of all the warring factions. Finally, in a sep- free movement of Somali people throughout the arate agreement, the factions agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to prepare for the conference in March.168 entire country as a measure of confidence-build- ing." Of equal importance was the call for a national reconciliation conference to be held in There were some issues in these agreements Addis Ababa on 15 March. The second set, signed that would have a tremendous impact on
58 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA UNITAF. The ceasefire was not the first one the in our area and happened so that they coincided factions had agreed to; but it was the first in which with our current mission we would be glad to they had voluntarily agreed to disarm and demo- accommodate within the system in doing bilize.169 This was a large task to which UNITAF them."174 UNITAF would not be monitoring the and the United Nations were now committed as ceasefire. That task would remain a mission of the members of the ceasefire-monitoring group. The United Nations, for which it would have to come only United Nations presence in Somalia was the in quickly to take advantage of the cooperative 500-man Pakistani brigade, so the work of prepar- attitude evident at that time.175 As General Zinni ing the plans for cantonment and encampment and said in March, there was a window of opportunity monitoring the factions' activities fell primarily to for the United Nations that they could not afford the UNITAF staff. Colonel Dotto explained to lose, but getting the U.N. to act with resolution UNITAF's participation in the planning: "General and dispatch was an issue that would confront the Johnston told Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen UNITAF staff until May.176 [the commander of the UNOSOM I force, the The Addis Ababa talks needed more than a Pakistani brigade] that he would provide his plan- good sense of timing if they were to succeed. ning cell, [that is] us, future plans, and we'd help National reconciliation, like a fragile flower, him in any way to come up at least with a plan to required the careful nurturing of trust if it was to go back to the U.N. with."170 As General Zinni bloom. The United Nations would have to ensure said: "Probably the vast majority of the work in that trust among all players and be an impartial this area is done by our staff since it was much moderator itself. In the end, this was a major more robust."171 The future plans section of stumbling block. Somali Police Forces Colonel Dotto's operations unit formed a cell composed of four UNITAF planners, plus five or six liaison officers from coalition countries and two planners from UNOSOM. The cell was aug- While national reconciliation among the mented by the arrival of Colonel Mark Hamilton, numerous factions received great attention, the USA, and Ms. Katie Sullivan, a political officer, rebuilding of national structures was also impor- both of whom had just come from El Salvador, where a similar peace process had occurred.172 In tant. Within a month of the initial landings, UNITAF encouraged the rebuilding of the Somali an effort to further the progress of the talks, police force. Before the civil war, the Somali General Johnston and General Shaheen issued a police were a respected national force of 40,000 joint letter to all of the signees of the accords of 8 men and women.177 Since they were not aligned January. The letter called upon them to "begin the with any clan, they also were trusted to be impar- disarmament process. ... [W]e request that you tial. But the police had left their posts with the provide the commanders of UNOSOM/UNITAF a anarchy that came with the civil war and the rise detailed list of all weapons heavy and light, under of bandits who were often better armed than the the control of your political movements. ... police. A few did stay on at their precinct houses, Additionally, to begin the planning for transition usually to try to protect the property itself, but of armed combatants to Somalian society, we they performed no real police duties except in the request the general geographic locations and num- immediate area. Faction comrades usually liberat- bers of all forces under your control." This letter ed apprehended criminals from the Mogadishu was issued on 8 February, and the information prison.178 was requested by the 15th.173 The arrival of UNITAF provided these officers The problem now faced by UNITAF was to a chance to regain their positions and once again determine how much of this work was within its to serve a meaningful purpose. There was as yet proper sphere. "We were asked if we could partic- no government to back them, or even to pay them, ipate in the disarmament process and we felt that but the interest and desire to serve were still evi- our participation could only be limited to conduct dent. General Johnston used one telling example of tasks that were within our mission statement to illustrate this point. "Early in the game, this old, and our mission constraints or parameters, and gray-haired policeman showed up. ... He was also within our area of operations. If cantoning asked, `Who do you work for?' because we knew weapons, if supporting transition sites, if picking there was no government, no police force, nothing up weapons, if all these sorts of things happened in uniform. `I'm working for the government.'
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 59 its former reputation as an impartial agency. "The defined Security Committee ... came to see me and said the day after the first Marine had been killed [13 January 1993], `We want to assume responsibilities for our own security. You are all doing things in the city that we should be doing and we'd like to help.' I said `What kind?' "He said `We want some material assistance, but we want assistance in fending off the political and clan influences that would try to turn such a force into their [instrument] rather than something that is relatively independent and national.'"180 This particular interest of some Somalis coin- cided with the interest of the leaders of UNITAF in the creation of a structure by which the Somalis could start to reclaim responsibility for their own security. The recreation of a police force would make it easier for UNITAF to accomplish its over- all security mission and prepare for the hand-off to the United Nations. Also, it would weaken the faction leaders. As General Johnston said: "We felt that [the recreation of a police force] was healthy to the extent that you can get somebody other than the warlords providing security, then you enfeeble the warlords. ... It is as effective as taking away their weapons, if there's another authoritarian figure that the Somalis recognize."181 Photo courtesy of the author Of course, this effect would also assist UNITAF Two Somali policemen, wearing their old uniforms, vol- by relieving the members of the coalition forces of untarily returned to their posts to provide security at the some duties. "We'd been around long enough to airport in Kismayo. know that if you have a Somali who is a figure of authority, then he'll take care of the rock-throwing `There is no government.' `Well, then I must be kids better than a Marine with a machinegun."182 working for the people.' So you could see some There were, of course, problems in the recre- spontaneous interest on the part of the Somalis, of trying to get hold of their own city again."179* ation of the Somali police that had to be addressed and resolved before any work on the project could begin. First, such an action was far beyond But it was more than just individual policemen UNITAF's mission. It clearly fell into the catego- who wanted to resurrect the police force. The ry of nation building. This broad and vague term security committee that worked closely with covered several kinds of projects that could easily General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley also become long-term and expensive measures more saw an opportunity to establish a police force with properly performed by the United Nations. However, it was recognized this project, so useful to all parties involved with Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF, United Nations, humanitarian * In travels throughout the area of operations, the author also noticed the emergence of the police. The first time was on a relief organizations, and Somali people) should be trip to Kismayo in early January where two Somali police- actively supported and encouraged. In a staff men were on duty at the airport. The men were working with- meeting held on 1 February, General Johnston out official sanction but were highly visible in their khaki described this as the "most important thing right uniforms with blue berets and silver badges. When Army now, even more important than the reconstitution officers at Kismayo were asked about them, no one could say much. They had simply shown up and kept away the crowds of the government."183 of curious and especially kept an eye on the adolescent boys But how far could that support go? United to ensure they did not cause trouble. States law was very explicit about assistance to
60 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces An Italian soldier provides weapons training to a member of the Somali auxiliary security force in the Italian camp at Balad. foreign nations for the training and establishment inal investigation division officers, and lawyers.* of police forces. Section 2420, Chapter 32 of the At these meetings, the subcommittee presented United States Code, "Foreign Assistance; their views on the rebuilding of the police force; Miscellaneous Provisions," states: "On and after its size, transportation and communications needs, July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to logistics requirements, and pay and food allot- carry out this chapter, and none of the local cur- ments for the officers and their families. They also rencies generated under this chapter, shall be used took Lieutenant Colonel Spataro on a tour of all to provide training or advice, or provide any Mogadishu police stations and the prison. From financial support, for police, prisons, or other law them he learned about Somali police operating enforcement forces for any foreign government or procedures and the rules for the use of force. any program of national intelligence or surveil- Initially, the Somalis sought a national force of lance on behalf of any foreign government within 6,000 to 7,000 men. Lieutenant Colonel Spataro the United States or abroad." Even more specifi- determined the national force was too difficult at cally, the 1991 Appropriations Act prohibited a that time, but that a 3,000-man auxiliary security foreign military financing program or internation- force for Mogadishu was an appropriate and al military education and training programs for Somalia, among other countries.184 workable start. He also noted their logistical request was bare bones, listing only 15 trucks, 42 Even as the UNITAF staff and Ambassador hand-held radios, two uniforms per man (two pair Oakley worked to define the basic structure of of trousers, two shirts, one pair of boots, one pair support that could be provided under U.S. law, of low-quarter shoes, two pair of socks, one pistol contact was made with senior officers of the old belt, canteen, handcuffs, beret with rank insignia, national police. The coalition's representative was and nightstick) and small arms. Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Spataro, USA, UNITAF's provost marshal. By 27 January 1993, he had met six times with the subcommittee of 10, * A subcommittee of the Security Committee discussed ear- an informal group of senior police officials, crim- lier.
POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE 61 Colonel Spataro noted the old Somali police were "armed more like soldiers with rifles and in fact called their personnel soldiers, NCOs [noncom- missioned officers] and officers." He determined that "we need to change that. Rifle carrying per- sonnel connote soldiers not police officers or aux- iliary forces. Probably need to look at giving rifles to selected and trained personnel for very specific missions."185 These meetings also provided information about the judicial and prison systems. Two judges were still working in Mogadishu, along with two prosecutors. This rudimentary judicial system took care of criminals unlucky enough to be apprehended and actually brought to justice. They were sent for incarceration in the prison by the port, a facility described as "built around 1905- 1910, and is really in need of repair, however, it was really kept well ... [and] operated very pro- fessionally."186 With needs and basic structures recognized, UNITAF could now get down to practical assis- tance. The new force would be called an auxiliary security force, and senior Somalis would vet the officers applying for positions. There were sever- DVIC DA-ST-96-01221 al criteria for appointment. Candidates must have Two Somali military policemen man a roadside check- been a member of the old force for two years prior point near Buurhakaba. The men are armed with a vari- to 26 January 1991, and would be reinstated at ation of the AK-47 and FAMAS rifles. their old rank. They had to be Somali nationals and could not have been involved in any "tangible auxiliary security force through liaison officers. offenses against ... Somali society." They also had Very specifically, there was no doubt about the to be in good physical condition. Pay was a mat- limits of American involvement with the force. ter of some concern, and originally the new auxil- "We're not commanding the police. We have nei- iary force would be paid with food. This was more ther the responsibility nor the authority to com- practical than it might at first seem; in a land of mand and control."187 * famine, it not only provided sustenance for the police and their families, but they could sell or The work of Lieutenant Colonel Spataro and barter any surplus to fill other needs. UNITAF proceeded quickly. By 30 January 1993, 3,000 officers were ready to work at 14 stations There was an advantage to working with an around the city. Pending the final decision to start international coalition with respect to establishing the program, coalition engineers worked on this auxiliary force. Foreign nations or organiza- repairs to the stations and the auxiliary security tions that did not have the same proscriptions as forces were uniformed, equipped, and trained. It the U.S. forces could provide what the Americans was initially expected they would begin their could not. Thus, the United Nations provided duties by 14 February. These would be standard most of the funds for the program; the World police duties, such as would be found anywhere Food Program gave the food that was the initial pay; the Italians were among the most generous of the allies, providing uniforms, money, and train- ing in police duties. The Australians in Baidoa * General Johnston emphasized this in a staff meeting held also helped with training and created an excellent on 1 February 1993. "We are facilitating, assisting and advis- ing. We cannot, by law, train a national police force; there- program with support from their lawyers. In fore, we have oversight, not control. We are fulfilling this Oddur, the French also participated by providing role in UNITAF because there is no one else to take it up." training. The Americans provided advice to the (Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93.)
62 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA else in the world. Their mission was to protect and were not without their own dangers; two lives and property and maintain public order. This police officers were killed in the line of duty with- would be accomplished through basic law in two weeks.188 enforcement, traffic and crowd control, neighbor- By the end of February, UNITAF was making hood patrols, and security at food distribution great progress on several lines. The reconciliation sites. talks were taking place, the auxiliary security By the first week in February, the new officers force was coming back into existence in were receiving refresher training in the use of Mogadishu, and weapons were being removed force and how to handle their batons. Their first from the streets. In the relief sectors, local real test came when UNITAF and the humanitari- UNITAF commanders were also successfully pur- an relief organizations implemented a mass- suing their own missions. feeding program, whereby food would be dis- Chapter 6 Moving to the Third Phase tributed at several sites throughout the city. The Settling In and Daily Work auxiliary security force was needed to provide crowd control and these officers performed well. The program was successful and was soon feed- ing up to a million people a week, a number that could not have been reached without the police As the members of Unified Task Force Somalia presence. Neighborhood patrols started soon after (UNITAF) moved throughout the area of opera- tions, they found themselves in a part of the world
that was at once foreign and exciting, forbidding and enticing. Except for some of the French soldiers stationed in Djibouti or the members of the contingents from the African countries, nearly every one of the coalition's Marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers was a stranger to this part of the world.* In spite of the harshness of the country, many were attracted by this unfamiliar landscape. When they traveled outside of Mogadishu, tions and gave welcome shade to the local inhab- what they saw in equatorial Africa seemed to itants. match the picture that existed in everyone's imag- These areas were also the locations for larger ination. Roads were often no more than tracks towns and cities. Here the buildings were of stone across flat, barren terrain of dust and broken or mud brick, plastered and whitewashed or paint- stone. The beige colors of the land contrasted with ed in pastel colors. As in Mogadishu, two years of the deep blue of the sky, across which a few small, civil war had relieved many of these structures of stark, white clouds might wander. their roofs and windows. The main streets of these The monotony of the landscape was broken by cities were usually tree-lined and shady and an occasional grove of scrub bushes, thorn trees, crowded with people. In the center of town, the and acacias. Some of these trees grew to a height markets were coming back into life, with vendors of about 25 feet and spread their branches wide, offering such wares as were available. Often these providing shade for the passing herders or people were limited to locally produced cigarettes, bits walking along the roads. Convoys frequently and pieces of unrelated merchandise, fixtures sal- passed herds of camels, cattle, or goats moving to vaged from vehicles or buildings, small amounts grazing lands or to market in some remote village. of local farm produce, surprisingly large quanti- Donkeys pulled two-wheeled carts laden with ties of laundry detergent, parts of rations from all firewood or drums of water. In the early morning of the coalition allies (the small bottles of Tabasco hours, women would be interspersed with the sauce from the meal ready-to-eat packet were pedestrian traffic, walking in small groups or by especially popular), and numerous bolts of bril- themselves and carrying large jugs of water or liantly colored cloth. The women used these last bundles of wood on their backs. Frequently they items to make their colorful dresses. Vivid reds, would be encountered miles from the nearest vil- blues, greens, yellows, and other bright hues lage, leaving one to wonder about where they splashing against the dull brown background were coming from or going to. made them look, as one Marine put it, "like exot- ic birds." The women usually did not wear a veil. The villages themselves were often small col- lections of huts fashioned of upright poles stuck in But occasionally some women were seen who the ground and covered with daub. The roofs were kept their faces covered, leaving only their eyes thatched, held in place with poles forming a sim- visible, which only increased the attraction. The ple dome. The huts might be round or square, men dressed much more plainly, with simple but- depending on the traditions of the resident clan. In toned shirts or tee shirts over trousers (often of larger settlements, houses were bigger and more military camouflage) or the traditional sarong-like elaborate, often constructed of stone and plastered skirt, called "ma-awis," extending from waist to and painted in soft colors. ankles. Leather shoes were sometimes seen, but footwear was usually leather sandals or rubber Where the roads drew close to one of the rivers, shower shoes. Local elders generally dressed tra- farmlands were encountered, and the resultant ditionally, in the ma-awis with colorful shirts and green of growing crops was a relief to the eyes. headdress. They also wore beards, which the older Large trees such as sycamores grew in these loca- men dyed with henna. Inland, as water grew scarce, communities * There were a few Marines who had been to Somalia before. might center on ancient wells. There, women and In the days of the Muhammad Siad Barre regime's ties to the herdsmen would gather to draw up buckets of the West, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit participated in life-giving liquid for their families or thirsty ani- Exercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area of Geesalay. Other Marines who served in Somalia included mals. Even farther afield, solitary houses might be those attached to the embassy or who performed security encountered. Zaribas enclosures made of inter- inspections. woven branches of thorn trees and bushes protect-
64 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of Italian Armed Forces Somali women, in typical brillantly colored dresses, carry firewood on a donkey cart. Traditionally, they play a pas- sive role in both family and political spheres. ed the houses and also were used as corrals for the supposed to drink at least five liters of water a day. herds. In these isolated places, deep pits were When out on patrol, or doing heavy work, this often dug to hold the precious rainwater from the might have to be increased. Providing this much wet seasons. After many dry weeks, these pits bottled water to the thousands of Marines and sol- were muddy enclosures containing pools of diers and allies scattered throughout the area of green-topped liquid. Unappetizing as it appeared, operations was one of the most important logistics these bits of water were necessary for survival. functions of UNITAF. Nomad camps were very simple. Zaribas were In contrast to the brilliance and heat of the days quickly set up for the protection of herds and peo- were the dark and cool of the nights. On a moon- ple. The huts of these herdsmen and their families less night the desert sky assumed a deep black that consisted of structures about five feet in height, was set off by the lustrous stars, giving them a made of bent poles covered with hides or sheets of brilliance rarely seen except at sea. Marines or green plastic. Similar huts were seen in every soldiers who had sweated while on patrol or while refugee camp. standing guard at some sun-beaten post would The climate was particularly harsh, and the shiver when the desert sand gave up its heat after native people had to be equally hard to survive in sundown. This was especially noticeable at those it. For the coalition's troops, the heat posed a real sites near the coast, where there was a continuous challenge, especially before they became accli- sea breeze, which added to the cooling effect. In mated. During the hot, dry months, the tempera- the various tent areas, the constant blowing of the tures climbed and the arid air sucked the moisture wind also produced a steady flapping of canvas. right out of the coalition soldiers. The sun at mid- This rhythmic accompaniment to daily life day felt, as one Marine later said, "like it was 10 became so much a part of existence that its feet over your head." For safety reasons, soldiers absence was noticeable and a cause for comment. on patrol or other duty outside the compounds The strong breezes kept tugging at the lines of the wore their full utility uniforms with protective tents, requiring the residents to pull them taut vests, helmets and other gear. This increased the every day, lest a sudden gust lift their canvas dehydrating effects of the climate. Everyone was homes off their poles. The same wind also
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 65 brought an unending drift of sand, which infiltrat- prove. Sniping and harassing fire continued, with ed every nook and cranny of tents, bedding, and compounds and convoys being the usual targets. equipment. Weapons had to be cleaned two or The large cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo, in three times a day to keep them in proper order. particular, were especially troublesome, since Native animals were sometimes encountered these were the scenes of frequent factional fight- along the tracks or in the compounds. Dik-dik, a ing and general banditry. The 1st Marine tiny antelope, would occasionally be seen running Expeditionary Force (I MEF) command chronolo- through the brush. More rarely, gazelles or boars gy for this period notes: "Mogadishu remained might be spotted from convoys heading to the out- volatile. The [Marine Forces Somalia] elements ... lying relief sectors. Large storks would alight in which moved into northern Mogadishu found the villages near the rivers, standing with equa- themselves constantly harassed by minor inci- nimity close to the people passing by. In the pre- dents of deliberate but inaccurate sniping and dawn hours, flights of silver-colored ibis would be spillover fire from factional fighting. These seen noiselessly flying just a few feet overhead. attacks were particularly frequent at the newly occupied soccer stadium and along the 21 October Road."189 There were rare encounters with poisonous snakes, such as the spitting cobra and the puff adder. At night, a flashlight might freeze a tiny jer- However, while these incidents were annoying, boa, a small rodent, in its beam, or a scorpion they were not the most serious threats. might be seen scuttling across the sand. Occasionally, a grenade would be rolled into the This was the world in which UNITAF conduct- path of a vehicle, causing casualties and damage ed its daily work. For all its exotic attraction, it and increasing the need for being always on the was still a dangerous place, as events would soon alert. As dangerous as these incidents were, in the Photo courtesy of the author The village chief of El Berde, Abdil Ugas Husen, poses with elders after meeting with French officers. Husen's inter- preter, Abdil Kader Abdilahi Ali, is in the center.
66 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of the author Hastily constructed for the protection of herdsmen and their herds of cattle, camels, or goats, zaribas were often encountered far from any village. early days of the operation the greatest threat was tion. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston knew more passive. During the civil war and resultant he had to take strong and immediate action factional fighting, land mines had been sown in against such an egregious and violent threat. scores of thousands all across the splintered coun- Throughout the remainder of that day, a plan try. These silent killers were placed on roads and was developed by Marine Forces Somalia tracks or in areas the unwary might stumble into. (MarFor) and coordinated with the UNITAF staff. Efforts to report and clear these weapons began The plan was simple but effective, and by using immediately. But they soon had their deadly all the types of firepower available, it was also a effect. dramatic demonstration of UNITAF power. The first two weeks of the operation had passed Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and with no fatalities, a happy circumstance for all. Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, would But this good fortune was offset by an unspoken surround the two weapons storage sites. Light question; how long would it last? It ran out on 23 armored vehicles from the 3d Light Armored December. On that day, a UNITAF vehicle struck Infantry Battalion were to screen the area, and an old Soviet land mine near Bardera. Three peo- snipers would be positioned to overlook the target ple were injured and one was killed. Lawrence N. areas. A reserve force was formed from a compa- Freedman, a United States government civilian ny of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special employee and retired U.S. Army sergeant major, Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and posi- was the first member of UNITAF to be killed in tioned at the embassy compound. The two rifle the performance of duty.190 companies (Team Alpha and Team Bravo) were Mogadishu strengthened by the attachment of M1A1 Abrams tanks and amphibious assault vehicles, as well as high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles A more serious and direct threat to UNITAF (humvees) mounting tube-launched, optically personnel and mission accomplishment came two tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles and heavy weeks later. On 6 January 1993, a convoy moving machine guns. Team Alpha, Company K, also had through Mogadishu was fired on from two of the four light armored vehicles. Seven helicopters authorized weapons storage sites belonging to were assigned to the operation, three AH-1Ws General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's fac-
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 67 with Hell Fire missiles and four UH-1Ns with chose to resist. The helicopter crews and snipers 20mm guns.191 reported that one of the tanks in the compound At 2200, Colonel Michael W. Hagee of the was manned and two Somalis were also preparing UNITAF staff met with Brigadier General Ali to fire a heavy antiaircraft machine gun. The com- Mohamed Kedeye Elmi, one of Aideed's chief manding officer of the task force, Colonel Jack W. subordinates.* Colonel Hagee informed General Klimp ordered a sniper to shoot the crew of the Elmi that because of the recent violations, the machine gun. The sniper did so, and also fired a authorized weapons storage sites were invalidated round against the barrel of the weapon, rendering and were surrounded by UNITAF troops. The it unserviceable. This opened the engagement, Marines would enter the compounds at dawn of which was short, sharp, and one-sided. Initially, the next day, 7 January, and confiscate all the the Marines came under a heavy volume of fire equipment and weapons located there.192 from recoilless rifles, machine guns, and small arms, but this was quickly suppressed. At 0615, the helicopters were cleared to fire their rockets By 2300, the two storage sites were surrounded against targets in the compound. They continued and kept under surveillance throughout the night. to fire for about 30 minutes, interrupting their fire Psychological operations teams from the U.S. only once for another psychological operations Army's Company B, 9th Psychological broadcast. At 0647, the tanks entered the com- Operations Battalion, were attached to each of the pound, followed 14 minutes later by the Marines rifle companies. At 0553, they began to broadcast of Company K.* warnings to the Somali fighters that they were sur- rounded, and that if they came out with their Resistance ended except some sporadic sniping hands up, they would not be hurt. At about the at the aircraft. The riflemen cleared the buildings same time, the helicopters appeared in the sky.193 that had not been destroyed by the helicopters. Major General Charles E. Wilhelm declared the The Somalis in weapons storage site Number 8 area secured at 0926, by which time additional surrendered. But those in the other site, Number 2, trucks were enroute to help carry off the confis- cated weapons. In addition to numerous small * At the time, General Aideed was in Addis Ababa for the arms and ammunition, there were 4 M47 tanks, 9 preliminary reconciliation talks. howitzers of various calibers, 13 armored person-
68 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DN-ST-93-02880 Early in the multinational relief effort, Operation Restore Hope, Marines in a humvee patrol the streets of Mogadishu. nel carriers, 3 antiaircraft guns, 11 mortars, and 1 This strong action did reduce the more blatant recoilless rifle.194 All was accomplished at the cost attacks against UNITAF forces by factional of only one casualty, a corporal wounded by an forces, although the sniping continued at about the accidental discharge. same levels. The spot reports received every day The action was a blow to General Aideed's at the headquarters contained the tally of such prestige and pride. At a staff meeting later that incidents. Generally, these were just random shots day, General Johnston mentioned that Aideed into compounds, most likely fired by individuals "was embarrassed by his lack of control [over his who were seeking to prove something. As soldiers] and regrets what happened." Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni said: "I think it's in the Somali nature to test you. I think it's The commanding general also told his staff that part of the warrior ethic; maybe it's part of the "[we] told Aideed we view his initiating clan proof of manhood and bravery, and of course for fighting to be destabilizing. ... [We] want all to two years around here the rule of the gun had gone know how we regard what they do. ... We com- about unchallenged. I think that the [reduction of municated with the faction involved. They accept the cantonment] sent a strong message and responsibility and we don't expect to see it again." showed them that we weren't to be messed with More importantly, UNITAF had demonstrated to and I think that test worked well in our favor."196 all factions that "our reach is long."195 The streets remained dangerous, however, pre- cisely because the threat was random. Marines or * Colonel Klimp referred to this part of the action as a soldiers on patrol or at checkpoints could never be "bluff." The tanks had no ammunition for their main guns, certain when they would walk into a factional fire- although they did have rounds for their machine guns. It was believed the armor of the M1A1 Abrams tanks would be fight, come upon a violent criminal act, or just be proof against anything the Somalis had, and the machine a ready target for someone's need to assert his guns would be firepower enough. authority or manhood. Such an incident occurred
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 69 DVIC DD-SD-00-00737 As Marines take cover behind a wall, a UH-1N Huey helicopter supports the assault on one of Gen Aideed's weapons storage sites. on 12 January and resulted in the death of city needed to be stabilized to carry out the over- UNITAF's first serviceman. That night, a security all security mission. He instructed Colonel Klimp patrol was making a routine sweep along the to devise an aggressive plan that would put southwest border of the airport. At about 2147, the MarFor ahead of the factions in terms of knowing patrol was ambushed and engaged in a firefight what was happening in the city and in prepared with several Somalis. In the course of the fight actions that may be necessary. Colonel Klimp Private First Class Domingo Arroyo was hit by came up with a four-phased plan in which each small arms fire. He died of his wounds about two hours later.197 phase would "turn at the same time" as the others, like the gears in a clock, as opposed to being Private First Class Arroyo was a veteran of the sequential. The first phase was for the collection Persian Gulf War and was a field wireman with of information; "information on the city; where Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, are the different clans located, where are the at the time of his death. His service on a security gangs headquartered." The next phase established patrol was in the Marine Corps' tradition of MarFor presence by conducting foot patrols, man- "every Marine a rifleman." Although a communi- ning checkpoints, and basically getting into the cator by military occupational specialty, he was city and being seen by the people. The third phase serving as a rifleman with Task Force Mogadishu, was for direct action when necessary, such as which had been formed specifically to provide security within the city.* By the end of December, the MarFor com- * The units participating in the seizure of the weapons stor- mander, Major General Wilhelm, recognized the age sites on 7 January were also part of Task Force Mogadishu.
70 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA when an important target like a weapons cache reducing the number of weapons on the streets by was identified. The fourth phase was for the eval- raiding the infamous arms markets operating in uation of actions taken, assessment of new infor- the city. mation, and formulating new tactics.198 Task The word market cannot convey a true image of Force Mogadishu was the instrument created to what these bazaars were like. Set into crowded undertake this stabilization mission. It was formed sections of the city, the shops were little more than at the beginning of January from the 3d Battalion, huts of wood and corrugated metal inside a maze 11th Marines; 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion; of twisting, unpaved streets and alleys. 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion; Company C, The ramshackle appearance of the business 1st Battalion, 7th Marines; and Company K, 3d locations belied the richness of types and amounts Battalion, 9th Marines. Colonel Klimp was of arms available. Rocket propelled grenades and assigned as the commanding officer of the task force.199 launchers and AK-47 assault rifles were the most frequently encountered weapons. Machine guns, Task Force Mogadishu numbered about 2,000 mortars, missiles, and even rounds for a tank's Marines. It moved to the sports stadium in the main gun were available. Arms of every major northern part of the city, where criminal activity weapons-producing nation could be found there; and fighting among factions were common, and American, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, British, soon began its operations. The main activity was French, and Chinese weaponry were available. patrolling, which helped Marines gather informa- The two large markets in the city, the Argentine tion from the local populace and provided the and the Barkera, were soon targeted by Task presence envisioned in Colonel Klimp's original Force Mogadishu.* The truckloads of weapons plan. Like a cop on a beat in the United States, this confiscated in these sweeps were hauled away for very presence helped reduce violence and reas- destruction. sured the majority of citizens of UNITAF's benign intent.200 Another important task was The first of these raids was against the Argentine Market on 8 January, followed by a raid DVIC DD-SD-00-00731 Two Marines run for cover while being fired on by clansmen snipers protecting the weapons storage site. The Marine in the foreground is carrying an M16A2 rifle with a M203 grenade launcher attached.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 71 DVIC DD-SD-00-00736 Supporting the Marine assault, an M1A1 Abrams tank approaches the weapons storage site. Its main gun was empty, but there was ammunition for the machine guns. on the Barkera Market on the 11th. Although February, violent events in the Kismayo relief sec- more than 1,500 weapons were confiscated, it was tor were reflected in Mogadishu. no secret that many others had been removed from the markets before the arrival of the Marines.201 When the Somali Patriotic Movement forces of Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as General Morgan Both markets, and other identified arms caches, and allied to Ali Mahdi Mohamed, attacked the were the targets of subsequent raids. followers of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in a fierce The patrols, raids, and checkpoints did have an fight for the control of Kismayo, General Aideed effect. As the I MEF command chronology for was quick to respond in Mogadishu. On 23 this period noted, MarFor's increased presence February, the day after the attacks in Kismayo, drove weapons off the streets, transforming Aideed used his own propaganda services, such as Mogadishu into a much safer city.202 However, his radio station, leaflets, and loudspeaker broad- there was still cause for concern and coalition sol- casts to spread the story that Morgan had only diers could not afford to drop their guard. In late been able to succeed because of the complicity of UNITAF. He also called upon his followers to attack UNITAF forces in the city. * Fortunately, these two markets were on opposite sides of That evening, thousands of people took to the the green line, which divided Mogadishu into sections loyal streets, erecting barricades, starting fires, pelting to Aideed or Ali Mahdi. A raid against one could be balanced with a raid against the other, thus showing UNITAF's impar- convoys with stones, impeding the progress of tiality. UNITAF vehicles, and noisily demonstrating. As
72 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00729 Patrolling the mean streets of Mogadishu near a possible weapons storage area, well-armed Marines keep a sharp watch from the bed of a 5-ton cargo truck. annoying as these activities were, the crowds were vide his men all possible support, Major General made up mostly of women and children and rep- Wilhelm ordered every available MarFor attack resented no real threat to the coalition forces. helicopter to provide reconnaissance and support Nonetheless, as MarFor units attempted to clear to the forces on the ground. He also requested, the roadblocks and keep traffic lanes open, they and received from Lieutenant General Johnston, were subjected to rock throwing that seriously permission to distribute CS riot control agents, a injured several Marines, sailors, and coalition sol- non-lethal tear gas. As an additional measure, he diers. But the main roads were reopened and the called out a P-19 aviation crash fire truck from the city quieted down by about 2300.203 air base at Bale Dogle. The truck's high-pressure The crowds were back the next morning. hose would be useful in dispersing rioting crowds, Again, roadblocks were put up and fires started. if necessary. In the end, these extraordinary meas- ures were not needed. The crowds dispersed by about noon.204 But more trouble was brewing. Again, Major General Wilhelm ordered MarFor to keep the main roads open. On this day, the main disturbances were centered near the United States On 25 February, the K-4 traffic circle was again Embassy compound and the important traffic cir- the center of tension. There, at about 0900, some cle known as K-4. This circle, at the intersection Somalis began to fire at the most available of two major roads, controlled traffic leading to UNITAF targets: Marines and Nigerian soldiers of UNITAF headquarters, the airport, and the port. It was considered a key point and was the site of a heavily manned checkpoint. Rocks and Molotov cocktails were thrown at Marines in these areas.* * These are gasoline-filled glass bottles, stopped with a soaked rag as a wick. When thrown against a vehicle or in the Two Somali auxiliary security policemen were area of troops, the bottles break, spreading flames. They are killed during the disturbances and three Marines an inexpensive and easy to make incendiary device, named for Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar and one Somali policeman were wounded. To pro- during World War II.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 73 DVIC DN-ST-93-02402 Marines man a checkpoint in Mogadishu on New Year's Day 1993. The presence of coalition troops often drew crowds of curious Somalis, usually composed of young men and boys. the 245th Reconnaissance Battalion who were area. Three Marines and two Nigerian soldiers responsible for the security of the traffic circle and were wounded during the action.205 surrounding area.* The Marines returned fire, and Valuable lessons were learned from these the Nigerians also began to fire rocket propelled events, and changes were made to better protect grenades at the buildings where the Somali gun- coalition forces should anything similar occur men were hiding. The heavy firing continued again. Some active measures, short of the use of throughout the day. Major General Wilhelm deadly force, were put into place. While MarFor ordered the area sealed off and swept within two had received permission to distribute tear gas to hours. A strong force of Marines and coalition sol- its units, this riot control agent is non-specific, diers was called out for the mission. With the blanketing an area and affecting the innocent as Marines of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, and the well as those engaged in hostile acts. It can also Nigerians as a blocking force, two companies of linger. Cayenne pepper spray was determined to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and soldiers of the be a better agent because it comes in an aerosol Botswana Defense Force Contingent acted as the can and can be directed against a specific target. maneuver element. Shortly after 1400, the Beginning on 1 March, pepper spray was issued to Marines and Botswana soldiers began their sweep MarFor units, although control of its use remained down three main approaches toward their com- with Lieutenant General Johnston and only per- rades at the traffic circle, converging with them sons trained in its use were to employ it. At about shortly before sunset. The action had a salutary the same time, two P-19 crash fire trucks were effect: the firing ceased and quiet returned to the moved to Mogadishu to support MarFor. One of these was placed at the port and the other at the stadium. A third truck was ordered for use in * At the time, and later, Aideed claimed these gunmen were bandits attempting to use the unrest of the past two days for Mogadishu and was available by 10 March. their own purposes, and that he had no control over them.
74 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA More passive measures also were taken to pro- city. Operations to clear the streets of traffic tect troops from rocks and other thrown items. obstructions and debris and distribute food were Protective visors that attached to the Kevlar hel- restarted as soon as possible after the February mets were issued and combat service support per- riots. When the forces of General Morgan and sonnel created wire mesh shields to be attached to Colonel Jess again clashed in Kismayo in the mid- humvees to protect the windows and occupants. dle of March, coalition units braced for trouble, These resourceful Marines also created another but nothing of significance occurred. Throughout special piece of gear to attach to amphibious the remainder of March and April, the efforts of assault vehicles. During the February distur- MarFor and coalition allies continued to stabilize bances, crowds of Somalis had effectively stopped the city. The demonstrations that took place dur- these vehicles by simply lying down in front of ing this time were described as peaceful and some them. The drivers were naturally loath to run over were even held in support of UNITAF. A good these people and risk injuring or killing them. indication of progress occurred on 24 March, the Service support Marines made cowcatchers that end of the holy month of Ramadan. For the first attached to the front of the amphibious assault time since the civil war the city was able to spend vehicles and allowed them to move through two days in celebration of this special holiday. crowds or barricades with minimal harm to Five days later, Somalis in the city peacefully held demonstrators.206 a rally in support of the recent Addis Ababa meet- With these measures in place, MarFor ings.207 increased its activities in the city and the number MarFor performed other important work in of patrols was boosted to create a greater pres- Mogadishu, not all of it related to patrolling or ence. MarFor officers continued to meet regularly manning checkpoints. When UNITAF forces first with neighborhood representatives and a greater arrived in the city the roads were choked with all degree of order and safety was achieved in the types of rubbish and the debris of war. Often only DVIC DD-SD-00-00770 As Somali civilians watch, U.S. Marines walk single file down a small alley in the capital's Bekara Market. The Marines swept the market looking for arms and munitions as part of Operation Nutcracker.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 75 DVIC DN-ST-93-03819 A Marine prepares to load a box of weapons parts onto a truck filled with munitions confiscated during a patrol. a single narrow lane existed for the passage of bution specified areas throughout the city, more traffic, and that would be thronged with pedestri- people could be reached more efficiently. Also, by ans. This was unacceptable to the military forces, flooding the city with grain, the price of food which needed to be able to move quickly through- would be lowered and the black market for stolen out the city and between the important facilities at food would be undermined. MarFor had the the port, airport, embassy, and elsewhere. responsibility of establishing the program with the Operation Clean Street started on 28 December relief organizations.209 The program was launched with the aim of clearing the main roads and open- in February in conjunction with the establishment ing them for the fast-moving traffic of the coali- of the Somali auxiliary security force. On 6 tion. Marine combat engineers and members of February, the first mass food distribution was the U.S. Naval Construction Battalion, the held. Eventually, there were 25 distribution sites Seabees, performed the work. The operation con- located throughout the city with Somali auxiliary tinued until 6 January 1993 and was the first of security forces providing control. Security for several Clean Street operations that benefited each site was the responsibility of MarFor units UNITAF as well as the citizens of the city. As and coalition forces guarded 18 of the 25 sites.210 soon as the roadways were opened to traffic, the The work of the coalition in Mogadishu was roadside markets began to come back to life, and reflected, on a lesser scale, in most of the other soon merchants, barbers, and tailors were operat- ing from small stalls.208 relief sectors. But each sector was unique, and people traveling outside Mogadishu saw a far dif- Another innovation used in Mogadishu was the ferent side of Somalia than was apparent in the idea of mass distribution sites. The large numbers capital city. This was largely because each human- of refugees, often scattered in settlements itarian sector generally had one dominant clan, throughout the city, made it difficult for humani- which meant factional rivalry and fighting were tarian relief organizations to effectively distribute not as prevalent as it was in the capital. Also, the food to those in need. By consolidating the distri- cities and towns were not nearly so large or
76 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA American soldiers, however. By early January 1993, the soldiers of the Royal Moroccan Army began to arrive, and by the 12th of that month they were placed under the operational control of Army Forces Somalia.211 The Moroccan forces were composed of two infantry companies, a cav- alry company, a medical section, and other sup- port detachments of the 3d Motorized Infantry Regiment, under the overall command of Colonel Major Omar Ess-Akalli.* This force formed a mobile intervention group of more than 1,000 men with 200 light vehicles equipped with crew- served weapons, as well as light tanks, artillery, and antitank missiles.212 Their initial task was to ensure the security of the airbase. Then, as more troops arrived through- out Mogadishu, control was extended. By 28 January, the Moroccans were responsible for most of the sector. On 1 March, they were placed directly under UNITAF control and given respon- sibility for the security of all of sector Bale Dogle.213 Their light vehicles provided the Moroccans Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 306-4-21 with flexibility and tactical mobility, which they Combat artist Maj Burton E. Moore, a former member used to patrol the sector and escort convoys. The heart of their tactical mission, however, remained the security of the important airbase.214 In addi- of a Marine Corps scout/sniperteam, joined Jump Team 1, Recon Company, 5th Marines, atop the old U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu as the team returned hostle fire tion to being a major aerial port for the operation, in 1993. Portrayed in his painting of the experience is Army Forces Somalia established a firing range (left) Sgt Charles A. Johnson, LtCol Edward J. for its AH-1 helicopters within the sector. The range was a key factor in maintaining the accura- cy of the weapons systems of the aircraft.215 Lesnowicz, Cpl Patrick B. Ward and Cpl Tim Richards. crowded as Mogadishu. Still, each sector had its The Moroccans had yet another mission, one own challenges. Some quickly became very qui- given to them by the King of Morocco himself. escent, and others continued to have troubles with The king wished to help the sick and distressed factional fighting and bandits. The establishment people of Somalia, and he extended the Moroccan of the first three humanitarian relief sectors out- humanitarian mission to include a large hospital side Mogadishu provided experiences and lessons operating in support of the Somali people. The that were used elsewhere. Bale Dogle, the impor- hospital staff had many specialties, to include tant airbase; Baidoa, the "City of Death;" and nutritionists, obstetricians-gynecologists, podia- Bardera all benefited from the early attention they trists, ophthalmologists, oral surgeons, and spe- received as centers of UNITAF activities. cialists in digestive disorders and bone diseases. Bale Dogle There was also an engineering specialist for water purification. Somali medical specialists and social workers were hired to assist the Moroccan staff. The control of the first sector, Bale Dogle, The hospital quickly gained an excellent reputa- passed quickly from the Marines to the soldiers of tion among the Somali people and was seeing 400 the 10th Mountain Division. As these soldiers to 500 people of all ages and tribes every day. flew directly into the airbase, they soon had responsibility for its security and the Marines * This was a highly experienced regiment, which at that time were able to move on to other cities. The respon- had just come from spending several years fighting insur- sibility for this sector did not remain long with the gents in the Western Sahara.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 77 There were five to six major surgical procedures accordingly, more violent incidents. Also, the performed daily.216 political situation was more complicated. The The Moroccan contingent was intended to be Marines who first occupied the sector were very self-sufficient, which they were with food, water, aggressive patrolling, conducting raids, and mak- and fuel. In fact, the king ensured his men in ing searches where threats were assessed. At Somalia received fresh food every day; they car- night, helicopters were used to extend the pres- ence of the coalition forces into outlying areas and to frighten off bandits.218 ried no prepackaged rations and cooked their meals daily. But the light vehicles, which provid- ed the force with its flexibility, also caused its Even at this early period, Colonel Gregory S. largest logistics problem. All maintenance and Newbold, as the commander of the 15th MEU, the repair on these vehicles had to be performed in Marines who initially occupied the town, recog- Morocco.217 nized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of creat- The Moroccan unit was one of the largest non- ing a secure environment in the relief sector if the U.S. contingents in the coalition. With this strong bandits were allowed to carry their arms openly. and mobile force patrolling the sector, Bale Dogle He, therefore, told the local leaders his forces soon became one of the quietest in the area of would seize any weapons seen on the streets of operations, with few incidents reported. Baidoa. While the aggressive actions of the Baidoa Marines quickly decreased hostile acts against the coalition, the policy of no weapons openly carried had equally good results. As the power of the ban- dits declined, the local elders could reassert their The next sector occupied, Baidoa, presented a authority. They did so within the first few days of very different aspect to the soldiers of the coali- the Marines' arrival. Several Somalis approached tion, and elicited different responses. There were more lawless elements present in this sector and, DVIC DA-ST-96-01283 The centrally located K-4 traffic circle in Mogadishu was the site of several confrontations between local Somali fac- tions and coalition forces.
