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Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force, 1992-1993   Mroczkowski
COVER: Civilian relief workers unload
food supplies at a village near Baidoa as
a Marine escort stands by.
                       DVIC DN-ST-93-01389
        Restoring Hope:
       In Somalia with the
 Unified Task Force, 1992 - 1993

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

         Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski
       U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

                History Division
           United States Marine Corps
                Washington, D.C.
                       Other Publications in the Series

                  U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation Provide
Comfort. (1995)

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. (1995)

A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991 - 1996. (2003)

On Mamba Station: U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990 - 2003. (2004)

                                   PCN 190 0041 3500

   This story of Operation Restore Hope relates how many issues unique
to operations other than war were addressed and resolved by the com-
manding general of the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) and his
staff. Because it is written specifically from the perspective of the com-
mand element and drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports
made at the time or shortly thereafter, this is a study of command, limit-
ed to that discrete portion of American involvement in Somalia that was
the United States-led coalition under the command of Marine Lieutenant
General Robert B. Johnston. It does not follow the actions of the indi-
vidual components or members of the units that made up the coalition
force beyond how they may have affected the work and mission of
   Modern military operations other than war are, in many ways, similar
to pacification operations conducted in Latin America and the Far East a
century ago. In fact, the lessons learned sections of many modern after
action reports are familiar to anyone who has read the Marine Corps'
1940 Small Wars Manual, a treatise of the Corps' experience in the
Banana Wars, which was written before World War II. Sections of that
manual emphasized that civic actions often affected mission accomplish-
ment more than military actions, and stressed that Marines must both
become attuned to local culture and remain aloof from domestic political
squabbles to be successful.
   The last decade of the 20th century brought great changes to the
world, many of which affected the United States military. If the years
1980 to 1989 were a time of reformulating military doctrine and inte-
grating new technologies, the years from 1990 to 1999 were a time for
testing those thoughts and instruments.
   The final defeat of communism in Europe, the fall of the Warsaw Pact,
and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were great ends in themselves.
But they were the heralds of the new world order proclaimed shortly
after by President George H. W. Bush. On the one hand, these occur-
rences allowed the United States and its allies to act decisively in the
Persian Gulf against Iraq in 1990 and 1991; but the loss of the Cold War
counterbalance of the Soviet Union and its strategic aims meant the
United States would find it easier to become involved in regional con-
flicts and localized civil strife. For the remainder of the decade, United
States military personnel bore a burden of increasing operational tempo
rarely known in eras of peace.
   Following the Persian Gulf War and its related Kurdish relief opera-
tion, the next major military commitment was to Somalia. The crisis in
that country was such that the humanitarian mission of the United States
and its coalition allies could only be met by military means. The
response to the crisis was named Operation Restore Hope and was sig-
nificant for its size and international support. It also provided useful les-
sons for succeeding humanitarian operations. Brigadier General Anthony
C. Zinni, one of America's foremost experts on operations other than

war, saw the need for the Marine Corps to train a new generation of
Marines able to think in new directions to solve the problems of human-
itarian operations conducted in support of sometimes obscure and limit-
ed national goals. Many of the issues faced in Somalia by planners and
executors (the Marines and soldiers on the ground) have resurfaced in
Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other hotspots.
   The author, Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, retired from the United
States Marine Corps Reserve on 1 March 1999, with nearly 31 years of
service. During that time, he served in Vietnam as an artillery forward
observer with two rifle companies, as an observer and advisor with the
37th Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, and the officer in charge of an inte-
grated observation device (laser range finder) team on an outpost in the
Que Son mountains. As a reservist, he later served in a variety of posi-
tions at the battery level with Battery H, 3d Battalion, 14th Marines.
While on the staff of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic Reserve
Augmentation Unit, he served as a liaison officer with the British Army
on six NATO exercises. He was the G-3 plans officer with the 2d Marine
Expeditionary Brigade from 1988 to 1990. During the early days of the
Persian Gulf War, he was recalled to active duty as a senior watch team
commander in the crisis action center of the II Marine Expeditionary
Force. He later received orders to proceed to Saudi Arabia as a field his-
torian with the 2d Marine Division. He served with that unit throughout
Operation Desert Storm. He was again recalled to active duty in
December 1992 to serve as a field historian with the headquarters of the
UNITAF in Somalia. In October 1994, he was recalled to active duty to
serve in Haiti as the joint task force historian with the multinational
force during Operation Restore Democracy. On 1 January 1996, he
returned to active duty as the historian assigned to United States
European Command to document Operation Joint Endeavor, during
which he served in Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bosnia, and Croatia. For the
last years of his military career he was the officer in charge of the Field
Operations Branch of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division.
During this time, he served with members of the general staff of the
Polish Armed Forces on three occasions in Poland and the United States
in the Partners For Peace program. He was recalled from retirement dur-
ing the Global War on Terror in March 2003 and served as a historian for
the Special Operations Command. He served overseas with a special
operations air detachment and two battalions of U.S. Army Special
Forces in Kuwait and Iraq.
   Colonel Mroczkowski is the author of U. S. Marines in the Persian
Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, and co-author of Fort Monroe: The Key To The
South. He also has written several articles on military subjects. In civil
life, he is the director of the U. S. Army's museum at Fort Monroe,
Virginia, a position he has held since January 1986.