78 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA the Marines and requested assistance in establish- mixture per day. In addition, there was a hospital ing a security council.219 ward treating various illnesses, such as malaria, cholera, tuberculosis, and other respiratory dis- eases.222 * Such work was typical of what the Under the direction of Colonel Werner Hellmer, the local civil-military operations team provided the secure and neutral venue needed to relief organizations were doing in all the sectors. establish such a council. Relying heavily on The civil-military teams provided coordination humanitarian relief organizations, the team sought with the military to ensure they received their out the legitimate local leaders and elders. At the relief supplies safely and answered other legiti- same time, Colonel Hellmer and his small staff mate needs. recognized the importance of including represen- By the middle of January 1993, the Marines tatives of all major groups and clans. It was vital were ready to hand over responsibility for the sec- to the Marine mission and its image of neutrality tor. At 2359 on the 16th, Baidoa was transferred to that no one who should be a member would inad- Army Forces Somalia, with the remaining vertently be left out. Representatives from the Marines placed under its control.223 However, this State Department and United Nations Operation situation was only intended to be temporary. Somalia (UNOSOM) were also in attendance at During this same period, the Australian contin- the beginning of this new security council. As gent arrived by ship and airplane. By 8 January, a throughout the area of operations, the idea was portion of the advance party had already come to that the Somalis would take care of their own Baidoa to assess the quality of the water and internal governance. Under the protection of the determine if it could be purified. Company A, Marine policies of "no openly carried weapons, which had left on the Royal Australian Navy's no crew-served weapons, and no technicals with HMAS Jervis Bay (GT 203) on 24 December, gun mounts," the weakening of the bandits, and made port at Mogadishu on 12 January. By the the strengthening of the elders, conditions in Baidoa soon began to improve.220 17th, the main body, composed of Company B, half of Company C, and most of the battalion On 27 December, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, headquarters, flew straight to Baidoa on board a relieved the 15th MEU of responsibility for Quantas Airlines 747 passenger aircraft. The Baidoa. They continued their predecessors' rou- remainder of the Australian forces arrived the next tine activities; protection of food convoys, day. Company A, mounted in trucks off the ship, patrolling in the sector, and mine clearing. The motor marched to the town.224 civil-military operations team remained in place working with the relief organizations and the local The Australian force would soon be one of the security council. By early January, Colonel largest national contingents. It included Hellmer believed they had made good progress. Companies A, B, C, and D of the 1st Battalion, 1st People were out on the streets again, the markets Royal Australian Regiment, with their normal bat- in town were open, and the local buses were run- talion headquarters, plus support and administra- ning. Fear no longer existed and people could tion companies. Attached to this battalion group sleep safely, some getting a full night's rest for the were Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry first time in years. The lingering problem that Regiment, mounted in armored personnel carri- Colonel Hellmer saw was what to do with those ers; the battery commander's party, Headquarters, who previously had made their living by banditry 6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment; and 17th and stealing relief supplies.221 Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat Engineer Another organization making life better in Regiment. All were supported by a detachment of the 103d Signals Squadron and the 1st Battalion Support Group.225 Baidoa was Action Internationale Contre de Faim (International Action Against Hunger). This relief agency set up two camps, one for the most critical The Australian force was intended to be as self- refugee cases and the other for those who were sufficient as possible. Therefore, when they less serious. In the first, there were four servings deployed, they tasked their support group for 30 per day of what was described as a very rich mix- ture of food. This was intended to get these peo- ple back up to strength and out of danger. Those * Such diseases were rampant in the refugee camps through- who were in better health were placed in the other out the area of operations and were the result of poor sanita- camp, where they were fed one meal of a regular tion, crowded conditions, and unclean water.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 79 Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense Australian soldiers move by convoy from the port of Mogadishu to Baidoa where they would relieve elements of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. days of supply and ammunition. The greatest con- the flags of both nations were lowered and raised cern was for water. The advance party found that in reversed positions on the flagpole. At the same the local water could be purified. Also, HMAS time, appropriate music was played on a harmon- Tobruk, which was also supporting the operation, ica. "Waltzing Matilda," the Australian battalion's could pump water into tankers that could then quick march and the national song, is also the make the overland journey to the relief sector. The division march of the 1st Marine Division, so it support group was a very capable organization, was chosen and matched with "The Star Spangled which contained fuel tankers and 8-ton cargo Banner."* For the previous two days, Company A trucks. It also had a medical section capable of of the Royal Australian Regiment had been under forming a regimental aid post. The maintenance the tactical control of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. detachment included a field workshop for electri- Now the situation reversed itself as Company L, cal and general engineering maintenance, as well 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was placed under the as for vehicle and communications repair.226 tactical control of the Australian forces. The Marines would retain this command relationship until they departed Baidoa.228 For requirements above the capabilities of the support group, the Australian forces could use UNITAF's logistics assets for water, fuel, rations, By 23 January, all of the Australian force was and other common consumables. These arrange- present in Baidoa; 888 soldiers armed with 36 ments were set under cross servicing agreements M113 armored personnel carriers and eight 81mm signed between the United States and Australian mortars. The Australians quickly settled into their governments. Anything required that was not available from UNITAF was either purchased in Kenya, or flown in from Australia by the Royal * In the author's interview with Major John Caligari, Royal Australian Air Force on regularly scheduled C- Australian Army, "Waltzing Matilda" was identified as the 130 Hercules flights.227 regimental march of the 9th Marines, and it is so identified in the notes of the interview. Calls to the division actually iden- The handoff of responsibility for the sector was tified it as the division's own march, adopted during World completed on 19 January. At a simple ceremony, War II.
80 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA mission, which, as elsewhere in the area of opera- There were two intelligence gathering organi- tions, was to control the sector and provide secu- zations operating in the Baidoa sector. One was a rity for the relief operations and the supply con- three-man combat intelligence detachment of the voys. The work was divided into three parts and Australian force. These soldiers were responsible rotated among the companies. One company for collecting human intelligence, checking the guarded the airfield, while another patrolled in populace, finding out who was in the area, and the town. The third company patrolled in depth, identification of the local clans and subgroups.231 throughout the sector, to establish presence, col- There also was a team of American Special Forces lect intelligence, and respond to any incidents.229 in the sector. This team was "used to conduct area About 80 kilometers from Baidoa on the main assessments throughout the [humanitarian relief road to Mogadishu was the town of Buurhakaba, sector], especially in those areas where conven- the second largest in the sector. A huge rock mas- tional forces or relief agencies had not yet sif that rose from the plain to a height of a few arrived." The local commander used these assess- hundred feet dominated the town. This area had ments to plan operations in support of the human- been the site of much bandit activity and was itarian relief organizations that were providing noted for the presence of several technicals. To relief to these outlying areas. In addition, the end these depredations, the Australians estab- Special Forces team also provided intelligence lished a permanent outpost at the town. This was about criminal activities and sources of bandit- occupied in company strength, with patrols ry.232 With one of the companies always operating extending out to other towns in the sector. The in the sector in a random pattern of patrolling, the other companies could be called for support if Australians were able to respond whenever and there were a need.230 wherever intelligence indicated that something Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense LtGen Robert B. Johnston talks with an Australian soldier while visiting the Australian headquarters in Baidoa. Behind LtGen Johnston is Col William J. Mellor, commander of the Australian army contingent.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 81 Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 119-9-51 During a 1993 deployment to Somalia, combat artist Col Donna J. Neary depicted this familiar scene of the inter- national relief effort. In this piece, an Australian soldier is shown escorting a refugee convoy. After relieving the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, in Baidoa, "Diggers," the nickname adopted by Australian soldiers, took over relief escort duties in that area. was afoot. The company could quickly move into The Australian forces soon were stamping out the the target area and remain for a few days.233 banditry that had been so rife in the sector. When Baidoa was not terribly plagued by the pres- they discovered that the bandits had adopted the ence of warring factions during this period.* There tactic of attacking civilian traffic along the roads were some instances of armed troops passing at night, the Australians became equally resource- through the sector, but these were generally small ful. After dark, Australian vehicles with their groups that were monitored closely as they moved lights off would follow the civilian trucks and along. Lawlessness was another matter. By the buses. The drivers would use night vision goggles end of January, the Australians had established the to operate, and the troops would also use night pattern by which they would operate for the next vision devices to scan the roadsides ahead to spot few months. Finding the towns that were the cen- any ambushes. These ambush-busting operations were a very successful deterrent to the bandit activity.234 ters of criminal activity, they used a series of cor- don and search or airmobile operations to find and confiscate weapons and make their presence felt. The Australians were constantly busy during their four months as a part of UNITAF. The pace of operations was described as grueling. While the * There was some factional activity in the sector, but it was work was hard, harsh, and unrelenting, it did help relatively minor. For instance, during the visit of the author to keep the sector more quiet and secure than to the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector in late January, a some others. The success of the Australians' oper- representative of the Somali Liberation Army had just ations can be measured by the fact that bandits appeared in town to recruit. The Australian's quick reaction only engaged them on four occasions. They sus- force planned to "pay him a visit" at his quarters to search for arms and explain the weapons policy. He was not very suc- tained no casualties while confiscating and cessful in his recruiting efforts.
82 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA destroying almost 1,000 weapons and a vast quan- Marines, the death toll soon dropped to less than tity of ammunition and explosives.235 10 percent of what it had been.236 Bardera After the success in Baidoa, Colonel Hellmer moved quickly to Bardera, arriving in late December. With Colonel Emil R. Bedard, the The Bardera relief sector differed from Baidoa commanding officer of the 7th Marines, he set up in several critical ways. First, it was a smaller sec- another civil-military operations center. Colonel tor. While the town of Bardera had been ravaged Hellmer's team soon was assisting the legitimate during the civil war, one clan, whose faction, the elders of Bardera to establish a security council United Somali Party, was led by General Abdi and reassert their own authority. Again, the Dahir Warsame, inhabited it. Therefore, there was Marines were there to provide security, not to little of the factional fighting that had been so govern. The elders took advantage of the opportu- troublesome elsewhere, and it was far simpler to nity to reestablish an effective local government, stabilize the sector once UNITAF troops arrived. enforcing laws, trying criminals, and meting out Ironically, the presence of a single faction in the justice to those convicted of crimes. By 7 town actually increased the effects of the famine. February, an auxiliary police force was brought Most of the starving people in the sector had come back into existence, and the police were soon join- from its outlying areas, and the inhabitants of the ing the Marines at checkpoints. As a result of town felt no obligation to assist those to whom these efforts, the influence of local bandits waned. they were not related. Those living in the town Bardera was noted for being a quiet sector for the were relatively well-off in comparison to the next four months.237 refugees, who were crowded into an area called Still, there were some problems that beset the the "Italian Village" to the south of the town. Here relief efforts. The most notable of these was the they were subject to starvation from the lack of presence of mines along the main roads. Nearly relief supplies, from disease due to crowded and every road in the sector was mined, making it dif- unsanitary conditions, and from the depredations ficult to open the main supply routes into the inte- of armed bandits. When the Marines arrived, as rior.* Even though few mines were encountered, many as 300 refugees were dying each day. With the clearance operations had to progress slowly the safe delivery of food and medicines to the and thoroughly along every mile before they were relief organizations and the presence of the safe for the passage of convoys. Even then, the Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense An Australian soldier uses a mine detector to search for hidden arms in the effort to stamp out banditry in the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 83 roads needed repair. As engineers worked on the brought with them great experience in operating roads, the helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 16 in this part of the world. Many of these French lifted food and relief supplies to the humanitarian soldiers and Marines had served in the neighbor- relief organizations in outlying villages that other- ing state of Djibouti, formerly known as French wise could not have been reached.238 Somaliland. They came, therefore, with knowl- Toward the end of January, the restructuring of edge of the importance of clan and tribal alle- giance in Somalia, and they tried to work within that context in this sector.242 In addition, the forces in the theater allowed Major General Wilhelm to rearrange the Marine forces in a man- ner he considered more in keeping with local con- French forces in Djibouti had witnessed the civil ditions. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which had war that began there in 1991 between the Somali originally occupied the Bardera sector, was Issas and the Ethiopian Afars. recalled to Mogadishu, where its riflemen were By 28 December, the last elements of the advantageously used in the urban environment. Its French forces arrived from France and Djibouti, place was taken by a new organization, Task and moved to Oddur through Mogadishu. By this Force Bardera, formed around the 3d Amphibious time, the French forces consisted of a command Assault Battalion. This unit, with its greater element, which included a special operations mobility, was better suited to the open terrain in company, a logistics support battalion, a military the sector. On 24 January, the task force officially intelligence detachment, and detachments of began its duties in Bardera.239 security forces, military police, and communica- While the sector was fairly quiet, there was still tions. The ground forces were composed of one the need for vigilance. This was especially true in battalion from the 5th Combined Arms Overseas late February when serious fighting erupted Regiment, one battalion from the 13th Foreign among the factions in Kismayo, the humanitarian Legion Demi-Brigade, and the 3d Company of the sector bordering Bardera to the south. To ensure 2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. The 3d that Bardera was not affected by the fighting, and and 4th companies of the 2d Marine Infantry especially to ensure that Colonel Jess' Somali Regiment strengthened the other battalions with Patriotic Movement forces did not enter the organic armored personnel carriers. These forces Bardera sector, Task Force Bardera maintained were supported by an aviation detachment from reconnaissance elements north and south of the the 5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, and the 3d town. At the beginning of March, squad-sized Company of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineer patrols were sent along the Jubba River valley as Regiment. All told, there were about 2,200 French soldiers, Marines, and Legionnaires in the Oddur sector.243 far south as the town of Saacow. These patrols and screens had the desired effect, and no disturbances or significant presence of Jess' forces were noted As in Bardera, the natives of Oddur were main- in the sector.240 ly from one dominant clan, the Rahanweyne. By the end of April, the Marines were able to However, that does not mean there was unity turn over responsibility for a sector that was throughout the sector. The Rahanweyne clan was returning to peace and normalcy. As UNITAF pre- described as "divided into a multitude of sub- pared to hand off operations to the United clans opposed to each other and characterized by Nations, Task Force Bardera was brought back to opportunism and fragile alliances." Also, the peo- Mogadishu to prepare for redeployment. On 18 ple living in the north and near the critical April, the Botswana Defense Force contingent Ethiopian border were members of the rival relieved the Marines of responsibility for Ogaden clan. As in Bardera, the townspeople felt Bardera.241 little sympathy toward the refugees from the out- Oddur lying districts who were not related to them. The local leaders looked out for their own clan, but not the others. The French would thus have to draw on all their experience and skills in dealing with the As the French soldiers moved into the towns native Somalis throughout this sector.244 from which they would operate in Oddur, they The French forces were deployed in their tradi- tional "oil spot" manner. The sector was first bro- * Lawrence N. Freedman was killed when his vehicle struck ken down into three sub-sectors centered on major a mine in this sector. cities or towns, which in this case were Oddur and
84 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of the author French Foreign Legionnaires made their headquarters in an old Italian fort at El Berde, from which platoons and squads were sent to villages and hamlets throughout the Oddur sector. the Ethiopian border, Wajid, and Tiyegloo. One feeding stations. The effectiveness of the organi- battalion occupied each of these sub-sectors. zations' work was significantly increased by the From these, 10 towns or hamlets were occupied arrival of the French Army, which controlled the by company-sized forces, which then sent pla- safe shipment and distribution of food and sup- toons to other locations, for a total of 20 occupied plies while leaving the humanitarian agencies to sites. The French then were able to operate from carry on with their own duties.246 these strongpoints, spread throughout the sector, By 30 December, just days after their arrival in show their presence, maintain a strong posture, the sector, the French special operations forces and conduct reconnaissance. In Oddur itself, a pushed out along the axis Oddur-Ted-El Berde. mobile reaction force supported by helicopters The purpose of this initial operation was three was kept ready to intervene in any situation.245 fold: first, it provided a surveillance line toward In the city of Oddur, the work of these coalition the Ethiopian border; next, it opened the sector to forces was very similar to what was going on in these areas for the local humanitarian organiza- the other sectors. The Somalis soon established tions; and finally, the French presence there would local committees for security, food distribution, help to stop the heavy flow of refugees coming into Oddur and other cities from the northern towns which were hit hard by war and drought.247 school operations, and so forth. As was the case elsewhere, the French recognized they had to get the Somalis to take responsibility for their own This area was very important to the entire oper- welfare and governance. The French also estab- ation because its northern limit stretched along the lished their own team to work with the relief Somali-Ethiopian border. The flow of refugees organizations in town, notably Medecines Sans across the ill-defined frontier brought with it the Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) and possibility of armed forces from either nation Concern. These organizations ran a hospital and crossing into the other's territory. This, in turn,
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 85 might cause an incident that could be difficult to French presence. By the beginning of February, contain. As early as 31 December, during a heli- mine clearing operations had effectively been copter reconnaissance in the vicinity of the town completed throughout the sector. A police force, of Yet, French troops came across four armed men armed only with batons, was established, and a in civilian clothing who were acting suspiciously. weapons registration program was in place. This The men were picked up, interrogated, and found program allowed the French to confiscate unregis- to be members of the Ethiopian Army. They were tered firearms and to arrest any armed individu- quickly turned over to their own authorities.248 als.251 The French soldiers, Marines, and The presence of the Ogaden clan also served to Legionnaires settled into a daily routine of patrols, increase the volatility of this section of the border. reconnaissance, ambushes, checkpoints, search- The town of El Berde, located just a few kilome- ing for arms caches, and seizing unauthorized ters south of the border, was a case in point. Prior weapons. to the civil war, a modus vivendi was in place here, During February, the French already realized as elsewhere in Somalia where a smaller clan or they could decrease and realign their forces with- sub-clan had to coexist in an area dominated by a out losing control of the sector, and the first larger, stronger one. An effective police force was French units began to rotate out of theater. The active in the area and there were regional and dis- battalion of the 5th Combined Arms Overseas trict committees, on which the local chiefs served. Regiment left, along with the engineers and one In this way, good relations were maintained with company of Marine armored personnel carriers. the various national ministries and the governor at Helicopter support also was decreased. To accom- Oddur. With the coming of the war, however, clan modate fewer troops, the number of towns and was pitted against clan. The populace of the hamlets occupied was reduced to 12, but the region around El Berde, about 8,000 people, amount of patrols was increased. By March, the crossed into Ethiopia.* By early 1993, they were French government decided that 1,100 men would returning to find their homes and villages take part in UNOSOM II. During the remainder of destroyed or damaged. They needed food, medi- March and April, the French forces continued to cine, and humanitarian assistance. To compound realign themselves, rotating out some of the orig- the situation here, the returning chief of El Berde inal units while bringing in new ones to support did not recognize the legitimacy of the new gov- the United Nations mission.252 Gialalassi ernor of Oddur. Despite the internal strife, the French were respected and were working with both sides to effect reconciliation and an agree- ment to bring back normal relations.249 As the Italian forces settled in around The French tactic of spreading across the sector Gialalassi, their responsibilities were soon into hamlets and villages in platoon and squad extended beyond that sector. Having reclaimed formations allowed them to cover maximum terri- their embassy in Mogadishu early in the opera- tory. With so many soldiers in the sector, they also tion, the Italians kept a strong force in the neigh- relied upon the mobility of their armored person- borhood for its protection. It also made sense to nel carriers and helicopters to move rapidly and the Italian commanders that they should be given establish control of the zone. By late January, responsibility for some part of the city that includ- their presence had created a reassuring effect on ed the area where they were located. Of course, the relief organizations, which were able to move political and practical considerations were about with greater security. The people also began involved in determining how the Italian forces to respond by gaining confidence, providing intel- would be employed in the city. ligence, and returning to their villages.250 First, there was the question of how the The first contacts between the French and the Somalis would accept the Italians, with their his- native Somalis were described as excellent, and tory as a colonial power. The issue was a delicate the local elders and chiefs were satisfied with the one, for the Italians were a strong presence who brought distinct benefits to the coalition. Yet, General Johnston did not want them to be placed * The French estimated about 113 villages and hamlets in the in a situation or position in which they would be sector had been abandoned and roughly 40 percent of the counterproductive if Somali anti-Italian reaction local population (118,000 people) had become refugees.
86 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces Italian soldiers on patrol in the Gialalassi humanitarian relief sector, which as later expanded to include the north- ern half of Mogadishu. was strong. He saw the older Somalis, who had western portion of the city, which was territory of lived in the period of Italian presence, would be General Aideed. The Italian Embassy was in the amenable to their return as a part of UNITAF. He northeast part of the city, in an area claimed by the was more worried about the younger Somalis, forces of Ali Mahdi. While this could be a coun- who might make an issue of colonialism. General terbalance, it was recognized that it was impera- Johnston therefore followed a policy of gradual- tive no favoritism be shown to either faction ism by which the Italian forces were slowly leader by the coalition forces in the area. Since the placed in the city and countryside and the reac- Italian Embassy was nearly adjacent to the head- tions of the Somalis were assessed. After the suc- quarters of Ali Mahdi, General Johnston deter- cesses of the Merka and Gialalassi operations, he mined the Italian forces headquarters should not decided the problem might have been overstated. be established in that area. Instead, the Italians Johnston soon decided to give the Italians respon- were given responsibility for the northeast portion sibility for a portion of the city.253 of Mogadishu, with their sector extending into Gialalassi. Their headquarters was then estab- Other political considerations had to be taken lished in the town of Balcad, several kilometers into account. MarFor and other coalition forces out of Mogadishu along the main route heading had occupied areas that were mostly in the south-
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 87 north. The gradual manner in which this was smallest force with 413 soldiers, was responsible accomplished, along with the professionalism of for Mogadishu. Charlie, the next largest task the Italian soldiers, allayed any suspicions by the force, split its deployment between Jawhar, with Somalis of either neocolonialism or favoritism.254 180 soldiers, and Gialalassi, with 550 soldiers. The Italian soldiers were soon conducting Task Force Bravo, the largest with 1,116 soldiers, patrols, arms sweeps, and other civil actions with- was at the so-called transitory base in Balcad, in the city of Mogadishu. The situation there from which it could deploy north or south as the required close cooperation between all parties. situation required. "As activity in Mogadishu picked up, MarFor and The threat to coalition forces differed in each of Italian units began running into each other on these places. As might be expected, Mogadishu, patrols and during operations, creating confusion with the presence of armed members of the two and potentially dangerous situations."255 Although main Somali factions, had the highest number of the creation of distinct areas of responsibility was incidents. Members of Ali Mahdi's Abgal clan a major step toward solving the problem, direct frequently clashed with those of the rival Habr liaison between the coalition members was a Gedr clan of General Aideed on the streets of the necessity. For example, early in January, Italian capital. These fighters also fired occasionally at soldiers had been fired at by a sniper along a route the Italian soldiers, or boldly threatened the local in a section of the city called the Villagio Scibis. populace, just as they did with American service- To show their resolve, the Italian command men and Somali civilians elsewhere in the city. planned a major sweep through this area using Bandits presented the main problem in outlying about 540 men. The operation was to start at 0430 towns. on 12 January. But when the liaison officer The Italians quickly demonstrated their pres- brought this to the attention of the UNITAF staff, ence and strength throughout the sector with rou- it was noted the MarFor also was planning to con- tine patrolling and checkpoints. From their duct an operation in a neighboring area at the strongpoints, reconnaissance patrols protected the same time. UNITAF postponed the Italian opera- main supply route, weapons caches and markets tion for 24 hours, when it was successfully com- pleted without incident.256 Major General were raided, arms were confiscated, and mines were cleared. More importantly, the Italians Wilhelm, the commanding general of MarFor, and devised a series of operations that would take Major General Gianpietro Rossi, the Italian com- place throughout the sector. The size of the force mander, also agreed on the conduct of joint oper- used for each of these operations depended on the ations in the city, beginning on 19 January. The objective. Those at the highest levels were named cooperation between the two coalition partners "canguro" (kangaroo). They were planned and resulted in the creation of Task Force Columbus, directed by the Folgore Brigade headquarters and composed of forces from the San Marco executed by its subordinate units. The next level, Battalion, and the 571st Military Police Company, named "mangusto" (mongoose) comprised opera- a United States Army unit under the operational tions undertaken by the 186th and 187th control of MarFor. The task force conducted Parachute Regiments of the brigade.* The lowest patrols and provided security for humanitarian level operations, meant for rapid reaction to relief warehouses in the area of the Karaan Market.257 events or intelligence, were named "hilaac" (Somali for lightning). These were executed by With such a wide and diffuse area of responsi- the brigade's special forces and were generally bility, the Italians had to align their units some- conducted in Mogadishu.258 what differently than those in other sectors. They A fourth type of operation was named "tam- maintained a large force in their sector of buro" (drum) and took advantage of the Italian Mogadishu, around the Italian Embassy. They also placed garrisons in the towns of Balcad, Jawhar, and Gialalassi. These four strongpoints controlled the main population centers in the sec- * As with regiments in many other modern armies, these tor and provided security along the main supply units were not formed in the manner familiar to Americans. Each was composed basically of one battalion, with a sepa- route that ran from Mogadishu to Bulo Burti. rate company-sized headquarters element through which the Three task forces (Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie) regimental commander provided command and control, were assigned to cover these bases. Alpha, the administration, and logistics support.
88 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00861 U.S. Marines in a light armored vehicle from the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion join Italian soldiers in a Fiat OTO Melara 6614 armored vehicle at an intersection along the Green Line in Mogadishu. force's large component of armored personnel The Italian command worked with Somali eld- carriers and helicopters. The mobility and rapid ers and leaders to establish local committees so movement provided by these vehicles made them order could be maintained and local governance especially valuable in emergency situations, the begun. They also were very actively involved in primary goal of tamburo operations. These opera- the establishment of the auxiliary security force in tions also enabled the Italians to react to situations Mogadishu and throughout the Gialalassi sector. far from the city strongpoints, effectively control- These forces worked in the main population cen- ling the entire relief sector.259 ters of Mogadishu, Gialalassi, Balcad, and The Italian soldiers were busy with civil activ- Jawhar. The auxiliaries were soon accompanying ities as well. In the Gialalassi sector, as elsewhere the Italian soldiers on patrols and at checkpoints. in the coalition's area of operations, the overall Weapons control within the sector was accom- success of the mission depended on the perception plished through a series of actions. First, the car- by the population that the coalition was there to rying of arms in the sector was prohibited; citi- assist the Somali recovery and to provide general zens were requested to voluntarily turn in security. The brigade engineer company cleared weapons. Next, arms were confiscated during mines from roads and villages, and detachments sweep operations in areas known or suspected to of soldiers provided security for relief convoys contain weapons caches or havens for armed per- moving throughout the sector. Relief organization sons. These actions had results similar to those warehouses and distribution points were kept taken throughout UNITAF's area of operations. Thousands of weapons and several tons of ammu- nition were confiscated and destroyed.261 under surveillance to prevent attack or theft. The Italians also provided direct medical aid to the Somali people. An ambulance service carried wounded or seriously ill civilians to the Italian medical facilities.* There they were treated in cooperation with Somali health and medical per- * The Italian forces established one military hospital and one surgical ward. Six infirmaries in the four strongpoint cities sonnel. By the end of January alone, these med- ical visits numbered more than 4,000.260 backed these up. They were staffed by 39 medical officers, 12 hospital corpsmen, and 170 troops.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 89 DVIC DD-SD-00-00864 An Italian soldier holding a 9mm Beretta 12S sub-machine gun patrols a heavily pockmarked section of the Green Line, which separated the warring factions in Mogadishu. In addition to the work of the medical staff, the resupply distance of Italy itself. The Italian offi- Italians assisted the local population in several cers' mess at Balcad was soon renowned for the direct ways. Wells damaged during the civil war quality of its fare; fresh pastas, meats and fish, were cleared and repaired. Main roads were put fruits and vegetables, and wine were all prepared back into good order. Schools were reopened, and and served daily.* Potable water for drinking and local businesses were encouraged and given sup- washing was a problem, as it was everywhere port to help restart the local economy. A postal else. This burden was relieved in large part by dig- service between Somalia and Italy was estab- ging two wells, one in Mogadishu and the other in lished.262 Gialalassi. The combined capacity of the wells was 14,000 liters of water per day, which could be used for washing.264 This represented a tremen- The supply of this large force (about 3,200 sol- diers) was an important issue for the Italian com- mand. This was the Italian armed forces' first dous boon because more of the water that was major deployment since World War II. The hauled into the relief sector every day could be Folgore Brigade had a related unit, the 46th used just for drinking and cooking. Aviation Brigade, which supported the operation with three Aeritalia G222 utility transport air- craft.263 These airplanes, along with 12 helicopters assigned to a composite helicopter regiment, pro- * General Order Number 1 prohibited the consumption of vided ample intra-theater transportation for per- alcohol. However, this applied only to American forces. sonnel and supplies. The Italian forces were also Americans traveling in the theater were offered wine in Oddur and Gialalassi and beer in Belet Weyne, which they fortunate in Somalia's location within easy air had to respectfully, and usually reluctantly, decline.
90 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00849 A sampling of the small arms and crew-served weapons confiscated by the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, at checkpoint Condor south of Merka. Through March and April, the Italians contin- 14 January when elements of Task Force 2-87 ued to suppress bandits and assist the local popu- seized 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunition lace. By the end of the latter month, as some of the hidden at an airfield near the town of Afgooye. UNITAF coalition partners prepared to depart, the Ten days later, Task Force 3-17, the 10th Italians were tasked to remain as a part of UNO- Mountain Division cavalry squadron, uncovered a SOM II. Their new area of responsibility would large arms cache kept in eight half-buried conex continue to include Gialalassi, with an expansion boxes. In both instances, the arms and ammuni- to the north to incorporate the neighboring relief tion were quickly destroyed. Task Force 2-87 con- sector of Belet Weyne. tinued cordon and search operations throughout Merka the sector, especially near large towns such as Kurtunwaarey, Baraawe, and Qoryooley.266 On 29 January, these operations uncovered two more The Italian forces also had been instrumental in caches.267 establishing the Merka relief sector, but once the Although it was originally outside the Merka port and airfield had been secured and roads relief sector, the town of Afgooye was a concern opened into the interior, Army Forces Somalia for the soldiers in this sector. Afgooye was locat- was given responsibility for that sector. The unit ed within the Bale Dogle sector, which also was that was left for this mission, 2d Battalion, 87th under the control of the Army Forces Somalia Infantry, was a part of the 2d (Commando) during January and February, and American sol- Brigade, 10th Mountain Division.265 Although a diers could therefore be transferred between sec- smaller sector than most of the others, Merka had tors as needed. The problems in Afgooye centered its share of challenges for the American soldiers. on banditry. The town was at a key location on a Patrols uncovered some large arms caches dur- main road to Mogadishu, and was therefore a ing January. The first of these discoveries came on magnet for bandits and lawless elements wanting
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 91 Regiment, which had arrived as part of UNOSOM II forces.270 Belet Weyne The Canadian presence grew quickly in the Belet Weyne sector after it was secured on 28 December. The entire Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group had flown in by the first days of January 1993. Commanded by Colonel Serge Labbe, the battle group strength was 1,359 soldiers at its height. The group was composed of three commandos, with a service commando and a reconnaissance platoon in support. The Royal Canadian Dragoons' A Squadron also was assigned for the mission, as were an engineer troop and a signal troop.271 * The Canadian forces were supported by Grizzly, Cougar, and Bison armored vehicles, which arrived by ship and were then driven over- land. ** Such vehicles were not normally part of Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces the regimental equipment. Due to the long dis- Italian soldiers exhibit some of the arms confiscated tances and the need for convoy protection, howev- during sweep operations in areas known to harbor er, they were borrowed from other units specifi- armed insurgents and contain weapons caches. cally for this operation.272 The Canadians con- ducted dismounted patrols until these vehicles to extort payments from travelers going to or from began arriving in the sector on 15 January. By the capital city. early March, the Canadian 93 Rotary Wing On 31 January, Commando Brigade conducted Aircraft Flight had provided six CH-135 helicop- a large cordon and search operation at Afgooye. ters, which increased the force's mobility and Task Force 2-87 conducted an air assault, while operational reach.273 *** Task Force 3-17 and the 984th Military Police The Canadians divided their sector into four Company held sectors in and around the town. security zones, each of which was assigned to a The operation continued for several days. At its sub-unit of the battle group. They quickly began conclusion, the 984th Military Police Company aggressive patrolling throughout the sector, both was left in the town to provide a presence and conduct stabilization operations. The operation successfully curtailed violence and banditry in * In the Canadian forces, the term battle group is analogous to task force. In this instance, it represents the formation of a this area, which allowed the people to reclaim their town.268These operations continued in the battalion-sized unit specifically reinforced and formed for this particular mission. The commandos that make up the Merka sector, which had become relatively quiet battle group are company-sized airborne infantry formations. through February. A 60-man police force was The term does not imply special operations capabilities. reestablished in the town and worked closely with Army Forces Somalia by the end of January.269 On ** These are Canadian-made all-wheeled armored personnel carriers. The Grizzly has eight wheels and mounted a 1 March, as the Moroccans assumed control of the 12.7mm machine gun and a 7.62mm machine gun. The Bale Dogle relief sector, Afgooye was removed Cougar is a six-wheeled fire support vehicle armed with a from that sector and incorporated into the Merka 76mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted coaxially with the main gun. The Bison is an eight-wheeled armored sector. The 984th Military Police Company personnel carrier mounting a 7.62mm machine gun. remained in place. On 9 April, the 1st (Warrior) Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, relieved the 2d *** Until this time, traffic moving between Belet Weyne and Brigade at Merka. On 28 April, the Merka relief the port of Mogadishu took five days for a round trip; two sector was turned over to the Pakistani 6th Punjab days each way and one day with overnight at the port.
92 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA dismounted and in the armored vehicles. Toward Army had moved more than 500 men to the area. the end of January, the Canadian command had The Ethiopians disarmed any Somali who crossed already assessed most of the humanitarian sectors the border, but were refraining from attacking the as generally quiet, making the patrolling of the Somalis.276 UNITAF Special Operations Forces large security zones safer for the soldiers. It was had made contact with the Ethiopian commander only to the north and east that friction was causing at Fer Fer by 5 January, and kept regular contact concern.274 with him. There, close to the Ethiopian border and the The Special Operations Forces performed other town of Matabaan, the political situation was important functions in the sector as well. They complicated. Most of the population within the traveled to all the major villages to assess the atti- sector was of the Hawadle clan, and the United tudes of the local populations. They also noted Somali Congress faction had a strong presence which clans people belonged to, the extent of ban- there. Some of these faction members were sup- dit activities, sources of water, main crops grown, porters of General Aideed. Colonel "John" and other information about daily life and politics. Hussein was one of Aideed's division command- This information was passed to the coalition com- ers. Aideed's first cousin, Colonel Omar Jaua, was mander in Belet Weyne, Colonel Labbe. It was the chief of staff of Aideed's 1st Division, which then passed to UNITAF, where, combined with operated in the vicinity of Galcaio (outside of similar information from the other sectors, it was UNITAF's area of operations). A local governor processed as intelligence about the entire area of named Harlane, in the town of Dharsamenbo, operations.277 reported directly to General Aideed. However, The Canadian forces soon established good there also was a United Somali Congress faction relations with the local populace and conducted that declared itself independent of both Aideed aggressive patrolling throughout the sector. They and Ali Mahdi. The Somali National Front and the also provided security for the convoys of relief Somali Salvation Democratic Front also had supplies coming into the sector, notably those of strong factions in the area, and a faction of the the Red Cross and Save the Children. These relief Somali National Movement was situated along the Ethiopian border.275 organizations took care of up to 45,000 people a day just in the main city of Belet Weyne. From From the start Canadian forces and U.S. that center, additional supplies were distributed to Special Operations Forces in the area began to outlying areas. Dependable stocks of food and make contact with these groups. From these initial regular feeding at the refugee centers brought the talks, the coalition soldiers received information famine under control. Toward the end of January, about camps and the locations of cantonment starving refugees were so far removed from dan- areas, of which there were a large number in the ger they only required one feeding per day. Yet, sector, each guarded by 60 to 70 men. The coali- even with food stocks available elsewhere, large tion troops inspected and inventoried these camps numbers of refugees stayed in the city because of and cantonments. Just as important, this aggres- the lack of water. Many wells had been destroyed sive activity showed a strong coalition presence or contaminated during the civil war. With the throughout the sector and acted as a buffer security provided by the Canadian soldiers, two between the factions. humanitarian relief organizations, Save the Children and Oxfam Quebec, worked on restoring wells and provided veterinary assistance.278 Such Of equal importance was the need to keep the factions from causing trouble across the interna- tional boundary with Ethiopia or beyond the lim- measures allowed the people to return to their vil- its of UNITAF's area of operations in Somalia. lages. The Belet Weyne sector adjoined both of these The Canadian command encouraged Somali critical areas. Coalition patrols along these areas self-reliance through a series of councils. There was enhanced by the personal contacts of were separate ones established for local security, Canadian and American soldiers with Ethiopian relief, reconstruction, and political concerns. and Somali leaders. In late December and early Colonel Labbe, as the commander, met only with January, the most volatile area was at the town of the councils, not with individuals. This discour- Fer Fer, which lay directly astride the Ethiopian- aged any charges of Canadian favoritism. All fac- Somali border. The Somali National Movement tions and clans needed representation on these had a strong presence there, and the Ethiopian
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 93 DVIC DD-SD-00-00904 A soldier from the 10th Mountain Division points an M16 rifle into an enclosure while checking for weapons during a sweep of the small village of Afgooye. The village was a haven for weapons and bandits. councils and at major meetings to ensure their engineers undertook the hazardous duty of clear- respective interests were heard and protected.279 ing mines from roads and other areas. The Canadians also reached out to the Somali Aside from the threat posed by potentially people in more direct ways. As was happening in volatile confrontations of the numerous armed other sectors, they helped reestablish a police factions, the major problem in the sector was sim- force. These local policemen did not carry ple banditry. This usually took the forms of loot- weapons, but they were soon accompanying the ing, sniping, and setting up roadblocks for the Canadian soldiers on patrols. The Canadians purpose of robbery and extortion. The Canadians trained these officers in first aid and riot control sought to control these activities through the pres- procedures and even procured uniforms for them. ence of their patrols. They also issued a strict The education of Somali children also received weapons control policy. All weapons in the sector had to be registered, and none could be carried openly.* Non-registered weapons were seized. In attention. In the population centers of Belet Weyne and Matabaan, several schools were repaired and reopened with the help of the this manner, small arms in the sector became less Canadian soldiers. School supplies were procured of a problem. Then, by working closely with the through the United Nations Children's Fund and various factions, the Canadians got the Somalis to distributed to these institutions. Teachers were agree to place their heavy weapons in canton- ments. By 27 March 1993, the entire sector was rated secure.281 recruited, tested, and given vocational training and returned to their duties. The Canadians also established a fund totaling $75,000 to pay for In April, the Canadians prepared for the arrival local laborers working on repair projects, such as of UNOSOM II forces. Under the transition plan, roads. These workers were employed and man- aged through the local rehabilitation committee, but the funds were controlled and disbursed by the Canadians.280 As elsewhere in Somalia, military * This allowed humanitarian relief organizations that had legitimate security needs to maintain their protection.