                             C.D. Melson
                Acting Director of Marine Corps History


   Operation Restore Hope was a complicated and unusual operation. From the
initial commitment of United States Armed Forces on 9 December 1992 until the
turnover to the United Nations in May 1993, there was little need for direct mili-
tary action by large units, although the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF)
command was not loath to use force when necessary. Rather, the need to keep a
neutral and balanced approach to the situation in Somalia was more important to
the success of the mission. Small unit actions, patrolling, manning key points,
convoy security, and crowd control were the order of the day. For a military his-
torian, it has been an important task to identify the critical issues, often political
in nature, which were of importance to the command and its conduct of the oper-
ation, and to follow these issues as events unfolded. This is far easier in a classic
military operation with well-defined missions and objectives, and in which the
effects of enemy actions or capabilities are readily discernible. The history of this
operation is more about the evolution of ideas and command structures than it is
about the engagement of enemy forces.
   I have no reservations in claiming that the operation was successful; Lieutenant
General Robert B. Johnston and his coalition staff skillfully accomplished the
mission of the Unified Task Force, which was to create a secure environment for
the shipment of relief supplies and the establishment of the second United Nations
force in Somalia, UNOSOM II. The Unified Task Force was able to turn over to
the United Nations a country that, though still beset by problems, was beginning
to recover and in which the famine had been broken. What occurred after 4 May
1993 is another story, of which Operation Restore Hope was the prologue.
   The narrative is drawn from interviews, notes, and after action reports created
at the time or shortly thereafter. As the historian assigned to UNITAF headquar-
ters, I was in a notable position to have access to what was discussed and planned,
but was also able to directly observe the resulting operations. I attended meetings
and daily briefings and was able to travel throughout the theater, eventually reach-
ing each of the humanitarian relief sectors. This gave me the opportunity to con-
duct interviews in the field with commanders, staff officers, and individual sol-
diers, Marines, airmen, and sailors. It also gave me the opportunity to see the
diversity of action in each sector and to appreciate the complex nature and vast
scope of operations: Somalia was not just Mogadishu, and Operation Restore
Hope was more than the daily round of patrols and spot reports. The greatest dif-
ficulty I faced was in the very size of the area of responsibility (which was itself
but a small part of the entire country of Somalia.) Travel was both time consum-
ing and physically demanding; it could easily take at least three days to reach
some of the farther cities, conduct a few interviews, and then return. Whether
going by motorized convoy or aircraft, a day would be spent in travel each way,
and a full day or two would be spent on the ground. All had to be timed to trans-
portation schedules that could change with little or no advance notice. Failure to
connect left one stranded until the next convoy or aircraft departed. Also, since I
could not presume to impose on the hospitality of others, I had to be prepared to
bring everything that I might require for food, water, or accommodation.
"Humping" through the dust from a dirt airfield along a desert track with a full
combat load, several liters of bottled water, a full Alice pack and a cot was not
something to look forward to. But the camaraderie shown in each sector certain-
ly was, and the information gathered was worth the effort.
    I also was fortunate to have met several persons with whom I got to work close-
ly, or who helped me accomplish my mission. The first of these was Colonel Billy
C. Steed, the UNITAF chief of staff, who gave me the latitude to go where I need-
ed, provided me with access to meetings, and ensured that I reviewed important
documents. Next was Captain David A. "Scotty" Dawson, who was the historian
for the Marine Forces, and who had been overseeing the UNITAF headquarters
portion as well until I arrived. He very quickly showed me around, and he was
indefatigable and always full of enthusiasm. Much of my working time was spent
in the operations center under the watchful eye of Colonel James B. "Irish" Egan,
whose colorful manner made more bearable a daily grind in uncomfortable cir-
cumstances. He also demonstrated that the more important, but less noted, part of
military professionalism often lies in the attention to routine duty and detail. I was
fortunate to share a cramped, hot and airless working space in UNITAF head-
quarters with a distinguished civilian, Dr. Katherine A. W. McGrady, an employ-
ee of the Center for Naval Analyses. She provided insight in what was going on
and kept me apprised on what happened while I was out traveling. More impor-
tantly, we shared the documents and information we collected, making the effort
more complete than it would otherwise have been. I had the opportunity to visit
on a few occasions with the 10th Mountain Division's historian, Captain Drew R.
Meyerowich, USA. In addition to discussing the collection of documents and
information, he spoke of his desire to get away from his desk and be more active-
ly involved in the operation. He got his wish a few months later as the command-
ing officer of Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, which, as part of the quick
reaction force for the raid on General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's head-
quarters on 3 October, fought its way through the streets of Mogadishu. Captain
Meyerowich was awarded the Silver Star for his valor and leadership. Several out-
standing Marine Corps combat artists also documented Operation Restore Hope.
The first of these was Colonel Peter "Mike" Gish, who had an ability to see the
essence of a scene and capture it in his sketchpad in just a few strokes. His good
humor and endurance belied the age of a man whose service extended back to his
time as an aviation cadet in the latter days of World War II, and who had seen
active service during the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and in the Kurdish
relief operation. He and I shared many travels and many a dinner of meals, ready
to eat, atop the chancery building in Mogadishu. He was an excellent mentor who
taught me how to properly use the authority of a full colonel to accomplish one's
mission. The lessons came in handy in later years in Haiti, Europe, and eventual-
ly back in Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Donna J. Neary also deployed to Somalia, and
I had the opportunity to watch her talent in the field. A gifted artist, she also had
a knack for photography that was used to create a portfolio of coalition uniforms
and arms. Captain Burton Moore brought his experience as an infantry officer
during Vietnam, and worked as an artist with the Marine Forces. He created some
remarkable works of Marines in action. Two of these artists are represented in this
volume. I was very fortunate in meeting Major Daniel M. Lizzul, who was work-
ing as a liaison officer with the Italian forces. He not only assisted in interpreting
interviews, but also ensured I got to accompany the Italians on some of their oper-
ations. I count him as a good friend and a highly professional officer. Warrant
Officer Charles G. Grow, who I had known during Desert Storm, continued his
excellent performance as both a combat photographer and artist. He was an
invaluable liaison with the Joint Combat Camera Team. Sergeant B. W. Beard, a
writer with the Joint Information Bureau, accompanied me on a memorable jour-
ney to Gialalassi in late December. His articles, written for the local coalition

forces' newspaper and service magazines, captured the spirit of what was hap-
pening for the Marines and soldiers who were out on the streets. Finally, there
were all of the officers and soldiers of the various services of the coalition forces
who responded to my requests for interviews and information. These men and
women were often busy with their own duties, but they managed to find time to
speak with me and help me to gather a full impression of their work.
   Of course, not everyone who contributed to my work in the field or to this his-
tory was with me in Somalia. As I left Somalia, my good friend and comrade,
Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, took my place. He was leading the first
Joint History Team to deploy in support of an active operation, composed of five
men besides himself: Commander Roger T. Zeimet, USNR; Major Robert K.
Wright, Jr., USAR; Major Robert L. Furu, USAR; Major Jimmy Miller, USAFR;
and Sergeant Michael Eberle, USA. Lieutenant Colonel Cureton led a highly
organized and thorough field history program. These officers were able to conduct
scores of interviews and collect thousands of documents. Their prodigious col-
lection effort has been compiled into a volume entitled Resource Guide: Unified
Task Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope, pub-
lished by the U.S Army Center of Military History. This book has been of tremen-
dous value in researching and writing this monograph.
   Back in the United States, I owed my position to Brigadier General Edwin H.
Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. When the call came
for a historian to go to Somalia with UNITAF, he selected me from a field of very
qualified candidates. His deputy, Colonel Marshall B. Darling, kept me informed
of what was happening back home and forwarded anything that I requested. The
director of the Joint History Office, Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA
(Retired), also provided me with briefings, information, and encouragement, and
helped me to secure the opportunity to deploy to Somalia as a historian. I certainly
wish to thank those who reviewed the draft of this history, most especially
Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Cureton, and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown.
Both of these officers have been friends and comrades in the service of the histo-
ry of our Corps. Lieutenant Colonel Brown, a Basic School classmate, made sev-
eral recommendations that helped with the clarity of some of the more technical
aspects of this history. Brigadier General Gregory Gile, USA (Retired), also
reviewed the chapter that details the work of the coalition forces in the relief sec-
tors. Brigadier William J. A. Mellor DSC, AM, Royal Australian Army, did the
same for those portions that involved Australia's participation.
   I also wish to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, chief historian, Mr. Charles R.
Smith, senior historian, and Mr. Scott N. Summerill, senior editor, for their thor-
ough review of the final draft. My gratitude also goes to Mr. W. Stephen Hill, who
designed the maps, and to Mrs. Catherine A. Kerns, who prepared the manuscript
for publication, and again to Mr. Charles R. Smith for illustrating the history and
preparing the index.
   Not everything in the field worked as planned. A rare, sudden thunderstorm
caught me in an open vehicle shortly after I arrived. The water caused havoc with
my tape recorder. Thereafter, I was forced to use a notebook to record conversa-
tions with members of UNITAF while in the field. This is referred to as my field
notebook in the pages that follow to distinguish it from my journal. In that latter
volume, I recorded the information from briefings and meetings, as well as per-
sonal observations about the operation. Whenever I was working in the UNITAF
headquarters compound, I could use the services of the Joint Combat Camera
Team to record my interviews with commanders and staff officers. Unfortunately,
most of these were unavailable to me while I was writing this history. Fortunately,
I kept notes of these interviews and have used these.
   I chose to allow the materials used to guide the writing of the history and to fol-
low the development of issues. I have endeavored to use sources collected by
myself or by others at the time of the operation, or shortly thereafter. The views
and comments presented most nearly coincide with those perceptions held by the
participants at the time. Where I have used secondary sources, I have tried to use
ones that gave insight into the more non-military aspects of the operation, such as
Somali culture, politics, United Nations participation, etc. Here again, I have used
studies that were prepared just a few years after the operation.
   There are now several excellent studies of the operations in Somalia, but which
were not used for the preparation of this work. Many of these deal with the more
dramatic events of October 1993, which is outside the scope of this monograph.
Interested scholars are directed to Somalia and Operation Restore Hope by John
L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, and Policing The New World Disorder: Peace
Operations and Public Security, edited by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic,
and Eliot M. Goldberg. Of importance for an understanding of the United
Nations' perspective and the relationships of UNITAF with UNOSOM I and II is
volume VIII of the United Nations blue book series, The United Nations and
Somalia, 1992-1996. Mark Bowden's Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War
is a moving account based on interviews with participants of the raid of 3 October
1993. It is by far the best of several that have been published in recent years. In
addition, there have been many excellent articles in military journals and the mil-
itary forces of several of the coalition nations have written after-action reports or
official histories of their contributions to the operation.
   In the middle of January 1993, shortly after the death in action of Private First
Class Domingo Arroyo, I was traveling by helicopter to an interview with Captain
John W. Peterson, USN. While waiting at the helipad near the airport, a small
group of Marines joined the party. They were members of Task Force Mogadishu.
As we waited, a first lieutenant and I struck up a conversation, as Marines often
will when thrown together for a short time. After explaining what we each did, he
asked me, referring to Private First Class Arroyo's death, "Sir, was it worth it?" I
could not answer his question then, knowing how keenly this loss had been felt.
Most certainly to Arroyo's family, friends, and comrades, the price was too great.
But there were also the scores of thousands of Somalis, many of them innocent
children, who had been saved by the efforts of Marines, soldiers, and sailors like
Private First Class Arroyo. For these and their families there could be no greater
gift. If, in the end, America and her coalition partners were repaid with callous
evil by some men, that does not mean the attempt ought not to have been made.
Someday, perhaps, one of those children, grown-up and grateful for what had
been done, will lead his country out of the fear, evil, and despair that have
engulfed it.

                               D. P. Mroczkowski
                  Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)

                             Table of Contents



Table of Contents..................................................................................................................................ix

Part I - A Crisis in the Making

Chapter 1 Descent Into Despair..........................................................................................................1
  The Beginning .......................................................................................................................................1
  Clans and Colonization .........................................................................................................................2
  A Trust Territory....................................................................................................................................4
  Unification and Independence...............................................................................................................4
  A Failed State ........................................................................................................................................5
  Operation Eastern Exit ..........................................................................................................................6
  Civil War and Anarchy ..........................................................................................................................7
Part II - Operation Restore Hope

Chapter 2 The Widening Mission ....................................................................................................11
  Historic Decision to Intervene ............................................................................................................11
  Initial Planning ....................................................................................................................................12
  First Steps............................................................................................................................................13
  Organizing Tasks .................................................................................................................................15
  Support Command...............................................................................................................................18
  Coalition Partners ................................................................................................................................19
Chapter 3 Plans and Preparations ....................................................................................................21
  Working with Central Command ........................................................................................................21
  Somali Opposition...............................................................................................................................22
  Somali Terrain .....................................................................................................................................24
  Specified Tasks....................................................................................................................................25
  Psychological Operations....................................................................................................................27
  Phases of the Operation.......................................................................................................................27
  The Flow of the Force .........................................................................................................................29
Chapter 4 Coming Ashore..................................................................................................................31
  Initial Landings ...................................................................................................................................31
  Logistical Buildup ...............................................................................................................................35
  Force Buildup ......................................................................................................................................36
  Into the Interior ...................................................................................................................................42
  Securing the Relief Sectors .................................................................................................................43
Chapter 5 Politics, Peace Talks, and Police.....................................................................................51
  Military-Political Cooperation ............................................................................................................51
  Weapons Control and the use of Force ...............................................................................................52
  Reconciliation Conferences.................................................................................................................55
  Somali Police Forces...........................................................................................................................58
Chapter 6 Moving to the Third Phase .............................................................................................63
  Settling In and Daily Work .................................................................................................................63
  Mogadishu ...........................................................................................................................................66
  Bale Dogle...........................................................................................................................................76
  Bardera ................................................................................................................................................82

    Gialalassi .............................................................................................................................................85
    Belet Weyne.........................................................................................................................................91
    Morale and Restraint ...........................................................................................................................98
Chapter 7 Drawing Down the Forces ............................................................................................103
  Naval Operations ...............................................................................................................................103
  Air Operations ...................................................................................................................................104
  End Game..........................................................................................................................................110
  Restructuring and Redeployment ......................................................................................................112
  UNITAF Redeployment ....................................................................................................................113
  Coalition Shifts..................................................................................................................................117
Chapter 8 Normality Begins to Return..........................................................................................119
  Logistics ............................................................................................................................................119
  Medical Care and Health Issues........................................................................................................124
  Engineering .......................................................................................................................................130
  Psychological Operations..................................................................................................................137
  Civil-Military Operations ..................................................................................................................140
Part III - Getting Out