94 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA the Belet Weyne sector was to be handed over to Just as MarFor had responsibility for stabiliz- the control of soldiers from India. But the Indians ing the capital, so Kismayo was the responsibility would not arrive on time, and the Italians had to of the Army Forces Somalia. Major General temporarily extend their control into this sector. Steven L. Arnold decided on 17 December to Lieutenant Colonel Carol J. Mathieu, com- deploy his 10th Mountain Division artillery tacti- manding officer of the battle group, recognized cal operations center staff to the city, under the the sensitive position of his sector, which bor- command of Colonel Evan R. Gaddis, USA. The dered on both Ethiopia and the portion of Somalia advance party of six officers and enlisted soldiers arrived at Mogadishu on 12 December and were that was not within the UNITAF area of responsi- quickly informed about the situation, given their bility. He foresaw that difficulties could arise from mission, and told what was expected of them. the presence of factional forces around Galcaio They traveled to Kismayo by humvee and linked and he recommended the extension of his sector, up with the Belgian and U.S. Marine units that something that was eventually done under UNO- had just secured the port and airfield.283 Task SOM II.282 Fortunately, the Canadians brought Force Kismayo was created from the U.S. Army's Belet Weyne quickly and skillfully under control, 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and the Belgian 1st and the possibility for violence never became real- Parachute Battalion. The task force headquarters ity. The humanitarian sector on the other flank of was formed from the 10th Mountain Division the coalition's area of operations, however, would artillery staff, reinforced by other division assets pose serious problems for UNITAF. Kismayo including an aviation detachment, a boat compa- ny, a communications platoon, a psychological operations team, a civil affairs team, and a support element.284 Brigadier General W. Lawson After Mogadishu, Kismayo was the relief sec- Magruder III, USA, the assistant division com- tor that had the greatest number of incidents. That mander for operations, was selected to be the task city also caused the greatest concern because of force commanding general. the potential for inter-faction fighting. As in the General Magruder moved quickly to impress capital, these armed factions were ultimately tied upon the faction leaders in the sector the power by alliance to either Aideed or Ali Mahdi. Both and determination of UNITAF. He also wanted to groups wanted to control this important city, ensure they understood the coalition was neutral which had been the scene of heavy fighting until and was there only to assist the Somali people. the arrival of UNITAF. To further exacerbate the The task force began its security operations on 28 problem, the leader of the group loyal to Aideed, December. The very next day, General Magruder Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, was suspected of hav- hosted a meeting with Colonel Jess, local elders, ing perpetrated a massacre among the followers of clan members, and former police officers to form General Said Hirsi "Morgan" just before coalition an interim security council for the sector. Shortly forces landed. Tensions were high in the city and after this first meeting took place, two other its environs, and the need to keep the two factions important steps were taken. First, the local Somali apart was critical. Morgan's Somali National police began to form as an auxiliary security Alliance faction of the Somali Patriotic force. Soon they manned roadblocks with coali- tion forces. The second step was to issue a "no weapons policy" on 1 January.285 This was a com- Movement numbered only about 1,000 men, but many of them were well-disciplined veterans of the old national army.* Jess' Somali Patriotic prehensive policy that stated: "no one may carry a Movement faction was about four or five times pistol, rifle, automatic weapon or transport a larger, but was not nearly as well organized. Prior crew-served weapon within the city limits of to the arrival of UNITAF troops, Morgan had Kismayo." It also banned pedestal mounts for moved his followers far up the Jubba River valley, weapons on vehicles. The only exceptions were near the Kenyan border. He began to move south for legitimate bodyguards, and even they had to be in possession of an authorized permit, and in the again in January. presence of their employer. Their weapons had to be carried openly (in a holster or slung over the * This is a conservative estimate of Morgan's strength. shoulder with the muzzle pointed down.) This Various sources put his numbers at two or three times this. policy took effect on 9 January, and was enforced
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 95 Photo courtesy of the author Canadian soldiers mounted in a Bison light armored vehicle patrol the Belet Weyne sector to create and maintain a secure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian work. through a system of routine patrols, searches of ment areas could be destroyed. General Morgan vehicles and individuals, roadblocks, and mobile disclosed the locations of his forces at four towns checkpoints. Coalition forces and auxiliary secu- in the sector. General Magruder replied that four rity forces worked together to enforce the ban.286 sites were too many. Morgan stated he had already The coalition forces in Kismayo would soon be told his forces not to engage coalition forces, and at the forefront of one of UNITAF's major chal- that he would avoid having his men on roads used lenges. The ceasefire agreement on 15 January for relief convoys if he was forewarned about required all factional forces to remain where they them. He also agreed, "not to initiate attacks were on that date. Barely a week after the signing against other factions." Finally, he stated he could be contacted on 26 January to arrange another meeting.287 In the end, however, this proposed of the initial Addis Ababa accords, General Morgan began moving his forces south from the Kenyan border toward Kismayo. There was no meeting was overtaken by other events. doubt that General Morgan wanted a confronta- General Morgan was one of the more interest- tion with his rival Colonel Jess for control of the ing characters in the Somali political landscape. A city. General Magruder moved quickly and direct- former Minister of Defense, he was a son-in-law ly to end the possibility of fighting between the of Siad Barre. He also had attended the United factions and to warn General Morgan of the con- States Army Command and Staff College at Fort sequences of his actions. On 23 January, General Leavenworth, Kansas. As U.S. Ambassador Magruder met personally with General Morgan at Robert B. Oakley said, this meant Morgan under- the town of QoQaani. General Magruder stood how we think, "but we don't have the fog- explained UNITAF's position on the cantonment giest idea of how he thinks." Ambassador Oakley of large weapons and technicals and told Morgan did describe him as "very cunning and totally that any such weapons found outside the canton- untrustworthy."288 As if to prove the ambassador's
96 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA assessment, General Morgan's agreement not to the opposing factions pulled away from each attack his rivals did not last 24 hours. other. The Kismayo relief sector entered a period Some of Colonel Jess' soldiers were in a can- of uneasy peace. Over the next few days, the tonment at the town of Bir Xaani, located about Belgian paratroopers aggressively sought out and 35 kilometers from Kismayo. Security was lax, confiscated weapons, and American attack heli- perhaps in part because these men thought copters destroyed technicals found outside the UNITAF would protect them from attack.289 On compounds.292 General Morgan and his men, 24 January, General Morgan's fighters attacked some of whom claimed a right to return to homes the outpost as part of an attempt to move against in Kismayo, remained a threat in the area. Colonel the port city. In response, Colonel Maulin, one of Jess' followers also caused troubles in the town Jess' subordinates, made an unauthorized move and lower Jubba valley. There were several inci- against Morgan's forces.* UNITAF responded dents of sniping and of grenade attacks against quickly with two radioed warnings to General coalition soldiers, particularly the Belgians. These Morgan to desist in his aggression and to pull increased in intensity through the middle of back. When he paid no attention and continued February. By that time, General Morgan and with his intentions of reducing the Jess canton- Colonel Maulin were probing each other. In the ment, Task Force Kismayo was ordered to stop midst of this turmoil, Colonel Jess returned to him by force. Kismayo. UNITAF had placed a lid on the situa- The task force planned a combined operation, tion on the southern flank, but it continued to sim- with the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, providing air mer. assault elements and attack helicopters and the In late February, General Morgan was prepared Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion forming the to move against Colonel Jess' forces in Kismayo ground assault element. An aerial reconnaissance once again. Taking advantage of the better disci- of Bir Xaani located General Morgan's forces and pline of his men, he infiltrated small groups into warning shots were fired. After these were the city on 22 February. Again, Jess' men were ignored, Cobra attack helicopters fired cannons caught napping. In a short but intense action, sev- and antitank rockets at the Somali technicals and eral of Jess' fighters, as well as some civilians, military equipment. The fire was described as were killed and Jess and his followers fled the "accurate and deadly." Belgian soldiers, soon on city. This clash was to have serious consequences the scene, captured several technicals, artillery, and armored vehicles.290 This preventive opera- for UNITAF. tion was successful; although Morgan's soldiers Such a daring challenge could not go unan- did return fire, they also pulled back quickly. The swered. Both General Johnston and Ambassador small, sharp engagement was important for two Oakley immediately issued a strongly worded reasons. It was the first time preemptive force had ultimatum to General Morgan. "There can be no been used against one of the Somali factions to excuse or pardon for the deliberate, well-planned enforce the Addis Ababa accords, signed only 10 actions of your forces and senior commanders in days before. Second, as Ambassador Oakley said attacking Kismayo on 22 February 1993. in an interview, the attack was necessary to "teach UNITAF condemns and holds you responsible for Morgan a lesson. ... Cobra gunships went in and killing innocent civilians and terrorizing the entire took care of Morgan for not respecting the cease- population, threatening to destroy all the progress fire, continuing to move south after we told him to toward [prosperity] and peace which has been stop, and for general misbehavior."291 General made in the region." UNITAF commanders then Morgan had to withdraw his remaining vehicles told General Morgan, "as a result of these inex- 35 kilometers from Bir Xaani, and his troops cusable, criminal actions and the breaking of the seven kilometers from the town. ceasefire, all your forces and weapons must be The forceful reaction of UNITAF forces pro- moved out [of] the lower Jubba valley to locations duced an immediate effect. Fighting ceased, and north of [Dhoble] no later than midnight 25 February. You must designate these locations to UNITAF by 25 February. If any of your forces are * Colonel Jess had gone to attend the talks in Addis Ababa and had not returned. In fact, with the notoriety of the found outside of these locations on 26 February or thereafter, they will be engaged. Any weapons located will be destroyed."293 December massacre in Kismayo, there was speculation he might never return.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 97 To give teeth to the ultimatum, Army Forces But General Morgan was not done making Somalia's quick reaction force was ordered to trouble. With the start of the next round of peace Kismayo. Other Army units were shuffled in the talks scheduled to begin shortly in Addis Ababa, theater to keep all humanitarian sectors secured. there was concern violence might again erupt. On Even as Morgan withdrew to the Dhoble area, 9 March, Colonel Frederick C. Peck, the public Colonel Jess' forces were ordered to move out of affairs officer, expressed UNITAF's views in a the city, to the area of Jilib. These measures were press statement: "We're going on intuition and timely, effective, and balanced, but the damage track record. We are concerned that someone had been done. might try to derail things or make a point or get a In Mogadishu, General Aideed claimed that little bit better situation."295 After only two weeks Morgan could not have succeeded at entering of relative quiet, Morgan's forces again attacked Kismayo unless he had the cooperation of Jess' followers on 16 March and tried to take over UNITAF. He also told his followers that all of the city. Jess' supporters fled to the north, and UNITAF's actions were directed against his ally, UNITAF recalled its quick reaction force to the Colonel Jess, conveniently ignoring what the city. This 500-man unit, under Brigadier General coalition was doing to chastise General Greg L. Gile, USA, was backed with 13 attack Morgan.294 Aideed's efforts at disseminating prop- helicopters. The belligerents were quickly pushed aganda succeeded in bringing his followers out out of the city. To further emphasize UNITAF onto the streets of Mogadishu for three days of resolve to keep the factions from confronting each disturbances. other, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp In Kismayo, as the situation quieted down (LHD 1) and three other ships carrying the 24th again, the Army handed over responsibility for the Marine Expeditionary Unit were stationed off the sector to the Belgians on 5 March. About 150 city's coast on 25 March. The MEU landed the Americans remained out of the original 1,000- next day and conducted patrols to the west of the man contingent. Their main mission was to work port city. At the same time, 200 American soldiers with the humanitarian agencies. and the Belgians pushed to the north, placing a DVIC DD-SD-00-00798 A Canadian soldier manning a machine gun in a bunker guards the entrance of Belet Weyne airfield as a U.S. Marine KC-130 lands on the dirt airstrip.
98 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA strong cordon between the forces of Morgan and was a tedious sameness to the daily round of Jess. work, however, and shifts were long and often The Addis Ababa talks, which had begun on 15 monotonous with no days off. There also was an March, continued through this period. With news edge to life in the area of operations from the of General Morgan's latest actions, Aideed threat- occasional attacks or sniping incidents. Within a ened to leave the talks, again charging UNITAF month of the start of the operation, tension was with complicity. Colonel Peter A. Dotto, mounting for those who patrolled the streets of the UNITAF's future plans officer, was also the coali- cities or the roads of the countryside, or who were tion representative to the conference. He warned riding in convoys. An official document stated the Aideed that leaving the conference would only case clearly: "the strain of operating in an envi- "play into the hands of his enemies."296 Aideed ronment where a Marine on patrol might be met refused to listen and left. But this time he had by a waving, smiling crowd on one corner and overextended himself. His people in Mogadishu gunfire on the next began to tell on the individuals did not come into the streets as they had before. in MarFor. Many Marines began to grow increas- Also, several of his lieutenants disagreed with his ingly impatient with the naturally curious stubbornness and formed their own contingent to Somalis, particularly when Somalis crowded continue representation at the conference. Faced them."298 with this unacceptable loss of support and prestige This attitude was not peculiar to Americans or from his own faction, Aideed decided his interests Marines. In Baidoa, the Australians also noted: were best served by returning to the negotiating The soldiers observed acts of corruption and table. While Aideed's resentment undoubtedly exploitation among Somalis and Somali continued, Kismayo settled into a period of quiet for the remainder of UNITAF's time in Somalia.* Non-Government Organization staff. They became disillusioned. In many cases their Even as the city and the area of operations morale plummeted as they asked themselves began to calm down near the end of March the why they were risking their lives in a remote, events in Kismayo and their spillover in hot and dangerous country, hell bent on its Mogadishu had two serious consequences. For own destruction. It was an immense chal- General Aideed, loss of credibility would cause lenge for the commanders within the 1 RAR him to seek some method to regain his stature Group to maintain morale, and prevent sol- with his followers. For UNITAF, the Kismayo diers from allowing their disillusionment troubles caused a reevaluation of the transition to and anger to lead to overly-aggressive prac- UNOSOM II and a rearrangement of the rede- tices. All of those who served in Baidoa had ployment schedule.297 to dig deep to remain in touch with values Morale and Restraint and attitudes developed at home in Australia, while working under pressure in a brutalized society, stricken with corruption and violence.299 During the third phase of the operation, the work in Somalia could be rewarding for the sol- Such frustration was familiar to those senior diers and Marines of the coalition. They could see commanders and noncommissioned officers who the results of their efforts, whether they were had served in Vietnam. There the enemy often hid engineers building a bridge, infantrymen on within, and was supported by, the civilian popula- patrol, officers assigned to the civil-military oper- tion. In Somalia, there was no enemy in the tradi- ations teams, or air traffic controllers bringing in tional sense, but it was just as difficult to discern aircraft filled with supplies or troops. Each person the intentions of a mob of people, or to spot with- contributed to a situation that was noticeably in a crowd the person who might pose a real improving for the vast majority of Somalis. There threat. Strong leadership at all levels was required to keep soldiers and Marines focused on their mis- sion. * Kismayo continued to be a source of tension and conflict. Major General Wilhelm recognized the creep- On 6 and 7 May 1993, just two days after the departure of UNITAF and the turn over of the operation to the United ing tiredness and frustration of his Marines by Nations, Colonel Jess attacked General Morgan's forces in a mid-January, and he issued MarFor a "Thirty-Day bid to retake the city. Belgian forces, then under the com- Attitude Adjustment Message." In addition to call- mand of UNOSOM II, repelled the attack. ing for a brief stand down of operations to allow
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 99 coalition shot a Somali. The individuals involved would either be upheld in their decision or recom- mended for a court-martial. On 4 February, a young Somali was shot and killed by a Marine sergeant as he rushed toward the back of an open vehicle while carrying a closed box. The box turned out to hold nothing dangerous. This was a very sorrowful event, causing grief to the boy's family and deep remorse to the Marine involved. But since the contents of the box were not known, and since the boy's actions were deemed to pose a possible threat, the sergeant was determined to have acted in accordance with the rules of engage- ment and did not face a court-martial. But there were also some who did let their frus- tration and anger get out of hand, with drastic results. On 2 February, Gunnery Sergeant Harry Conde, shot and wounded a Somali youth who had approached his vehicle and stolen his sun- glasses.* Gunnery Sergeant Conde shot the boy as he was fleeing from the vehicle. The gunfire also wounded another Somali. Since the boy did not present any threat to the gunnery sergeant, he was deemed to have used excessive force and was tried by court-martial. He was found guilty of two Photo courtesy of the author counts of assault with a firearm with intent to Belgian paratroopers stand guard at the port of inflict grievous bodily harm, was fined, and was Kismayo. reduced in grade to staff sergeant. The most serious set of incidents occurred in his Marines to gain some respite, he reminded Belet Weyne. The Canadians had problems with them that they needed to maintain good relations Somali men and youths sneaking into their lines at "with the 90 [percent] of the population who wel- comed the American presence." As he noted, no matter how frustrating the situation might * Riding in a convoy in the city of Mogadishu or in Kismayo was always a tense time. Roads between major points were become, the Marines "had to avoid alienating the citizens of Mogadishu."300 In Baidoa, Lieutenant kept clear by the Clean Street operations to allow for fast movement, and routes were occasionally varied, but there Colonel David W. Hurley adopted the motto of was always the chance of random sniping or a grenade "firm, fair, and friendly" as the guide for the attack. Also, Somali pedestrians frequently stepped in front of vehicles to purposely separate them from their convoy and Australian soldiers. He also made it clear that slow them down or stop them. Then the vehicle could be unnecessary violence would not be tolerated, and mobbed as crowds of young men and boys rushed in to grab that all actions must be within the rules of engage- whatever they could get. Passengers in the vehicles were lit- ment.301 erally sitting targets if anyone wished to take advantage of the situation. There was a need for constant vigilance in such The professionalism and discipline of coalition situations, and coalition soldiers had to be able to protect soldiers were essential in keeping down the num- themselves and their property. On leaving a compound, a ber of unfortunate incidents. Occasionally, some magazine was inserted into one's personal weapon and a round chambered with the safety on. Many also carried sticks soldier or Marine would be confronted with a sit- or the end poles from cots to rap the knuckles of those who uation that called for a quick decision to use dead- might attempt to steal. At one point it was noted that some ly force, although these were rare. At such times, soldiers, such as the Tunisians, were traveling with bayonets the rules of engagement provided both a basis for fixed to deter thieves, but this practice was stopped. It was determined the very act of fixing bayonets provided a clear action and protection for the soldiers involved if message of the intent of the soldiers involved and could act there was an obvious threat. An investigation was as a deterrent that would not be possible if the bayonets were held for any incident in which a member of the already on the rifles.
100 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00788 BGen Lawson W. Magruder III, USA, the 10th Mountain Division's assistance division commander and Task Force Kismayo's commander, meets with Col Ahmed Omar Jess, the Somali faction leader in Kismayo. night and stealing whatever they could. The thefts Just a few days later, Major Anthony Seward, were bad enough, but no one could determine the the commanding officer of 2 Commando, passed intentions of these intruders, and for that reason on to his platoon commanders that any intruders they posed a threat to the soldiers and a danger to captured in Canadian lines were to be abused. The themselves. Frustration and resentment mounted intention of this poorly worded direction was that against these thieves. Unfortunately, some junior any Somali thieves should be taught a lesson that leaders took matters into their own hands in a would deter them, or others who might be con- manner that was unjustifiable and deadly. On 4 templating such actions, from stealing from the March, soldiers of the Reconnaissance Platoon Canadians. Some officers passed this word on to were ordered to augment security at the engineer- their men. Unfortunately, some soldiers took it as s' camp at Belet Weyne. That evening the pla- a license to do what they could to anyone unfortu- toon's commander, Captain Michael Rainville, set nate enough to fall into their hands. On the night in motion a plan to capture infiltrators by placing of 16 March, a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone, rations and equipment in a position that could be was caught in the Canadian base at Belet Weyne. seen by Somalis coming close to the compound. He was bound and taken to a bunker that had been Eventually, two unarmed Somali men were used to hold such prisoners until they could be observed entering the compound. They were chal- turned over to proper authorities. There he was lenged by members of the platoon and attempted tortured and beaten to death by at least two sol- to flee. Warning shots were fired, but they contin- diers, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and ued to run. One of the Somalis was shot and cap- Private Kyle Brown. Several noncommissioned tured. The other continued to run inside the com- officers had knowledge of the beating, although they may not have known of its severity until too late.302 pound until he, too, was struck by rifle fire, knocking him to the ground. As he tried to get up, he was shot twice again at close range and killed.
MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE 101 DVIC DD-SD-00-00946 Two Belgian military police officers go through the possessions of a Somali taxi driver at a checkpoint at the entrance into the compound at the port of Kismayo. Canadian authorities investigated both inci- tion, they developed into a national scandal, dents. The result tarnished the reputation of a fine reaching into the highest levels of the Canadian military establishment, which had received praise Ministry of National Defense. A special from General Johnston for "the humanitarian Commission of Inquiry was established in focus of the Canadian troops. It has earned them Canada, which worked on questioning all officers enormous good will and they have properly por- and soldiers connected in any way with either trayed themselves as having come to Somalia for incident. As a result of the investigation and the [a] noble purpose."303 The careers of many sol- scandal, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was diers in the Airborne Regiment and in the disbanded. Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu was court Canadian Ministry of National Defense were martialed; although acquitted he retired from the ruined. service. Several other officers and noncommis- sioned officers were also court martialed. Among The initial investigations began with a com- the most significant was Major Seward, who was manding officer's investigation immediately after found guilty of negligent performance of duty and the 4 March shooting, but this was not received at received a severe reprimand, three months in National Defense headquarters until 23 March. prison, and dismissal. Captain Rainville was court However, an investigation by Canadian military martialed and found not guilty. Master Corporal police began in late April, just days before the Matchee attempted to commit suicide while in redeployment of the UNITAF headquarters. The custody in Somalia, resulting in permanent brain Canadian forces began redeploying in May and damage that rendered him incompetent to stand continued to arrive back in Canada through June. trial. Private Brown was court martialed, found As word of the incidents began to emerge, along guilty of manslaughter and torture, and sentenced with allegations of withheld or altered informa- to five years imprisonment and dismissal with dis-
102 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA grace. mand chronology for this period stated: "The dis- Among the 30,000 members of UNITAF, such cipline of the Marines ensured that potentially incidents of unwarranted violence and abuse were explosive situations, instead of deteriorating, were rare. Generally, the soldiers and Marines of all the defused. Many a young Somali who could have coalition partners were concerned with maintain- been legitimately shot under the rules of engage- ing their personal honor in a difficult situation, ment owes his life to the restraint of MarFor per- and with assisting the great majority of Somalis sonnel."304 The great majority of the coalition's who needed and welcomed their efforts. The work soldiers displayed the same discipline. was not always easy, and it often required patience and forbearance. But as MarFor's com-
Chapter 7 Drawing Down the Forces Naval Operations replenishment oiler Mowain (AOR A20), destroy- er Tughril (DD 167), and fleet oiler and stores While their comrades on the ground were ship Dacca (AOR A41); and the Indian Navy's working throughout the theater, the coalition guided missile corvettes Kuthar (FSG P46) and sailors were busy in various activities off the Khukri (FSG P49). Some of the transiting ships Somali coast. The work at sea was characterized were supply ships supporting their countries' during the third phase by patrolling, training with troops ashore, such as the Belgian command and coalition partners, and shipboard routine. support ship Zinnia (AGF A961), and the Australian helicopter and logistic support ship Situation reports for this period are filled with Jervis Bay (GT 203). Other ships represented the the names of ships of coalition partners that naval contingent of coalition allies that also pro- entered the waters off the Somali coast and, for a vided ground troops to the operation. In this cate- time, became part of Navy Forces Somalia. Some, gory were the Australian landing ship logistic like the Indian offshore patrol vessel Sukanya Tobruk (LSL L50); the Italian amphibious trans- (OPV P51), were that nation's entire contribution port dock San Giorgio (LPD L9892), mine coun- to the coalition and remained as part of the force. termeasures support ship Vesuvio (MCS A5384), Others spent time in the area working with the and guided missile frigate Grecale (FFG F571); United States and other nations' vessels and then the Turkish landing ship tank Ertugrul (LST departed when their limited missions were done. L401), depot ship Derya (AD A576), and guided Examples of such ships were the Pakistani Navy's missile frigate Fatih (FFG F242); and the DVIC DN-SN-93-06061 An Alouette III SA-316B Chetak helicopter prepares to land on board the Indian Navy's Sukanya-class offshore patrol craft Sharda (P 55), anchored off the Somali coast.
104 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DN-SD-00-00795 A U.S. Marine KC-130 Refueler aircraft on the ground at Belet Weyne airfield, as a Marine AH-1 "Cobra" attack hel- icopter flies overhead. The mission of the KC-130s was to refuel the Cobras, keeping them in the air to escort food convoys. Canadian replenishment oiler Preserver (AOR chant vessels in the Mediterranean. The Maria 510). was eventually reported as seized by the The daily work of all the vessels in the coali- Seychelles Coast Guard in their national waters tion was varied. There were the normal training on 5 March. The ship was carrying 90 tons of munitions and falsified registry papers at the time.305 and drills, and underway replenishments were Air Operations common, but the more important tasks were in direct support of the operation. Naval air was a key factor, and Navy Forces Somalia assumed the air traffic control mission for the operation during its early days. Aircraft performed road reconnais- Air support was vital to every aspect of the sance for convoys and stood ready for close air operation. It provided a capability that offset the support if needed. Logistics and tanker flights tremendous distances of the area of operations helped troops on the ground stay supplied, while and served as an important and flexible supporting forward infrared radar surveillance flights kept the arm to troops on the ground. commanders informed of movements within the Although a service component, the U.S. Air theater. The ships also conducted coastal surveil- Force was in some aspects similar to a functional lance and intercepted and searched merchant ves- organization. Its primary duty as the overseer of sels entering the waters of the area of operations. Air Force Forces Somalia was to provide mobili- This latter mission was very important in ty, both into the area of operations and within the ensuring more weapons were not smuggled into theater. It was one of the smallest components of the theater. In one notable example, an intelli- the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), but gence report indicated a cargo vessel named the there was no shortage of airframes in the country. Maria, a ship of Greek origin laden with arms and Most of these came from the American forces, and ammunition, was sailing from Serbia and suppos- all four Services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and edly heading for Somalia. The coalition naval Marine Corps) contributed to the air armada that forces kept a tight watch for this ship, which was was sent to Somalia. Some of the coalition part- nondescript and bore a name common to mer-
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 105 ners also used their own aircraft for resupply or as The calibration of weapons was important to a contribution to the overall operation. the effectiveness of the aircraft. Marine Aircraft The aircraft were used for almost every tradi- Group 16 (MAG-16) built a firing range five miles tional mission of air power.* In the initial phases northwest of Bale Dogle airfield where all avia- of the operation, fixed-wing attack aircraft from tion weapons could be properly checked. From 6 the carriers flew air patrols for detachments work- January to 12 January, the group conducted a bat- tle-sight zero range to sight all of its M16A2 rifles.308 ing at distant sites and were prepared for close air support if necessary. Medical evacuation flights and search and rescue flights were also significant Aircraft were also critical to the supply of parts of the planning.** Later, Army and Marine forces in the field, especially in the operation's Corps attack helicopters provided close-in fire early days. Working with the Air Force or air support to operations against factions in mobility element, MAG-16 set up "spoke chan- Mogadishu and Kismayo. Transport aircraft fly- nel" flights to the sectors of Bardera, Bale Dogle, ing on the air bridge brought personnel and sup- and Baidoa. Service began a few days before plies into the country, and C-130 and C-141 intra- Christmas. An average of four transport flights a theater flights carried fuel and supplies to the sec- day soon delivered vital cargo of rations, miscel- tors. laneous supplies, and engineering equipment to these areas. Lockheed KC-130 Hercules trans- The absence of traditional ground supporting ports from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport arms (e.g., tanks and heavy artillery) during Squadron 352 delivered fuel, as did CH-53D/E Operation Restore Hope was offset by the use of heavy lift helicopters from MAG-16. These heli- attack helicopters. These aircraft filled an impor- copters also transported personnel and carried tant void in the organizational structure. With the oversize cargo by external lift. The spoke channel decision to leave howitzers on board the maritime flights served Kismayo and other sectors with fuel prepositioning force shipping, gunships assumed deliveries. Even the French forces at Oddur bene- a vital supporting arms role. Marine Forces fited from these flights by driving the shorter dis- Somalia (MarFor) used them successfully in the tance to Baidoa to pick up fuel and water deliv- attack on weapons storage sites in Mogadishu, ered by air.309 As the New Zealand forces came and the Army employed them frequently during into theater they set up scheduled "Kiwi flights" troubles in Kismayo in February and March. The into the various relief sectors. Their light fixed- Army's after action report claimed: "Attack avia- wing Andover aircraft were used to deliver pas- tion provided the discriminatory firepower sengers and light cargo on a regular basis. required for this type of environment."306 Also, the The peculiarities of the desert environment Somalis displayed an evident respect for the capa- affected aircraft as well as soldiers. The bilities of these weapons. "[Their] presence also omnipresent dust was extremely damaging to provided a psychological effect that helped in equipment, especially to the machines' sensitive intimidating potential threats. ... On several occa- air intakes. Even the finest filters could not keep sions, the mere presence of the attack helicopters out all the powder-like dust. The aircraft at dirt served as a deterrent and caused crowds and vehi- airfields in the interior were particularly vulnera- cles to disperse."307 These versatile aircraft pro- ble to this problem, since every time an airplane or tected convoys throughout the theater, performed helicopter took off or landed at one of these fields day and night reconnaissance missions, and it raised a storm of red or ochre dust, the color accompanied coalition forces on the ground. They depending on the location. One solution was to added appreciably to the coalition mission to cre- use dust palliatives that could be put down on the ate a secure environment. runways and adjacent surfaces to hold the parti- cles in place. Another solution was to place AM2 interconnecting panels, a medium-duty, alu- * The Marine Corps lists six functions of support provided minum, landing mat capable of supporting both by its air arm. These are offensive air support, antiair war- fighter and cargo aircraft operations, on ramps fare, assault support, aerial reconnaissance, electronic war- and taxiways. fare, and control of aircraft and missiles. Despite all the work to repair the runways and ** See Chapter 8 for a more detailed description of medical keep them serviceable, problems developed rapid- evacuations. ly. The traffic of the heavy Lockheed C-141 air-
106 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00923 Using a John Deere road grader, U.S. Air Force SSgt Robert Chandler, along with other members of the Air Force's Red Horse civil engineering team, smoothes out the ground at Oddur airstrip. craft rutted or broke up the surfaces. In some Airways DC-10, Kuwait DC-8 and C-5 on civilian cases, such as at Bale Dogle, a main air base for ramp. Military ramp saturated with civil and other the operation, this meant the suspension of C-141 nations military aircraft." The next day, he noted flights or the transfer of cargo to the smaller C- that "[Mogadishu Airport] operating close to the 130 aircraft for delivery. limit." By early January, "the north ramp (old mil- The need for continuous maintenance of the itary ramp where several non-flyable MiGs are runways was distressing. So was another common located) was saturated with a variety of traffic. ... problem, foreign object damage. This was caused Civilian, relief agency, coalition force and Marine by small items, such as pebbles, screws, or trash KC-130s are all using the ramp on a free flow that could get onto an aircraft operating area and basis. We even saw two African Airlines 707s." cause damage to airframes or engines when blown Colonel Lias was also very specific about the around or kicked up. Damage from foreign cause of the crowding: a lack of what he called objects was plentiful at Somali airfields. It often visibility. By this he meant the air mobility ele- ment had no knowledge of, or control over, the arrival of many of these aircraft.310 came in the form of stones or small rocks that were blown onto runways by propeller aircraft. Airmen, soldiers, or locally hired Somalis Control and management of aircraft were long- engaged in a never-ending struggle to keep the running problems during the operation. There operating areas clear and safe. were several causes. First, there were actually two Rocks, dust and debris weren't the only prob- operations (and thus two headquarters) responsi- lems at the airfields. Within a short time, the air- ble for sending aircraft into Somalia. One of these port at Mogadishu became the busiest on the Horn was UNITAF. The other was the joint task force of Africa, resulting in serious overcrowding. for Operation Provide Relief, which was still Colonel Dayre C. Lias, USAF, Air Force Forces based at Mombasa. Establishing a chain-of-com- Somalia deputy director of mobility forces, noted mand and tracking authority between these two on 18 December that there were a "World entities were some of the first priorities Air Force
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 107 Forces Somalia had to establish. Provide Relief control authority staff, published a memorandum headquarters was willing to work with UNITAF to all "potential users of Somali airspace." It cited man-to-man between the respective operations a United Nations Resolution 794 provision to sections (through U.S. Central Command, their "take all necessary means" to establish the secure common superior) using information passed in environment for relief operations. This was the situation reports. This was a solution, but one that basis to assume the airspace control authority for was still fraught with difficulties.311 Somalia by UNITAF, "effective the 9th day of Other internal problems existed. The operation December 1992," and continuing until further took place early in the joint era, when common notice. Having assumed this authority, General command and communications systems were still Johnston enjoined "all countries ... to direct their being formed. As the components came into the registered aircraft to strictly comply with all air- area of operations, each brought their own sys- space control orders and applicable regulations tems with them, and these were not always com- and conventions in place in Somalia. All aircraft patible. There were "lots of software problems," must strictly comply with established airspace Colonel Lias noted. The Navy used the contin- control procedures to ensure effective procedural gency theater automated planning system, while control. Violations of air traffic control directions the Marines relied on fragmentary orders, and the will be reported to the International Civil Aviation Organization, the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, and other appropriate national agencies."313 Air Force employed the theater air mobility sys- tem, all of which sought to manage complex air- ground operations.312 Unfortunately, problems of airspace manage- The UNITAF method to manage and control ment and control continued. Not everyone saw the the airspace was through an airspace control clear logic in the commanding general's memo- authority, established within the Air Forces direc- randum. At a meeting held in Nairobi on 7 torate of mobility forces.* Under normal circum- January 1993 between representatives of UNITAF stances, a control authority is the responsibility of and civilian agencies, the timely dissemination of a sovereign nation, which, working with the Notices to Airman was identified as the main International Civil Aviation Organization, can problem. But there were greater, related issues publish and distribute Notices to Airmen to help brought up at the meeting. The International Civil control the air traffic within its airspace. But, as Aviation Organization did not accept the joint task with so much in Somalia, there were no normal force's authority to issue Notices to Airman, nor circumstances. No sovereign government existed did it acknowledge the task force's interpretation to work with the international aviation organiza- of U.N. Resolution 794 that it controls Somali air- tion. Thus, the job fell by default to UNITAF. space except for military traffic, nor did it recog- nize task force air control orders where they con- Coalition commander Lieutenant General flicted with existing Notices. The civil aviation Robert B. Johnston, working through his airspace organization and other participants at the meeting further asked to discuss precise technical issues such as air traffic control procedures over * In most joint operations, a joint force air component com- mander (JFACC) would be established. The commander is Somalia, communications frequencies, changes in Notices to Airman language, and the status of nav- igational aids.314 * normally charged with developing the air campaign plan for the theater, basing it upon the assets available to him. In a war or combat situation, this plan would address four impor- tant air functions: airspace management, airspace control, air defense, and targeting. It was soon obvious the last two func- tions were not of significance to Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF did require the first two, however, and so the air- * Other participants included the International Air Transport space control authority was established. In the first few Association, a trade organization that serves the commercial weeks to the operation, Major General Harold W. Blot, com- airline industry, and the National Geodetic Survey, a part of manding general of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, held this the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. position. In her study of UNITAF, Dr. Katherine A. W. Among other missions, the National Geodetic Survey con- McGrady of the Center For Naval Analyses explained the ducts aerial photographic surveys of airports in the United development of the authority and its functions. She also States to locate the positions of obstructions and aids to air notes the term "JFACC" was sometimes erroneously used. travel. Since the survey agency does not function outside the Part of this confusion may have unintentionally come from United States, it is likely that some of its personnel may have UNITAF itself, which listed Major General Blot as joint air attended this meeting to provide information and expertise in component commander on its early personnel rosters. these matters.
108 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00917 A variable omni-range, meteorological navigational aids system using an AN/FRN-44 site survey van with an omni- range radio was set up at Mogadishu airport by the 485th Engineering Installation Group to assist civilian aircraft into what became the busiest airport in the Horn of Africa. The tension created by the inflexibility of the M. Lorenz, UNITAF's staff judge advocate, civilian authorities was made clear by the joint explained the legal basis for this position under task force's airspace control authority when it United Nations Resolution 794 and passed out threatened to impound civilian aircraft if they "did copies of the memorandum by which General not start complying with the air control orders." Johnston assumed this authority. Difficulties with On the other side, international organizations the dissemination and publication of Notices to claimed they could not issue Notices to Airman Airman were identified, and the air control order based on the air control order language because civilian operators could not understand them.315 process was explained. The meeting reconvened the next day and again on the 16th.317 In spite of the seeming impasse, both sides One of the most important agreements reached agreed "that safety is now the paramount issue in the critically congested airspace over Somalia."316 on the 15th was that the International Civil Aviation Organization recognized that the This one point of agreement and the willingness UNITAF commanding general served as the air- of people to work to a common end were the space control authority "`on behalf' of the sover- beginning of the solution. eign state of Somalia." The distinction was noted Just one week later, on 14 January, representa- as being academic, but it was sufficient to verify tives of UNITAF, the International Civil Aviation the UNITAF commanding general as the "sole Organization, and other agencies met in authority for airspace procedures in the Mogadishu for a technical meeting. The com- Mogadishu [flight instruction region]." Progress manding general of UNITAF was again designat- that day and the next created a single airspace ed as the airspace control authority "for all of the control plan. UNITAF air control orders were territorial airspace of Somalia." Colonel Frederick reviewed, along with existing Notices and the
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 109 international organization's plans. From this agreements made at the beginning of March with work, two Notices, controlling upper and lower the adjacent flight instruction regions (Nairobi, airspace, were circulated through the Kenyan Addis Ababa, Aden, the Seychelles, and Civil Aviation Authority. All future Notices to Bombay.) The agreements covered such coordina- Airman would be distributed "on behalf of tion issues as radio frequencies, transfer of Somalia at the request of the Commander, Unified responsibility from one region to another, and Task Force." A meeting was set between established routes, flight levels and separation UNITAF's airspace control authority representa- between aircraft, and the acceptance of messages tive, Major John D. Reardon, and those of com- and revisions. These agreements went into effect mercial carriers flying out of Nairobi. The on 31 March.319 International Civil Aviation Organization prom- Management of military aircraft coming into ised to provide plans for reconstructing airspace the area of operations did not pose such drawn-out control within the Mogadishu region and to hire a problems, but it still had to be addressed. General permanent organizational representative in Johnston established his airspace control authori- Mogadishu. Finally, requirements for the transi- ty through the air mobility element's director of tion of airspace control authority to the com- mobility forces, Colonel Walter S. Evans, USAF. manding general of United Nations Operation By the end of December, as the tempo of air oper- Somalia II (UNOSOM II) would be forwarded by ations reached the maximum capacity for the international aviation organization to Mogadishu airport, Colonel Evans worked UNITAF.318 through the United States Transportation These matters essentially cleared up the ques- Command and Central Command to establish tion of control of the civil aircraft coming into time slot allocations for all aircraft coming into Somali airspace. The UNITAF staff continued to Mogadishu, including those of coalition partners. work out other coordination problems. The most At the same time, he worked with the various significant of these were addressed by a series of ground forces quartered in or near the airfield to DVIC DD-SD-00-00889 A group of Maleel townspeople gather to await the deliver of wheat donated by Australia. The wheat was flown in slung underneath a Marine CH-53 helicopter.