Chapter 9 Transition and Return ....................................................................................................147
  United Nations Relationship .............................................................................................................147
  Slow Transition to U.N. Control .......................................................................................................150

  Appendix A: Unified Task Force Somalia Organization ..................................................................169
  Appendix B: Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling .............................................179
  Appendix C: Chronology of Events and Operations ........................................................................183
  Appendix D: Citation ........................................................................................................................187

                                                  Chapter 1

                                      Descent Into Despair

                 The Beginning                              gency food supplies to Somalia. This initial effort,
                                                            named Operation Provide Relief, was based in
   By the summer of 1992, almost every                      Mombasa, Kenya, and was commanded by
American was familiar with the problems of                  Marine Brigadier General Frank Libutti. Military
Somalia. Images of sick, weak, and starving peo-            and civilian aircraft were used to fly shipments of
ple had been forced into the consciousness of even          food to towns inside Somalia.1 From there, the
the most casual observer of the news of the day.            food was to be distributed to needy refugees by
Television specials, photographs in magazines,              humanitarian relief organizations and nongovern-
newspaper articles, and even radio programs all             mental organizations such as the International
served to focus the attention of our nation to this         Red Cross and the World Food Program.
devastated land on the Horn of Africa. That peo-            Unfortunately, the accomplishment of this
ple were suffering and dying in the thousands was           humane task was often frustrated by the condi-
obvious; that something needed to be done was               tions on the ground in Somalia.
unquestionable. But even the best intentions are of            As is so often the case with crises that seem-
no consequence without identifiable goals and the           ingly flash across the nation's television screens
means to implement a relevant plan. In August               and magazine covers, the situation that led to a
1992, the United States, responding to a great              united intervention in Somalia had a long and
human tragedy, was ready to act. The plan, origi-           complex history that was not immediately appar-
nally quite simple, was the start of what would             ent. Of all of the world's areas, the Horn of Africa
develop into one of the largest humanitarian relief         always has been one of the most overlooked and
efforts in the history of the world, Operation              least understood. Yet, an appreciation of the histo-
Restore Hope.                                               ry and culture of this region is necessary to under-
   On 18 August 1992, President George H. W.                stand what the United States-led coalition did, and
Bush ordered the airlift of 145,000 tons of emer-           what its accomplishments were.

                                                                                                  DVIC DF-ST-98-04803
A Somali herds his flock of goats near the village of Belet Weyne. Unlike much of postcolonial Africa, Somalia's bor-
ders enclosed a single ethnic group, the Samaal, which has occupied the region since biblical times.

                                                                            clan-families descend and
                                                                            through which all ethnic
                                                                            Somalis trace their ancestry.
                                                                            On the Sab branch, these
                                                                            clan-families are the Digil
                                                                            and Rahanweyne; from
                                                                            Samaal are descended the
                                                                            Darod, Dir, Issaq and
                                                                            Hawiye. Over generations,
                                                                            each of these clan-families
                                                                            was further subdivided into
                                                                            clans, subclans and fami-
                                                                            lies.2 This fracturing of the
                                                                            people by lines of descent
                                                                            produced a dichotomy not
                                                                            unusual in clan societies in
                                                                            which there is strength
                                                                            against an external foe, but
                                                                            internal national weakness.
                                                                            For example, while a threat
                                                                            to the overall structure
                                                                            could bring about a unified
                                                                            effort to combat it, the vari-
                                                                            ous entities could still be
                                                                            fiercely antagonistic to one
                                                                            another. In an area in which
                                                                            resources are scarce and
                                                                            competition for those
                                                                            resources is very great, such
                                                                            hereditary divisiveness can
                                                                            assume tremendous impor-
                                                                            tance. In Somalia, the

         Clans and Colonization
                                                                            scarcity of water and arable
                                                                            land for both nomadic
                                                      herdsmen and for farmers has led to a tradition of
                                                      competition among the various families and
   One of the most important aspects of Somali        clans.3
society, and perhaps the most difficult for Western
observers to understand or appreciate, are the con-      A unified Somali nation did not exist until the
cepts of lineage and clan affiliation. For many       20th century. In earlier times, the country was
                                                      under the control of various emirates, generally
Americans, the word "clan" conjures up images of
                                                      centered along the coast. Cities carried on a trade
Scottish or Irish ancestry. To a Somali, however,
                                                      between the peoples of the hinterland and the
clan relationships define individual identity and
                                                      Arabian Peninsula. By the late 19th century, how-
relationships to every person that he comes into      ever, several other countries were colonizing or
contact with. It is no exaggeration that Somali       occupying parts of the Horn of Africa that would
children are taught their lineages for several gen-   become Somalia. The French occupied the north-
erations back so that on meeting another person,      ernmost sector, French Somaliland, today known
each can recite his ancestry and thus understand      as Djibouti. The Italians, seeking an empire in
his obligations and responsibilities to the other.    Africa, colonized the southern portion and called
   Traditionally, all Somalis trace their ancestry    Italian Somaliland. The British, with an eye to the
back to one man, Abu Taalib, an uncle of the          protection of the Suez Canal and their trade
Prophet Mohamed. His son, Aqiil, in turn had two      through the Red Sea, occupied an area on the Gulf
sons, Sab and Samaal. It is from these two the six    of Aden known as British Somaliland. Even the
                                                                                            DESCENT INTO DESPAIR                 3

Egyptians and Ethiopians claimed portions of the                  cult not to see a reflection of these earlier events
territory inhabited by the Somalis.4 A legacy of                  in those that would occur 80 years later.5
bitterness, particularly against the Egyptians, the                  While Great Britain, Italy, and France were
Coptic Christian Ethiopians, and the Italians, was                allies during World War I, the rise of the Fascist
formed at this time and was still apparent during                 dictator Benito Mussolini was to cause a division
Operation Restore Hope.                                           among the colonial powers. The Italian invasion
   Life was not always tranquil for the occupying                 and conquest of Ethiopia in 1935 placed Italy
powers, and they often fought among themselves.                   squarely in confrontation with Great Britain.
In 1896, the Italians invaded Ethiopia from                       British opposition to this aggression moved
Eritria, their colony on the Red Sea. The army of                 Mussolini to join Adolf Hitler, whose policies of
the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, stunningly                     expansion in Europe Mussolini had formerly
defeated them at the Battle of Adowa. Imam                        opposed.6 Thus, when World War II began, the
Mohamed Ibn Abdullah Hassan raised an insur-                      Horn of Africa was occupied by belligerents and
rection in British Somaliland in 1899 in response                 was soon to become a battleground.
to perceived threats to the Islamic religion from                    The Italian Fascist government recognized it
foreign influences. Known to history as the "Mad                  had the "chance of five thousand years" to
Mullah," Mohamed Abdullah waged an intermit-                      increase its African colonial holdings at the
tent 22-year jihad against both the British and the               expense of Great Britain.7 But Italy did not
Ethiopians. This was a period in Somalia's histo-                 declare war on the British Empire until the fall of
ry marked by chaos, destruction, and famine and                   France was imminent, in June 1940. Before the
during which it is estimated that one-third of all                year ended, however, the British were already
males in British Somaliland died, often at the                    planning to attack the Italian forces in Somalia, as
hands of the Mullah and his followers. It is diffi-               part of an overall strategy to clear the African con-

                                         Somalia Clan Affiliations
 The influence of clans and sub-clans was seen in the numerous factions and political organizations, which had been strug-
 gling for power since the overthrow of Muhammad Siad Barre. Virtually all derived their influence from their affiliation with
 one of the clans or clan-families. The important clans to the work of Operation Restore Hope were:

 The United Somali Congress (USC). This was the largest of       In the north was the Somali National Movement (SNM),
 the factions operating in southern Somalia, and it was one of   dominated by the Issaq clan-family. Under the leadership of
 the first to fight against the Barre regime. Composed princi-   Abdulrahman Ali Tur, this faction declared the independ-
 pally of the Hawiye clan-family, it was further subdivided      ence of the northwestern portion of the country as the
 into two factions, which were in violent competition with       "Somaliland Republic."
 each other. The first of these was the faction led by General
 Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed. Usually referred to as USC         Also in the north was the Somali Salvation Democratic
 Aideed, it was drawn from the Habr Gedr clan. The force         Front (SSDF), composed of members of the Majertain clan
 under Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the USC Ali Mahdi, drew its            of the Darod clan-family. The SSDF opposed the USC.
 support from the Abgal clan and opposed the USC Aideed
 faction. Both were strong in the Mogadishu area, and each       The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) was affiliated
 had supporters in other factions in the port city of Kismayo.   with the Rahanweyne clan-family and operated to the west
                                                                 of Mogadishu, centered on the town of Bardera and also
 The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Active mainly in           strong in Baidoa.
 the south around Kismayo, this faction was drawn from the
 Ogadeni clan of the Darod clan-family. It also was divided      The Somali National Front (SNF) was drawn from the
 into two rival groups. One, led by Colonel Ahmed Omar           Marehan clan of the Darod clan-family and was active along
 Jess, was allied with General Aideed. The other was led by      the border of Ethiopia near the town of Luuq.
 Colonel Aden Gabiyu and was allied with the forces of
 Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as "General Morgan."                  The Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) had its
 Morgan's forces were an independent faction of the Ogadeni      center in the town of Kismayo, and was representative of the
 sub-clan and were active in the Kismayo area, extending to      Biyemal clan of the Dir clan-family.
 the towns of Bardera and Baidoa. Morgan was allied with
 Ali Mahdi and therefore was opposed to Colonel Jess.            There also were several religious-based organizations, par-
                                                                 ticularly in the north. These groups included al-Itihaad al-
 Several other factions were operating in Somalia at this        Islamiya (Islamic Unity), which had fought against the
 time. Each had an armed militia. While these had less           SSDF in the north, and Akhwaan al-Muslimiin (Muslim
 impact on the coalition's work, they had to be considered.      Brotherhood), which had adherents throughout the country.

tinent of the enemy. Accordingly, in February           in the SYL, who did not want Italy to control any
1941, British Empire forces were on the offensive       of the country, they did acquiesce to the proposal.
to places that would become familiar to American        For the next 11 years, the country was prepared
servicemen 52 years later. On 14 February, the          for independence as a Trust Territory. Although
port city of Kismayo was captured, followed by          there was some antagonism toward the Italians in
the town of Jilib on the Jubba River on 22              the early years of this period, it began to wane as
February. The city of Mogadishu was attacked            the country's economy and political structures
next. Although it is more than 200 miles from           developed. The time was one of optimism as
Kismayo and Jilib, British Empire troops entered        enthusiasm for the new democracy raised a
Mogadishu only three days later, on 25 February.        national spirit without the traditional connections
With the Italian forces retreating into the interior,   to the clan-families.10
British forces advanced quickly beyond the bor-
ders of Italian Somaliland and into Ethiopia.8
                                                           During the 1950s, the SYL continued to be the
                                                        most important and strongest of the political par-
   As the war moved away from Somalia, the              ties. By 1956, the SYL had received the majority
British assumed responsibility for the administra-      of the seats in the national assembly. It followed a
tion of the entire area. During this period, the        program that was nationalist in outlook and
Somali people began to develop their first modern       sought to weaken the influence of the clans. When
political organizations. The Somalia Youth Club         drafting the constitution for the new nation as it
was formed in 1943, including in its membership         approached independence, the SYL sought a uni-
native civil servants and police officers. In 1947,     tary form of government. A federal form was
the organization changed its name to the Somali         believed to be too susceptible to the divisiveness
Youth League (SYL), with the announced aims of          of clan interests, and even in the SYL itself there
the unification of all Somali territory, a standard-    were individuals who were more interested in the
ized written form of the language, and protection       furtherance of their particular clan than in a pure-
of Somali interests. With branches in all Somali-       ly national program.11

                                                             Unification and Independence
occupied territories, including areas of Ethiopia
and Kenya, and with a membership from nearly
all clan-families, this party represented a true
national political organization. Other parties also        In 1956, Britain agreed to the eventual inde-
came into being at this time, but these were invari-    pendence of British Somaliland and its incorpora-
ably representative individual clan-families.9          tion in the new nation. Accordingly, British