110 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00794 MajGen Steven L. Arnold, USA, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, meets with town elders, Red Cross representatives, and other humanitarian relief works in Merka. stop the growing number of near accidents caused the remaining airspace control authority for by unauthorized personnel and equipment on the Somali airspace on 1 February, delegating it to runways and taxiways.320 Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Meara, USAF.322 With the establishment of these procedures and Establishing air control and airspace manage- organizational structures, UNITAF was able to ment had been long, and at times it was very com- look forward and plan for the ultimate transfer of plex work within a thicket of military and interna- air traffic services back to civil authorities. As tional organizations and operational procedures. early as 18 January, an initial plan for the transi- But, as with many issues confronted by UNITAF, tion of airspace control authority functions was the problems were eventually resolved in a spirit published. Under it, the authority could stand of cooperation and mutual interest in the safety of down on 22 January except for airspace manage- all aircrews and the success of the overall mission. ment functions and "aviation services ... still The best indicator of the success of these efforts required by JTF Somalia Components." On that was that, in spite of the small and poorly equipped date, Air Force Forces Somalia would be respon- state of the Mogadishu airport, it was accident- sible for publication of a "combined flight sched- free even while operating as the busiest airport on the Horn of Africa. End Game ule for U.S. and coalition forces" and the air mobility element was to incorporate into it all fixed-wing airlift schedules of the components and coalition partners. Provision also was made for UNITAF's operations air section to eventually The work performed during the third phase, coordinate all air issues within the area of opera- from the beginning of January to the end of tions.321 Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, in March, provided the basis for the transition that his position as the director of operations, assumed would occur in early May. Throughout this phase,
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 111 Lieutenant General Johnston allowed his subordi- soldiers provided medical care and worked with nate commanders great discretion. As he said in a the local populace to improve their lives by such component commanders' meeting on 6 January: projects as digging wells or improving roads. "Every HRS [humanitarian relief sector] is differ- More importantly, a secure environment, which ent; commanders must be given broad missions. was UNITAF's primary mission, was in place. [They] will have to weave [their] way through a This security allowed the delivery of food, medi- broad fabric of village elders and others. I'm cines, and other relief supplies. The United pleased with what I see; commanders on the Nations acknowledged the important effects of ground taking initiative and doing a splendid UNITAF's work during this period in its report on job."323 Somalia: All the coalition partners set up similar struc- The improved security conditions made it tures in the humanitarian relief sectors, ensuring a possible for United Nations agencies and standard method of working throughout the area NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] to of operations: weapons control policies were in strengthen their staff in Somalia, and numer- place in every sector; civil-military operations ous new [nongovernmental organizations] teams coordinated the needs of each sector's relief arrived. In addition to the WFPs [World Food Program's] stepped-up food deliveries, organizations and reported through the main civil- UNICEF expanded its operations, providing military operations center in Mogadishu; former medicines and staff to 16 hospitals, 62 moth- police were vetted into auxiliary security forces; er-and-child health [centers] and 156 health councils of local elders and clan leaders were posts throughout Somalia by January 1993, established to place responsibility for Somali gov- and together with its [nongovernmental ernance and security back into their own hands; organization] partners, helped feed over and patrols established the reach of UNITAF far 200,000 children a day. The World Health into the countryside. Where possible, coalition Organization opened a central pharmacy in DVIC DD-SD-00-00785 Marines of 2d Platoon, Company C, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion provide security for a convoy of United Nations trucks carrying food from Mogadishu to Baidoa.
112 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00845 Marines of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 15th Expeditionary Unit, board an American Trans Air L-1011 for the flight back to the United States. Mogadishu. Indeed, by January 1993, food done to make the deployment run more smoothly and medical supplies were getting through to or alleviate the harshness of daily life for the sol- almost all the towns of southern and central diers in the field. Restructuring and Redeployment Somalia, with immediate and dramatic results. Although many hungry, weak people were still staggering into feeding [centers], most could now be saved. Deaths from star- Before the end of December, General Johnston vation and disease fell sharply and, reflect- was ready to take an objective look at the force to ing the greatly increased food supply, by March 1993, cereal prices had fallen to a see how well it matched the mission in light of the third of their September 1992 level.324 progress of the past few weeks. General Johnston faced an interesting dilemma. With the success of the first two phases, the continuing arrival of While coalition forces were acting so success- capable coalition partners, and a less intense fully in the field, UNITAF command in threat than had been originally anticipated, Mogadishu was heavily engaged in two important General Johnston had to decide if it still made activities: shaping the force to meet the changing sense to bring in the major portions of two realities of the mission and preparing for the tran- American divisions. If not, he had to determine sition to United Nations control. By the end of what sort of force structure there should be in the December, with the end of Phases I and II and the theater to ensure the accomplishment of the mis- start of Phase III, there was an opportunity to sion. As General Johnston later stated, it was a oversee the development of the theater. The forces good thing to have "the ability to refine your deci- spreading out through the area of operations need- sions that were made ... before you started; you've ed attention and logistics support. There were got to have the flexibility of not feeling like you many things, small and great, which could be can't change."325
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 113 Even before the end of 1992, the composition assets. His guidance was that the force would of the American forces within the coalition draw back to the Army and Marine brigades, changed greatly from what had originally been which would mean reducing the current size of anticipated. It was already clear there was no need MarFor and the UNITAF headquarters as well. He for a force incorporating armor and artillery. Also, also directed that MarFor should plan to attain its it was clear a smaller force could perform the mis- light brigade size by 30 March.327 sion. Accordingly, MarFor cancelled its scheduled There were immediate changes at UNITAF deployment of two of its subordinates; the 1st headquarters. General Johnston later said he knew Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 1st Tank Battalion. the headquarters was heavy to start, but that was Thus, the last Marine unit to arrive was the 3d needed during in the early phases when planning Battalion, 11th Marines, on 31 December 1992. was critical. "But very quickly you don't need [a But this artillery battalion did not even draw its large headquarters staff.] Once you get into the howitzers from the maritime prepositioning force HRS [humanitarian relief sectors], I don't need all ships. It operated instead as a provisional rifle bat- that command and control. ... The guys on the talion with assigned security duties in Mogadishu.326 * ground doing the sweeps, the convoys, didn't need the headquarters anymore to plan all of these On 6 January 1993, General Johnston held a operations, so I was anxious to download head- meeting with his commanders and staff to discuss quarters."328 A joint personnel processing center restructuring and redeployment of forces. He stat- had already been established within the operations ed the intent had always been to build up quickly section by the end of December to take care of to provide overwhelming force, and then to draw non-unit line number movements out of theater.329 back. The question of how forces could be By the end of the year, personnel who could be reduced while maintaining a balanced structure spared from the headquarters staff sections were was freely discussed among the officers present. returning home or to their former units. Out of an General Zinni, the operations officer, remarked initial headquarters of 1,008 personnel, 225 were that the force did not need any more combat units. identified by the staff sections as excess and were In the ensuing discussion, it was recognized that redeployed.330 with the scheduled redeployment of the 3d General Johnston had to convince some offi- Battalion, 9th Marines, in about two weeks, cers in his chain-of-command that it was appro- MarFor would be at about brigade size. Looking priate to scale back the size of UNITAF at this at the Army Forces Somalia units that were com- time. As he said: "there has been some uneasiness ing in behind the Marines at that time, it was also on the part of Joint Chiefs of Staff and even recognized there could be a force composed of CentCom [Central Command] with this drawing one Army brigade and one brigade of Marines. down." But, as he also made clear: "It obviously From an initial heavy brigade structure, MarFor takes more forces to impose the security environ- could reduce its size to a light brigade, which was ment that we have created than it does to maintain about the size of the present Army Forces it." He saw the improving intelligence situation, Somalia. Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, and the ability to maintain mobility and firepower commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, in the reconfigured force, allowed him to continue voiced his concern that UNITAF should remain the security mission and prepare for the eventual joint, both within its headquarters and in its organ- turnover to the United Nations. He also knew, ization. He saw the mix of a Marine Corps however, that "I had to keep selling and convinc- brigade-sized force with light armored vehicles ing people [to] trust me. I'm the guy on the would work well with an Army brigade contain- ground and I know, talking to my commanders, ing aviation assets. General Johnston foresaw that what we can draw down to and still be able to han- UNITAF headquarters would have to be drawn dle any kind of eventuality."331 UNITAF Redeployment back as well, but would have to remain fairly robust to take advantage of national intelligence * This was not unprecedented. In October 1983, during the By 8 January, the UNITAF staff had developed invasion of Grenada, H Battery, 10th Marines, as part of the a three-phase plan for the reduction of the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, did not land their howitzers American forces. The first phase was to go from and served as an infantry company. 15 January to 5 February 1993, with MarFor and
114 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00874 A Marine 5-ton cargo truck is driven up the stern ramp of the MV Pvt Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004) at the port of Mogadishu. By late January 1993, the operation had accomplished its mission well enough to allow the command to reduce the size of UNITAF. Army Forces Somalia each drawing back to their for their continuing services. These important heavy brigade configurations. This would leave assets would be consolidated in an engineer group the Marine brigade with the 7th Marines, Marine or the naval construction regiment, both reporting Aircraft Group 16, and a force service support directly to UNITAF headquarters. In the final group. The Army brigade would be composed of phase, lasting from 21 February to 5 March, the the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, Task Force ground forces would be reduced to MarFor or Kismayo, an aviation battalion, a military police Army Forces Somalia light brigades. The pro- battalion, and a forward support battalion. Forces posed Marine brigade would consist of the 1st from the Navy and Air Force would be reduced as Battalion, 7th Marines (three rifle companies, a appropriate. Personnel from Operation Provide weapons company, a tank platoon, a light armored Relief, in Mombasa, would also begin to redeploy vehicle platoon, an armored assault vehicle pla- at this time. Special Operations Forces would toon, an engineer platoon, and a truck detach- remain at current strength. Also during this peri- ment), Marine Aircraft Group 16 (consisting of od, the Joint Task Force Support Command would eight CH-53D helicopters, four UH-1Ns, and four assume responsibility for the support of residual AH-1Ws) and a combat service support group. forces. The second phase was to begin on 6 The Army brigade would comprise an infantry February and last two weeks, until 20 February. In battalion, an aviation battalion (consisting of 15 this phase, the UNITAF headquarters, Air Force, UH-60s, 6 OH-58s, and 4 AH-1s), a military and Navy Forces would continue reductions. police battalion of two companies, and the for- Special Operations Forces would begin reductions ward support battalion. UNITAF headquarters, as appropriate. The Support Command would also Air Force Forces Somalia, Navy Forces Somalia, begin to draw back its strength, except for engi- Support Command, and the remaining personnel neer units since there was still a recognized need of Operation Provide Relief would continue to
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 115 reduce where possible. Some engineer units was, therefore, loaded onto the 1stLt Jack would redeploy, but others would remain to con- Lummus (T-AK 3011) and the 1stLt Alex tinue necessary support.332 Bonnyman (T-AK 3003). Throughout these evolu- This plan was forwarded to Central Command tions, any mission essential equipment was kept ashore in support of the Marines still in the area of operations.337 for approval on 11 January. Five days later, General Joseph P. Hoar gave his approval to the concept, but denied approval for the timeline. By the end of January, 15th Marine General Hoar stipulated that units would redeploy Expeditionary Unit also was putting its equipment only at his direction and that redeployment would through a rigorous maintenance effort, preparing be driven by events, not a time schedule. to embark on board the amphibious shipping. This Specifically, such events would be in one of two unit had earned well-deserved laurels in its work categories; an American unit would be replaced throughout the area of operations. At the begin- by an arriving member of the coalition, or the unit ning of February, these Marines, with pristine would be no longer necessary to the operation, as equipment, back loaded onto their ships. They decided by the commanding general of departed the Somali coast on 3 February to con- UNITAF.333 tinue their deployment in the Persian Gulf.338 The MarFor staff immediately began work on On 19 February, UNITAF ordered MarFor to the redeployment plan. The concerns were two- commence a reduction to the heavy brigade level. fold. They had to reduce the size of the force With the planning the Marines had already done, while continuing to conduct operations, and they and with the redeployments that had already had to maintain a balanced force throughout each occurred, this was easily accomplished. With stage of the reduction. Major General Charles E. most nonessential personnel already gone from Wilhelm had told General Johnston he could con- the theater, MarFor needed only to redeploy a tinue to conduct his mission with about a third of detachment of CH-53 helicopters from Marine the current number of troops.334 The MarFor plan Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 to reach the goal called for a reduction to a heavy brigade of about by the beginning of March.339 4,000 Marines and sailors by 31 January and to a The first days of that month saw a continuation light brigade of 2,000 troops by 1 March. In actu- of departures as residual detachments and person- ality, the dates were slipped in accord with cir- nel not part of the heavy brigade left Somalia. At cumstances, but the plan provided the basis for the the same time, preparations went forward for reductions as they occurred throughout the next three months.335 reduction to light brigade strength. On 9 March, MarFor began validating these movements, and The first unit to depart from Somalia was the on the 13th the realignment of its forces between 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which began boarding Bardera and Mogadishu began. By 17 March, the flights from Mogadishu airport on 19 January. 7th Marines, with its attached coalition forces, MarFor then had to reconfigure its forces, partic- had returned to the capital city while Task Force ularly the 7th Marines, to take the place of their Bardera remained in the city for which it was departing comrades.336 named. The same day, Colonel John P. Kline, Jr., An important part of the retrograde was the and his staff from Marine Aircraft Group 16, return of equipment to the maritime preposition- departed the theater, making Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 the MarFor aviation combat element.340 ing force shipping. Two of the ships, the PFC James Anderson, Jr. (T-AK 3002) and the Pvt Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), were scheduled On 21 March, the staff of the light brigade took to return to the Blount Island rework facility. over the watch schedules at the MarFor command Since these ships were to depart soon, equipment post. From that point on, in addition to their rou- that needed repair was loaded onto them. (Work tine of normal duties within Mogadishu and progressed so quickly that the reloaded Anderson Bardera, the Marines began to plan for the gradual was able to sail on 7 February, easily making its assumption of their security mission by coalition scheduled arrival date.) Also complicating the forces and for the transition of the operation to the operation was the possibility the maritime prepo- United Nations. The remaining staff of 7th sitioning force ships might be needed to support Marines performed operational planning, while another contingency. Equipment in good shape the residual MarFor staff worked on transition
116 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of the Turkish Armed Forces Turkish soldiers with an armored infantry fighting vehicle, outfitted with a 25mm gun and machine gun, patrol their sector of Mogadishu. planning.341 Major General Wilhelm departed was complicated because some Army units would from Somalia on the 23d and Colonel Jack W. remain in Somalia to support UNOSOM II. Army Klimp assumed command of Marine Forces plans therefore had to account for residual organ- Somalia. izations and establish a rotation schedule to allow Army units to return home after four months in theater.* Army planners were thus responsible for The size and structure of Army Forces Somalia were also changed. A field artillery battalion, an aviation company of CH-47 helicopters, and some both the arrival and departure of units during this subunits of the 710th Main Support Battalion left phase. Reducing numbers while keeping up capa- their major equipment on board ship, or had it bilities was accomplished through "constant mis- back loaded.342 Not all of these decisions went sion analysis" to "continuously reassess each unit unquestioned. The return of the CH-47s was a and piece of equipment deployed."344 source of complaint by the United States Army The first Army units to rotate home were a mix Europe, which had sent them. As General of organizations from both Army Forces Somalia Johnston explained: "it seemed like a require- and the Support Command, units that had either ment, initially. But very quickly after we got here, completed their assigned missions or had been we began to say `Do we need 47s?' Because ... replaced by coalition forces. These included two we've got C-130 capable airstrips where we need them to be, why do we need CH-47s? We're not going to go and make massive vertical * The Army's four-month rotation was a self-imposed assaults."343 requirement to facilitate transition planning and to provide an orderly flow of units in and out of theater. Under UNOSOM The Army Forces Somalia staff also had to plan II, Army units and personnel served tours of six months to for the redeployment of their units, but their work one year.
DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES 117 Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz Three armed Moroccan soldiers prepare to set up a defensive position on the grounds of the abandoned Somali National University in Mogadishu. signal battalion mobile subscriber equipment USA, was formed to ease the rotation. This cell companies; the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation; the continued to work in Somalia until the middle of 710th Main Support Battalion; and selected Army April. During that time several other Army units Forces Somalia staff. Later redeployments includ- arrived, including the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry; ed Task Force Kismayo; the 3d Battalion, 14th the 3d Assault Helicopter Battalion; the 10th Infantry; the 41st Engineer Battalion; and the Forward Support Battalion; and the 4th Platoon, 511th Military Police Company. 300th Military Police Company. As these units Under the four-month time limit in theater, the came into the area of operations, they transferred first rotation of units would begin in April. On 20 property from their departing counterparts. On 9 February, Army Forces Somalia requested that April, the "Warrior Brigade" took full responsibil- U.S. Army Central Command identify the organi- ity for all Army Forces operations in Somalia, for zation that would pick up responsibility for the the theater's quick reaction force, and for the Army's mission in Somalia. On 28 February, a Merka relief sector.346 Coalition Shifts reconnaissance party for the 1st (Warrior) Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, arrived in Mogadishu. The brigade advance party arrived on 30 March.345 Major General Arnold, the com- manding general of Army Forces Somalia, had The largest coalition forces assumed responsi- returned to the United States on 13 March. A tran- bility for all humanitarian relief sectors, but small- sition cell, under the assistant division command- er forces sent by many nations also were put to er for support, Brigadier General Greg L. Gile, effective use. These units were often only compa-
118 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA ny sized, but in the aggregate they formed a con- nine kilometers north of Mogadishu, and also con- siderable addition to UNITAF capabilities. ducted patrols in Afgooye and Merka. Egyptian Many of these coalition units were placed forces conducted patrols and provided security at under the operational control of MarFor. These the airport. Kuwaiti forces conducted mounted units were from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and dismounted patrols and provided security for Botswana, Zimbabwe, Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, the ammunition supply point. The Botswana and the United Arab Emirates.347 After working forces conducted security operations in the with their Marine counterparts at first, they were Bardera relief sector. Nigerian forces manned the later given their own areas of responsibility. These strongpoint at the K-4 traffic circle in central areas were generally within the city of Mogadishu and conducted patrols. They also Mogadishu, and often were at some key point or manned strongpoints in the northern part of the in the vicinity of the airport, which was where city and worked with the Somali auxiliary securi- most of them had their bivouacs. The Tunisian ty force in the vicinity of the presidential palace. forces worked directly with the Support By this time, United Arab Emirate forces were Command at the university compound that under the operational control of the Italian forces adjoined the grounds of the American Embassy. and conducted security patrols at the New Port Toward the end of the operation, with the and in the Villagio Bur Carole and Hamar Jab Jab departure of MarFor and portions of Army Forces areas of the city. The Greek force, a company of Somalia, these small units were given greater 110 soldiers, arrived in early March and were security duties. Situation reports for the last weeks placed under the operational control of the French forces at the Oddur relief sector to provide med- ical support from their base in Wajid.348 of April and the first days of May show these units at work throughout the city. To illustrate the scope of their activities, the report for 1 May notes that In this manner, all of the elements of the coali- Turkish forces, which had previously been con- tion helped maintain the secure environment, ducting security patrols in the vicinity of the par- which was the mission of UNITAF. Those mem- liament building and presidential palace, were bers of the coalition who were staying in Somalia then providing security for the embassy com- also were aligned within the humanitarian relief pound. Tunisian forces were providing security at sectors for their roles in UNOSOM II.* the American University complex. Saudi forces conducted night patrols and manned security posi- * It should be noted that many of these coalition members tions at the airfield. Zimbabwe forces manned two were from African or Muslim countries. Many of these con- strongpoints, conducted patrols in the northwest tributions were made from a feeling of support for their reli- part of the city, and established ran- dom check- gious or ethnic brethren in Somalia. For some it was viewed points. Pakistani forces (by that time composed of as a distinct obligation and the United Arab Emirates contin- gent used that very name for their unit. As Colonel Major four battalions) conducted motorized security Omar Ess-Akalli, the commander of the Royal Moroccan patrols in the northwest part of the city and forces told the author, Somalia was an African problem and manned numerous checkpoints. They were it was only right that Africans should be taking part in assist- responsible for security at the pump site located ing in the solution.
Chapter 8 Normality Begins to Return Logistics service support assets available to the Army, this command was organized around four specialized For the first few weeks of the operation, the 1st groups: the 36th Engineer Group; the 62d Medical Group; the 593d Support Group (Area); and the 7th Transportation Group.* In addition to the Force Service Support Group from I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) provided outstand- ing support to the Unified Task Force Somalia organic units belonging to these groups, the (UNITAF) as a part of Marine Forces Somalia Support Command also had the 2d Chemical (MarFor).349 However, by early January, the Battalion, the 720th Military Police Battalion, the group's ability to continue its prodigious effort 240th Quartermaster Battalion, and a special sig- was under a severe strain due to two develop- nal task force. This command also included per- ments. sonnel and postal companies, ordnance detach- ments, public affairs teams, and an air traffic con- The first was the growing size of UNITAF trol team. itself. By the middle of January, American forces and coalition partners were approaching a total of When fully assembled in the theater, the 30,000 soldiers. Since most of the supplies they Support Command could provide exceptional needed were coming from maritime preposition- support and strength to UNITAF. The difficulty ing force ships, of which four had been unloaded, was in the amount of time it would take to bring that figure was about 10,000 men more than what all of these soldiers and their equipment to would normally be supported from these Somalia; plans called for the Support Command sources.350 A related complicating factor was the to become fully operational on 28 January 1993. distance that separated some parts of the coalition. Until that time, UNITAF was dependent on the Transportation assets, such as trucks, fuel tankers, capabilities of MarFor's service support group and water trailers (commonly referred to as and the maritime prepositioning force. Although "water buffaloes") were critical for the continued stretched by great demands, these units were "per- success of the operation. Those available were forming their support well and exceeding expecta- being run hard on lengthy and rugged roundtrips tions."352 However, before the command was fully to outlying sectors. operational, it was necessary to task some service The other factor in the group's ability to con- support assets from Army Forces Somalia to tinue to support UNITAF was inherent in its very assist UNITAF. Selected 10th Mountain Division nature as an integral component of a Marine expe- units were consolidated to perform such critical logistics functions as water production and petro- leum distribution.353 This support lasted from ditionary force. When MarFor returned to the United States, the support group would have to go back as well. As Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston explained: "When you retrograde the * These units and the support systems they used were reflec- [Marine Expeditionary] Force, you retrograde the tive of the Army's structure and its need to provide support FSSG [Force Service Support Group], because we to corps and army levels ("echelons above division"). were part of I MEF, a package."351 Normally, a deploying Army division would be provided with a slice of the corps' support elements and the division These difficulties had been foreseen. The would have its own structures to coordinate and work with planned answer was in the creation of UNITAF's these higher levels. In Operation Restore Hope, however, the one functional subordinate command, the Support entire 10th Mountain Division did not deploy, and the 1st Command.* Relying on the significant combat Marine Division did not have the same structures in place to work with the Support Command, as did their Army com- rades. The Support Command also was responsible for pro- viding some support to the coalition partners. The command * The full name of this organization was the Joint Task Force had to adjust their traditional methods of doing business to Support Command, but it was sometimes referred to as the meet the demands of the theater and of the UNITAF struc- Joint Logistics Command. ture.
120 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00879 A Russian Antonov AN-124 Condor long-range heavy transport from the Aviation Industrial Complex, Ulyanovsk, waits to unload at Mogadishu airport. The aircraft was chartered to carry a load of supplies for Brown and Root Services Corporation, a U.S. Government contractor. about the middle of January until the end of the take up their duties, its staff looked to the future. month. The command was to have another, longer lasting The Support Command's units began to arrive mission than its support of UNITAF. It would in theater in late December, along with the com- become the main United States contribution for manding general, Brigadier General Billy K. United Nations Organization Somalia II (UNO- Solomon, USA. Although his command was not SOM II). As General Johnston explained in expected to assume the entire theater logistics March: "When you talk about the Joint Logistics Command, we always saw ... our U.S. role in this support mission until late that month, individual thing as long term. Yes, we had a mission, but I units assumed responsibility for their portion prior don't think anybody ever believed that we would to that date. For instance, on 15 January, the 7th draw every American out of here: that we would Transportation Group took responsibility for port have something for UNOSOM II and really operations from Navy Forces Somalia and MarFor.354 By 28 January, when the Support thought it would be in the form of logistics, strate- gic lift, which is why we formed the Joint Command assumed its total support mission, Logistics Command that would come in to replace responsibility for medical support, some food the [Force Service Support Group]."356 supply (class I), water, and petroleum, oil, and On 28 January, the Support Command com- lubricant (class III) supply operations were pleted its transition of responsibilities and fully already performed by command units. Support assumed the burden of combat service support in Command and MarFor ran in-theater movement the entire area of operations.357 By that time, the control jointly.355 command had established its headquarters in the Even as the elements of the Support Command American University compound, which adjoined were deploying into theater and just starting to the American Embassy grounds. Tunisian soldiers
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 121 provided the security for the compound and the center of such activity for UNITAF was the task command's headquarters.* force director of acquisitions. Under the original The most important function the command joint task force plan, MarFor contracting elements would provide was transportation, the nerve cen- were located in Kenya, from where they provided ter for which was in Mogadishu. "Because most goods services to their brethren in Somalia. Army of the force equipment and nearly all of the sup- Forces Somalia contractors were established in plies had to flow through the Port of Mogadishu, Somalia itself. As necessary, requirements could also be forwarded to contracting elements in the Middle East or in Europe.361 the port operations became the logistics center of gravity. The design of the [echelons above divi- sion] port support structure was critical to sustain- Army contracting officers operated under a ment operations."358 Although the port's size and double handicap. The Somali economy could only limited berthing space caused competition be described as sparse since there was little to be between arriving humanitarian cargo ships and gotten from local sources. There were also struc- military prepositioned afloat stocks, the 7th tural difficulties for them to work around. Army Transportation Group was able to establish an Forces Somalia had deployed its own field-order- effective command and control system for the ter- ing officers early in the operation, and these sol- minal operations. The group not only operated the diers were able to make small purchases of serv- port, it also controlled the inland distribution of ices and supplies for their units. The U.S. Army the supplies.359 component of Central Command imposed strin- The 593d Area Support Group was prominent gent restrictions on its subordinates in Somalia, in establishing the logistics distribution structure. most notably for the contract of labor services. A Once again, the long distances covered by waiver to these restrictions had been requested, UNITAF were a determining factor. The area sup- but was denied until the Army Central Command port group was specifically strengthened with contracting officer could confirm the needs. additional trucks, and those of the 7th Unfortunately, this officer had not yet arrived in the theater. Army Forces Somalia's judge advo- Transportation Group were also available for mis- cate reviewed the situation and determined the sions. To ensure supplies reached their intended ordering officers could make the necessary pro- users quickly and efficiently, the support group curements. Eventually, in coordination with Army established a series of intermediate theater sup- Central Command, an acquisition officer was war- port bases. These bases complemented each of the ranted as a contracting officer and deployed to the American Army and Marine divisions' own sup- theater. This officer had the authority to make pur- chases up to $100,000.362 port facilities. This made the distribution of sup- plies easier since security operations in the sectors were also conducted out of these fixed locations. Another contracting system, tried for the first In addition, the system kept down the requirement time during an active campaign in Somalia, was for additional combat troops because the logisti- the logistics civil augmentation program. The pro- cians could rely upon security from the combat gram contract with the civilian firm of Brown and units in these outlying sectors. In this manner, the Root was started in 1992 through the U.S. Army Support Command was able to provide direct sup- Corps of Engineers. These civilians, working ply maintenance support to the Army's non-divi- under contract, arrived in Somalia to perform sional units and backup support to both the Army logistics tasks that otherwise would have fallen to and Marine divisional units, as well as provide the soldiers and Marines themselves. For instance, common item supply support and services to the they provided laundry services by hiring local units of the coalition partners.360 Somali women to do the job. They dug wells and operated cranes and worked at the port. They gen- In the austere Somali environment, the ability erated power for the camps and they provided and to contract for goods and services was important cleaned portable toilets. Overall, the program was for provisioning complete logistics support. The regarded as a major help to the operation, although that help was expensive.363 Of a total of $33 million originally appropriated for the con- * The Support Command Site Security Force was originally tract, $7.5 million remained by 5 March, with $5 a Moroccan company (-), assigned to this duty on 4 January million of that fenced against the contractor's 1993. The Tunisians assumed the mission a few days later. demobilization and draw down costs. More
122 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00778 A tank truck is filled with fresh water from a desalinization plant for distribution inland. The U.S. Air Force's 823d Civil Engineering Squadron, also known as Red Horse, set up the plant at Mogadishu airport. money had to be requisitioned to keep these force had delivered a total of 845.5 thousand gal- important services functioning.364 * lons of water to the collection points.365 If transportation was a key logistics function, In those early days, when 1st Force Service the most critical commodity supplied to the troops Support Group was providing the logistics sup- was water. Drinking water alone was rated at four port, every means available was used to carry the to five liters per man per day. Water also was nec- water. For the 7th Marines' movement to Baidoa, essary for basic hygiene and cleaning clothing. water trailers were used and supplemented by There were no sources of safe, potable water in five-gallon "jerry" cans filled with water and Somalia when UNITAF arrived, so the coalition placed "in every nook and cranny of every vehi- had to take extraordinary measures to provide the cle." This allowed the Marines to carry 8,100 gal- precious liquid. lons on that initial trip. By the end of December, At first, ships in the port manufactured potable regular convoys were set for every other day, water. This was pumped ashore for transportation bringing 14,000 gallons of water to Baidoa and to the soldiers and Marines in the field. The Bardera on each run.366 But this effort, coupled importance of this source can be gauged from the with the need to resupply Bale Dogle, "stretched statistics in the situation reports of the maritime to the limit MarFor's ability to make and distrib- prepositioning force. On 15 January, for instance, ute water." Fortunately, Army Forces Somalia was the prepositioning ship MV 1stLt Jack Lummus arriving with its bulk liquid assets by that time. As (T-AK 3011) pumped 13.5 thousand gallons of these units became operational, they provided water ashore. By that date, the prepositioning relief to the burdens of the Marines.367 Another important source of water was in the * Brown and Root operated these logistics civil augmenta- ground of Somalia. The native population had tion support programs successfully in Haiti, Rwanda, and long centered some of their towns on deep wells. Bosnia. Army engineers and Navy construction battalions
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 123 DVIC DD-SD-00-00777 A water truck fills a large bladder, part of a tactical water distribution system. The 823d Red Horse Squadron set up the system and accompanying shower facility at Mogadishu airport. had the equipment to dig new wells or improve Commercial bottled water provided another those that already existed. The well water still had source of drinking water. Veterans of Desert to be treated before it was deemed potable, or Storm were familiar with the clear plastic liter even usable for washing. To achieve this, reverse bottles containing pure water that could be easily osmosis water purification units were put into distributed to the troops with their rations. operation. These specialized units used a series of Palletized loads were unloaded from ships direct- membranes, filters, and chemicals to purify the ly onto trucks for transport throughout the the- water. They could produce potable water from ater.* Troops still carried canteens, but they were fresh sources, brackish groundwater, or seawater. commonly seen with bottles of water sticking out The purified water was then stored in large inflat- of cargo pockets or next to them in vehicles. able bladders from which it could be pumped as The increase in water production and distribu- needed. By setting these units up in outlying areas tion had one other benefit for the soldiers and with wells, additional water was provided to the local troops.* Marines on the ground. By early January 1993, bath units arrived in the theater and set up mobile shower units. Even in the midst of the hottest day coalition troops could look forward to a few min- utes of refreshing cool showering in the evening. * There was similar work to improve the lot of the Somali To match the clean bodies, the contracts for laun- people as well. For instance, members of the 593d Area Sup- dry services provided clean clothing and saved the port Group repaired 18 of 20 wells serving Afgooye, and then improved the reservoir system of the city of Mogadishu. The level of the reservoir was raised from eight inches to more than two meters, increasing the total volume of avail- able water from 100,000 gallons to more than 3 million gal- lons. For the first time in two years, the people of Mogadishu * There was one notable incident in which a cargo ship could had running water. (593d Area Support Group, FY 93 Annual not be unloaded properly and a human chain of Marines was Historical Review, Fort Lewis: Washington, Dec93, p. 2.) used to pass bottles of water one at a time.
124 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00779 A KC-130 Hercules aircraft from Marine Aerial Transport Refueler Squadron 352 homebased at El Toro, California, delivers needed fuel through expeditionary distribution system at Kismayo airfield. troops the burden of washing their uniforms by Fuel was often delivered to outlying sectors by hand.* air. Early in the operation, Marine Corps and Air As water was necessary to the health of the Force C-130 aircraft were used to make daily coalition soldiers, so fuel was necessary to run flights to deliver fuel and other cargo. But as the Support Command became fully operational, the need for air delivery declined dramatically.370 their machines and vehicles. Like water, petrole- um had been identified very early in the planning process as a critical class of supply. An offshore The Support Command's 593d Area Support petroleum distribution system allowed this com- Group brought ample fuel transport vehicles for modity to be brought to the theater by ships, the task of bulk petroleum distribution. The real which did not have to use precious berthing space problem encountered was a shortage of trained at the port. The ships could stand offshore and drivers in some of the units. Army Forces Somalia remedied this by providing assistant drivers for these line-haul operations.371 pump the fuel to a storage and distribution point.368 By the middle of January, maritime Medical Care and Health Issues prepositioning force ships had pumped ashore a total of 470,300 gallons of JP-5 (jet fuel) and 517,000 gallons of MoGas (a motor gasoline fuel that can be used in some aircraft).369 Living in Somalia presented several serious threats to the health of the coalition soldiers, and UNITAF had to be prepared to deal with them all. * This chore, when performed by the troops, was not only As with nearly every other logistics function, drudgery, it was often futile. In the early days of the opera- there were two levels of support organizations at tion there was not enough water to get clothing really clean or to rinse it out properly. Leaving the damp utilities hanging work: the first provided the initial medical infra- from the lines of a tent or the branches of a tree then exposed structure and the second, within the Support them to the fine blowing sand, which made them stiff, gritty, Command, was meant to be the long-term solu- and uncomfortable. tion. At first, each of the American components
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 125 had its own medical units providing first-line sup- unit level, had to be aware of the condition of their port. These worked under the overall guidance of troops, constantly watching for signs of heat the UNITAF surgeon, Captain Michael L. Cowan, stress. An advisory issued to UNITAF soldiers USN. In addition, many of the larger coalition stressed that they should work on the "weak link" forces had their own internal medical organiza- principle; that when one soldier succumbed to tions. heat injuries or showed symptoms, the others After the possibility of wounds, the greatest would not be far behind. Regulating work periods, threat to the well being of coalition soldiers came resting, staying in the shade when possible, and from the very country itself. The hot and arid cli- forcing liquids were all recommended measures mate of Somalia posed a serious threat to to prevent heat casualties. UNITAF personnel. The intensity of the sun dur- Another environmental threat came from the ing the daytime and any physical exertion drained creatures and organisms that lived there. Some of troops of fluids and electrolytes. The greatest these were obvious; venomous snakes, spiders, safeguard against dehydration and heat casualties and scorpions could inflict painful and dangerous was a program of awareness. Leadership at all lev- bites. Other threats were not so easily noticed. els was necessary to ensure preventive measures Mosquitoes carried malaria, dengue fever, yellow were carried out. The first of these was the replen- fever, and other diseases. The bites of sand fleas ishment of water. But having water available could cause fevers and sores. Ticks carried hem- could do no good if it was not consumed in the orrhagic fever, typhus, and relapsing fever. Fleas proper amounts. Leaders, especially on the small were vectors for typhus, plague, and relapsing DVIC DD-SD-00-00821 Lt Patrick Cosmajkl of the U.S. Navy's Environmental and Preventative Medicine Unit, Naples, Italy, examines a slide under the microscope for confirmation of a suspected Malaria case in the 1st Medical Battalion Field Hospital in Mogadishu.