              A Trust Territory
                                                        Somaliland was granted independence on 26 June
                                                        1960, and on 1 July it joined with the Trust
                                                        Territory to form the Somali Republic. During this
   British administration continued until the end       early period of independence, the new national
of the war, when the Allies decided the Italian         government had to address the differences
colonies seized during the war would not be             between the two sections' political, economic, and
returned. A commission composed of representa-          social development. While clan allegiances
tives of Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the     remained important, the development of a posi-
United States was formed to study the disposition       tion with an appeal to the interests of both the
                                                        northern and southern sections helped to bring the
                                                        nation closer together.12
of these former colonies, including Somalia. The
SYL proposed that all Somali territories be uni-
fied and requested a trusteeship by an internation-        The major issues facing the new country during
al commission for 10 years to be followed by            the 1960s were the improvement of social condi-
complete independence. While such a proposal            tions and the nation's physical infrastructure. At
was agreeable to the commission, the Allied             the same time, many of the nation's political lead-
Council of Foreign Ministers could not decide on        ers espoused the idea of "Pan-Somalism," a con-
the proper method for preparing the country for         cept that called for the unification of all the
independence. Finally, in 1949, the General             Somali peoples into one nation. Whether this
Assembly of the United Nations assigned Italy the       unity was to be achieved by peaceful or aggressive
trusteeship with the stipulation that Somalia must      means was an issue of some debate among the
be entirely independent before the end of 1960.         leaders, but the idea had a great appeal with the
Although there were many Somalis, particularly          people. Since many Somalis lived in the border
                                                                              DESCENT INTO DESPAIR               5

areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, this goal      the nation. In this they were fairly successful,
placed Somalia in confrontation with those             employing a program of sending those who were
nations. There were several border clashes with        already educated throughout the country to teach
Ethiopia during this period, as well as guerilla       others. Not as successful was the attempt of the
raids into Kenya. While this expansionist program      government to improve the economy of the coun-
may have alienated Somalia at times from its           try. One of the poorest of all nations, Somalia's
neighbors, the general policy did provide a broad      economy was defined by the pastoral nomadic
basis for agreement among nearly all of the polit-     lifestyle of the majority of its people. Foreign
ical leaders.13                                        exports were limited mainly to cattle or other
    The 1960s also saw the increasing dominance        foodstuffs produced in the fertile river valleys.
of the SYL in the government. Curiously, the           Most farming, however, was of a subsistence
party's great success was becoming a weakness.         level. Such a fragile economy was susceptible to
As candidates in national elections began to rec-      the droughts that would regularly strike the
ognize the SYL was the winning ticket, the party       region, which left the country very dependent
                                                       upon foreign assistance, particularly from the
                                                       Soviet Union.16
drew persons of all political views and beliefs into
its ranks. More importantly, the party became the
means through which nepotism and clan alle-               In this period of the Cold War, there was some
giances were once again served. Ironically, the        strategic significance to the position of Somalia
SYL thus came to represent the very factionalism       based upon the approaches to the Red Sea and the
it had originally opposed. In addition, the party      Suez Canal. With many of its Army officers edu-
and government became corrupt as favors and per-       cated in the Soviet Union, and with its commit-
sonal gain took the place of public service. By the    ment to a socialist form of government, Somalia
end of the decade, the nation was ripe for a coup

                A Failed State
   An assassin, apparently motivated by a clan
grievance, killed President Abdirashid Ali
Shermarke on 15 October 1969. Although the act
was an isolated incident of violence, it served as
the catalyst for events that quickly followed. The
assassination was used as an excuse for the over-
throw of the democratic government. On 21
October, when Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal tried
to arrange the selection of a new president, the
military moved to take over the country. Major
General Mohammed Siad Barre quickly assumed
leadership of the new Supreme Revolutionary
Council. Members of the old government were
arrested, political parties were outlawed, the
National Assembly was abolished, and the consti-
tution was suspended. Under the new name of the
Somali Democratic Republic, the country
embarked upon its own social experiment of sci-
entific socialism. Specifically, the new regime
wanted to end the influence of allegiance to clans                                     Photo courtesy of the author
and the corruption that had become endemic in          MajGen Mohammed Siad Barre took power in late
the government. Society was to be transformed in       1969 in a bloodless coup following the assassination of
accordance with a political philosophy based on
both the Quran and Marxism.15
                                                       country's prime minister, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermarke.
                                                       Barre's goal of removing the clan as the primary Somali
   Among other projects begun by the new gov-          allegiance ultimately would lead to the destruction of
ernment was an attempt to raise the literacy rate of   the Somali state.

eagerly accepted Soviet military and economic           was active in the southern region; and the United
aid. In return, the Soviets were allowed to build       Somali Congress (USC), composed mainly from
airfield and port facilities at Berbera, on the north   the Hawiye clan and active in the central part of
coast. While the ties to the Soviet Union were          the country. By December these forces had
never truly strong, they were to be severed perma-      pushed the Somali Army back the outskirts of the
nently by the pursuit of Somali foreign policy.17       capital, Mogadishu. Violence and unrest began to
   The concept of Pan-Somalism had continued            grow within the city itself, creating a dangerous
into the Barre regime. In the early years of his        atmosphere for the foreign personnel and diplo-
rule, this policy was pursued through peaceful          mats living there. Open fighting had begun in the
negotiations with neighboring countries.                city by late in the month as the predominantly
Especially in regard to the Ogaden region, con-         Marehan-based army attempted to destroy USC
trolled by Ethiopia, the Somali government dis-         elements in the Hawiye enclaves. The resulting
                                                        breakdown of all order unleashed even greater
tanced itself from the insurgent movements that

                                                                  Operation Eastern Exit
had previously been supported there. This
changed after the 1974 overthrow of Emperor
Haile Selassie and the establishment of a Marxist
government in Addis Ababa. When attempts
failed at negotiating a settlement of the Ogaden           On 5 December 1990, due to escalating vio-
question, the Somali government recognized the          lence and chaos, American Ambassador James K.
Western Somali Liberation Front, which was              Bishop ordered the departure of non-essential
fighting to break the Ogaden from Ethiopia. Aid         embassy personnel and dependents. By mid-
was given to the Ethiopian People's Revolu-             month, several foreign countries had joined the
tionary Army, which was fighting a guerilla war         United States in advising their citizens to leave.
against the new Ethiopian government. Finally, in       On 30 December, Ambassador Bishop brought all
July 1977, the Somali Army invaded Ethiopian            remaining official Americans into the embassy
territory in an attempt to gain the Ogaden. In this     compound, where he initially thought they could
contest between two of its client states, the Soviet    wait out the fighting in safety. By 1 January 1991,
Union came to the aid of Ethiopia. With large           attacks on foreigners, including Americans, had
amounts of modern Soviet equipment and a rein-          increased and the embassy itself had been hit by
forcement of Cuban troops, the Ethiopians turned        small arms fire. Ambassador Bishop decided the
the tide of battle and drove the Somalis from their     situation was too dangerous to permit embassy
territory. In retaliation, Siad Barre ejected Soviet    personnel to remain any longer, and on New
personnel from Somalia and turned to the West for       Year's Day he requested permission from the U.S.
support. In 1980, an agreement was reached with         State Department to evacuate the embassy.
the United States whereby use was given of the          Permission was granted on 2 January.22
port and airfield facilities at Berbera in exchange        In a fine example of forward thinking, on 31
for military and economic aid.18 Somalia stayed         December 1990, Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur,
close to the United States throughout the remain-       USN, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central
der of the 1980s.                                       Command, had already alerted his staff to be pre-
   This decade was not to be an easy one for the        pared to conduct a non-combatant evacuation
Barre regime, however. In spite of its attempts to      operation (NEO) in Mogadishu. Even though
rid the country of the influence of "tribalism," the    heavily involved in Operation Desert Shield and
government was increasingly identified with the         the final preparations for Operation Desert Storm,
Marehan, Barre's own clan.19 In addition, corrup-       Central Command in Saudi Arabia began plan-
tion in the government created even more dissat-        ning rapidly for the evacuation. After reviewing
isfaction. By 1988, armed opposition to the Barre       the Central Command plan, the Joint Chiefs of
regime had begun with a rebellion in the north of       Staff issued an execute order for the evacuation
the country.20 There were three main opposition         operation late on 2 January. By that time, forces
                                                        for the operation were already being assembled
                                                        from those available in the Persian Gulf.23
groups forming in late 1990 around geographical
and clan affiliations: the Somali National
Movement (SNM), which had begun in Northern                The operation was named Eastern Exit.
Somalia; the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM),           Planners had created a variety of potential scenar-
which was mainly recruited from the Ogaden and          ios, each tailored for a specific situation. In a
                                                                                      DESCENT INTO DESPAIR         7

preparatory move, U.S. Air Force AC-130 Specter                    The 60-man evacuation force was composed 51
gunships and ground security elements deployed                  Marines and corpsmen from the 4th MEB, and
to Nairobi, Kenya, in case the preferred option, a              nine U.S. Navy special warfare personnel from
peaceful evacuation through the Mogadishu air-                  Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Team 8F. The security ele-
port, could be accomplished. This plan was not                  ments boarded the helicopters at 0330 on 5
pursued once Ambassador Bishop decided it was                   January. At 0345 they lifted off, with an expected
too dangerous for embassy personnel to make the                 arrival time of 0620. With the in-flight refueling
nearly two-mile journey to the airport. Conditions              successfully completed, the helicopters crossed
at the airport also had deteriorated to such an                 the coast just at dawn. There was some initial dif-
extent that an air operation would be too risky.                ficulty in identifying the embassy, but it was clear-
These circumstances left an amphibious option.24                ly distinguished on the second attempt. As the hel-
                                                                icopters came in for their landings, numerous
    Admiral Arthur chose to create an amphibious
                                                                armed looters were seen positioning ladders
force composed of only two ships, the amphibious
                                                                against one side of the compound wall. Upon
transport dock USS Trenton (APD 14) and the hel-
icopter assault ship USS Guam (LPD 9).* The
                                                                landing, the SEALs immediately established the
                                                                security of the chancery building while the
commanding general of 4th Marine Expeditionary                  Marines provided a perimeter defense for the
Brigade (4th MEB), Major General Harry W.                       compound. Both helicopters were quickly filled
Jenkins, Jr., designated Colonel James J. Doyle,                with evacuees and they returned to the Guam by
Jr., as the commander of the landing force. His                 1040.27
counterpart, the commander of the amphibious
                                                                   Back at Mogadishu, the evacuation force and
task force, was Captain Alan B. Moser, USN.
                                                                the embassy security force assisted in bringing in
These two officers embarked their staffs and the
                                                                several citizens from other foreign countries. By
task force got under way from Masirah Island, off
                                                                evening, the first of four waves of Boeing-Vertol
the tip of Oman, by 2330 on 2 January. Colonel
                                                                CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters from the Guam
Doyle and Captain Moser had been informed the                   arrived at the embassy landing zone. These five
use of the airport was not an option, nor was an                helicopters remained on the ground only 20 min-
across-the-beach landing because of the distance                utes, departing with an additional 75 evacuees. As
inland of the embassy from any potential landing                the first wave of helicopters returned to the Guam,
sites. The plan with the greatest chance of success             the second wave set down at the embassy. This
was, therefore, to use shipborne Marine helicop-                wave, also of five helicopters, departed after just
ters that could land directly in the embassy com-
                                                                18 minutes on the ground, leaving only the
                                                                ambassador, his staff, and the Marine Security
    By 3 and 4 January, the threat to the embassy               Guard to be evacuated. The third wave departed at
and its personnel increased. The embassy guards                 2210, and the fourth wave carried the ambassador
engaged in a firefight with looters, and small arms             and the perimeter defense force. This final wave
fire and even a rocket propelled grenade impacted               took off even as looters clambered over the walls
inside the embassy grounds. At that point it was                and entered the compound. The last helicopter
decided that a pair of Sikorsky CH-53 Super                     landed back on the Guam at 2323, and 20 minutes
Stallion assault helicopters could be launched                  later the ambassador declared the operation com-
when within 500 miles of Mogadishu. The time of                 pleted.28

                                                                          Civil War and Anarchy
departure would be calculated to provide an early
morning arrival at the Somali coast. This long-dis-
tance journey would require at least one aerial
refueling and cause crew fatigue, but it would get                 With the completion of this highly successful
the aircraft and security forces to the embassy                 operation, the American presence in Somalia
much sooner.26                                                  ended for nearly two years. Few in the United
                                                                States noticed what was happening there because
*Planning for the imminent start of Operation Desert Storm      the attention of Americans and most of the world
was paramount in the minds of planners at this time, and the
choice was to have as many ships available as possible in the   was focused on the events in Southwest Asia. By
Persian Gulf area. It was not possible to forecast either how   the end of January 1991, Siad Barre was forced to
long Eastern Exit would take, or when ships committed to it     flee Mogadishu, and the country fell deeper into
would be able to return.                                        anarchy and chaos as the various armed factions