126 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00823 HM3 Anthony Pacino, USN, records a patient's vital signs in a ward of the 1st Medical Battalion Field Hospital. The use of mosquito nets was required because of the prevalence of malaria. fever. Mere contact with the ground or water deploying. Required immunizations were immune could make a soldier prey to parasites and dis- serum globulin, tetanus-diphtheria, oral polio, eases. Hookworms lived in the soil, as did mud- influenza, typhoid, yellow fever, meningococcal, worms and whipworms that could be ingested if a and measles. For malaria, the prophylactic meflo- soldier did not wash his hands before eating. quine was given to the troops on a weekly basis.373 Tetanus from puncture wounds was the real men- Captain Cowan recognized the challenge he ace. The worms carrying snail fever could enter a faced in guarding the task force's health as its sen- body from exposure to the water of streams, ior surgeon. The time-phased force deployment rivers, or ponds. Mud fever came from contact caused shortages of mosquito nets and insect with water or mud contaminated with infected spray, which had to be made up quickly. Apprising animal urine. Prevention for all of these included such simple practices as avoiding areas where General Johnston of the situation, Captain Cowan received the support he needed to get these items to the troops.374 He also began a campaign to edu- snakes, spiders, or scorpions might be lying. Clothing and boots were shaken out before put- ting them on and all personnel were warned to cate the soldiers and Marines about the benefits of avoid sleeping on the ground (all American per- so simple an act as washing one's hands frequent- sonnel were issued cots) or walking barefoot. ly. Lister bags and bars of soap were placed where Keeping trousers bloused and sleeves rolled down they were most needed, outside of latrines and helped avoid contact with insects, and repellants near the entrances to mess facilities. containing DEET (N,N-diethyl-meta-toluamide) To combat the spread of disease, Captain were issued. All personnel had mosquito nets for Cowan had three epidemiological units assigned their cots. If soldiers or Marines had to enter bod- to him. These units had a sophisticated serology, ies of water, they were warned to keep their parasitology, and bacteriology laboratory. They trousers bloused and to cover as much of their bodies as possible.372 were responsible for monitoring the health of the personnel of units in the field and going out to any Vaccines were available for the prevention of battalion aid station on the first sign of an epi- many diseases, and troops were inoculated before demic to stop it before it could take hold. These
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 127 DVIC DD-SD-00-00835 Maj Eric Edwards, USA, head nurse of Intensive Care Unit 1, 86th Combat Support Hospital, tends a wounded Somali who had been caught in a crossfire during a gunfight on a Mogadishu street. His left leg was severely wound- ed and eventually required amputation. medical specialists identified areas from which able to transport any casualty to Mogadishu with- diseases were spreading, enlisted local command in two hours. To answer this need, MarFor heli- emphasis for the preventive medicine programs, copters from the amphibious assault ship USS and stopped the incidents. An outbreak of dysen- Tripoli (LPH 10) were placed forward in such tery was stopped in Mogadishu. In Bardera, areas as Bardera, and they never missed the time occurrences of malaria and dengue were swiftly limit for a critical medical evacuation. A casualty brought under control.* Infected soldiers were clearing company in Mogadishu was ready to sta- brought from the outlying areas back to bilize patients and then forward them on. In the Mogadishu for proper treatment, and in most early days of the operation, this meant going to cases returned to duty in four days.375 the Tripoli, which was the only medical backup Medical evacuation was another health con- available in the theater. The combination of the cern. Again, the distances in the theater were a pervasive dust and the old style tents caused prob- factor. Specific helicopters were assigned to aeri- lems for the sterility of the clearing company's al medical evacuation and were required to be modern and sophisticated equipment. As Captain Cowan said: "This great new state-of-the-art [equipment] is in 19th century tents, full of dust. [The corpsmen] did a good job, but ... this [kind of * A Center for Disease Control study indicated the effective- structure] is definitely wrong, not for this climate, not for the desert."376 ness of the preventive medicine programs. Of the thousands of American personnel in Somalia during the time of UNITAF, there were only 131 incidents of malaria, of which The answer to many of the captain's concerns 83 appeared after the troops had returned home. (Center for Disease Control, "Malaria Among U.S. Military Personnel was within the Support Command. The initial Returning From Somalia, 1993," CDC MMWR Weekly, planning for medical support was based on the 16Jul93, pp. 524-526.) expectation of large numbers of casualties. This in
128 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA turn dictated the structure of the medical unit, the Mombasa because its length was too great for 62d Medical Group. In addition to an evacuation the docks there. So the 86th Hospital had to wait hospital, there were the three medical companies for its equipment to be brought in by air. This (one each for ambulance, air ambulance, and required adjustments to the time-phased deploy- clearing), two sanitation detachments, an epi- ment that interrupted the scheduled airflow, but demiology detachment, an entomology detach- the operations section's movements unit worked ment, two veterinary detachments, a dental wonders in getting the equipment into the theater. detachment, and one for combat stress control. The hospital was up and running by 6 January The group even contained its own medical logis- 1993. The hospital consisted of four operating tics battalion. The mission of this large unit was to rooms and more than 100 beds for patients, in- provide "comprehensive care to all U.S. forces cluding an intensive care unit with 12 beds. With involved in the security and humanitarian mission the establishment of the Army hospital, the Navy and to provide limited support to other coalition casualty clearing company was able to depart. The forces in the theater (i.e., on an emergency-only 62d Medical Group picked up all UNITAF med- basis)."377 ical responsibilities by 28 January.378 One of the 62d Group's first challenges was The number of American troops supported by receiving its planned hospital equipment. The the 62d Medical Group reached a peak by mid- Army barge-carrier vessel Green Valley (TAK January, then declined through the transition to 2049), which carried the 86th Evacuation the United Nations at the beginning of May. The Hospital's gear, had too deep a draft for the port number of combat casualties was not nearly as of Mogadishu. Not could the ship offload great as initially planned for. So the group, like at DVIC DD-SD-00-00858 Hospital Corpsman James Brown, USN, applies topical ointment to the arms of a Somali infant as part of the med- ical civic action program conducted in the streets of Mogadishu by medical personnel from MEU Service Support Group 15.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 129 DVIC DD-SD-00-00697 U.S. Air Force 1st Mobile Aeromedical Staging Flight personnel carry a patient from a Marine CH-46 Sea Knight hel- icopter at Mogadishu airport. other units, was able to scale back its personnel accommodating the long distances, and since ade- and organization for the follow-on medical units quate fixed medical facilities would not be avail- that arrived in early May. The surplus capability able in the country, the evacuation hospital also meant the medical staff was able to provide some remained. The continuing threat of disease dictat- services for Somalis, although this was not part of ed keeping a large preventive medicine capabili- their mission. It was always expected, however, ty.380 By early May, the 86th Evacuation Hospital that the American medics would treat any Somalis was replaced by the 42d Field Hospital, a smaller injured by American forces. Doing so had the facility with only 32 beds. In its time of support to additional benefit of maintaining skills. There also UNITAF, the 86th provided service to a large was a humanitarian aspect, the desire to treat an number of the force's soldiers and Marines: there injured fellow human being. But there was a two- were 4,914 outpatient cases with 971 Americans fold problem in providing treatment to these admitted for treatment.381 Somali civilians. First, they were taking up beds, Air evacuation was one of the most important facilities, and medical stocks that might be need- parts of medical planning. Original estimates ed should there be a sudden surge of American casualties.379 Second, there was the ethical dilem- were for 200 patients per week showing up at the battalion aid stations per 1,000 soldiers. The vast ma of how to provide care that exceeded that majority of this estimate was expected to be for which would normally be found within the coun- disease and non-battle injuries, with a smaller por- try at large. As Captain Cowan noted, "we can't be tion for combat injuries; but preparations still had the medical facility of Somalia." An answer lay in to be made for the movement of these persons assisting local doctors and care providers, and in within and out of the area of operations. The U.S. the use of the facilities of the hospitals provided Air Force's 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron by some of the coalition partners, such as the was tasked to develop the evacuation system for Swedes and the Moroccans. patients to third and fourth echelon medical facil- Even with American casualties lighter than ities. Two aerial evacuation crews supplemented expected, the 62d Medical Group had to maintain the squadron, one each from the 183d and 156th certain capabilities as it reduced the size of its Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons. The 1st force. An air ambulance was retained to continue Aeromedical Squadron was located with the Air
130 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Force's air mobility element and was composed of The debarkation ports for these movements were an aeromedical evacuation coordination center, a at Cairo West, Egypt, and Ramstein and Rhine mobile aeromedical staging facility, and the Main air bases in Germany. In some rare aeromedical evacuation liaison team. By 19 instances, casualties were flown directly from December, all aeromedical evacuation personnel Somalia to Germany on board strategic airlift had arrived in Mogadishu. A separate aeromedical using aerial refueling support.383 evacuation operations team and six evacuation For the first 90 days of the operation, the crews deployed to Cairo West Airport, Egypt, to support transiting evacuation missions.382 squadron moved a total of 304 casualties. Of these, 38 were sent out of theater. By 10 March, Since the battalion aid stations in the humani- the size of the aeromedical evacuation system was tarian relief sectors had only limited medical reevaluated in consideration of the actual needs of capabilities, the evacuation plan was set for the operation. On 19 March, all remaining 1st patients to be moved to the larger and better- Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron personnel equipped facilities in Mogadishu and Mombasa, redeployed and the evacuation mission was turned Kenya. At first casualties were taken to the over to U.S. Air Force Reserve component per- Tripoli. Later, as the Army's 86th Evacuation sonnel. The reserve airmen were stationed in Hospital became operational, patients stayed at Cairo West, and rotated into Somalia as that facility in Mogadishu or the one in Mombasa. required.384 Engineering Evacuation aerial ports of embarkation were established in the theater at Kismayo, Bardera, Gialalassi, Oddur, Belet Weyne, and Baidoa. The aerial ports of debarkation for these flights were UNITAF was provided numerous engineering in Mogadishu and Mombasa. Serious cases need- assets and capabilities. Some coalition members ing even higher levels of treatment were sent out brought their own engineer units, often specifical- of theater. Embarkation ports for these evacuation ly sent to clear mines and undertake local work missions were established at Mogadishu, projects. In addition, each of the U.S. Armed Mombasa, Djibouti, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Services had internal engineer units. Photo courtesy of the author A merchant ship carrying vital relief cargo arrives at the port of Kismayo shortly after coalition forces reopened that port.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 131 The task force's engineer staff consisted of 34 oversaw the work of the various engineer units of individuals from all Services. Under the leader- the components, ensuring it all fit within the task ship of Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA, the task force's requirements. The UNITAF engineers' force engineer, they were divided into two sec- mission was to "protect U.S. and allied troops; tions. The facilities section was responsible for repair and maintain needed sea and air ports, other real estate management and all related functions, logistics facilities, roads and bridges, and com- such as the location of the tent cities and bases, mand and control facilities; and construct bases to support coalition forces."385 hazardous waste storage, and coordination of vehicle parks and wash down sites. This section also managed critical engineer supplies such as The first engineering task was to improve and dust palliatives, plywood sheets, lumber, electri- repair the theater infrastructure. Ports and airfields cal, and concertina wire. The operations section were given top priority. In Mogadishu, the engi-
132 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA neers cleared the port's docks and warehouses. els for aircraft turnarounds, parking aprons, and They also acquired additional adjacent space and helipads. Similar work, but on a lesser scale, was more warehouses to increase the port's capacity. done at the airfields at Bale Dogle and Bardera. At In Kismayo, engineer divers removed sunken the former site, the Seabees worked alongside hulks and prepared the port to receive shallow- Marines of Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 to draft vessels. As the area of operations expanded, build landing and staging areas for CH-53 heli- repairs and maintenance were performed at each copters and taxiways and turnaround areas for C- of the airfields. 130 aircraft.389 As soon as the initial objectives were secured, The Air Force also had specialized engineers Marine engineer assets were quickly put to work for airfield repair. These airmen belonged to an at Mogadishu port and the airfield. As the opera- organization called "Red Horse," an acronym for tion moved inland, and as the coalition grew in rapid engineer deployable heavy operational numbers, these Marines brought their skills to repair squadron engineer. Like the Navy Seabees, new sectors. Soon they were helping build a bet- these engineer specialists provided assistance in ter quality of life for their comrades in the field. base camp construction. But their larger, and more They repaired roads and constructed base camps, important, mission was to "perform heavy dam- tent areas, heads, and mess facilities. Marine age repair" to facilities and utilities in an expedi- Corps explosive ordnance disposal personnel also tionary environment. The austere setting and destroyed confiscated ordnance and rounds and mines discovered in the field.386 degraded infrastructure in Somalia made these airmen key players in the operation.390 * The Navy supplied two mobile construction They went to work early. On 10 December, a battalions to the engineer effort. These "Seabee" team was testing the airfield at Bale Dogle for units were a part of the 30th Naval Construction serviceability for C-141 aircraft. With an Air Regiment. The first of the Seabees, a nine-man Force combat control team on hand and Special advance party, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 De- Forces soldiers for protection at the remote loca- cember and were immediately put to use repairing the runway lights at the Mogadishu airfield.387 tion, the Red Horse team used a specialized piece of equipment to check the runway surface. This The construction battalions' main mission was was a large, weighted rod that could be dropped to provide "vertical construction support" to the from a set height. The weight was dropped on the United States forces and coalition partners. This runway surface and the depth of its penetration translated to working on base camps in the relief was measured.391 Of the 10,500-foot runway, the sectors, to include building tent areas with wood- first 4,500 feet were determined unserviceable en decks and siding, latrines, showers, and mess and repairs were quickly begun. facilities. Like the Marines, the Seabees worked The Army's 36th Engineer Group was respon- on the main supply routes, grading shoulders to sible for one of the operation's most important widen the roads and making repairs to bridges. They also drilled wells and installed a new water construction projects. This was the repair of the pump for a refugee camp on the banks of the main supply network and the construction of what Jubba River near Bardera. They joined their became known as the "Somali Road." Marine counterparts in the Clean Street operations The task force staff recognized that improve- in Mogadishu and prepared the site for the Army ment of the road system would provide multiple evacuation hospital.388 benefits for the entire operation. First, it would Both mobile construction battalions were heav- enhance security by connecting all the humanitar- ily involved in the repair and maintenance of the ian relief sectors and reducing the travel time airfields in the theater. Relief flights by C-130 air- craft into Baidoa caused that airstrip to deteriorate * Red Horse teams moved into each of the relief sectors as early in the operation. Repairs involved removing they were opened, often accompanying the troops. The 300,000 square feet of the runway's asphalt sur- author watched one such team operating the morning after face and pulverizing it. This material was then the Italians secured Gialalassi airfield. When it was deter- mined the dirt runway was not sturdy enough to take the mixed with Portland cement and poured, graded, wear of heavy aircraft, the Red Horse engineers discovered and compacted to make a new surface. The an abandoned roller on a part of the field. They soon had it in Seabees then put down 600,000 square feet of repair and running across the field in an early attempt to AM2 interconnecting aluminum landing mat pan- compact and upgrade it.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 133 DVIC DD-SD-00-00891 Soldiers of Company A, 41st Engineer Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, celebrate the completion of a Bailey Bridge they erected between Kismayo and Jilib. The bridge was named for Sean Devereaux, a UNICEF worker killed while endeavoring to feed thousands of starving people in southern Somalia. between them. This in turn would mean that fewer Work began on 20 January 1993 and proceeded forces would be required in theater to cover the rapidly. Many difficulties were encountered but same amount of ground. Rapid-moving convoys overcome. Mine removal operations were neces- could more efficiently deliver relief supplies. Safe sary on some stretches to open the way to the inte- and quick movement on the roads would also ben- rior. Mines were a persistent problem throughout efit the people of the interior by providing them the entire area of operations and were not limited with a means of getting their products from farms to roadways, although they caused considerable and herds to markets in the cities. Contracted trouble there. Commander William F. Boudra, labor would provide jobs for local Somalis and USN, of the UNITAF staff described what the boost the overall economy. Finally, the roads engineers faced: would give the factions an easy means to move Massive quantities of land mines and unex- their forces and heavy weapons to transition sites ploded ordnance dotted roads and the and cantonment areas. The 36th Engineer Group Somalian landscape. Our forces encountered was given the mission of working on the main a variety of mines and other munitions man- supply routes and creating the Somali Road to ufactured by many different countries. connect all the sectors.392 General Johnston, Because operational procedures called for through his engineering staff, specified standards marking and bypassing mines and unexplod- for the road system: "All supply and resupply ed ordnance, we used minesweeping teams routes were made to carry two-way traffic at mil- frequently. Marking, however, had to be aus- itary load class 30 and used soil stabilization tere because any valuable materials would where possible."393 certainly be stolen. We settled on painting
134 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA mine warnings on rocks. Breaching mine Communications and [unexploded ordnance] areas to open routes was required on numerous occasions. Another important method to link the area of Several methods were employed. Teams operations was effective communications. For equipped with metallic mine detectors were UNITAF, this responsibility fell to the communi- used but their value was limited because cations section, whose members had to work most mines and ordnance were non-metal- lic.* Therefore, we used field expedient mine closely with the components and with the forces of the coalition partners. rollers made from locally procured and mod- ified construction compactors pushed by Colonel Robert G. Hill faced a daunting task as armored combat vehicles. This method the UNITAF communications officer. In early proved very effective. Both explosive ord- December, as he was building his joint team nance detachments and Sappers were put to through the Central Command administration work on countermine and [unexploded ord- officer, he was planning his own concept of sup- nance] neutralization operations.394 port for the overall mission and the courses of Other difficulties came from the condition of action. The communications section would be the road surface in various stretches, requiring responsible for identifying and sourcing needed decisions about whether these areas should be equipment, and then installing and operating it. repaired or bypassed. Where available, locally The system had to link the commander to his staff, procured surface aggregate was used to fill holes. the components, and the coalition partners, and had to provide support for operations, intelli- gence, and personnel and logistics functions.397 In other cases, the roadways were patched with mixtures of soil and cement, and dust palliatives were put down throughout the routes. Bridges The communications network would have to work were repaired or strengthened as necessary. In over long distances in theater and be able to reach some areas, the road had to be entirely rebuilt.395 literally around the world when needed, and be set The portion between Jilib and Bardera had to be up within the bare infrastructure environment that laid down on a different route through new terrain. affected every other aspect of the operation. In the Kismayo sector, two Bailey bridges were Prior to deployment, the communications sec- constructed and a third was set up in Bardera. tion worked with MarFor to set the basic commu- Five weeks of heavy, hurried labor completed nications plan. Communications nodes would be the job. On 24 February, the Somali Road was fin- established at each of the relief sectors as they ished. The engineer group had constructed or were secured. These nodes would be "constructed repaired more than 1,100 kilometers of roadways, around an AN/TSC-93 spoke terminal and would connecting all of the humanitarian relief sectors. consist of a switching capability, communications The interior of the entire area of operations was center, two high-frequency radios, two tactical satellite terminals, and a local area network serv- er."398 opened to the movement of relief supplies, the transportation of local produce, and the resettle- ment of refugees. More importantly, driving time Equipment came from a variety of sources. between sectors dropped dramatically. It had orig- Colonel Hill knew I MEF's normal equipment inally taken 26 hours to travel by vehicle from load could not meet the dual requirements placed Mogadishu to Kismayo; now it took only 12. on it, to support both the new task force head- Travel time between other sectors dropped by 50 quarters and the 1st Marine Division acting as to 75 percent. This major engineering feat was a MarFor. He therefore asked for augmentation of great success, one that contributed to the security satellite communications and single-channel radio of the force and the completion of its mission.396 systems through the joint communications sup- port element, an organization under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The communications ele- * In Oddur, the author saw a stockpile of several hundred ment controlled a pool of equipment to support cases of such antipersonnel mines. These were simply made two joint task force headquarters; some of this of wood with a hinged top for inserting the charge and a was duly allotted for UNITAF's use. This equip- small opening in one side for placing the detonator. These devices could be placed in the ground with pressure-sensitive ment provided the connectivity from the task detonators or rigged as booby traps with trip wires. With lit- force headquarters to the components, which then tle metallic content, they would have been difficult to find supplied the necessary equipment on their end. with traditional metal detectors. Internal support came from the 9th
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 135 DVIC DD-SD-00-00707 On a rise overlooking Mogadishu airport, TSgt Jack Richards, Sgt Derrick Hawkins, and A1C Charles Layne, of the U.S. Air Force's 5th Combat Communications Squadron, conduct daily maintenance on the microwave dish of a tropo satellite support radio system. Communications Battalion and the communica- using Air Force transmission systems, and Army tions company of the 1st Marine Division.399 units were using Marine gear. Overall, however, the ability to use whatever equipment was at hand was judged to have worked well.401 Communications with the outside world were established early in the deployment. The task force headquarters was connected to Central The need to be prepared to operate in a bare Command in Tampa, Florida, by a single-channel environment caused one noticeable problem. As tactical communications satellite. Satellite com- some units arrived they brought commercial satel- munications also were established between Fort lite equipment with them that would ensure reli- Meade, Maryland, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.400 able communications anywhere in the world. By attaching a STU-III, secure communications could also be achieved.* Ironically, the conven- A communications support element van arrived with limited telephone connectivity. This helped to expand internal communications, albeit on a ience of this equipment was also its greatest small scale. As the coalition's forces moved into weakness. This was a commercial system, and the relief sectors, connectivity was provided to there was an expensive cost to its use. Some units keep the soldiers and Marines on the ground had borrowed the equipment from their non- linked to the headquarters at Mogadishu. An early deployed comrades, creating an interesting dilem- problem was encountered when some component ma: who would pay the user fees, the owner or the forces arrived before their command and control assets. This led to borrowing of equipment among * TacSat, InMarSat, and STU-III (secure telephone unit, U.S. forces to ensure that all missions were prop- third generation) are all communications systems and pieces erly covered. As more equipment arrived, so too of equipment. TacSat is a military satellite system that uses did the opportunity to normalize things along communication repeaters that work with the terminal equip- Service lines. But, even by late January, there ment of land, sea, and air forces. InMarSat is a commercial were still anomalies. Because of the mix of units satellite communications operator that provides telephone, fax, and data transmission services to client ground, sea, and and missions there, the American components at air users. The STU-III is a voice encryption device that the port and airfield at Mogadishu displayed a cor- allows speakers to discuss classified matters over a telephone responding mix of equipment. Marine units were by scrambling the sound.
136 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA using unit? Colonel Hill soon recognized he had classified information. For them, liaison officers to get control of the number and use of these sets were assigned. These officers accompanied the in theater.402 partners in the field, and they carried the appro- Communications with the coalition partners priate U.S. communications equipment.403 In this presented some challenges. Where NATO mem- manner, all units of the task force, no matter what bers were operating there was no great difficulty their size or mission, were linked through because of the interoperability of equipment and UNITAF headquarters. procedures. For the other nations, all manner of A greater difficulty was communicating with communication issues had to be resolved. UNOSOM headquarters, even though it was Frequency assignment was a concern, but direct located less than a half mile from the UNITAF contact with the UNITAF frequency manager kept compound. Telephone landlines, which would all partners on separate networks. Communica- normally be an easy method of connecting with tions security was another matter that had to be U.N. forces, could not be used because the wire addressed, both among the United States compo- would have been stolen as soon as it was strung. nents and the partners. It would be inappropriate In addition, both headquarters used different radio for every organization in theater to be receiving its communications equipment. A solution was to own secure communications deliveries. So a joint issue hand-held radios, called "bricks," for both communications security management office was headquarters. Even then difficulties were encoun- formed as a central point for the delivery and dis- tered due to the different voltages of the battery tribution of all such messages and materials. This chargers each headquarters used. Such small mat- office also was responsible for working with the ters were difficult to foresee, but each was Defense Courier System to ensure the proper resolved as it was encountered through the appli- receipt of all such materials. But the non-NATO cation of a cooperative attitude and a desire to get coalition partners were not cleared to receive such the job done.404 DVIC DD-SD-00-00907 U.S. Air Force SSgt Rick Robinson of the 52d Combat Communications Squadron adjusts an SB3865 tactical tele- phone switch at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. The squadron provided communications support for the Air Force's Air Mobility element.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 137 DVIC DD-SD-00-00791 A soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) hands leaflets to several Somalis on the streets of Kismayo. Psychological Operations Psychological Operations Group (Airborne). The nucleus of the task force came from the 8th Lieutenant General Johnston knew the success- Psychological Operations Battalion and the ful completion of his mission would be greatly Product Dissemination Battalion. The 9th helped by a well-run psychological operation Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical) effort. "Having understood the potential impact of provided two brigade psychological operations PSYOP [psychological operations], I was support elements and eight loudspeaker teams. These last units were attached to the 7th Marines, and the Army's 10th Mountain Division.406 extremely interested in having PSYOP up front for this operation because I knew ... that it would prevent armed conflict. ... You come in with tanks The joint psychological operations task force and people think you're there to hurt them. had the mission of providing information and PSYOP worked well to convince [Somalis] that coordinating communications to two target audi- we were there with the military capability to take ences. The first group included those persons and care of the factions and their little armies--that organizations General Johnston had to work we were going to provide support and safety."405 closely with to accomplish the mission: the spe- To ensure this valuable support was planned cial envoy, UNOSOM, United Nations agencies, and integrated into the UNITAF operation, a joint and the humanitarian relief sectors. The second psychological operation task force was organized group was the Somalis, comprised of the general under the supervision of the director of opera- Somali population, the leaders of the factions, eld- ers from the clans and villages, religious leaders, and professionals and intellectuals.407 tions, Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni. This specialized task force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA, was The task force accomplished its information formed from elements of the Army's 4th dissemination mission through a variety of prod-
138 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00792 On the streets of Kismayo, a soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion distributes copies of Rajo, the Somali-language newspaper. The paper proved to be an effective tool in providing UNITAF information to the Somali people. ucts. Leaflets were easily produced and widely peace and reconciliation talks. Other features distributed. These small sheets usually had a col- dealt with public health information, articles orful picture on one side and a related message in about rebuilding the educational system and Somali on the other. Themes ranged from an police forces, and interviews with relief staff explanation of the purposes of the coalition forces members. One other popular feature was a cartoon to information about the dangers of mines and featuring a Somali named Celmi and his camel unexploded ordnance. These were distributed to Mandeeq. The conversations between these two target areas by aircraft. Throughout the operation characters emphasized the themes of the coali- several types of aircraft were used: Marine Corps tion's mission and what current operations were CH-53 helicopters; USAF and Canadian C-130 accomplishing. The first copy of this paper was Hercules airplanes; Army UH-60 and UH-1 heli- published on 20 December 1992, and it soon had copters; Navy S-3 Viking airplanes; and New a daily run of 15,000 to 28,000 copies, depending Zealand C-748 Andover airplanes.408 on the availability of paper. It was distributed to Another printed product was a Somali-lan- every town and village in which UNITAF soldiers guage newspaper named Rajo, the Somali word were deployed. The paper was apparently effec- for hope. The staff of the paper included soldiers tive in getting out UNITAF information to the from the 4th Psychological Operations Group, Somalis. As U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Robert civilian area experts, and Somali linguists. They B. Oakley later told the Rajo staff: "We are using produced articles about military operations in Rajo to get the correct information into the hands Mogadishu and the other relief sectors, relief of the Somali population and to correct distor- operations, redevelopment, and analyses of the tions. ... It has made a big difference. The faction
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 139 leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every once in a while [General Mohamed Farah Hassan] Aideed or Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] or one of the other faction leaders draws to my attention some- thing that appeared in the newspaper. So they're very, very sensitive to it and they know its power."409 In cooperation with the newspaper, UNITAF established a Somali-language radio station, also named Rajo. Radio Rajo offered the Somali peo- ple a choice from the faction-controlled radio sta- tions as a source of information. Twice a day, the station broadcast a 45-minute program consisting of news stories from the Rajo newspaper, world events, readings from the Quran, readings of Somali stories and poetry, and Somali music. The broadcasts were designed to encourage the Somali factions to settle their differences and rebuild their country. There were several specific themes the DVIC DD-SD-00-00812 station staff wove into the broadcasts. These were A young Somali boy holds one of several leaflets pre- to emphasize the neutrality of the coalition and pared and distributed as part of UNITAF's psychologi- ensure listeners that the rules of engagement cal operations effort. The leaflet portrays a Somali man would be applied fairly against all factions as nec- shaking the hand of a U.S. soldier, thereby emphasiz- essary; to highlight the capabilities of the coali- ing that the United States was in Somali as a friend try- tion and the work its members were doing, espe- ing to help end the suffering. cially those from African or Islamic countries; to encourage disarmament and highlight the agree- emphasis to the coalition messages in the Rajo ments made by the faction leaders; to reinforce paper and radio broadcasts by meeting with vil- the idea that only the Somali people could resolve lage elders and local religious leaders.412 their problems and encourage the rebuilding of Psychological operations teams supported the country's social infrastructure; to encourage every UNITAF action from the very start of the displaced people to return home and harvest or operation. On 9 December, loudspeaker teams plant crops; and to emphasize that there would be accompanied the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit no change in the rules of engagement or capabili- during the initial landings. A Marine CH-53 car- ties during the transition from UNITAF to UNO- SOM II.410 ried a team for the first leaflet drop over the city of Mogadishu. After that, loudspeakers and leaflet The radio station was located at UNITAF head- drops were a part of each movement of coalition quarters in the U.S. Embassy compound. It broad- forces into the relief sectors. Two to three days cast on a combination of midwave and shortwave before the arrival of UNITAF soldiers into a town, frequencies. With extensive adjustments to the the teams dropped special handshake leaflets that transmitting antenna, the Rajo shortwave pro- depicted a Somali and a coalition soldier shaking grams could be received in every city and town in each of the relief sectors.411 hands and explained the mission of the coalition to assist the relief operations. While emphasizing One other method of getting out the UNITAF the peaceful intent of the coalition, these leaflets message was through loudspeaker teams. also clearly stated that UNITAF was prepared to Accompanying troops during operations, these take any necessary action: "We are prepared to teams broadcast surrender appeals and gave use force to protect the relief operation and our instructions to crowds or to Somalis in arms mar- soldiers. We will not allow interference with food kets or at roadblocks. The team members helped distribution or with our activities." After UNITAF to distribute copies of the Rajo newspaper. They forces moved into a sector other leaflets were also worked closely among the people, gathering dropped over the cities and villages and along the important information and assessing the security routes leading to it. These showed Somali people environment. They gave an added, personal waving to a guarded convoy of relief trucks, and
140 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA explained: "We are here to protect relief convoys." Civil-Military Operations They also warned: "Do not block roadways! Force will be used to protect the convoys."413 While most of the structures created by Loudspeaker teams were conspicuous during UNITAF were internal, that is, created to assist its the Marine assault against the weapons storage own forces in accomplishing the mission, there sites in Mogadishu in early January and in the was one that looked externally, to the humanitari- an relief organizations. These organizations, Army's efforts against the forces of Mohamed working directly with the people of Somalia, were Said Hirsi (General Morgan) in Kismayo in the link between the military security mission and February. They accompanied coalition forces on the end of famine. They worked in a wide variety sweeps of arms markets and during Clean Street of areas, distributing food, providing medical care operations. Special leaflets explained the intent of and assistance, helping with agricultural and vet- these operations and in February a very specific erinary problems, assisting refugees and displaced one was directed at the forces of General Morgan. persons, digging wells for clean water and work- The leaflet explained the ultimatum issued by the ing on other small civil projects. They occupied a UNITAF commander and told Morgan's men they unique place in the mosaic of the operation; must move by the deadline of 25 February, "or manned by civilian staffs and controlled by indi- risk destruction."414 vidual parent organizations, they were highly independent. They also were an important part of These task force activities were of great value the solution to Somalia's woes. They truly were to UNITAF, clearly demonstrating a benign and partners in the operation, and their needs had to be neutral stance balanced with a will to use force if considered and met. necessary. Speaking of the loudspeaker teams, The relationships with the relief organizations Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, the MarFor did not have to be created entirely from whole commander, summed up the value of the psycho- cloth. During his time in Operation Provide logical operations efforts: "They reduced the Comfort in Iraq, Brigadier General Zinni had seen amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing the value of establishing an entity to coordinate Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."415 civil and military efforts. He wanted to repeat the DVIC DD-SD-00-00790 Soldiers from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion ride in a humvee broadcasting messages to local Somalis gathered on a street in Kismayo. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division walk alongside providing security.
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 141 process used in the Kurdish relief operation by tions with specialty interests such as agriculture, establishing a similar group in Somalia.416 Also, sanitation, health, and education. The loose con- the United States Government, through the State nections of all these groups into one organization Department, had created a number of organiza- meant it had little real authority. The director tions whose primary mission was to provide dis- responded to the U.N., and the deputies to either aster assistance and economic aid, as well as fur- the Agency for International Development or nish the structures by which these could operate in UNITAF. The relief agencies were responsible to foreign countries. their parent organizations. The center was able to As early as August 1992, the United States do one thing well; it established the forum for all Government had been supporting the relief organ- these organizations to discuss and coordinate their izations in Somalia through these agencies. The needs and efforts. The main center was estab- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a part of the lished with the U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu on 11 December. Thereafter, a center was estab- lished in each humanitarian relief sector.418 United States Agency for International Development, had established a disaster assis- tance response team for Somalia. Two disaster Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, a veteran of response teams also operated in Nairobi and cyclone relief operations in Bangladesh, had been Mombasa, as coordinating agencies for Operation the chief of staff for Operation Provide Relief Provide Relief.417 With the military intervention in since August. He was, therefore, familiar with December the requirement grew for closer coop- many of the key players in the humanitarian oper- eration among all parties. ations community, whether they were United During Operation Provide Relief, humanitarian States Government workers or relief organization relief organizations had already begun to tax the personnel. He was selected to be the military military command with requests for assistance. To deputy director of the humanitarian operations center and head the main civil-military operations cell in Mogadishu.419 reduce these direct requests and to coordinate the military response to them, a humanitarian opera- tions center was established. This center was As part of the operations center, the cell was staffed with military officers, workers from the the clearinghouse for requests of the relief organ- Agency for International Development and some izations for military support such as convoy relief workers. This worked well for Provide escorts, security of facilities, space-availability on Relief, and so a center was established in military flights, and technical assistance.420 Mogadishu for Restore Hope. The operations cen- Colonel Kennedy saw his duties as working in ter had a simple mission: to plan, support, and two directions. The cell was the link for the relief monitor the delivery of relief supplies; but it had a organizations to the military of UNITAF and complex organization, reflecting the mix of mili- UNOSOM. He also had to work closely with tary, governmental, international, and civilian Ambassador Oakley and the UNITAF staff to humanitarian aid members. The director was coordinate their support. He assisted the humani- Philip Johnston, a United Nations official and a tarian organizations to define their logistics member of UNOSOM.* There were two deputy requests so they could get what they actually directors; one, a civilian, was from the response needed, such as the berthing of relief ships, the team, and the other was a military officer from staging of containers, and setting convoy routes UNITAF. The center contained a standing liaison and times. Colonel Kennedy saw the cell needed committee, composed of members from UNO- to be an institution that continued beyond the life SOM, UNITAF, the disaster assistance response of UNITAF. He therefore worked with the team, United Nations and Red Cross agencies, Japanese, Germans, Canadians, and others in the and an executive committee to represent the non- solicitation of funds. He also was involved in the governmental organizations. A bloc called the development and implementation of relief policy, "Core Groups" represented those relief organiza- working with the United Nation's 100-Day Plan, and creating a similar plan through 1993 for pres- entation at the Addis Ababa conferences.421 * Philip Johnston was then the president of CARE USA, and The main cell in Mogadishu did not have a had been appointed by United Nations Secretary General large staff, but it was a busy organization. There Boutros Boutros-Ghali to lead a 100-day action program for were daily meetings to which all relief organiza- accelerated humanitarian assistance in Somalia.
142 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz Representatives of the major humanitarian relief organizations gather for a daily meeting in the civil-military opera- tions center in Mogadishu. Based on a similar organization established during the Kurdish relief effort in Iraq, the center endeavored to coordinate the civil and military efforts. tions were invited, along with representatives of ability, and the repair and condition of the road the United Nations and the disaster response system.422 teams. This was in keeping with Colonel Ken- Just as each relief sector had a humanitarian nedy's desire to be inclusive. These meetings operations center, each also had its own civil-mil- were used to discuss upcoming humanitarian itary cell, which maintained contact with Colonel operations, exchange information, and pass on Kennedy's central organization in Mogadishu. intelligence. The main cell also had a variety of These small teams of Marine or Army officers relief-related responsibilities. It promulgated and worked closely with the sector commanders and explained UNITAF policies to the relief organiza- helped provided the same types of support to their tions, and it worked closely with the UNITAF op- local relief organizations. They also were given erations section in conducting mission planning latitude to work with the local security commit- for requests that needed complicated support, tees and councils. required more than one military unit, or that in- Convoy escorts were probably the most visible volved more than one organization. It chaired the support the military gave the relief organizations. Mogadishu port shipping committee to coordinate When an organization was expecting to move a access to the port and pier space. It maintained a convoy of trucks loaded with relief supplies, they 24-hour watch to respond to emergency requests filled out a standard request and submitted it to the from relief organizations and coordinate them operations cell at least 48 hours in advance. The with the UNITAF staff. It also helped to create a cell then tasked either a U.S. or coalition partner food logistics system for the organizations. This with escort duty. The relief organization and the system monitored food stocks, tracked delivery military unit then had authorization for direct liai- dates, listed warehouse capacities, transport avail-
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 143 son. The component or coalition partner control- every place needed UNITAF protection every day, ling the relief sector that a convoy was going to there were times when threats, real or perceived, was generally tasked with escort duty. Convoys made it appropriate to call for such assistance. going to those sectors closest to Mogadishu At such times, staffs of the relief organizations (Baidoa, Bardera, Merka, and Gialalassi) received could call a "911-type" emergency number in the security escorts all the way to their destinations, civil-military operations center. The request was but farther districts would split the responsibility. then passed on to the UNITAF joint operations For instance, if a convoy was going to Belet center, where it was assigned to a component or Weyne, the Italians would escort it beyond coalition unit. Again, this was an easy process, but Gialalassi, and the Canadians would meet them and take it the rest of the way.423 it had its limitations. First, there were four levels the request had to go through: the relief organiza- This was a rather simple process that worked tion; the civil-military operations center; the joint well. For the first 90 days of the operation, operations center; and then on to the military unit. UNITAF averaged 70 escorts a month, with Response time was increased, therefore, by the monthly averages of 700 trucks carry 9,000 met- request moving along this chain, no matter how ric tons.* Convoy security gave the relief organi- quickly each entity tried to pass it on. Also, there zations an additional benefit; they could use were numerous sites that might have to be guard- trucks to move food to distant areas, so they could ed. Mogadishu alone had 585, and there were provide more food at less cost than they had been more throughout the rest of the area of operations. able to bring in by airplane. This security not only Consolidation of facilities and spaces could have allowed the World Food Program to bring in its eased this problem, but the relief sites remained own fleet of trucks, but also increased competition dispersed.426 among the local transportation providers, further lowering costs.424 In addition to simple security needs, the relief organizations also required advice and, from time There were some difficulties. Coordination to time, direct assistance. Brigadier General between relief organizations and military units Zinni, in an assessment of the operation made in was not always perfect. Occasionally an escort March, saw it proceeding on three tracks. There unit was not informed of delays in the formation were the obvious military and political portions. and start times of convoys. Locally hired trucks Then there was the humanitarian aspect, which he were subject to breakdowns, often the result of described as going beyond the "short-term sense deliberate sabotage by their drivers who sought to of getting food and emergency care to the people obtain a portion of the shipment when the rest of that are in jeopardy, but it's also the long-term the convoy had to proceed without them. There reconstruction in terms of getting public services were some days when there were simply not started: hospitals, public works, that sort of enough assets to provide security for all the thing."427 He had praise for Philip Johnston and requested convoys. Some would have to wait, but his work with the United Nations in the humani- eventually all convoys received an escort.425 tarian operations center, and the establishment of Convoys were not the only humanitarian relief the plan for the development of the country. But organization assets that required security. The providing the kind of actions envisioned was dif- organization oversaw hundreds of offices, ware- ficult. houses, distribution centers, clinics, and housing The problems with giving this kind of assis- for their staff personnel. These facilities, located tance were limitations under United States law of throughout the country, often fell prey to bandits what the military could provide and the obscure since they contained food, medicines, and cash. boundary between legitimate civil affairs-type Many of the relief organizations hired armed activities and nation-building, which was to be guards before the arrival of UNITAF. These mer- left to the United Nations. Within this gray area, cenaries were often unreliable and prone to resent however, there was room for work to be done by any attempt to fire them, in which case they the troops in the field. As Colonel Kennedy said: became a threat to their employers. While not "the [Civil Affairs] program has been laissez- faire; do it if you want to, do it if you can."428 The money that could be legally spent on such projects * These figures are only for convoys going out of Mogadishu, and do not count the convoys traveling inside the was limited (a small amount of operations and city. maintenance funds), as was the ability to define it
144 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz UNITAF's chief engineer briefs humanitarian relief workers on new and ongoing projects at the civil-military opera- tions center in Mogadishu. as work that benefited UNITAF and thus assisted its with security sweeps of the area between the the overall security mission.429 airfield and the port. These actions helped to sta- bilize the neighborhood and make it safer for UNITAF troops.430 Out in coalition units, soldiers and Marines had the desire to help the Somalis in more positive ways than simply providing security. They had Later, MarFor in Mogadishu worked closely another necessary asset; time in their off-duty with local schools. The Marines saw two benefits hours to volunteer for such work if they so to these actions. Schools represented a piece of wished. It was not long before commanders took normality for the population, and they would keep advantage of these attributes of their troops. On 24 children off the streets and away from trouble and December, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold, com- harm. The Marines wrote to relatives and friends manding officer of the 15th MEU (SOC), initiated at Marine Corps Bases Camp Pendleton and Project Hand Clasp, a program to assist schools, Twentynine Palms, California, soliciting school orphanages, and other organizations in the town supplies. The United Nations Children's Fund of Baidoa. Through these actions, Colonel provided special educational kits for teachers, Newbold sought to maintain a benevolent image school staff, and students. These were given to of his Marines in the minds of local Somalis. The schools close to the soccer stadium, a main work had the added benefit of keeping up the MarFor site, and one was sent on to Bardera. In a morale of the MarFor personnel involved. In particularly dangerous area of Mogadishu, which January, these Marines began Operation warring factions claimed, the schools needed Renaissance in Mogadishu. This civil affairs oper- more than just supplies. The presence and activi- ation combined medical and dental assistance vis- ties of a MarFor civil-military operations team at
NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN 145 these schools kept them from being attacked or You could see them blossom. ... The shops looted. The team also contacted the World Food were open, the kids were in the street, chil- Program on behalf of the teachers and staff and dren were now taking the donkeys and water procured supplies of corn, cooking oil, and burros and getting [containers] filled without sugar.431 the adults there with them. You saw bicycles on the street, kids playing soccer, children In the farther relief sectors things were happen- carrying bags of rice, which they weren't ing in much the same fashion. Colonel Werner able to do several weeks before because they Hellmer, the MarFor officer-in-charge of the civil- got robbed. The storefronts, the signs were military operations center, had established civil- being painted. You saw electricity in Baidoa. military operations teams in Bardera and Baidoa. ... They were rebuilding places. The econo- Working on the adage that actions speak louder my was starting to thrive. The marketplace than words, the Marines in these sectors, noted was open. There was music. People in the Hellmer, "get actively involved with the people ... streets sitting in front of their houses now one on one. ... We went out there and got involved, without barricading themselves in the com- saw what the people wanted, how we could help pound. Those are just the changes we saw them, and we did that."432 What they got involved within thirty days.434 in was the provision of security to wells, protec- During the third phase of the operation, suc- tion of schools by visible patrolling, and assis- cesses were observed throughout the theater. tance to schools and orphanages. Repairing water Coupled with the decrease of violence and the mains, leveling of school grounds, repairing class- improved security situation, many members of room spaces, and other small maintenance proj- UNITAF felt their part of the task of restoring ects were coordinated with Marine combat engi- Somalia to the community of nations was close to neers and Seabees. Materials were not specifical- an end. They hoped they might soon return ly requisitioned for the projects; but in a land home, but for that to happen the United Nations where any building materials were scarce, scrap ad to be prepared to accept the mantle of respon- lumber was kept and used for such purposes.433 sibility. These experiences of the Marines were not Chapter 9 unique. They were repeated in all the other sec- Transition and Return tors, whether run by Army Forces Somalia or a United Nations Relationship coalition member. Within a short while, the secu- rity operations, the work of the relief organiza- tions, and that of the civil-military operations teams all had their effect on the daily lives of the Somali people. As Colonel Hellmer said of From the very beginning, United States mili- Bardera and Baidoa: tary and civil leaders maintained close ties to their
counterparts in the United Nations. Senior U.S. Government officials met with the U.N. staff "two or three times each week" about the Somalia operation.435 By January 1993, military planners from U.S. Central Command were in New York "to assist the undermanned U.N. Military Staff Committee in developing its concept of operations and list of logistics requirements. Those planners remained avail- able to the United Nations while it stood up a functional staff in Mogadishu in April."436 It was much the same in the field. Iraq's Ismat sition period. "The key to the fourth phase is the T. Kittani, the special representative of the U.N. structures to provide security and basic Secretary General of the United Nations, met reg- humanitarian needs. Nations of the world must ularly with his U.S. counterpart, Ambassador provide funding and forces. The presence of secu- Robert B. Oakley. In particular, Kittani attended rity forces will be needed for a while. The factions the very first meeting between Ambassador must reconcile their differences and agree on how Oakley, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, to restructure the government. The U.N. must help and the faction leaders on 11 December.437 with basic services and infrastructure to allow Thereafter, the military and political sides of them to be self-sustaining: [these are] growth and Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) worked exports, security forces, police and militia, politi- closely with the U.N. staff, most notably Lansana cal development, humanitarian services."440 Kouyate of Guinea, the deputy U.N. special rep- The difficulties facing the United Nations in resentative, in establishing and running the Addis Ababa conferences.438 On the military side, fielding its UNOSOM II force reflected its differ- ences from UNITAF in operational capabilities General Johnston's staff maintained close cooper- and goals. The operation in Somalia presented the ation and exchanged liaison officers with U.N. with many challenges, and, as an interna- Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen's United tional organization, it had to work its way through Nations Organization Somalia (UNOSOM) staff. them in accordance with its own structures and The UNITAF operations staff was especially help- diplomatic methods. As Secretary General ful to UNOSOM by drafting the plans for disar- Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, the operation in mament and ceasefire that came from the initial Somalia was distinct from nearly every other Addis Ababa talks. Also, Marine Colonel Kevin operation in which the United Nations had been M. Kennedy, from the UNITAF civil-military involved. operations cell, was the military deputy director of the humanitarian operations center, headed by There was no precedent for the organization Philip Johnston, a United Nations appointee. [U.N.] to follow as it embarked on this course, no example but the one it was about This close cooperation would be strained as to set, and there were many unanswered time went on. By early March, UNITAF had questions about the undertaking to which the accomplished much in terms of creating security, international community had committed ending famine, and helping to encourage reconcil- itself. Would member Governments con- iation and the reconstruction of social structures. tribute sufficient troops, including the neces- The members of UNITAF also knew they were sary logistics elements, and place them never intended to be the long-term solution to under the command of the United Nations? Somalia's problems; that work fell more appropri- Would these forces be deployed in time for a ately to the United Nations. Unfortunately, the smooth transition from UNITAF? Would the U.N. was slow in coming. Brigadier General troop-contributing countries follow through Anthony C. Zinni summed up the general feeling on an enforcement mission if hostile action at this time: "I think the process [of reconcilia- by one or more of the factions led to casual- tion] is well along the way. I think the faction ties among their troops? And would member leaders and the Somalis are ready to begin the states be willing to pay for what would process. Frankly, I don't feel the U.N. is prepared inevitably be an ex-pensive operation at a at this point ... though I feel they've got to deal rel- time when the United Nations peace-keep- ing budget was growing faster than at any point in its history?441 atively quickly because they cannot lose this win- dow of opportunity when everyone appears very cooperative."439 General Zinni also was clear The United Nations did not have a readily about what was necessary for the U.N. to be suc- available body of troops, nor did it have command cessful in taking over responsibilities in this tran- elements from which it could draw to construct its
148 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA new UNOSOM II force. These would all have to heavy weapons to parts of Somalia where be solicited from member states, and this would the task force had not been deployed and take time. bide their time. The problems of reconcilia- Even more important to the United Nations tion, disarmament, and demobilization were were the conditions it saw as necessary to be in national in character and thus required UNITAF's presence throughout the coun- try.442 place for the transition. The question of building organizations and military systems was the easier of the U.N.'s two hurdles in taking over the oper- This was very different from UNITAF's per- ation. The second, and more difficult, concerned ception of its mission. As General Johnston stated specific aims for UNITAF. In a letter to President in February 1993: "I had specific guidance ... that George H. W. Bush on 8 December, the Secretary- our mission was focused on an area that required General emphasized two conditions, which he be- humanitarian relief. Quite frankly, disarmament lieved to be important for a successful transition: was only required for us to conduct our humani- The first was that UNITAF, before its with- tarian mission."443 At the next level of the chain- drawal, should ensure that the heavy of-command, General Joseph P. Hoar, the com- weapons of the organized factions were mander in chief of Central Command, agreed with brought under international control and that General Johnston's assessment: "Disarmament the irregular gangs were disarmed. The sec- was excluded from the mission because it was nei- ond essential condition for a successful tran- ther realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environ- ment for relief operations."444 sition, I believed, was for UNITAF to exer- cise its mandate throughout Somalia. ... Countrywide deployment was indispensable as the militias could simply withdraw their Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz On 3 April 1993, representatives of the 16 Somali factions meet at the United Nations headquarters in Mogadishu to discuss disarmament. At the head of the table is BGen Imtiaz Shaheen, Pakistani Army, UNOSOM I military com- mander.
TRANSITION AND RETURN 149 Ambassador Oakley stated the United States ment delayed high-level approval for shipping Government's position in even more detail a few units out of Somalia.446 years later: The draw down was also affected by events in The United States was convinced that the area of operations. The confrontations despite its own military superiority, the between factional groups under Mohamed Said Somalis would fight rather than give up all Hirsi (known as General Morgan) and Colonel their weapons under external coercion. Ahmed Omar Jess in Kismayo in February and Complete disarmament of all the factions March were handled quickly by UNITAF, but they would have required at least a doubling of were indications the situation was still volatile. To the UNITAF personnel and, almost certain- U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali "the events ly, would have resulted in substantial casual- in Kismayo were a serious violation of the cease- ties, as well as a disruption of humanitarian fire and a setback to hopes that the factions would operations. hand over their heavy weapons. Action by just one The United States was prepared to support faction was enough to risk unraveling the progress made in Addis Ababa and jeopardize the delicate stability established by UNITAF."447 UNITAF did and assist the United Nations on the broader, long-term issue of beginning a systematic program of voluntary demobilization and not see the situation as being so delicate as did the disarmament under United Nations auspices, U.N., but these actions did delay the return of some U.S. Army units from Kismayo and slowed the overall reduction of units.448 but not willing to accept formal responsibil- ity for this long-term, major program. Its UNITAF partners agreed with this proposal With the slower pace of the reductions and the and were prepared to participate. The United wait for the arrival of UNOSOM II, UNITAF con- Nations, however, refused responsibility. tinued its work from February to May. One addi- Consequently, the program was not under- tional aspect, on the political side, was to support taken.445 the next round of talks in Addis Ababa in March. This wide gulf continued throughout February, Lansana Kouyate led this important confer- March, and April, and it would affect the eventual ence, sponsored by the United Nations. The talks transition. The result was a dilemma for both opened on schedule on the 15th and continued for sides. For the U.N., the difference between its ear- 12 days. All factions were represented except the lier peacekeeping missions and this one of peace Somali National Movement, which controlled the enforcement meant it had to have a military northwest portion of the country it declared to be organization of comparable size and strength to the independent nation of Somaliland.* By 27 UNITAF working under similar rules of engage- March, the representatives had adopted a unani- ment. The time required to assemble a staff and mous "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First build a force was lengthened by U.N. reluctance Session of the Conference on National to assume responsibility before its conditions Reconciliation in Somalia." This agreement com- were met by UNITAF. The coalition partners were mitted all factions to ending their armed conflict frustrated because they had fulfilled their own and to a peaceful reconciliation of differences. missions, and were providing the U.N. with exact- The agreement also set a two-year transition peri- ly the window of opportunity of which General od for a new central government that would come into being in March 1995. All parties recognized Zinni spoke. the need for local governments, district and UNITAF restructuring also caused concern. regional councils, and a national police force. Of While General Johnston had no doubts about the concern for UNITAF was the provision by which ability of UNITAF to do its job as it drew back to the factions agreed to a "complete and simultane- its two light brigades, not everyone shared his ous disarmament" throughout the country. optimism. In his mind, the two actions of reduc- UNITAF and UNOSOM were asked to assist in tion and transition were separate issues. He also this process by accepting the weapons of the fac- knew he had to keep his superiors comfortable tions. The turn-in process was to be completed about what he was doing. As he put it, he wanted to "de-link" the two actions in the minds of those at Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command. * The Somali National Movement did send observers to the That was difficult, because the lack of U.N. move- conference.
150 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA within 90 days. These two organizations were also don't want to make decisions on where the asked to react strongly against those who might cantonment areas are, where the resettle- violate the ceasefire.449 ment areas are, because I won't be here. Despite the impressive cooperation by the fac- General Bir is going to have to execute, and tions expressed in the wording of the agreements, should have been here to do the planning. ... We are only now, in the first few days of success depended on the willingness of all parties March ... seeing the blue hats starting to to make the accords work. No one was fooled into form in here. ... The U.N. still does not have an unrealistic sense of optimism, yet the next sev- a staff.451 eral weeks remained a quiet time throughout the area of operations. It was during this period the General Johnston also was busy pushing his U.N. forces began to arrive. superiors, within the bounds allowed him as a mil- Slow Transition to U.N. Control itary officer, to bring pressure on the United Nations to move more quickly. "Ambassador Oakley was very useful in doing that. I mean, he came on publicly. I came on in message traffic. UNITAF and Central Command had begun to Some of them were [in the form of] daily tele- plan for the transition as early as 23 December phone calls to the [Commander in Chief of 1992. On that date, a point paper was issued set- Central Command] saying, `We need some help. ting very broad guidance for the transfer of Who is pushing the U.N.?'"452 responsibilities, the establishment of a quick reac- While the United Nations was not moving as tion force, and the residual support the United quickly as it might have, it had chosen the com- States would provide to UNOSOM II. It even mander of its new UNOSOM II force. Lieutenant included a notional U.N. peacekeeping organiza- General Cevik Bir was a Turkish officer, tion. While some points of this paper eventually described by General Johnston as having "a good changed, this was a start for planning. The pro- operational background, good reputation."453 He posed plan required UNITAF to maintain control was chosen to be the commanding general of over the entire area of operations until it was UNOSOM II because of his military background secure; suggested that coalition partners remain- and his religion. Placing a Muslim in charge was ing under UNOSOM II be emplaced in the a bow to the sensibilities of the vast majority of humanitarian relief sectors they would eventually the Somali people. It was hoped this would estab- control; and called for the UNITAF staff to grad- lish a bond between the populace and the new ually work with and give responsibility to the UNOSOM II staff.450 But such a broad plan left United Nations presence. many specifics to be worked out on the ground, General Bir had been on one brief inspection to actions considered to be appropriate to the UNO- Somalia in late February. Unfortunately, the tim- SOM II staff, and this planning would fall by ing of this visit was poor. He had arrived at the default to UNITAF. General Johnston expressed time of the troubles in Kismayo and Mogadishu, some of the anxiety felt by UNITAF members and the UNITAF staff's attention was not focused who had to do this work on their own in January, on the general who would lead their replacements. February, and March: As noted in a Navy Forces Somalia situation report: "The unfortunate timing of these clashes I could see all of these frustrations that near the American Embassy compound has affected our mission, of things that we knew caused the curtailment of briefings for Gen Bir. had to be done by UNOSOM II in the big [General] Johnston has concluded it is difficult to picture [reconstitution of the police force, focus on briefings with this activity nearby."454 working with the humanitarian relief organ- izations, civil-military operations, refugee General Bir returned on 15 March, but his com- resettlement, disarmament, and canton- mand was still in an embryonic stage. Members of ment], not just our limited mission. You the UNOSOM staff came in individually or in know, professionally, you take some pride in small groups at this time. The UNITAF staff did looking ahead and saying what needs to be its best to accommodate and inform them about done. ... But for the last month at least ... I the operation and the duties they would fulfill. On have been making decisions for him 11 March, for instance, UNITAF held a meeting [Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, the for the UNOSOM II chief of staff, Brigadier incoming UNOSOM II commander]. ... I General James S. Cox, Canadian Army, who had
TRANSITION AND RETURN 151 arrived a few days before. He met with the deputy ognized the new UNOSOM II organization need- commanders of the chiefs of staff of all those ed to be very strong to match this mandate. forces that would participate in UNOSOM II. Boutros-Ghali proposed to the Security Council Three days prior, General Cox and UNOSOM II that UNOSOM II have 28,000 troops, including communications personnel had moved into the 8,000 in logistics roles. Logistical support was to embassy compound with their equipment. That come primarily from UNITAF troops already in same day, the UNITAF operations staff officially Somalia. This meant the Support Command started their transition to UNOSOM II. Less than would continue to be a major contributor. Also, a week later, on the 14th, General Johnston the United States was asked to provide a quick approved UNITAF's final transition plan. The reaction force. On 26 March, the Security Council next day, UNOSOM II staff members began to adopted Resolution 814, which provided a man- integrate with the UNITAF operations watch cen- date for UNOSOM II and included all the condi- ter in a process called "twinning."455 General tions Boutros-Ghali had asked for.458 A tentative Johnston described this twinning process as "sit- transition date was set for 1 May. ting counterparts next to our counterparts, and Following these actions, personnel began arriv- we'll work with them ... until they're ready to take ing in Somalia to prepare for the transition. Two the hand-off."456 important additions to the United Nations staff On 3 March, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali were both Americans. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral reported to the U.N. Security Council, "the effort Jonathan T. Howe was appointed as the new undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure envi- Special Representative of the United Nations ronment is far from complete and in any case has Secretary General, and Major General Thomas not attempted to address the situation throughout Montgomery, USA, was selected as the UNO- all of Somalia."* Following the advice given to SOM II deputy force commander. him by United States officials as early as 18 General Montgomery's appointment revealed a December, Boutros-Ghali sought a new mandate strange dichotomy in the force structure. Not only for UNOSOM that would change it from peace- was he UNOSOM II deputy commander, he also keeping to peace enforcement. UNOSOM II was the commanding general of the United States should, in his words, "cover all of Somalia ... and Forces in Somalia for UNOSOM. These forces include disarmament."** To ensure the success of were split along two chains-of-command. Most of this mission, he sought a mandate for the new the U.S. troops were part of the logistics support force that would achieve several goals: to monitor to the operation as well as part of the United all factions with respect to the ceasefire agree- Nations force. There was also the 1,100-man ments; to prevent resumption of violence, using quick reaction force for UNOSOM II, the 10th force if necessary; to maintain control of the fac- Mountain Division "Warrior Brigade," which had tions' heavy weapons; to seize the small arms of been filling the same role for UNITAF. It also unauthorized armed groups; to maintain the secu- reported to General Montgomery. But others rity of all ports, airfields, and lines of communi- reported through their own chains-of-command. cations; to protect the lives of United Nations and These included a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit, relief organization personnel; to clear mines; and which would remain on call as the theater reserve. to assist refugees.457 In August, another United States unit independent of U.N. control was sent to Somalia. This was With the exception of the extension of the mis- Task Force Ranger and was composed of Army sion to "all of Somalia" and the emphasis on total Rangers and Special Forces. Major General disarmament, none of this was different from William F. Garrison, USA, commanded the force, what UNITAF had been doing for months. The which reported directly to Central Command's document did, however, show that the U.N. rec- commander, General Hoar. Several of UNITAF's coalition partners would * This was written less than one week after the Kismayo- remain to participate in UNOSOM II, which made Mogadishu disturbances of late February, which likely influ- the United Nations' search for contributing enced the Secretary General's perception. nations easier and enabled the transition to ** UNOSOM II's area of responsibility eventually extended progress more rapidly. Pakistan, already present farther north than that of UNITAF, but only to the city of in UNOSOM I and UNITAF, sent two additional Galcaio. battalions, creating an infantry brigade. Several
152 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz Leaders from U.S. Marine Forces Somalia, from left, Col Jack W. Klimp, Marine Forces deputy commander, Col Emil R. Bedard, Task Force Mogadishu commander, and Col Werner Hellmer, staff judge advocate and head of the Marine Forces civil-military operations team, wait to meet Somali elders. other nations made commitments. India, Ireland, the next day and then return to Mogadishu. On the Norway, Bangladesh, Nepal, Romania, Republic 11th, the task force completed this movement and of Korea, and Malaysia eventually sent troops. redeployed from Somalia. The 10th Mountain Many of these forces were slow to join UNOSOM Division's main command post was on the same II. At the time of the official transition, the force flight, and its commander, Major General Steven was still 11,000 soldiers short of its goal. L. Arnold, departed two days later.459 On 9 April, UNITAF had been realigning forces to ensure the Warrior Brigade, which would stay as part of those remaining would be in place and operating UNOSOM II, assumed all responsibility for in their designated relief sectors by the time of the Merka sector, the quick reaction force, and all transition. These included the French, Italians, remaining Army operations in Somalia. This flex- Belgians, Australians, Moroccans, Pakistanis, ible brigade was composed of the 1st Battalion, Botswanans, and Turks. At the same time, United 22d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 25th Aviation; 10th States forces continued their redeployment sched- Forward Support Battalion; and other support ules. Army and Marine Corps units withdrew detachments. When the Merka sector was turned from the field and moved back to Mogadishu prior over to the Pakistani forces on 28 April, the Warrior Brigade moved into new quarters at the university complex and airport in Mogadishu.460 to embarkation. Both Army Forces Somalia and Marine Forces Somalia (MarFor) were down to light brigade strengths by late March and early The Marines continued their redeployments April. leading to the light brigade level, and by the 13th On 4 March, Army Forces Somalia directed they had realigned their forces between Bardera Task Force Kismayo to prepare to turn over full and Mogadishu. By 17 March, the 7th Marines responsibility for the relief sectors to the Belgians had consolidated in Mogadishu, and Task Force
TRANSITION AND RETURN 153 Bardera remained in that city for the time being. members of the UNOSOM II and UNITAF staffs, On 21 March, the light brigade staff "assumed all members of the Somali auxiliary security force, watches in the MarFor CP [Command Post]," and representatives of all the remaining coalition while the staff of the 7th Marines moved from the forces. Remaining MarFor elements began rede- soccer stadium to the embassy compound. Two ploying the next day.461 days later, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm left By the beginning of May, the work of UNITAF for Camp Pendleton. Colonel Jack W. Klimp was done. In five months of unrelenting effort it replaced him as MarFor commander. Over the had formed itself from four branches of the next few weeks, the focus of the remaining American Armed Forces and 22 coalition nations; Marines was to work with coalition forces to turn deployed rapidly to Somalia; worked through a over responsibilities. In Mogadishu, these were number of complex issues while conducting Pakistani soldiers and those of the United Arab demanding military operations; succeeded in its Emirates. In Bardera, the task force worked with security mission; and prepared the way for its the Botswanans. On 9 April, Colonel Klimp replacement, UNOSOM II. On 4 May, in a cere- returned to the United States and Colonel Emil R. mony held at the embassy compound, Lieutenant Bedard, commanding officer of the 7th Marines, General Johnston passed responsibility for opera- assumed duties as commander of MarFor. On 18 tions in Somalia to Lieutenant General Bir. April, the Botswanans assumed responsibility for Shortly after, General Johnston and the remaining Bardera sector. In Mogadishu, the Marines passed members of his staff boarded an airplane for the operational control of the United Arab Emirates long flight home. forces to the Italians on 15 April. On the 24th, They arrived in Washington the next day. There MarFor ceased patrolling in the city and turned over their principle areas of interest to the the new U.S. president, William J. Clinton, met Pakistanis. On the 26th, the MarFor Marine them in a special ceremony on the south lawn of Aircraft Group 16 made its last flights and ceased the White House and thanked them for all they operations. That day, MarFor formally turned over had done and accomplished. In his remarks, the all its responsibilities to the Pakistani forces of President summed up what had been done in a UNOSOM II during a ceremony attended by short time: Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces LtGen Robert B. Johnston transfers responsibility for operations in Somalia to Turkish LtGen Cevik Bir at a formal ceremony held in May 1993 at the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu.
154 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Photo courtesy of the Clinton Presidential Library (P3276-04) President William J. Clinton welcomes LtGen Robert B. Johnston to the White House, where he presented him with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. "I'm receiving the medal," LtGen Johnston said, "but a lot of 18 and 19- year-old men and women in uniform demonstrated enormous discipline, good judgment, and a good deal of patience in performing a rather unique mission." You represent the thousands who served in To understand the magnitude of what our this crucial operation--in the First Marine forces in Somalia accomplished, the world Expeditionary Force, in the 10th Mountain need only look back at Somalia's condition Division, aboard the Navy's Tripoli just six months ago. Hundreds of thousands Amphibious Ready Group, in the Air Force of people were starving; armed anarchy and Air National Guard airlift squadrons, ruled the land and the streets of every city and in other units in each of our services. and town. Today, food is flowing, crops are Over 30,000 American military personnel growing, schools and hospitals are reopen- served at sometime in these last five months ing. Although there is still much to be done in Somalia. And serving alongside you were if enduring peace is to prevail, one can now thousands of others from 20 nations. envision a day when Somalia will be recon- Although your mission was humanitarian structed as a functioning civil society.462 and not combat, you nonetheless faced diffi- After the ceremony, the former members of cult and dangerous conditions. You some- UNITAF continued their journey home to resume times were subjected to abuse and forced to their lives and various duties, and the Unified Task dodge rocks and even bullets. You saw first- Force dissolved back into its individual units. hand the horror of hunger, disease, and In Somalia, the forces of UNOSOM II did not death. But you pressed on with what you set wait long to be tested. On 6 and 7 May, the forces out to do and were successful. You have served in the best tradition of the Armed of factional leader General Mohamed Farah Forces of the United States. Hassan Aideed's ally, Colonel Omar Jess, clashed
TRANSITION AND RETURN 155 with the Belgians while trying to retake the city of dent on 12 July, missiles fired from helicopter Kismayo. This was the precursor to bloody fights gunships burst into a house at which leaders of in June, July, and October. Aideed's United Somali Congress faction and eld- Epilogue ers of Aideed's Habr Gedr clan were holding a meeting. Many Somalis were killed, some esti- mates of the number dead reached as high as 70. On 1 March 1995, Lieutenant General Anthony Many previously neutral Somalis believed they C. Zinni returned to Mogadishu as the command- had to defend their homes and their land against ing general of a combined coalition task force. the United Nations and joined Aideed's camp. Seven nations provided ships and amphibious Although lightly armed, these soldiers were aware forces for Operation United Shield.* The mission of American tactics and conformed their own to was to protect the last UNOSOM II forces, make the best use of what was available. On 25 Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers, as they with- September, a militiaman shot down a helicopter drew from Somalia. Earlier that day, 1,800 U.S. with a rocket-propelled grenade, a highly unusual Marines of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit feat. Having proven it could be done, Aideed's (Special Operations Capable) and 350 Italian forces awaited their next opportunity, which came Marines landed and set up a defensive perimeter. on 3 October. The operation was completed 73 hours later. That day, Aideed was to attend a meeting with The intervening two years since the departure some of his chief lieutenants. The site for the of UNITAF had not been kind to either the United meeting was identified and a task force of U.S. Nations forces or to the Somalis. Shortly after the Rangers and Special Forces was sent to capture departure of the Unified Task Force, a subtle but him. The mission ran into trouble even as the hel- important change in the mission came about that icopters carrying the assault force approached the had profound effects on UNOSOM II and the par- target building. A rocket-propelled grenade struck ticipation of the United States in the operation. one helicopter, forcing it to land close to the tar- get. Another was shot down shortly thereafter, General Aideed had not forgotten the incidents also by a rocket, and crashed a few blocks away. of late February 1993 in Mogadishu and Kismayo. The mission then turned from one of capturing On 5 June that year, in a bold and confrontational Somali leaders into one of also rescuing the sur- move, his forces attacked a contingent of vivors of the downed aircraft and bringing out the Pakistani troops, killing 24 of the UNOSOM sol- diers.* This challenge to the United Nations was force. The Rangers were soon surrounded by hun- dreds of Somali militiamen firing on them with answered by trying to destroy Aideed's power small arms and rocket-propelled grenade. The structure. He was declared a criminal and UNO- reaction force, composed of soldiers of the 10th SOM II, with the support of the Clinton adminis- Mountain Division, had to fight its way through tration and United States forces, began to actively the streets of the city, which were now filled with seek to capture him to bring him to justice. This thousands of militiamen and civilians trying to action may have appeared appropriate, but it over- kill as many UNOSOM troops as they could. looked the fact that Aideed was still a respected After 15 hours of fighting, the convoys returned to and influential figure to a large number of his the base at the airport, bringing the survivors and countrymen. This act also tore the fabric of neu- most of the dead. The price was 18 Americans trality by singling out Aideed as a specific target, which fed his propaganda machine. Finally, it placed UNOSOM troops in direct confrontation with Aideed's strong political faction, and its mili- * The Pakistani soldiers were on an operation to inspect one of General Aideed's compounds in Mogadishu. During tia forces in the city. Operation Restore Hope, these inspections were announced American forces, notably Task Force Ranger, shortly before they would take place, but not with enough tracked down and captured several of Aideed's lead time for the factions to move or hide anything. The high-ranking subordinates. In an unfortunate inci- inspections were thus not a total surprise to the factions, and they knew why they were taking place. Unlike such inspec- tions under UNITAF, this one was unannounced. The com- pound also adjoined the site of Aideed's Radio Mogadishu * Nations participating in Operation United Shield were the transmitting station. Claiming the United Nations soldiers United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Malaysia, were there to shut down the station, Aideed was able to rally Pakistan, and Bangladesh. his followers in a deadly attack.
156 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA DVIC DD-SD-00-00884 Somali men carry bags of wheat delivered by a Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363. killed and 78 wounded. The cost, along with the Hussein, who had served with UNITAF as a pictures of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged United States Marine Corps corporal and transla- through the streets by gloating Somalis, was more tor, returned to Somalia and took over his father's than the administration was willing to pay. position. Somalia is still divided. The northern A decision to withdraw American forces from portion claims its independence as Somaliland, Somalia was made shortly after. With the most although it is not, as yet, recognized. In the south, powerful member state of UNOSOM II leaving, the area of Operation Restore Hope, the fighting other nations followed suit. By the beginning of and dying continues. Cities and towns change 1995, the United Nations announced that UNO- hands, and a few humanitarian relief organiza- SOM II was to end on 31 March. Operation tions still try to bring some assistance. The talks United Shield was actually conducted weeks between the factions continue amid reshuffling before that date. As the final U.N. troops were alliances. The State Department still issues ready for their withdrawal from Mogadishu, strongly worded warnings about travel in Marines were ordered to provide security for the Somalia, and the country is listed as one of the operation. The last U.N. and American forces left world's most dangerous places. the country on 4 March. But, in spite of such results, some good came After the U.N. departure from Somalia, things from Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF did suc- continued as they had before. Aideed and Ali ceed in ending the famine and holding down the Mahdi Mohamed still vied for power and blood- violence during its time in Somalia. Some shed continued unabated, along with suffering of accounts claim more than 200,000 lives were innocent people. All this happened as if a curtain saved by the efforts of UNITAF in getting relief had descended around the country's borders. supplies through. As the Joint Meritorious Unit What occurred in Somalia received little attention Award citation to UNITAF states: in the world press. Only unusual news came out. Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the For instance, General Mohamed Farah Aideed delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief was killed in a gun battle in Mogadishu on 1 supplies to the starving population, disarmed August 1996. Shortly afterwards, his son, warring factions, fostered a ceasefire, and
TRANSITION AND RETURN 157 restored police and judiciary systems. Kosovo. In any situation characterized by civil Through the intervention and leadership of war and the destruction of civil institutions and Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of structures, the successful completion of the mis- over 60 different aid and relief organizations sion will depend in some part on the reconstitu- and the support of 23 nations were coordi- tion of those agencies. What is appropriate in one nated and focused to reverse a human case may not be in another. In Somalia, the intent tragedy of famine and disease that was of UNITAF was to encourage the Somalis to take claiming the lives of thousands each day. responsibility for their own governance and inter- Operation Restore Hope, along with its prede- nal security. In Bosnia, the active assistance with cessor Operation Provide Comfort, opened a civil structures and economic development was decade of humanitarian relief and peacemaking more deliberate. Again, the responsible com- mander will have to determine how much support operations. The experience of each has con- to provide without entangling his unit or his gov- tributed to the success of the next, and many of the ernment in the affairs of a recovering nation. issues that were of importance during Restore The reconstitution of police forces was another Hope have remained through subsequent opera- issue that first became important in Somalia and tions. They are part of the current military world. then came up elsewhere. The United States-led One of the operation's greatest strengths was intervention in Haiti quickly worked with an inter- the close relationship that existed between the national police component to recruit, train, and military and the political sides. The cooperation deploy police forces throughout the country. If between the commanding general and the special this latter case was more successful, it was envoy was seamless and presented a united front because of the recent experience in Somalia.* to the Somali factions. It also ensured the mem- The long wait for the United Nations to field its bers of the coalition were working toward goals UNOSOM II force tried the patience of UNITAF. established for UNITAF. The support that The fact that the United Nations might have an Lieutenant General Johnston and Ambassador agenda that differed from that of the United States Oakley provided to each other set a standard for future joint task forces assigned to such humani- tarian missions. The idea of force protection continues to per- meate military planning at the beginning of the new century. In a humanitarian or peacekeeping role, how many casualties are Americans willing to tolerate? This question was forcefully answered for the specific instance of Somalia in October 1993. However, with each new operation com- manders must consider how success depends on keeping their soldiers safe and casualties within acceptable limits. The measures taken to ensure this safety can range from permissive rules of engagement which allow individual soldiers to take action against perceived threats to the wear- ing of protective vests and helmets at all times. These latter measures especially can impose a burden on soldiers or Marines working in tropical or desert climes. Equally important, they can become a physical reminder to any opposing force of the unacceptability of loss to Americans. This DVIC DD-SD-00-01026 can become a weakness in itself, if only in per- Two Somali men load large bags of Australian wheat on ception. Finding the proper balance is a comman- the back of a truck for transport to the village of Maleel. der's responsibility. The distribution was a cooperative effort of U.S. Nation building is another term that has been Marines, who provided the helicopter support, and the heard referring to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Australian Army, which secured the delivery perimeter.
158 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA and its coalition partners was hardly surprising, civil-military operations structure that extended but it foreshadowed the vast difference in mission throughout the country. While relations with some that would come after UNITAF turned over of the humanitarian relief organizations or their responsibility. The nature of the relationship staff members proved difficult at times, it was rec- between the U.N. and those U.S. forces assigned ognized they had legitimate concerns, they were a to it was also fraught with difficulty, because the source of valuable information, and they were United States tried to keep a course, which important to the successful completion of the allowed it to maintain its national objectives while operation. The civil-military structures in each concurrently serving as part of a larger peace- succeeding operation have improved based on the keeping force. The split between United States experience of Somalia, and the need to work and United Nations forces may have been a con- cooperatively with these organizations is now tributing factor in the clash of 3 October 1993. incorporated into service and joint doctrine. The experience of Somalia was helpful in Haiti, Each military operation is unique. The condi- where the United Nations force came in more tions that existed in Restore Hope have not been quickly and better prepared for its mission. duplicated exactly in the campaigns that followed. While the original mission was seemingly very Each of these has been a beneficiary of the ideas, straightforward, it soon was necessary to deter- structures, and solutions that were so carefully mine the bounds of what was acceptable to thought out and implemented for the first time in accomplish that mission. The term mission creep the deserts and cities of Somalia. The legacy of was invoked as a check for every extra action Operation Restore Hope lies in these: the exam- UNITAF was asked to perform. The repair of ples of the good work of the Unified Task Force in roads, building of bridges, and other physical difficult and dangerous conditions; the restraint improvements were permissible if they would aid and good order of its personnel; and the mainte- the task force mission. The internal operation of nance of its political balance and neutrality. the country was to be left to the Somalis, with The men and women, Marines, soldiers, encouragement from UNITAF. Full disarmament sailors, and airmen who served in Restore Hope was never an option for UNITAF, but with the were challenged to replace anarchy and fear with transition to the United Nations, the definition of order and security. They faced situations that were what was appropriate began to change. From the then novel, but have since become familiar. Their initial goal of providing a secure environment, the efforts made them the first of General Zinni's new forces under the United Nations were drawn more thinking American military. and more into the internal affairs of Somalia, and Notes eventually lost the neutrality maintained with such rigor under UNITAF. The experiences of the staff of I Marine Expeditionary Force creating a joint task force Chapter 1 headquarters and bringing together a coalition force have been incorporated into several mis- sions that followed. Provisions for standing joint task force headquarters, and the recognition of the needs and capabilities of coalition partners, are There have not been many books available on now a part of the joint warfare doctrine of the Somali history and culture until recently. Even the most current books deal mainly with the events of United States. October 1993, and give only a cursory view of how Relations with civilian organizations were Somalia came to its condition of 1992. However, there important during Restore Hope. Working from the are a few official sources that deal with these topics in recent experience of the Kurdish relief operation, some detail. Headquarters, Department of the Army, the staff of UNITAF quickly built an effective publishes a series of area studies for the nations of the world. The one for Somalia was published in 1982 (third edition) and updated in a fourth edition in 1993. * This operation had some of the same troops as well. The These books provide information about Somali culture, ground component for Operation Restore Democracy was clan affiliation, political and military structures, terrain formed around the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division. and climate, and the important history of this nation. These are important sources for anyone researching the
history of Somalia prior to the 1990s. At the start of Operation Restore Hope, the United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center published a small volume entitled Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada: Soldier Handbook. This handy guide was intended for troops deploying to Somalia, and provided basic information about climate and terrain, diseases and preventive medicine, weapons of the factions, and a lexicon of basic Somali words and phras- es. More importantly, it described the Somali clans, identifying the armed factions and their leaders. Adam B. Siegel wrote an excellent monograph study of Operation Eastern Exit for the Center for Naval Analyses. It was used extensively for the portion of this chapter relating 30. Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing to the evacuation of the American Embassy in U.S. Policy in Somalia (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 1995), pp. 4-7. Chapter 2 Mogadishu in January 1991. 1. "Marine Heads Somalia Relief Efforts," Marine Corps Gazette, Oct92, p. 4. 2. Department of the Army, Somalia: A Country Much of the material for this chapter was taken Study, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing from notes the author made during interviews with Office, 1982), pp. 8-9, 81-92, hereafter DA, officers of the joint task force, which also were record- Somalia: A Country Study. ed on videotape by members of the Joint Combat Camera Team. The policy at that time was for the tapes 3. Ibid., pp. 9, 82. to be sent to the main combat camera office in 4. Ibid., pp. 12-17. Washington, D.C. Many of these tapes are unaccount- 5. Ibid., pp. 14, 17-19. ed for. Therefore, the author's notes have been used 6. Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm-The here. The information in this chapter is from interviews Second World War, vol 1, (Boston: Houghton with: LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston- Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 133-134, 165-168. Mroczkowski intvw; Col Sam E. Hatton, hereafter 7. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance-The Hatton-Mroczkowski intvw; Col William M. Handley, Second World War, vol 3, (Boston: Houghton Jr., hereafter Handley-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 80. Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski 8. Ibid., pp. 80-86. intvw; Capt Michael L. Cowan, hereafter Cowan- 9. DA, Somalia: A Country Study, pp. 24-27. Mroczkowski intvw; MajGen Steven L. Arnold, here- 10. Ibid., pp. 27-31. after Arnold-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen Thomas R. 11. Ibid., pp. 31-33. Mikolajcik, hereafter Mikolajcik-Mroczkowski intvw; 12. Ibid., pp. 33-38. Col Thomas D. Smith, hereafter Smith-Mroczkowski intvw; and Col Robert W. Tanner, hereafter Tanner- 13. Ibid., pp. 38-40. Mroczkowski intvw. 14. Ibid., pp. 43-45. 15. Ibid., pp. 45-46. 16. Ibid., pp. 52-57. 31. Bruce W. Nelan, "Taking on the Thugs," Time, 14Dec92, p. 29, hereafter Nelan, "Taking on 17. Ibid., pp. 58-59. Thugs." 18. Ibid., pp. 60-62, 225-227. 32. Ibid. 19. Ibid., p. 52. 33. David Binder, "Bush Ready to Send Troops to 20. United States Army Intelligence and Threat Protect Somalia Food," The New York Times, Analysis Center, Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada: 26Nov92, p. A1. Soldier Handbook (Dec92), p. 6, hereafter Soldier 34. James Kitfield, "Restoring Hope," Government Handbook. Executive, Feb93, p. 20. 21. Adam B. Siegel, Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant 35. "UN-Mandated Force Seeks to Halt Tragedy: Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu, Operation Restore Hope," UN Chronicle, Mar93, Somalia, January 1991, (Alexandria, Virginia: Vol. XXX, No 1, p. 1-13. Center for Naval Analyses, Apr92), p. 7. 36. Ibid., p. 13. 22. Ibid., PP. 8-9. 37. Nelan, "Taking on Thugs," p. 29. 23. Ibid., pp. 8,11. 38. Ibid., p. 13. 24. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 39. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 25. Ibid., pp. 12-13, 16-18. 40. I MEF ComC, 27Nov92 to 28Feb93, Sec 3, 26. Ibid., pp. 17-19. "Chronological Listing of Significant Events"; 27. Ibid., pp. 18, 22-25. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource 28. Ibid., pp. 28-34. Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December 29. Soldier Handbook, pp. 6-7. 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope
160 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA (Washington, D.C., U.S. Army Center of Military 65. Briefing papers, "Joint Task Force Somalia History, 1994), p. 105. Relief," dtd 921203. 41. General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, "A CinC's 66. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 67. USCinCCent mss, dtd 22Nov92, subj, 1993, p. 56, hereafter Hoar, "A CinC's Commander's Estimate of the Situation. Perspective." 68. CentCom AC/S G-3 to CG I MEF msg, 42. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 195611Nov92, subj, Somalia Ops. 43. Ibid. 69. JTF Operation Order, 6Dec92, Annex B. 44. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 58. 70. DIA to DIACUPIntel msg, 262333ZNov 92, subj, 45. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. Somalia: The Logistic Setting. 46. Hatton-Mroczkowski intvw. 71. Soldier Handbook, p. 113. 47. Handley Mroczkowski intvw. 72. CinCent Operation Order for Operation Restore 48. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. Hope. 49. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw. 73. United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual 50. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1940), p. 1. 51. Capt David A. Dawson, USMC, Restore Hope 74. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. manuscript, pp. 6-7. 75. Col Frederick M. Lorenz, USMC, "Law And 52. ComUSNavCent msg 061908zNov92, subj: Anarchy In Somalia," Parameters, Winter 93-94, Concept For Support Relief Operations In p. 28. Somalia, hereafter ComUSNavCent msg, Relief 76. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. Operations in Somalia. 77. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 53. Katherine McGrady, The Joint Task Force in 78. JTF Somalia Operation Order. 6Dec92. Operation Restore Hope, (Washington, D.C.: 79. Zinni-Cureton intvw. Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), pp. 115-116, 80. CentCom Order, 5Dec92. hereafter McGrady, Restore Hope. 81. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92. 54. Arnold-Mroczkowski intvw. 82. Ibid.; Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 55. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. 83. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92, Annex C. 56. Mikolajcik-Mroczkowski intvw. 84. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92. 57. Smith-Mroczkowski intvw. 85. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. 58. 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), U.S. 86. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92. Army Forces Somalia, 10th Mountain Division 87. Briefing papers, "JTF Deployment Timeline," dtd (LI): After Action Report Summary (Fort Drum, 921201. New York: 10th Mountain Division (Light 88. "The Military Sealift Command in Operation Infantry) and Fort Drum, Jun93), p. 68, hereafter Restore Hope," pp. 11-16. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 89. Ibid., pp. 6-6A. Somalia; McGrady, Restore Hope, p. 52. 90. Kent M. Beck and Robert deV. Brunkow, Global 59. Tanner-Mroczkowski intvw. Reach in Action: The Air Mobility Command and 60. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces the Deployment to Somalia (Office of History, Air Somalia, p. 67. Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, 61. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 61. Chapter 4 Illinois: 15Feb94), pp. xi-xxiii. 62. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 63. ComUSNavCent msg, Relief Operations in Chapter 3 Somalia. This chapter is based mainly on information taken from interviews conducted by the author in the field. These were with Capt John W. Peterson, USN, here- The information for this chapter was taken from after Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt J. W. Perkins, official sources. Oral history interviews used were USN, hereafter Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt between the author and LtGen Robert B. Johnston, Brian Boyce, USN, hereafter Boyce-Mroczkowski hereafter Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen intvw; Col Les van den Bosch, Belgian Army, hereafter Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Thulagalyo intvw; and BGen Anthony C. Zinni and LtCol Charles Masisi, Botswana Defense Force, hereafter Masisi- H. Cureton, hereafter Zinni-Cureton intvw. Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M. Taylor, hereafter Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Ailen Pietrantoni, 64. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. French Army, hereafter Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Emanuel Spagnuolo, Italian Army, here-
NOTES 161 after Spagnuolo-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Carol J. 111. Col William J. Mellor, Royal Australian Army, Mathieu, Canadian Army, hereafter Mathieu- "The Australian Experience in Somalia," Mroczkowski intvw; and Maj Lelon W. Carroll, USA, Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, Hugh hereafter Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw. The author also Smith, ed. (Australian Defense Studies Center, used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra: journal with appropriate date citations. 1993), pp. 59-60. 112. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource 91. Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw. Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December 92. Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw. 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope 93. Ibid. (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), pp. 185-186. 94. Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw; Boyce- Mroczkowski intvw. 113. Intvw with Capt Mosa al Anzi, Kuwaiti Army, LtCol Charles H.Cureton, USMCR, and Maj 95. 15th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology, Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, 22Feb93. 1Dec92-3Feb93, sec 4, Supporting Documents, 114. Intvw with Col Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Army hereafter 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC. and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, 22Feb93. 96. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, sec 2, Narrative 115. Masisi-Mroczkowski intvw. Summary, p. 2-2. 116. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en 97. Ibid., p. 2-3. Somalie, "Chronologie." 98. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises en Somalie, Compte Rendu de L'Operation 117. I MEF, ComdC, p. 4. `Oryx' (9 decembre 1992-12 avril 1993), sec II, 118. Ibid.; Commandement Francais des Forces "Chronologie," hereafter Commandement Francaises en Somalie, "Chronologie." Francais des Forces Francaises en Somalie, 119. Intvw of Ambassador Robert B. Oakley with "Chronologie;" Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw. LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. 99. Ibid. Wright, Jr., USAR. 100. Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw. 120. Intvw of LtGen Robert B. Johnston with LtCol 101. Kent M. Beck and Robert deV. Brunkow, Global Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., Reach in Action: The Air Mobility Command and USAR. the Deployment to Somalia, vol. 1 (Office of 121. Mroczkowski-Peterson intvw. History, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force 122. van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw. Base, Illinois, 15Feb94), p. xix. 123. Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw. 102. I MEF, ComdC, 27Nov92 to 28Feb93, sec 2, 124. van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw. Narrative Summary: Command, Operations, and 125. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; I MEF, ComdC. Training, p. 2, hereafter I MEF, ComdC. 126. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw. 103. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 127. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 21Dec93. Somalia, pp. 18, 66. 128. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises 104. Ibid., p.17. en Somalie, "Chronologie;" I MEF, ComdC, sec 105. I MEF, ComdC, p. 2. 3, Chronological Listings. 106. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 129. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw; Comman- Somalia, p. 18. dement Francais des Forces Francaises en 107. Intvw with LtGen Robert B. Johnston on "Meet Somalie, "Chronologie." The Press," 13Dec92. 130. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 23Dec92. 108. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, sec 3, Sequential 131. Spagnuolo-Mroczkowski intvw, trans by Lt Listing of Significant Events, p. 3-2; I MEF, Umberto Albarosa, Italian Army. ComdC, sec 3, Chronological Listing of 132. UNITAF FragO 7, dtd 16Dec92. Significant Events, pp. 2-3. 133. Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw. 109. 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report 134. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 23Dec92. Operation Deliverance Somalia Dec 92-Jun 93, 135. 10th Mountain Division, US Army Forces in dtd 4Nov93, Annex A, Part One, Background, p. Somalia, p. 20; Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw. A-3/7. 136. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 31Dec92. 110. Claudio Graziano, Operazione Somalia: 1992- 137. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92. 1994, "Lineamenti E Consuntivo 138. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 24Dec92; Dell'Operazione;" Conversation between LtCol UNITAF FragO 12, dtd 21Dec92. Daniel M. Lizzul, Liaison Officer to the Italian 139. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92. Forces and LtCol Gennora Fusco, Italian Army, as reported to the author. 140. 10th Mountain Division, US Army Forces in Somalia, p. 22.
162 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Chapter 5 162. CJTF Somalia J-3 msg, 151701ZJan93, subj: HRS Transition Matrix LOI; Dotto-Mroczkowski The information for this chapter was taken primari- intvw; Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2. ly from interviews conducted in the field by the author 163. United Nations Department of Public and other historians. Those by the author were with Information, The United Nations and Somalia, LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston- 1992-1996, United Nations Blue Book Series, Mroczkowski intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Volume VIII (United Nations, New York: 1996), Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw; Col Peter A. Dotto, here- p. 38, hereafter U.N. Public Information, United after Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw; and LtCol Donald C. Nations and Somalia. Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw. 164. Msg to American Embassy, Mogadishu, dtd A second interview between the author and LtGen 27Dec92, subj: Security of the Peace Rally, Zinni was conducted on 14 May 1994, hereafter Zinni- signed by Hussein Sheekh Ahmed, Chairman of Mroczkowski intvw 2. Interviews conducted by LtCol the Political Reconciliation Committee of the Charles H. Cureton, USMCR, and Maj Robert K. North Side and Ali Mohamed Ali, Chairman of Wright, Jr., USAR, were with LtGen Robert B. the Political Reconciliation Committee of the Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw; South Side. Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, hereafter Oakley- 165. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2. Cureton-Wright intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, here- 166. U.N. Public Information, United Nations and after Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw; and Col Peter A. Somalia, p. 221. Dotto, hereafter Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw. The 167. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia author also used his personal journal, referred to as and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Mroczkowski journal with appropriate date citations, Peacemaking and Peacekeep-ing, (Washington, and his field notebook, referred to as Mroczkowski D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, field notebook, which contained copies of many of the 1995), pp. 94-95. interviews. 168. Ibid., pp. 241-244. 141. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton 169. U.N. Public Information, United Nations and University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), p. Somalia, p. 39. 87. 170. Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw. 142. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. 171. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw. 143. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; Johnston-Cureton- 172. Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw. Wright intvw. 173. Ltr from commanders of UNITAF/UNOSOM to 144. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. Chairman, United Somali Front, dtd 4Feb93, with 145. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. copies to the signees of the Addis Ababa 146. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw. Agreement of 8Jan93. 147. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. 174. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw. 148. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw. 175. Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw. 149. Mroczkowski journal, entries dtd 21-22Dec92. 176. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw. 150. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw. 177. LtCol Stephen M. Spataro, USA, UNITAF 151. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93; Provost Marshal: memorandum from PM for J-3, Mroczkowski field notebook; Spiece- subj: Auxiliary Security Force, dtd 27Jan93, p. Mroczkowski intvw. 1. 152. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. 178. Ibid., pp. 3, 5. 153. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 5Jan93. 179. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. 154. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. 180. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93. 155. Ibid. 181. Ibid. 156. Johnathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with 182. Ibid. Humanitarian Relief Organizations: 183. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93. Observations from Restore Hope, (Alexandria, 184. Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-227, Virginia: Center For Naval Analyses, Oct93), pp. The Army Lawyer, Nov91, p. 14. 28-32. 185. Spataro, op. cit., p. 3. 157. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 186. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 158. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw. 187. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93. 159. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw. 188. Ibid. 160. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 25Dec92. 161. Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw.
NOTES 163 Chapter 6 197. CJTF Somalia to USCinCCent, msg, 130055ZJan93, subj: Death of USMC Member. This chapter was based mainly on interviews the 198. Klimp-Dawson intvw, 11Jan93. author and other historians conducted in the field. 199. Ibid. Those by the author were with BGen Anthony C. Zinni, 200. Sgt B. W. Beard, "Marines Relieve Suffering In hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2; Colonel Major Somalia," CMC News Release, 222001ZJan93. Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army, hereafter 201. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2: "Narrative Summary: Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M. Taylor, Command, Operations, and Training," p. 10. hereafter Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; Col. Werner 202. Ibid., p. 10. Hellmer, hereafter Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw; Maj 203. Ibid., pp. 15-16. John Caligari, Royal Australian Army, hereafter 204. Ibid.. p. 16. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Ailen Pietrantoni, 205. Ibid., pp. 16-17; Andrew Purvis, "In the French Army, hereafter Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski Crossfire," Time, 8Mar93, p. 47. intvw; Maj Daniel M. Lizzul, hereafter Lizzul- 206. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30 Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative Mroczkowski intvw; Maj Leland W. Carroll, USA, Summary," p. 2-2. hereafter Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw; SFC Kenneth 207. Ibid., pp. 2-3 to 2-4. W. Barriger, USA, hereafter Barriger-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt Geoff Kyle, Canadian Army, hereafter 208. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 6. Kyle-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Carol J. Mathieu, 209. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 20Jan93. Canadian Army, hereafter Mathieu-Mroczkowski 210. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp. intvw; and LtCol Donald C. Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter 14, 18. Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw. Many of these interviews 211. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces were copied in the author's field notebook, cited as Somalia, p. 23. Mroczkowski field notebook. Interviews made by other 212. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in historians included in this chapter were by LtCol Mroczkowski field notebook. Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., 213. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces USAR, with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, hereafter Somalia, p. 23. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; LtGen Robert B. 214. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw; Mroczkowski field notebook. and BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Cureton- 215. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces Wright intvw. Also used was the oral history inter-view Somalia, p. 62. between Capt David A. Dawson and Col Jack W. 216. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Klimp, hereafter Klimp-Dawson intvw. The author also Mroczkowski field notebook. used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski 217. Ibid. journal with appropriate date citations. He was also 218. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in provided a copy of the personal journal of Col Dayre Mroczkowski field notebook; Gary Ramage and C. Lias, USAF, hereafter Lias journal, with appropriate Bob Breen, Through Aussie Eyes: Photographs of date citations. The Australian Defense Force in Somalia 1993 (Canberra: Department of Defense, 1994), p. 52, 189. I MEF, ComdC, 7Dec92-28Feb93, sec 2, hereafter Ramage and Breen. "Narrative Summary; Command Operations and 219. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp. Training," p. 9, hereafter I MEF, ComdC. 4, 37-38. 190. UNIATF, "Memorandum For Correspondents," 220. Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in dtd 24Dec92; transcript of NBC "Today" intvw Mroczkowski field notebook; I MEF, ComdC, sec with Col Fredrick C. Peck, "Spokesman in 2, "Narrative Summary," pp. 37-38. Somalia," dtd Thursday, 24Dec92. 221. Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 191. I MEF, ComdC; Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd Mroczkowski field notebook. 7Jan93; Memo from ComMarFor to CJTF 222. Personal observations of refugee camp in Somalia, subj: Operations Summary for the Mroczkowski field notebook. Period 062300CJan 93 to 071750CJan 93, here- 223. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 16January93. after ComMarFor Memo. 224. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 192. I MEF, ComdC. Mroczkowski field notebook. 193. ComMarFor Memo; Klimp-Dawson intvw. 225. Handwritten note provided to the author by Maj 194. ComMarFor Memo. John Caligari, Royal Australian Army. 195. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 7Jan93. 226. Ibid.; Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 196. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93. Mroczkowski field notebook. 227. Ramage and Breen, p. 102.
164 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 228. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 251. Ibid., sec C, Consolidation: Domaine Mroczkowski field notebook. Operationnel, p. 1; Mroczkowski journal, entry 229. Ibid. dtd 1Feb93. 230. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 252. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en Mroczkowski field notebook; Ramage and Breen, Somalie, "Chronologie," sec C, Consolidation: p. 78. Domain Operationnel, p. 1, and sect D, Passage A 231. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Oryx 2, p. 1. Mroczkowski field notebook. 253. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 16Mar93. 232. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 254. Ibid.; Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93. Somalia, p. 32. 255. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 233. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 12. Mroczkowski field notebook. 256. Lizzul-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 234. Ramage and Breen, pp. 78-79. Mroczkowski field notebook. 235. Ibid., p. 79. 257. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 236. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 13. 38. 258. Il Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 142-150; Briefing notes, 237. Ibid., pp. 9, 12, 14, 38; I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar- Commander Italian Forces to Commanding 30Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-3; General UNITAF, undated (about 29Jan93). Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 259. Il Volo Dell'Ibis, p. 148. Mroczkowski Field Note Book. 260. Briefing notes, Commander Italian Forces to 238. I MEF, ComdC, section 2, "Narrative Summary," Commanding General UNITAF, undated (about p. 9. 29Jan93). 239. Ibid., p. 12; I MEF, ComdC, sec 3, 261. Ibid. "Chronological Listing Of Significant Events," p. 262. Ibid.; Il Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 104-115. 15. 263. Il Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 135-136;U.S. Army Center 240. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative of Military History, Resource Guide: Unified Task Summary," p. 2-3. Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993 241. Ibid., p. 2-10. Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.: U.S. 242. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Army Center of Military History, 1994), p. 174. Mroczkowski field notebook. 264. Briefing notes, Commander Italian Forces to 243. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises Commanding General UNITAF, undated (about en Somalie, "Chronologie," pp. 1-3; U.S. Army 29Jan93). Center of Military History, Resource Guide: 265. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces Unified Task Force Somalia December 1992-May Somalia, p. 22. 1993 Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.: 266. Ibid., p. 23. U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), pp. 267. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 29Jan93. 172-173. 268. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 244. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en Somalia, pp. 23-24. Somalie, "Chronologie," sec B, Domaine 269. Mroczkowski journal, entry dated 21Jan93. Operationnal, p. 2. 270. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 245. Ibid. Somalia, p. 26. 246. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 271. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource Mroczkowski field notebook. Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December 247. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope Somalie, "Chronologie," p. 4. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 248. Ibid. History, 1994), pp. 169-170. 249. Mroczkowski Field Note Book: intvw with Chief 272. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Abdi Ugas Husen of El Berde, interpreted by Mroczkowski field notebook. Abdil Kader Abdilahi Ali. Also Pietrantoni- 273. 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report, Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski Operation Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7. field notebook. 274. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 250. Commandement Francais des Force Francaises en Mroczkowski field notebook. Somalie, "Chronologie," sec B Securisation: Domaine Operationnel, p. 2. 275. Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report, Operation Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.
NOTES 165 276. Mroczkowski journal, entries dtd 25Dec92 and 298. I MEF, ComdC, sect 2 "Narrative Summary," p. 5Jan93; Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 10. Mroczkowski field notebook. 299. Ramage and Breen, p. 109. 277. Barriger-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 300. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. Mroczkowski field notebook. 10. 278. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 301. Ramage and Breen, p. 110. Mroczkowski field notebook; Kyle-Mroczkowski 302. The Honorable Art Eggleton, Minister of National intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski field notebook. Defense, Report of the Somalia Commission of 279. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Inquiry, (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Government Mroczkowski field notebook; Mroczkowski jour- Publishing Directorate, 1997). nal, entry dtd 21Jan93. 303. Ltr from LtGen Robert B. Johnston to Adm 280. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 20Jan93; Anderson, Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff, Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in dtd 1May93, as quoted in the Report of the Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian Somalia Commission of Inquiry. Division, After Action Report, Operation 304. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. Chapter 7 Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-4/7. 18. 281. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report, Operation Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7. 305. CJTF Somalia SitRep 093, dtd 081535Mar93. 282. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 306. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces Mroczkowski field notebook. Somalia, p. 61. 283. Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in 307. Ibid., pp. 61-62. Mroczkowski field notebook. 308. Marine Forces Somalia Air Combat Element 284. Briefing papers: "Operation Restore Hope, Task ComdC, 9Dec92-19Mar93, sec 2, "Narrative Force Kismayo," dtd 7Jan93. Summary," p. 2. 285. Task Force Kismayo, unpublished paper "Task 309. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp. Force Kismayo: 10th Mountain Division 26-27. Operation Restore Hope," undated (probably 310. Lias journal, entries dtd 18-19Dec92 and 5Jan93. early Jan93), p. 2; 10th Mountain Division, U.S. 311. Ibid., entries dtd 5, 15Dec92. Army Forces Somalia, p.22. 312. Ibid., entry dtd 16Dec92. 286. Task Force Kismayo, "Gun Control in the Jubba 313. Memo for the record, from Commander (Unified Valley," undated. Task Force Somalia) to Potential Users of Somali 287. Task Force Kismayo Somalia to ComMarFor, Airspace; subj: Control of Somali Territorial msg, subj: BGen Magruder Meeting with Gen Airspace, undated. Morgan, 232324ZJan93. 314. American Embassy Nairobi to Secretary of State, 288. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23June93. msg, 111337ZJan93, subj: JTF Liaison with 289. Ibid. ICAO. 290. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 315. Ibid. Somalia, p. 23. 316. Ibid. 291. Diana Jean Schemo, "U.S. Copters Attack Rebel 317. Memo for the record, Air Control Representative Force in Southern Somalia;" The New York Times, to International Civil Aviation Organization, subj: 26Jan93. Results of ICAO/UNITAF Technical Meeting, dtd 292. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 25Jan93. 15Jan93. 293. Ultimatum from United States Special Envoy to 318. Memo for the record, Air Control Authority Somalia and Commander, Unified Task Force Representative to International Civil Aviation Somalia, 23Feb93. Organization, subj: Results of ICAO/UNITAF 294. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; Johnston- Working Group Sessions, dtd 18Jan93. Cureton-Wright intvw. 319. International Civil Aviation Organization, Eastern 295. "Troops Fear Disruption of Somali Peace Talks," and Southern African Office: "Informal ATS Associated Press, 10Mar93. Coordination Meeting for Air Operations in 296. "U.S. Sends Troops Back to Kismayu," Mogadishu FIR (Nairobi, 3-5Mar93)." Associated Press, 18Mar93. 320. Memo, AME/DirMobFor to WOC Mombasa/For 297. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw; Zinni- all Aircrews, subj: Operations at Mogadishu Mroczkowski intvw. Airport, dtd 31Dec92; USTransCom/CAT to HQ
166 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Airspace; subj: Control of Somali Territorial 339. Ibid., p. 15; I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sec Airspace, undated. 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-3. 314. American Embassy Nairobi to Secretary of State, 340. Ibid., pp. 2-3-2-4. msg, 111337ZJan93, subj: JTF Liaison with 341. Ibid., p. 2-4. ICAO. 342. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 315. Ibid. Somalia, p. 26. 316. Ibid. 343. Johnston-Cureton-Wright Intvw, 12March93. 317. Memo for the record, Air Control Representative 344. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces to International Civil Aviation Organization, subj: Somalia, p. 26. Results of ICAO/UNITAF Technical Meeting, dtd 345. Ibid. 15Jan93. 346. Ibid. 318. Memo for the record, Air Control Authority 347. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sec 1, Representative to International Civil Aviation "Organizational Data," pp. 1-1, 1-2. Organization, subj: Results of ICAO/UNITAF Chapter 8 348. CJTF Somalia SitRep 147, dtd 011455Zmay93. Working Group Sessions, dtd 18Jan93. 319. International Civil Aviation Organization, Eastern and Southern African Office: "Informal ATS Coordination Meeting for Air Operations in Mogadishu FIR (Nairobi, 3-5Mar93)." This chapter was based upon information obtained 320. Memo, AME/DirMobFor to WOC Mombasa/For through interviews conducted by the author and other all Aircrews, subj: Operations at Mogadishu historians in the field. Those by the author were with Airport, dtd 31Dec92; USTransCom/CAT to HQ Capt Michael L. Cowan, USN, hereafter Cowan- AMC TACC, msg, subj: Evaluation of Air Traffic Mroczkowski intvw; Col Robert G. Hill, hereafter Hill- Flow into Mogadishu Airport, dtd 1943/01Jan93. Mroczkowski intvw; and Col Kevin M. Kennedy, here- 321. CJTF Somalia to USCinCCent, msg, subj: after Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw. Interviews by Transition of Airspace Control Authority other historians were with LtCol Charles H. Cureton, Functions, dtd 181910ZJan93. USMCR, and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, with 322. Memo of Introduction, dtd 1Feb93. LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston- 323. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93. Cureton-Wright intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, here- 324. United Nations Department of Public after Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw; and between Capt Information, The United Nations and Somalia, David A. Dawson and Col Werner Hellmer, hereafter 1992-1996, The United Nations Blue Book Hellmer-Dawson intvw. The author also used his per- Series, Volume VIII. (New York: The United sonal journal, hereafter Mroczkowski journal with Nations, 1996), p. 35. appropriate dates. 325. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. 326. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2 "Narrative Summary," p. 7. 349. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 327. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93. Somalia, p. 11. 328. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. 350. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6January93. 329. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92. 351. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. 330. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force in 352. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93. Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: 353. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 110. Somalia, p. 11. 331. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. 354. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 170600ZJan93. 332. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force in 355. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 280600ZJan93. Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: 356. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), pp. 95-96; 357. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 290600ZJan93. "Drawdown Concept Paper" prepared by the UNITAF staff, dtd 11Jan93. 358. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 333. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force in Somalia, p. 67. Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: 359. Ibid., p. 69. Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 96. 360. Ibid., pp. 68-69. 334. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93. 361. Ibid., p. 71. 335. I MEF, ComdC, pp. 10-11. 362. Ibid. 336. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 16Jan93. 363. Ibid. 337. I MEF, ComdC, pp. 32-33. 364. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 050600ZMar93. 338. Ibid., p. 14. 365. CMPF Somalia SitRep, dtd 151700ZJan93.
NOTES 167 366. I MEF, ComdC, sect 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 392. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 26. Somalia, pp. 64-65. 367. Ibid., p. 27. 393. Cdr William F. Boudra, USN, "Engineers Restore 368. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 60. Hope," The Military Engineer, Jul93, p. 7. 369. CMPF Somalia SitRep, dtd 151700ZJan93. 394. Ibid. 370. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 395. Ibid., pp. 7-8. Somalia, p. 67. 396. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 371. Ibid., pp. 68-69. Somalia, p. 24. 372. ww.usariem.army.mil/somalia/disinsec.htm; 397. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw. www.usariem.army.mil/somalia/dissoil.htm. 398. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 373. Ibid. 34. 374. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw, as recorded in 399. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw; I MEF, ComdC, sect 2, Mroczkowski field notebook. "Narrative Summary," p. 34. 375. Ibid. 400. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw. 376. Ibid. 401. Ibid. 377. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for 402. Ibid.; 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance Somalia, p. 38. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand 403. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw. Corporation, 1996), p. 53. 404. Ibid. 378. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw, as recorded in 405. Unified Task Force Somalia, Psychological Mroczkowski field notebook. Operations in Support of Operation Restore Hope, 379. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for 9Dec92-4 May93, p. 3. Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance 406. Ibid., pp. 1,2. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand 407. Ibid., p. 3. Corporation, 1996), pp. 80-81. 408. Ibid., p. 4. 380. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 409. Ibid., pp. 8-9. Somalia, pp. 68-69. 410. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 381. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for 411. Ibid., p. 10. Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance 412. Ibid., pp. 7-8. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corpora- 413. Ibid., pp. 3,4,5. tion, 1996), pp. 58, 65. 414. Ibid., pp. 14-20. 382. 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Operation Restore Hope After Action Report, 15Jun93), pp. 415. Ibid., p. 6. 1-2. 416. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93. 383. Ibid., pp. 1-4. 417. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with 384. Ibid., pp. 2,6. Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope (Washington, 385. Cdr William F. Boudra, USN, "Engineers Restore D.C.: Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 14- Hope," The Military Engineer, Jul93, pp. 4-5. 15. 386. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, 1Dec92-3Feb93, sec 418. Ibid., pp. 17-20. 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-5; I MEF, ComdC, 420. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with sect 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 29. 419. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw. Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Obser- 387. Keith B. Richburg, "U. S. Envoy Tells Somalia's vations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: Warlords Not to Interfere," The Washington Post, Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 19-20. 8Dec92, p.2; Naval Mobile Construction 421. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw. Battalion 40, NMCB Command History; 422. Ibid.; Col Kenneth Allard, USA, Somalia www.seabee.navy.mil/nmcb40/welcome/history/h Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: tm, p. 2. National Defense University Press, Jan95), pp. 388. Naval Historical Center, Seabee History: 109-111. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 423. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq67-7/htm, p. 5 Humanitarian Relief Organizations: 389. Ibid. Observations from Restore Hope (Washington, 390. Capt Brenda Campbell, USAF, "Red Horse D.C.: Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), p. 22. Celebrates 35th Anniversary," 424. Ibid., pp. 21-22. w w w. a f . m i l / n e w s / s e p 2 0 0 0 / n 2 0 0 0 7 2 8 - 425. Ibid., pp. 22-24. 00152.shmtl, p. 1. 391. Lias journal, entry dtd 10Dec92.
168 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 426. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 443. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. 427. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw. 444. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 58. 428. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw. 445. Robert B. Oakley, "Somalia: A Case Study," Two 429. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with Perspectives on Intervention and Humanitarian Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Obser- Operations, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., editor vations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.: (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 26-27. Jul97), p. 13. 430. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp. 446. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. 5-6, 41. 447. Department of Public Information United 431. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar93-30Apr93, sec 2, Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, "Narrative Summary," pp.2-6, 2-7. Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia 432. Hellmer-Dawson intvw, 28Feb93. 1992-1996 (New York, New York: United 433. Ibid. Nations, 1996), p. 39. 434. Ibid. 448. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. 449. Department of Public Information United Chapter 9 Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996 (New York, New York: United The information for this chapter was based on a Nations, 1996), pp. 46-47. variety of sources written by participants. These include the comments of United Nations Secretary 450. CentCom Point Paper, subj: "Proposed Transition General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in the United Nations from Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to United Blue Book Series, Volume VIII, The United Nations Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)," And Somalia 1992-1996. Also used was the author's dtd 23Dec92. interview with BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter 451. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw, and the interview between 452. Ibid. LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, 453. Ibid. Jr., USA, with LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter 454. ComNavFor Somalia SitRep, dtd 252000ZFeb93. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. 455. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December 435. Department of Public Information United 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia History, 1994), pp. 155-157. 1992-1996 (New York, New York: United 456. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw. Nations, 1996), p. 33. 457. Department of Public Information United 436. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 62. Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, 437. Robert B. Oakley, "Somalia: A Case Study," Two Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia Perspectives on Intervention and Humanitarian 1992-1996 (New York, New York: United Operations, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., editor Nations, 1996), pp. 42-43. (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 458. Ibid., p. 43. Jul97), p. 5. 459. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource 438. Department of Public Information United Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military 1992-1996 (New York, New York: United History, 1994), pp. 154-157. Nations, 1996), p. 46. 460. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces 439. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93. Somalia, p. 26. 440. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw. 461. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sect 2, 441. Ibid., p. 44. "Narrative Summary," pp. 2-3 to 2-5, 2-8, and sec 442. Department of Public Information United 3, "Chronological Listing of Significant Events," Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series, p. 3-4. Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia 462. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1992-1996 (New York, New York: United "Remarks by the President to General Johnston Nations, 1996), pp. 40-41. and Staff," 5May93.
Appendix A Unified Task Force Somalia Organization Command and Staff Battalion Headquarters Alpha Company Commanding General: Lieutenant General Robert Bravo Company B. Johnston Charlie Company Special Envoy: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley Delta Company Deputy Commanding General: Major General W. Support Company D. Moore, USA Administration Company Joint Force Air Component Commander: Major 1st Battalion, Support Group General Harold W. Blot Battalion Headquarters Chief of Staff: Colonel Billy C. Steed Transport Troop Political Advisor: Mr. John Hirsch Field Supply Platoon Administration (J-1): Colonel L. Rehberger III Medical Platoon Intelligence (J-2): Colonel W. M. Handley, USA Dental Section Operations (J-3): Brigadier General Anthony C. Field Workshop Zinni B Squadron, 3d/4th Cavalry Regiment Logistics (J-4): Colonel Sam E. Hatton, USA Battery Commander's Party, 107th Field Plans and Policy (J-5): Colonel John W. Moffett Battery Command, Control, Communications (J-6): 17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat Colonel Robert G. Hill Engineer Regiment Executive Assistant (J-8/EA): Colonel Michael Detachment, 103d Signals Squadron W. Hagee Naval Contingent Joint Information Bureau: Colonel Frederick C. Peck Joint Visitor's Bureau: Colonel R. J. Agro HMAS Jervis Bay Civil-Military Operations Center: Colonel Kevin HMAS Tobruk Belgium M. Kennedy Unified Task Force Surgeon: Captain Michael L. Cowan, USN Unified Task Force Engineer: Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA Commanding Officer Headquarters Commandant: Major Eric C. Holt Colonel Marc Jacqmin, Belgian Army Joint Combat Camera Detachment: Lieutenant Commander James P. Kiser, USN 1st Parachute Battalion (Reinforced) Coalition Forces Headquarters Company Support Company 11th Company 13th Company Australia 21st Company Reconnaissance Company Engineer Platoon Commanding Officer Supply Platoon (Reinforced) Colonel William J. Mellor, Australian Army Surgical Team Signal Platoon 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team Battalion Group Aviation Detachment 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Judge Advocate General Team Regiment
170 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Naval Contingent HMS Zinnia Composite Reinforced Company 1st Platoon (Light Armored) Botswana 2d Platoon (Light Armored) Logistics Platoon Medical Section Commanding Officer Engineer Section Lieutenant Colonel Thulanganyo Masisi, Maintenance Section Botswana Defense Force Logistics Section France Composite Reinforced Company Command Section 1st Platoon (Mechanized) 2d Platoon (Light Infantry) Commanding General 3d Platoon (Light Infantry) Major General Rene Delhome, French Army 4th Platoon (Light Infantry) Special Forces Troop Command Element, 9th Marine Infantry Division Mortar Platoon Battalion, 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade Medical Section Battalion, 5th Combined Arms Overseas Transportation Section Regiment Signals Section 3d Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment Stores Section 4th Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment Messing Section 3d Company, 6th Foreign Legion Engineer Central Arms Depot Regiment Engineer Section Detachment, 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment Detachment, Special Forces Canada Detachment, Logistics Support Battalion Naval Contingent Frigate Georges Leygues Commanding Officer Light Transport La Grandiere Colonel Serge Labbe, Canadian Army Amphibious Ship Foudre Tanker Var Canadian Joint Force Somalia Germany Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group 1 Commando 2 Commando 3 Commando Service Commando Commanding Officer DFS Platoon Lieutenant Colonel Meitzner, German Air Reconnaissance Platoon Force A Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons Engineer Troop The German contingent consisted of three Signal Troop Luftwaffe C-160 Transall aircraft operating from Aviation Detachment Mombasa, Kenya, as a part of Operation Provide Naval Contingent Relief. Greece HMCS Preserver Egypt Commanding Officer Colonel Spilitios, Greek Army Commanding Officer Infantry Battalion (-) Colonel Al-Fakhrani, Egyptian Army
APPENDIX A 171 India Logistics Section Communications Section Commanding Officer Military Police Section Commodore Sam Pillai, Indian Navy Post Exchange Section Naval Contingent Public Affairs Section Morocco Tanker INS Deepak Amphibious Landing Ship INS Cheetah Frigate INS Kuthar Commanding Officer Italy Colonel Major (brigadier general equivalent) Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army Commanding General Base Section Major General Gianpietro Rossi, Italian 3d Motorized Infantry Regiment Army Infantry Company Infantry Company Headquarters Element Cavalry Company Folgore Parachute Brigade Air Defense Artillery element Headquarters Regiment Medical Section New Zealand 186th Parachute Regiment 187th Parachute Regiment 9th Assault Parachute Battalion Logistics Battalion Armored Vehicle Company Commanding Officers Engineer Company Colonel Dunne, Royal New Zealand Air Tank Company Force, 9 December 1992 to 18 March 1993 Field Hospital "Centauro" Wing Commander Duxfield, Royal New Surgical Detachment Zealand Air Force, 18 March 1993 San Marco Battalion (Marine Infantry) Composite Helicopter Regiment Detachment, 42 Squadron (Three Andover trans- Detachment, 46th Aviation Brigade port aircraft) Naval Contingent Frigate ITS Grecale Nigeria Logistical Landing Ship ITS Vesuvio Landing Ship Tank ITS San Giorgio Commanding Officer Kuwait Lieutenant Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola, Nigerian Army 245 Reconnaissance Battalion Commanding Officers Battalion Headquarters Lieutenant Colonel Mohamad al-Obaid, Administration Company Kuwaiti Army Company Headquarters Major Al Muzien, Kuwaiti Army Quartermaster Platoon Engineer Troop Composite Reinforced Motorized Company Light Aid Detachment Company Headquarters Signals Section Armored Car Platoon Mobile Shop Scout Platoon Company A (Mechanized Infantry) Scout Platoon Company B (Mechanized Infantry) Medical Section Company C (Reconnaissance Company) Engineer Section Company D (Reconnaissance Company)
172 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Pakistan (Note: Does not include Pakistani forces in Tunisia Somalia as part of UNOSOM I) Commanding Officer Commanding Officers Lieutenant Colonel Sharif, Tunisian Army Colonel Asif, Pakistani Army Lieutenant Colonel Tariq S. Malik, Pakistani Infantry Battalion (-) Turkey Army 6th Battalion, The Punjab Regiment Battalion Headquarters Company A Commanding Officers Company B Colonel Huseyin Erim, Turkish Army, 9 Company C December 1992 to 25 March 1993 Company D Major Haldun Solmazturk, Turkish Army, 25 Support Company March 1993 Company Headquarters Signals Platoon 1 Company, 1 Battalion Mechanized, 28 Brigade Administrative Platoon Headquarters Section Transport Section 1st Platoon (Mechanized Infantry) Administrative Section 2d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry Assault Engineer Platoon 3d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry 81mm Mortar Platoon Fire Support Platoon 7th Battalion, Frontier Forces Quartermaster Platoon 10th Battalion, Baluch Regiment Transport and Maintenance Platoon 1st Battalion, Sind Regiment Signal Section Medical Section Saudi Arabia Engineer Section Naval Contingent Commanding Officer Landing Ship Tank Ertugrul Colonel Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Land Logistics Ship Derya Forces Destroyer Fatih United Arab Emirates 5th Royal Saudi Land forces Airborne Battalion (Reinforced) Headquarters Company 1 Company Commanding Officers 2 Company Lieutenant Colonel Alkefbi, United Arab 3 Company Emirates Army, 9 February 1993 Combat Service Support Element Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Ketbi, United Medical Platoon Arab Emirates Army Engineer Platoon Al Wajeb Battalion Sweden Maintenance Platoon Headquarters Company Services Section Combat Engineer Platoon Commanding Officer 81Mm Mortar Platoon Lieutenant Colonel Lars A. Hedman, Reconnaissance Company Swedish Army 2d Company (Mechanized Infantry) 3d Company (Mechanized Infantry 1st Field Hospital
APPENDIX A 173 United Kingdom E Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (Provisional) Commanding Officer Scout Platoon, Headquarters, 1st Wing Commander Humphrey, Royal Air Battalion, 87th Infantry Force Aviation Brigade (Falcon Brigade) 3d Battalion (Assault), 25th Aviation The United Kingdom contingent consisted of two Headquarters Company Royal Air Force C-130 aircraft flying out of Company B Mombasa, Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Company C Relief. Company D 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry United States Headquarters Troop A Troop Air Force Contingent B Troop C Troop D Troop Commanding Officers 10th Mountain Division Support Command Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik, 210th Support Battalion (Forward) USAF, 9 December 1992 to 29 March 1993 Headquarters and Company A Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 9 March 1993 Company B Company C Air Force Forces Somalia 710th Support Battalion (Main) Air Force Forces Somalia Staff, Mogadishu Headquarters and Company A 437th Tactical Airlift Wing Company B 5th Combat Communications Group Company C 823d Civil Engineering Squadron Company D Mogadishu Airfield Tactical Airlift Control Company E, 25th Aviation Element 10th Signal Battalion Mogadishu Airfield Support Headquarters Company Deployed Tactical Airlift Control Element Army Contingent Company A Company B Company C Commanding Generals 41st Engineer Battalion Brigadier General William Magruder III, Headquarters Company USA Company A Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22 Company B December 1992 to 13 March 1993 110th Military Intelligence Battalion Brigadier Greg L. Gile, USA, 13 March to 4 Technical Control And Analysis May 1993 Element Military Intelligence Support Team Army Forces Somalia Counter Intelligence Team 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) Ground Surveillance Radar Team 2d Brigade (Commando Brigade) Long Range Surveillance 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry Detachment Headquarters Company 10th Military Police Company Company A Battery B, 3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense Company B Artillery Company C Detachment, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry 62d Air Defense Artillery Headquarters Company Company A Joint Task Force Support Command Company B Commanding General Company C Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA A Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry
174 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 36th Engineer Group 360th Transportation Company 43d Engineer Battalion 710th Transportation Company (Provisional) Company A (Boat) Company B 870th Transportation Company Company C 22d Transportation Detachment Direct Support Maintenance Unit 160th Transportation Detachment 63d Engineer Company (Combat Support 169th Transportation Detachment Equipment) 329th Transportation Detachment 642d Engineer Company (Combat Support 491st Transportation Detachment Equipment) Military Traffic Management Command 74th Engineer Detachment (Diving) "Tiger" Team 95th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) 2d Chemical Battalion 520th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) 720th Military Police Battalion 597th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting) 511th Military Police Company 33d Finance Battalion (Provisional) (FSU)(-) 571st Military Police Company 602d Maintenance Company 978th Military Police Company Detachment, 514th Maintenance Company 984thMilitary Police Company 62d Medical Group Military Police Criminal Investigation 32d Medical Battalion (Logistics) Element 86th Evacuation Hospital 240th Quartermaster Battalion 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) 110th Quartermaster Company (POL) 423d Medical Company (Clearing) 267th Quartermaster Company 514th Medical Company (Ambulance) 18th Quartermaster Platoon 61st Medical Detachment (Preventive 26th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU Medicine Sanitation) Barge Team) 73d Medical Detachment (Veterinary) 30th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU 224th Medical Detachment (Preventive Barge Team) Medicine Sanitation) 82d Quartermaster Detachment 227th Medical Detachment (Epidemiology) 22d Quartermaster Laboratory 248th Medical Detachment (Veterinary) Detachment, 54th Quartermaster Company 257th Medical Detachment (Dental) (Graves Registration) 485th Medical Detachment (Preventive Task Force Thunderbird (Signal) Medicine Entomology) 209th Signal Company 528th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress 516th Signal Company Team) Company C, 327th Signal Battalion 555th Medical Detachment (Surgical) Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment 513th Military Intelligence Company, 11th Signal Brigade Brigade Detachment, 63d Signal Battalion 593d Support Group (Area) Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 4th Support Center Material Management) 86th Signal Battalion 548th Supply and Services Battalion Detachment, 19th Signal Company 62d Supply Company Detachment, 69th Signal Company 266th Supply Company (Direct Support) Detachment, 385th Signal Company 364th Supply Company Detachment, 505th Signal Company 7th Transportation Group Detachment, 521st Signal Company 49th Transportation Center (Movement Detachment, 526th Signal Company Control) Detachment, 593d Signal Company 6th Transportation Battalion 10th Personnel Services Company 24th Transportation Battalion 546th Personnel Services Company 24th Transportation Company 129th Postal Company 57th Transportation Company 711th Postal Company 100th Transportation Company Detachment, Company B (Air Traffic Control), 119th Transportation Company 1st Battalion, 58th Aviation 155th Transportation Company Task Force 5-158 Aviation
APPENDIX A 175 13th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 60th Ordnance Detachment (EOD) Operations Capable) 542d Ordnance Detachment (EOD) (Control Headquarters, 24th Marine Team) Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 27th Public Affairs Team Capable) 28th Public Affairs Team Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron Commanding Officer 263 (Composite) Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 8th Psychological Operations Battalion 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Product Dissemination Battalion Intelligence Group 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical) Headquarters Company, 1st Surveillance, Marine Corps Contingent Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (-) Commanding Officers 1st Intelligence Company (-) Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, 9 1st Force Service Support Group December 1992 to 23 March 1993 Headquarters, 1st Service Support Group Colonel Jack W. Klimp, 23 March 1993 to 9 (Forward) April 1993 Headquarters and Service Battalion (-) Colonel Emil R. Bedard, 9-28 April 1993 7th Engineer Battalion (-) Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, 28 April 1993 7th Motor Transport Battalion (-) to 4 May 1993 1st Landing Support Battalion (-) 1st Supply Battalion (-) Marine Forces Somalia 1st Maintenance Battalion (-) 1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced) 1st Medical Battalion (-) Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division 1st Dental Battalion (-) (-) (Reinforced) Marine Aircraft Group 16 7th Marines (-) (Reinforced) Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 16 Headquarters Company, 7th Marines Marine Light Attack Helicopter 1st Battalion, 7th Marines Squadron 369 3d Battalion, 9th Marines Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) Marine Aerial Transport Refueler (Reinforced) Squadron 352 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter (Reinforced) Squadron 466 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion (-) Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) 38 (-) Reconnaissance Company, 5th Marines Detachment, Headquarters and Company C, 1st Tank Battalion (-) Headquarters Service Squadron (Reinforced) Detachment, Marine Wing 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Communications Squadron 38 Operations Capable) Detachment, Marine Air Traffic Headquarters, 15th Marine Control Squadron 38 Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Detachment, Marine Air Support Capable) Squadron 3 Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion, Detachment, Marine Air Control 9th Marines Squadron 1 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron Detachment, Marine Wing Support 164 (Composite) Squadron 1 Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Detachment, Marine Aviation Support Group 15 Logistics Squadron 16 30th Naval Construction Regiment
176 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Headquarters, 30th Naval Construction Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Regiment 4 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1 Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 37 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40 Fighter/Attack Squadron 27 9th Communications Battalion Fighter/Attack Squadron 97 1st Radio Battalion Tactical Electronic Warfare 1st Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) Squadron 134 MAGTF Integration Instruction Team Attack Squadron 52 National Intelligence Support Team Marine Detachment Naval Contingent Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Unit 3 Commanding Officers USS Leahy Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19- USS W. H. Standley 28 December 1992 USS Sacramento Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19-28 USS Tripoli December 1992 USS Juneau Rear Admiral (LH) James B. Perkins III, USS Rushmore USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 1993 CTF 156 Captain J. W. Peterson, USN, 15 January USS Tripoli 1993 to 1 February 1993 USS Juneau Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February USS Rushmore 1993 to 5 March 1993 USS Niagara Falls Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, 5-23 CTF 155 March 1993 Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 2 Commodore Pyle, USN, 23 March Wasp Amphibious Ready Group CTF 156 Naval Forces Somalia Amphibious Squadron 2 Ranger Battle Group TF 156 Cruiser Destroyer Group 1 USS Wasp Destroyer Squadron 7 USS El Paso USS Ranger USS Louisville Carrier Air Wing 2 USS Nashville Fighter Squadron 1 USS Barnstable County Fighter Squadron 2 Naval Beach Group 1 Attack Squadron 145 Assault Craft Unit 1 Attack Squadron 155 Beachmaster Unit 1 Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 38 Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 Tactical Electronic Warfare Cargo Handling Group 1 Squadron 31 Military Sealift Command Office, Mogadishu Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Patrol Squadron Special Project Unit 14 VAW 116 Special Operations Contingent HSL 47 Detachment 2 Commanding Officers HC 11 Detachment 10 Colonel Thomas Smith, USA USS Wabash Lieutenant Colonel William L. USS Valley Forge Faistenhammer, USA, after 20 January 1993 Kitty Hawk Battle Group Cruiser Destroyer Group 5 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Destroyer Squadron 17 Company B USS Kitty Hawk ODA 526 Carrier Air Wing 15 ODA 54 Fighter Squadron 111 ODA 543 Fighter Squadron 51 ODA 546 VAW 114 ODB 560
APPENDIX A 177 ODA 561 S Company, 42 Infantry Battalion (Reinforced) ODA 562 Headquarters Section ODA 563 Administration ODA 564 Operations ODA 565 Signals 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Engineering Company A (Operation Provide Relief) Public Affairs Company C Electrical and Mechanical Engineering/Stores Zimbabwe Chaplain 1st Platoon 2d Platoon 3d Platoon Commanding Officer 81mm Mortar/Antitank Platoon Major Vitalis Chigume, Zimbabwe Army Medical Platoon
Appendix B Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle ACA Airspace Control Authority ACE Air Combat Element ACO Air Control Order AES Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron AFFor Air Force Forces Somalia AMC Air Mobility Command AME Air Mobility Element APOD Aerial Port Of Debarkation APOE Aerial Port Of Embarkation ArFor Army Forces Somalia ARG Amphibious Ready Group ASG Area Support Group ATF Amphibious Task Force AWSS Authorized Weapons Storage Site CA Civil Affair CentCom U.S. Central Command CinC Commander in Chief. In the United States military, used as the title of a commander of a specified or unified command, as in CinCCent, the commander in chief of the United States Central Command. CJTF Combined/Joint Task Force Somalia. One of the names given to the organization respon- sible for Operation Restore Hope, when it included both United States Armed Forces and coalition partners (thus making it a combined and joint force). Note that this acronym is sometimes also used for Commander Joint Task Force Somalia, especially in message traffic. See also JTF and UNITAF. CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center CMOT Civil-Military Operations Team CoSCom Corps Support Command CSSE Combat Service Support Element CWT Coalition Warfare Team FIR Flight Information Region FSS Fast Sealift Ship FSSG Force Service Support Group GCE Ground Combat Element Humvee High Mobility Multiwheeled Vehicle HRO Humanitarian Relief Organization HRS Humanitarian Relief Sector ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization I MEF I Marine Expeditionary Force JTF Joint Task Force Somalia. The original name given to the organization that would conduct Operation Restore Hope. As a joint task force, it referred only to the organization when it was composed of United States forces. It was changed over time to CJTF Somalia and to UNITAF
180 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA JTFSC Joint Task Force Support Command. Sometimes referred to as the Joint Logistics Command, or JLC LCAC Landing Craft Amphibious Cargo MarFor Marine Forces Somalia METT-T Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available MEU (SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force MPS Maritime Prepositioning Squadron or Ships MSSG MEU Service Support Group MSR Main Supply Route NavFor Navy Forces Somalia NGO Nongovernmental Organization NoTAm Notice to Airmen OpCon Operational Control. It is defined as a level of command authority used frequently in the execution of joint operations. It is the command authority, which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be del- egated or transferred. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over sub- ordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. PhibRon Amphibious Squadron PsyOps Psychological Operations PVO Private Voluntary Organization RoE Rules of Engagement ROWPU Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit SNA Somali National Army SNF Somali National Front SPF Somali Patriotic Front SPM Somali Patriotic Movement SOCCent Special Operations Command, Central Command SOFor Special Operations Forces SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force SYL Somali Youth League TaCon Tactical Control. It is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or com- mands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TaCon may be delegated to and exercised by com- manders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TaCon is inherent in OpCon. TransCom The United States Transportation Command TPFDD Time phased force deployment data ULN Unit Line Number. A number assigned to a unit, with its personnel and equipment, which is to be shipped as an entity. The ULN is used to tell units when to be prepared to load onto transport. It also informs the receiving headquarters when they can expect the arrival of a unit in theater. It can also be used to track the unit while it is enroute. UNITAF Unified Task Force Somalia. The name given to the organization responsible for Operation Restore Hope, encompassing the headquarters, the United States Armed Forces compo- nents, and the coalition partners.
APPENDIX B 181 Notes on Somali Spelling There was no standard written form of the Somali language until the 1960s. Fortunately for those in the West, the government decided to adopt the Latin alphabet as the basis for the written form. However, the exact spellings of place and personal names vary from one source to another, depending on the under- standing of the phonetics by the individual transliterating. To further complicate matters, the major clans often speak different dialects. There are also differences between Italian and English forms of the sounds and words. For the sake of clarity, a standard of spelling for the most common names has been used in this vol- ume. However, where a name or word is quoted, the spelling used in the quotation may have been kept. The following is a list of these names, with alternate spellings as they may be found in other sources, atlases, or histories. Afgooye; Afgoi Aideed; Aidid Baidoa; Baydhabo Balcad; Balad Bale Dogle; Bali Dogle; Baali Doogle Bardera; Baardheere Beer Hanni; Bir Xanni; Bir Hane Buulobarde; Bulo Burti; Buulo Berde Buurhakaba; Buurhabaka (note transposition of the k and b); Bur Acaba; Buur Hakaba Belet Weyne; Beled Weyne; Belet Uen; Belet Huen Djibouti; Djibuti Dhoble; Doble; Dhooble Fer Fer; Ferfer; Feer Feer Galcaio; Galkayo; Gaalkacyo Gialalassi; Jialalaqsi; Xialalaksi Habr Gedr; Habir Gedirh; Habr Gidr Hargeisa; Hargeysa Hawadle: Xawaadle Hussein: Huseyn Jawhar; Giohar; Johar Jilib; Gelib Jubba; Juba; Giuba Kismayo; Kismayu; Cismayo; Chisimayu; Chisimaio; Kismaayo Merka; Marka; Merca Mogadishu; Mogadisho; Muqdishu Mursade; Murasade; Mursida Oddur; Huddur; Xuddur Shabele; Shabeele; Shabeelle; Shebelle; Shebeli; Scebeli Tiyegloo; Tayeeglow; Tigieglo; Tayeegle Webi: Uebe Wajid; Waajid; Wadjid Yet; Yeet; Yeed
Appendix C Chronology of Events and Operations 26 June 1960 British Somaliland receives independence. 1 July 1960 British Somaliland joins with the Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic. 15 October 1969 President Shermarke is assassinated. 21 October 1969 Siad Barre takes over the government of Somalia in a military coup. July 1977 Somali Army invades Ethiopia. November 1977 Barre abrogates Somali treaties with the Soviet Union. 1978 Somalia signs an agreement with the United States allowing U.S. military access to Somali military facilities. 1980 An agreement is signed between Somalia and the United States. In return for military aid, the United States receives use of the port and airfield at Berbera. 1988 Armed opposition to the Barre government begins with a rebellion in the north of the country. 1990 Three main opposition groups are fighting against the Barre regime. These are the Somali National Movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United Somali Congress. December 1990 Fighting nears Mogadishu. Civil order breaks down in the city. 5 December 1990 U.S. Ambassador James K. Bishop orders the evacuation of all non-essential United States Embassy personnel. 30 December 1990 All remaining Americans are brought into the United States Embassy com- pound. 31 December 1990 The commander of U.S. Naval Central Command orders his staff to prepare for an evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu. 1 January 1991 Ambassador Bishop requests permission from the State Department to evacuate the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. 2 January 1991 The State Department grants permission for evacuation of the embassy. 2 January 1991 Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an execute order for Operation Eastern Exit. 2 January 1991 Four ships carrying Marine forces get underway from the Persian Gulf to con- duct noncombatant evacuation of the embassy. 5 January 1991 Ships arrive off the coast of Mogadishu. Operation Eastern Exit begins. First helicopters leave the ships at 0345; the last helicopters return at 2323. The oper- ation is declared complete at 2340. 22 January 1991 Siad Barre flees Mogadishu May 1992 Barre's forces are defeated and he flees Somalia. Fighting between the factions for control of the country begins. 17 November 1991 Fighting and civil disorder force United Nations staff to evacuate Somalia. 18 August 1992 President George H. W. Bush orders the airlift of 145,000 tons of food to Somalia in Operation Provide Relief. 23 November 1992 Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), carrying the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU (SOC)), departs Singapore enroute to the Persian Gulf.
184 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 25 November 1992 President Bush announces to the United Nations that the United States was pre- pared to provide military forces to assist in the delivery of food and relief sup- plies to Somalia. 27 November 1992 Commanding general of Central Command (CentCom) designates I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as the headquarters of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia. 29 November 1992 United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the U.N. Security Council would consider authorizing an operation by member states. 1 December 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a warning order to the commander in chief of Central Command (CinCCent). 2 December 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff order the commander in chief, Pacific, to assign I MEF to CinCCent. 3 December 1992 The United Nations Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 794, authorizing military intervention in Somalia. CinCCent issues deployment to I MEF. Tripoli ARG arrives off southern Somali coast. 4 December 1992 JTF Somalia headquarters established. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston briefs his concept of operations to component commanders. 5 December 1992 CentCom issues its operation order for Restore Hope. CinCCent assigns com- manding general I MEF as commanding general, JTF Somalia. 6 December 1992 JTF Somalia issues its operation order for Restore Hope. 7 December 1992 First trainload of Army equipment departs Fort Drum for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey. 9 December 1992 At 0330, landing vehicles carrying Marines and Navy Sea, Air, Land personnel (SEALs) are launched from the ARG for initial landings and arrive at Mogadishu at 0540. By 1145, the Mogadishu airport is declared secure and the first military aircraft lands. One company of the 2d French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment joins the JTF in Mogadishu. 10 December 1992 General Johnston arrives in Mogadishu. Headquarters for Combined JTF Somalia is established in the United States Embassy compound. Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) decides to move up the deployment of Army forces, originally scheduled to begin on 19 December, by eight days. 11 December 1992 Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, commanding general of Marine Forces Somalia (MarFor) arrives in Mogadishu. General Johnston and Ambassador Robert B. Oakley begin talks with faction leaders. General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed agree to respect the ceasefire and to remove heavy weapons from the city. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali invites 11 political faction leaders to a preparatory meet- ing for a conference of national reconciliation. 12 December 1992 Three helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 are fired on by Somalis in two separate incidents. The helicopters destroy two "technicals" and damage one M113 armored personnel carrier. HMCS Preserver arrives at Mogadishu port, beginning the Canadian Operation Deliverance. First Army unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrives at Bale Dogle. 13 December 1992 Bale Dogle secured by Marines of the 15th MEU (SOC). First Army unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry arrives in Bale Dogle. The Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of the Italian Folgore Brigade, a reconnaissance unit, arrive in Mogadishu. 14 December 1992 Advance party of Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of Kuwaiti force arrive in Mogadishu. 15 December 1992 Army forces assume control of Bale Dogle sector from Marines.
APPENDIX C 185 16 December 1992 Turkish advance party arrives in Mogadishu. Task Force Hope, composed of elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and French forces, secures the airfield at Baidoa. Italian reconnaissance unit reoccupies the Italian Embassy. Phase I of Operation Restore Hope is completed. 19 December 1992 Turkish reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of Saudi Arabian force arrive in Mogadishu. 20 December 1992 Kismayo port and airfield are secured by elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion. 22 December 1992 Australian forces reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. Major General Steven L. Arnold, commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, arrives in Mogadishu. 23 December 1992 A mine near Bardera kills Lawrence N. Freedman, a U.S. Government civilian employee. Mr. Freedman is the first member of the Unified Task Force to die in the performance of duty. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., arrives at the embassy compound in Mogadishu for a formal visit. The San Marco Battalion arrives with the Italian Naval Group. 24 December 1992 Bardera is secured by elements of the 7th Marines. Task Force Kismayo is formed from the Army forces under the command of Brigadier General Lawson W. Magruder, III, USA. Main body of Italian Folgore Brigade arrives. 25 December 1992 French forces secure Oddur. 27 December 1992 Italian forces secure Gialalassi. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi meet on the "green line" dividing Mogadishu, declaring it abolished. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, relieves the 15th MEU (SOC) of responsibility for Baidoa sector. 28 December 1992 Elements of Army Forces Somalia and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group secure Belet Weyne, last of the originally planned relief sector. Phase II of Operation Restore Hope is completed. Operation Clean Street begins in Mogadishu, continuing until 6 January 1993. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi meet in Mogadishu and agree to dismantle the "green line" separating the city. 31 December 1992 Merka port and airfield are secured by elements of Army Forces Somalia and the Italian San Marco Brigade. President Bush arrives in Mogadishu, visiting units in the city and aboard ship. 1 January 1993 President Bush visits units in Baidoa and Bale Dogle. 2 January 1993 Main body of Turkish forces arrives in Mogadishu. 4 January 1993 First reconciliation conference begins at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 14 factions are represented. 6 January 1993 Commanding general issues guidance for the draw down and restructuring of the force. Members of General Aideed's faction fire on a UNITAF convoy trav- eling through Mogadishu. A plan is developed for the seizure of the weapons storage areas involved. 7 January 1993 In a dawn assault, the two weapons storage areas are seized by Marines of Task Force Mogadishu. 8 January 1993 Identification card system for weapons control goes into effect. Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Argentine arms market. Australian forces advance party arrives in Baidoa. 8-15 January 1993 All participants to the Addis Ababa conference sign a series of agreements, call- ing for a ceasefire, the cessation of all hostile propaganda, cooperation with international organizations, free movement of the Somali people, and specific agreements on disarmament. 11 January 1993 Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Barkera arms market.
186 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 12 January 1993 Private First Class Domingo Arroyo is killed by small arms fire while on patrol in Mogadishu. Private Arroyo is the first uniformed member of UNITAF to be killed in action. Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the operational con- trol of Army Forces Somalia. 13 January 1993 Somali Security Committee in Mogadishu approaches UNITAF about the reestablishment of the Somali National Police Force. 16 January 1993 Baidoa sector transferred to Army Forces Somalia. 17 January 1993 Main body of Australian forces arrives in Baidoa. 19 January 1993 Australian forces assume responsibility for Baidoa sector. 30 January 1993 3,000 Somali auxiliary security force personnel are reported as prepared to start police duties. 8 February 1993 General Johnston and Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen send a joint letter to all signatories of the 8 January Accords calling on them to begin the disarmament process. 23 February 1993 Supporters of Aideed begin rioting in Mogadishu as a result of incidents in Kismayo. 24 February 1993 Rioting continues in Mogadishu, especially in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic cir- cle. 25 February 1993 U.S. Marines and Botswana soldiers conduct clearing operations in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic circle. Calm returns to Mogadishu by the evening. 2 March 1993 Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the direct control of UNITAF and given responsibility for Bale Dogle sector. 4 March 1993 Members of the Reconnaissance Platoon, Canadian Airborne Regiment, shoot two unarmed intruders in the engineer compound in Belet Weyne, killing one of them. 16 March 1993 Two Canadian soldiers torture and beat to death a Somali teenager caught infil- trating the Canadian compound in Belet Weyne. 24 March 1993 The final day of Ramadan, and the start of two days of celebration. This is the first time in two years the citizens of Mogadishu have been able to celebrate this religious feast day in peace. 4 May 1993 UNITAF turns over responsibility for operations in Somalia to the United Nations forces, under the command of Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, Turkish Army. The last of UNITAF headquarters staff depart Somalia. 5 May 1993 President William J. Clinton welcomes General Johnston and his staff back to the United States in a special ceremony on the White House lawn.
Appendix D Citation Joint Meritorious Unit Award Unified Task Force Somalia Citation: Unified Task Force Somalia, United States Central Command, distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service in Operation RESTORE HOPE from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. During this period, the Unified Task Force organized and deployed the largest humanitarian assistance mission in history, a joint and combined task force of over 38,000 personnel. Rapidly establishing security in eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors in war-torn and famine-raged Somalia, they effectively neutralized warring factions that had paralyzed and devastated the country. Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies to the starving population, disarmed warring factions, fos- tered a cease fire, and restored police and judiciary systems. It accomplished a major infrastructure rebuilding effort, restoring roads, airfields, seaports and public utilities that had been destroyed by two years of civil war. Through the intervention and leadership of Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of over 60 different air and relief organizations and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and focused to reverse a human tragedy of famine and disease that was claiming the lives of thousands each day. Under the stability provided by Unified Task Force Somalia, the process of reconciliation and rebuilding began. The successes of the members of Unified Task Force Somalia in the accomplishment of national security objectives, and their exemplary performance of duty have brought great credit to themselves, their Services, the United States Central Command, and to the Department of Defense. Given under my hand this 29th day of June 1993 Colin L. Powell Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
189 Index Abdulrahman Ali Tur, 3 2d Chemical Battalion, 119 2d (Commando) Brigade, 10th Mountain Abu Taalib, 2 Division, 90 Addis Ababa, 6, 52, 56-58, 75, 95-98, 109, 130, 36th Engineer Group, 119, 132-133 142, 147, 149 3d Assault Helicopter Battalion, 117 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 94, 117 Aden, 2-3, 56, 109 3d Battalion, 25th Aviation, 153 Afgooye, 90-91, 118, 181 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 96 41st Engineer Battalion, 117, 133, 173 Aideed, Gen Mohammed Farah Hassan, 3, 8, 21- 42d Field Hospital, 129 22, 52, 56, 66-69, 71-73, 86-87, 92, 94, 97-98, 4th Platoon, 300th Military Police Company, 139, 155-156 117 AIDS, 25, 107-108 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 137-138 Air Force Commands and Units 511th Military Police Company, 117 Air Force Forces Somalia, 18, 104, 106, 110, 571st Military Police Company, 87 114 593d Area Support Group, 19, 121, 123-124 156th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129 593d Support Group (Area), 119 183d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, 117 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129- 62d Medical Group, 19, 119, 128-129 130 710th Main Support Battalion, 116-117 437th Airlift Wing, 18 720th Military Police Battalion, 119 Air Force Forces Somalia, 18, 104, 106, 110, 7th Battalion, Frontier Service Regiment, 16 114 7th Transportation Group, 19, 119-121 86th Evacuation Hospital, 128-130 Air Mobility Command, 29, 36, 40 8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 137 American University, 118, 120 984th Military Police Company, 91 9th Psychological Operations Battalion Aqiil, 2 (Tactical), 137 Argentine Market, 71 Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 38 Company B, 9th Psychological Operations Army Commands and Units Battalion, 67 Army Forces Somalia, 16, 18-19, 37-38, 48- Product Dissemination Battalion, 137 50, 76-78, 90-91, 94, 97, 113-114, 116,- Third Army, 14, 16 119, 121-122, 124, 145, 152 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 121 10th Aviation Brigade, 5010th Forward United States Army Forces Command, 14 Support Battalion, 117, 153 XVIII Airborne Corps, 16 10th Mountain Division, 17, 19, 37, 40-41, 44, 48-50, 76, 90-91, 93-94, 100, 110, 117, Arnold, MajGen Steven L., USA, 17, 19, 48-49, 119, 133, 137, 140, 151-152, 154, 156, 94, 113, 117, 152 158 Arone, Shidane, 100 13th Corps Support Command, 13, 19 1st (Warrior) Brigade, 10th Mountain Arthur, VAdm Stanley R., USN, 6-7 Division, 91, 117 Australia, 20, 40, 79, 98 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, 117, 153 240th Quartermaster Battalion, 119 Australian Commands and Units 245th Reconnaissance Battalion, 73 103d Signals Squadron, 79 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 38, 49-50, 90, 114 17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat
190 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Engineer Regiment, 79 Boyce, Capt Brian, USN, 32 1st Battalion Support Group, 79 Britain, 3-4, 155 1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment, 40, 78-79 British Commands and Units, 42 6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment, 79 British Royal Air Force, 42 Australian Ready Deployment Force, 40 British Somaliland, 2-4 HMAS Jervis Bay (GT 203), 78 HMAS Tobruk, 79 Brock, Col Michael V., 14 Royal Australian Air Force, 79 Brown and Root, 120-122 Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 78 Brown, Pvt Kyle (Canadian Forces), 100-101 Baidoa, 3, 8, 28, 38, 42-43, 45-46, 52, 61, 76, Bulo Burti, 87 77-82, 98-99, 105, 111-122, 130, 132, 143-145 Bush, President George H. W., 1, 9, 11, 43, 148 Balcad, 87-89 Buurhakaba, 80 Bale Dogle, 25, 28, 38, 40, 42, 49, 73, 76-77, 90- Cairo West Airport, Egypt, 130 91, 105-106, 122, 132 Camp Pendleton, California, 12-14, 18, 37, 144, Bangladesh, 141, 152, 155 153 Baraawe, 90 Canada, 18, 20, 101 Bardera, 3, 28, 45-46, 52, 66, 76, 82-83, 105, Canadian Commands and Units 115, 118, 122, 127, 130, 132, 134, 143, 145, 153 93 Rotary Wing Aircraft Flight, 91 Barkera Market, 71 Airborne Regiment, 9, 40, 49, 91, 101 HMCS Preserver (AOR 510), 104 Barre, Gen Mohammed Siad, 3, 5-8, 21, 23, 26, Ministry of National Defense, 101 63, 95 Royal Canadian Dragoons, 91 Battle of Adowa, 3 Ceelgasass, 46 Bedard, Col Emil R., 45, 82, 152-153 Central Command, 6, 11-14, 17-19, 21-22, 25- Belet Weyne, 1, 9, 28-29, 48-49, 53, 89-95, 97, 27, 29, 32, 107, 109, 113, 115, 117, 121, 134- 100, 104, 130, 143 135, 147, 149-150, 152 Belgian Commands and Units Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, 18 11th Company, 45 Civil-Military Operations Center, 27, 82, 111, 1st Parachute Battalion, 44, 94, 96 142-145 Close Reconnaissance Squadron, 45 Clan-families Belgium, 18, 20, 155 Darod, 2-3 Berbera, 6, 25 Digil, 2 Dir, 2-3 Bir, LtGen Cevik (Turkish Forces), 96, 150-151, Habr Gedr, 3, 87, 155 153-154 Hawadle, 49, 92 Bishop, American Ambassador James K., 6-7 Hawiye, 2-3, 6, 8 Issaq, 2-3 Bombay, 109 Majertain, 3 Borchini, LtCol Charles, USA, 137 Ogadeni, 3 Rahanweyne, 2-3, 83 Bosnia, 122, 157-158 Clausewitz, Carl von, 51 Botswana, 18, 41, 73, 83, 118 Clinton, President William J., 154-155 Boudra, Cdr William F., USN, 133 Conde, GySgt Harry (Canadian Forces), 99 Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General Boutros, 11, 56, 141, 147, 149, 151 Conference on National Reconciliation, 150
INDEX 191 Cowan, Capt Michael L., USN, 14, 125-126, 2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, 33, 127, 129 42, 83 2d Marine Infantry Regiment, 83 Dacca (AOR A41), 103 5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, 83 Defense Courier System, 136 5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment, 46, 83, 85 Defense Intelligence Agency, 24 6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment, 83 Derya (AD A576), 103 French Special Operations Command, 42 Dharsamenbo, 92 French Somaliland, 2, 83 Djibouti, 2, 5, 34, 63, 83, 130 Fusco, Maj Gennaro (Italian Forces), 40 Doctors Without Borders, 84 Gabiyu, Col Aden, 3 Dotto, Col Peter A., 43, 55, 57-58, 98 Gaddis, Col Evan R., USA, 94 Doyle, Col James J., Jr., 7 Galcaio, 92, 94, 151 Egal, Prime Minister Ibrahim, 5 Garrison, MajGen William F., USA, 152 Egan, Col James B., 43 German Air Force, 41 Egypt, 20, 30, 36, 41, 118, 130 Gialalassi, 28-29, 46-47, 85-90, 130, 132, 143 El Berde, 46, 65, 84, 85 Gile, BGen Greg, L., USA, 97, 117 Elmi, BGen Ali Mohamed Kedeye, 67 Grecale (FFG F571), 103 Emperor Haile Selassie, 6 Green Line, 55-57, 71, 88-89 Eritria, 3 Green Valley (TAK 2049), 128 Ertugrul (LST L401), 103 Guam (LPD 9), 7 Ess-Akalli, Col Omar (Moroccan Forces), 76, Hagee, Col Michael W., 67 118 Haiti, 25, 122, 157-158 Ethiopia, 3-6, 52, 56, 85, 92, 94, 130 Hamar Jab Jab, 118 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army, 6, 85, Hamilton, Col Mark, USA, 58 92 Hancock, RAdm William J., USN, 17 European Command, 138 Handley, Col William M., Jr., USA, 14 Evans, Col Walter S., USAF, 109 Hargeisa, 25 Fatih (FFG F242), 103 Harlane, 92 Fer Fer, 92 Hatton, Col Sam E., USA, 13-14 Flowers, Col Robert B., USA, 131 Hellmer, Col Werner, 78, 82, 145, 152 Fort Drum, New York, 17, 37 Hill, Col Robert G., 134, 136 Fort Hood, Texas, 13, 19 Hirsi, Mohamed Said (Gen Morgan), 3, 23, 44, Fort Meade, Maryland, 135 52-53, 71, 74, 94-98, 140, 149 Fort Stewart, Georgia, 14 Hoar, MajGen Joseph P., 11-13, 22, 115, 149, France, 3-4, 18, 20, 83 152 Freedmann, Lawrence N., 66, 83 Horn of Africa, 1-3, 11, 25, 37, 56, 106, 108, 110 French Commands and Units 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, 42, Howe, Adm Jonathan T., USN, 151 46, 83
192 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA Hurley, LtCol David W. (Australian Forces), 99 Kenya, 1, 4-5, 7, 30, 42, 79, 121, 130 Hussein, Col John, 56, 92, 156 Khukri (FSG P49), 103 I'Home, MajGen Rene (French Forces), 46 Kincaid (DD 965), 17 Imam Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, 3 Kismayo, 3-4, 22, 25, 28-29, 43-45, 53, 59, 65, 71-72, 74, 83, 94-101, 105, 114, 117, 124, 130, India, 94, 152 132-134, 137-138, 140, 149-152, 155 International Action Against Hunger, 78 Kittani, Ismat T., 147 International Civil Aviation Organization, 107- Klimp, Col Jack W., 67-70, 116, 152-153 109 Kline, Col John P., Jr., 115 International Red Cross, 1, 9, 27, 92, 110, 141 Kosovo, 157 Ireland, 152 Kouyate, Lansana, 147, 149 Islamic Unity, 3 Kurtunwaarey, 90 Italy, 3-4, 18, 20, 40, 45, 89, 125, 155 Kuthar (FSG P46), 103 Italian Commands and Units 186th Parachute Regiment, 87 Kuwait, 41, 106, 118 187th Parachute Regiment, 87 Labbe, Col Serge, 91-92 24th Naval Group, 40 46th Aviation Brigade, 89 League of Arab States, 56 Folgore Brigade, 40, 47, 87, 89 Lias, Col Dayre C., USAF, 106-107 San Marco Battalion, 40, 50, 87 Libutti, BGen Frank, 1 Jacqmin, LtCol Marc (Belgian Forces), 44-45 Loi, BGen Bruno (Italian Forces), 40 Jaua, Col Omar, 92 Lorenz, Col Frederick M., 26, 108 Jawhar, 87-88 Magruder, BGen W. Lawson, III, USA, 44, 94, Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr., 7 95, 100 Jervis Bay (GT 203), 103 Mahdi, Ali (Mohamed), 3, 8, 22, 47, 52, 56, 71, Jess, Col Ahmed Omar, 3, 22-23, 44-45, 53, 56, 86-87, 92, 94, 139, 156 71, 74, 83, 94-98, 100, 149, 155 Malaysia, 152, 155 Jilib, 4, 97, 133, 134 Marine Corps Commands and Units Johnston, LtGen Robert B., 12-14, 16-18, 20-22, I Marine Expeditionary Force, 12-16, 21, 26- 25-27, 29, 34, 38-39, 42, 50-54, 56-61, 66, 68, 27, 65, 71, 119 72, 74, 80, 86-87, 96, 101, 107-109, 111-113, Marine Forces Somalia, 16, 18-19, 36, 65-66, 115-116, 119-120, 126, 133, 137, 141, 143, 147, 105, 116, 119, 152 149-151, 153-154, 157 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 113 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 38, 45-46, 66, 70, Johnston, Philip, 141, 143, 147 73, 83, 114 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6, 11, 25, 113, 134, 149 1st Force Service Support Group, 15-16, 18, 119, 122 Joint Task Force Somalia, 12-13, 22, 54 1st Marine Division, 15-16, 37-38, 45, 79, Jubba, 4, 24, 45, 83, 94, 96, 132 134-135 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Jubba River, 4, 83, 94, 132 Intelligence Group, 15 Juneau (LPH 10), 16, 31-32 1st Tank Battalion, 113 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 15, 38, 44-45 K-4 traffic circle, 73, 118 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion, 16, 45, 70, Kennedy, Col Kevin M., 141-142, 144, 147 83
INDEX 193 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, 69-70, 73, 113 33-34, 36-38, 40-42, 44-47, 49, 52, 54, 56-58, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 16, 45, 66, 70, 78, 60-63, 65-66, 69-72, 74-76, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87- 80-81, 112-113, 115 89, 91, 94, 97-99, 105-106, 108-113, 115, 117- 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 45, 66, 118, 121, 127-128, 130-132, 134-135, 138-145, 70, 88, 111 147, 150, 152-153, 155-156 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 15-16, 107 Mombasa, Kenya, 1, 42, 106, 114, 128, 130, 141 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 7 7th Marines, 38, 45-46, 66, 70, 73, 82-83, Montgomery, MajGen Thomas, USA, 151 114-115, 122, 137, 153 Morgan, Gen (See Hirsi, Mohamed Said) 9th Communications Battalion, 135 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Moroccan Commands and Units Operations Capable), 16 3d Motorized Infantry Regiment, 76 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Royal Moroccan Army, 76 Operations Capable), 155 Morocco, 18, 41, 76, 77 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 15-17, 32, 35, 38, Moser, Capt Alan B., USN, 7 42-45, 67, 77-79, 115, 139, 144 Mowain (AOR A20), 103 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 63, 97 Mundy, Gen Carl E., Jr., 14 Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 46, Muslim Brotherhood, 3 66, 70 Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 44-45 MV 1stLt Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003), 17, 115 Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 66, 70 MV 1stLt Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011), 16, 33, 35, Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th 115, 122 Marines, 69 Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron MV PFC James Anderson, Jr. (T-AK 3002), 17, 352, 105 115 Marine Aircraft Group 16, 83, 105, 114-115, MV Pvt Franklin J. Phillps (T-AK 3004), 17, 153 115 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 14 Nairobi, Kenya, 7, 107, 109, 141 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, 115 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 136 Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369, 115 Navy Commands and Units Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron Navy Forces Somalia, 17, 47, 103-104, 114, (Composite) 164, 15, 38-39 120, 151 Marine Wing Support Squadron 372, 16, 132 30th Naval Construction Regiment., 75, 132, MEU Service Support Group 15, 15, 128 145 Amphibious Squadron 3, 16 Masirah Island, 7 Amphibious Squadron 5, 32 Matabaan, 92-93 Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, 17, 29 Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3, 16 Matchee, Master Cpl Clayton (Canadian Forces), Military Sealift Command, 29 100-101 Naval Forces Central Command, 6 Mathieu, LtCol Carol J., (Canadian Forces), 9, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, 14 94, 101 Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Teams, 7, 32-33, 44 Surgeon General of the Navy, 14 Maulin, Col, 96 Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, 31, 154 Menelik II, 3 Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, 16-17 Merka, 49-50, 86, 90-91, 117-118, 143, 153 Nepal, 152 Mikolajcik, BGen Thomas R., USAF, 18 New Port, 118 Mogadishu, 4, 6-8, 11, 16, 22, 24-25, 27-29, 31, New York Army National Guard, 27th Brigade,
194 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 37 Prophet Mohamed, 2 New Zealand, 42, 105, 138 QoQaani, 95 New Zealand Commands and Units Qoryooley, 50, 90 Number 42 Squadron, 42 Rainville, Capt Michael (Canadian Forces), 100- Royal New Zealand Air Force, 42 101 Newbold, Col Gregory S., 15, 32-33, 77, 144 Rajo, 138-139 Nigeria, 20, 41, 118 Ranger (CV 61), 17 Norway, 20, 152 Reardon, Maj John D., 109 O'Meara, LtCol William J., USAF, 110 Republic of Korea, 152 Oakley, Ambassador Robert B., 43, 50-52, 54, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 135 56, 59-60, 95-96, 139, 141, 147, 149-150, 157 Romania, 152 Oddur, 28-29, 46-47, 61, 83-85, 105, 118, 130 Rossi, MajGen GianPietro (Italian Forces), 87 Ogaden, 6, 83, 85 Rushmore (LSD 47), 16, 31, 44 Operations Sab, 2 Clean Street, 75 Samaal, 1-2 Deliverance, 20, 40 San Giorgio (LPD L9892), 103 Desert Storm, 6, 54 Saudi Arabia, 6, 13, 18, 30, 41, 118, 135 Eastern Exit, 6 Saudi Arabia Commands and Units Ibis, 20, 40 5th Royal Saudi Land Forces Airborne Oryx, 20 Battalion, 41 Provide Comfort, 14, 27, 141, 157-158 Save the Children, 92 Provide Hope, 14 Scott Air Force Base, 18, 29 Provide Relief, 1, 9, 28, 30-31, 42, 106, 114, Seward, Maj Anthony (Canadian Forces), 100- 141 101 Renaissance, 144 Seychelles, 104, 109 Restore Hope, 1, 3, 9, 20, 27, 43, 49, 51, 59, Seychelles Coast Guard, 104 105, 156-157, 158 Shaheen, BGen Imtiaz (Pakistani Forces), 20, 58, Solace, 20, 40 147 United Shield, 155, 156 Shebelle River, 49 Organization of African Unity, 56 Shermarke, President Abdirashid Ali, 5 Organization of the Islamic Conference, 56 Smith, Col Thomas D., USA, 18 Oxfam Quebec, 92 Solomon, BGen Billy K., USA, 19, 120 Pakistan, 18, 41, 118, 152, 155 Somali Democratic Movement, 3, 56 Pakistani 6th Punjab Regiment, 91 Somali National Alliance, 56, 94 Peck, Col Frederick, C., 97 Somali National Army, 22 Perkins, RAdm James B., III, USN, 32 Somali National Front, 23, 92 Peterson, Capt John W., USN, 16, 31, 44-45 Somali National Movement, 3, 6, 56, 92, 149 Project Hand Clasp, 144 Somali Navy, 44
INDEX 195 Somali Patriotic Front, 44 Turkish Commands and Units 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Mechanized Somali Patriotic Movement, 3, 6, 23, 56, 71, 83, Brigade, 41 94 21 October Road, 66 Somali Road, 132-134 U.N. Security Council, 11, 151 Somali Salvation Democratic Front, 3, 56, 92 U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, 107 Somali Youth League, 4 U.S. Transportation Command, 18, 29 Somalia Youth Club, 4 Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), 34, 36- Southern Somali National Movement, 3 39, 41-43, 45-47, 49-50, 52,-70, 72-76, 79, 82- Soviet Union, 4-6, 8, 14 83, 86-90, 92, 94-98, 101-102, 104, 106-115, 118-122, 124-125, 128-131, 133-134, 136-147 Spataro, LtCol Stephen M., USA, 60-61 United Arab Emirates, 41, 118, 153 Special Operations Forces, 18, 31, 40, 49, 80-81, 84, 88, 92, 114, 132, 152, 155 United Nations, 4, 9, 11-12, 16, 19-21, 39, 50, Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces 55-56, 58-59, 61, 78, 83, 85, 93, 107-109, 111- Group (Airborne), 31 113, 115, 120, 128, 137, 141-145, 147-152, 155- 156, 158 Standing Committee of the Countries of the Horn of Africa, 56 United Nation Organization Somalia (UNO- SOM), 16, 20, 50, 56-58, 78, 85, 90-91, 94, 98, Strada Imperiale, 48 109, 116, 118, 120, 136-137, 139, 141, 147-156, Sukanya (OPV P51), 103 158 Sullivan, Ms. Katie, 58 United Nations Children's Fund, 93, 144 Support Command, 13, 18-19, 114, 116, 118- United Nations Economic Commission, 56 121, 124, 127, 151 United Somali Congress, 6, 22, 47, 92, 155 Task Forces United Somali Party, 56, 82 2-87, 90-91 United States Agency for International 3-17, 90-91 Development, 141 Bardera, 83, 115, 153 United States Embassy, 33-34, 72, 118, 120, 139, 151 Bravo, 87 Valley Forge (CG 50), 17 Columbus, 87 Vesuvio (MCS A5384), 103 Hope, 42-43 Vietnam, 98 Kismayo, 53, 94, 96, 114, 117, 152 Villagio Bur Carole, 118 Mogadishu, 69-71 Villagio Scibis, 87 Ranger, 152, 155 Wajid, 46, 84, 118 Tiyegloo, 46, 84 Warsame, Gen Abdi Dahir (Somali Forces), 82 Tobruk (LSL L50), 103 Wasp (LHD 1), 97 Trenton (APD 14), 7 Webi Jubba, 24 Tripoli (LPH 10), 16, 31, 127 Webi Shebelle, 24, 47 Tughril (DD 167), 103 Tunisia, 41 Western Somali Liberation Front, 6 Turkey, 20, 118 Wilhelm, MajGen Charles E., 16, 37-38, 68-69,
196 RESTORING HOPE IN SOMALIA 72-73, 83, 87, 98, 115-116, 140, 153 World Airways, 106 World Food Program, 1, 61, 111, 143, 145 Zimbabwe, 41, 118 World Health Organization, 111 Zinni, BGen Anthony C., 14, 17, 26-27, 51, 56, 58, 68, 110, 113, 137, 141, 143, 147, 149, 155, Yemen, 36 158 Zenawi, President Meles, 56 Zinnia (AGF A961), 103
The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continu- ous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.
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