continued to battle the forces of the old national         threat of losing subsistence to armed bands of fac-
government. Finally, by May 1992, Barre's forces           tional militias was now added to the threat of
were defeated and he was forced to flee the coun-          being robbed by the increasing gangs of bandits.
try altogether. This did not mean the end of fight-        With violence a reality of everyday life, everyone
ing, however. Instead, the various factions and            had to protect himself. Individuals armed them-
clans that had formerly opposed Barre now sought           selves, formed local militias, or hired others for
to achieve dominance in the new government.                protection. Even private relief organizations
When Barre was driven from Mogadishu, Ali                  became the targets of threats and extortion and
Mahdi Mohamed of the USC was selected as the               had to resort to the hiring of armed bodyguards. It
new president. The USC was an instrument of the            truly became a case of "every man against every
Hawiye clan, however, and Ali Mahdi never                  man."
received enough support to coalesce the rest of the            By the early 1990s, the history of Somalia dis-
country behind him. The fighting, which now pit-           closed certain disturbing patterns. First, it showed
ted the clans against one another, also led to the         that tribalism or clan loyalty was still a dominant
creation of new alliances and divisions. For               factor in society, despite earlier efforts to remove
instance, the USC itself split into two factions,          it. It was a force to be understood and reckoned
one led by Ali Mahdi and the other by General
Mohammed Farah Hassan Aideed.29 No single
                                                           with. The passage of time made no change in this
                                                           central fact of life. What had changed was the
group was strong enough to overcome the others             general lifestyle of the people. The reforms of the
in this unending fight for power. Without a central        Barre regime had removed many of the old struc-
government, anarchy, violence, and lawlessness             tures by which Somali society had been able to
reigned.                                                   keep clan rivalries and violence in check, or at
   To add to the suffering of the Somali people, a         least within acceptable limits. In fact, it could be
severe drought had devastated the region for about         argued that the Barre years actually made each
three years. As farmers were unable to raise crops,        clan more jealous of the others and desirous of
food itself became a weapon. To have it made               achieving dominance, destroying the balance that
one's own group strong; to deprive one's rivals of         had existed before.30 In addition, the years during
it weakened them as it strengthened oneself. The           which Somalia was a client state of the Soviet

                                                                                                DVIC DN-ST-93-03436
Village women gather near refugee huts outside Baidoa. The descending spiral of rape, murder, destruction of crops
and water supplies, and wholesale slaughter had led to mass starvation and forced thousands of Somalis to flee
their former homes.
                                                                                      DESCENT INTO DESPAIR              9

                                                                                                     DVIC DD-SD-00-01008
Members of the Aerial Port Squadron from Dyess Air Force Base, Abilene, Texas, and Dover Air Force Base, Dover,
Delaware, unload medical supplies from the left side of a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker's cargo bay. Off loaded at Moi
International Airport, Mombasa, Kenya, the supplies were transferred to U.S. Air Force C-130s for delivery to
Somalia as part of Operation Provide Relief.

Union and the United States saw the accumulation           ing and who now faced death by starvation.
of a large amount of weapons, ranging from rifles          Aircraft deliveries of relief supplies could be sent
to tanks and artillery. Somalia thus had an abun-          into the country, but there was no guarantee the
dant supply of weapons for its factional armies            aircraft would be allowed to land safely, or that
and bandits.                                               their cargoes would not be subject to extortionate
   Operation Provide Relief, begun so hopefully            payments.* In the autumn of 1992, it had become
in August 1992, soon was confronted with the               obvious that merely providing the necessities of
reality of the chaos and strife into which Somalia         life to these victims of anarchy would not suffice.
had descended. The breaking of the famine could               Operation Restore Hope was about to begin.
only be achieved by the safe delivery and distri-
bution of the food.
   In November, with deaths by starvation and
related diseases numbering 350,000 and expected
to increase rapidly, the United States decided to           * An example of the amounts which the relief organizations
                                                            had to pay simply to accomplish their humanitarian goals
take action. Acting on a United Nations mandate,            was told to the author by Lieutenant Colonel Carol J.
President Bush announced the United States                  Mathieu, commanding officer of the Canadian Airborne
would ensure the secure environment needed for              Regiment forces in Belet Weyne. The relief committee of the
the safe and effective delivery of relief supplies.         International Commission of the Red Cross was required to
However, there was no assurance the food would              provide each security guard at the airport with 85 kilograms
                                                            (187 pounds) of food per month. The cost for each airplane
ultimately be given to those for whom it was                landing at the airport was 50,000 Somali shillings. Also, they
intended, the thousands of refugees who were                were forced to rent cars and trucks at the rate of $1,600 per
driven from their homes by the drought and fight-           month.
                                             Chapter 2

                                 The Widening Mission

     Historic Decision to Intervene                   preferably be under U.N. command, but if that
                                                      was not feasible, a Council-authorized operation
                                                      undertaken by Member States was to be consid-
                                                      ered."35 On 3 December, the U.N. Security
   The 1992 Thanksgiving holiday brought the
usual round of family visiting and celebration to
the American people. Yet, perhaps especially at       Council unanimously passed Resolution 794,
this time, many in the United States reflected        authorizing military intervention in Somalia. A
upon the poignant differences between their for-      multinational force led by the United States was
                                                      allowed to use all necessary force to accomplish
                                                      its humanitarian mission.36 It was the first time in
tune and the plight of the Somali people. In
Washington, D.C., the holidays were not to be a
time of relaxation or conviviality for many in the    history the United Nations had elected to inter-
government. President George H. W. Bush was           vene in the internal affairs of a country without
conferring with advisers in the State Department      having received a request to do so from the coun-
and the Department of Defense about what could        try's government. Of course, Somalia was unique
be done to alleviate the suffering in Somalia. As
one official put it, "the number of deaths was
going up, and the number of people we were
reaching was going down."31
   The day before Thanksgiving, the President's
advisers provided him with three military options.
The first was a simple reinforcement of 3,500
troops to the 500 Pakistanis already in Mogadishu
as United Nations peacekeepers. The second was
to provide both air and naval support to a United
Nations force that would intervene in Somalia.
The third option, and the one the President quick-
ly chose, was for the United States to send in a
division-sized unit under United Nations aus-
   On 25 November, President Bush announced to
the United Nations that the United States was pre-
pared to provide military forces to assist with the
delivery of food and other supplies. The offer of
military assistance at this point was of a "general
nature," one that required a specific request from
the U.N. Security Council.33 Without waiting for
the Security Council to act, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff sent an alert order to the commander in chief
of U.S. Central Command, Marine General                                                            DoD Photo
Joseph P. Hoar. Within a week, the Joint Chiefs       Gen Joseph P. Hoar, the Marine Corps' deputy for oper-
provided a formal planning order to Central           ations during the Gulf War, and before that, Gen
Command, directing General Hoar to prepare a
detailed operations plan.34
                                                      Norman Schwartzkopf's chief of staff at Central
                                                      Command, in August 1991 assumed the post of
   The United Nations was not long in responding      Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, the uni-
to the American offer. On 29 November, the            fied command that has planning and operational
United Nations Secretary General, Boutros             responsibilities for 19 countries of the Middle East,
Boutros-Ghali, stated: "any forceful action should    South Asia, and the Horn of Africa.

in that there was no legitimate government and the                         Initial Planning
situation demanded swift action.
   The agreement allowing the United States to                While political issues were being discussed, the
lead the force satisfied one of the few demands            military planning was already in progress. As
placed by President Bush upon the offer of troops.         early as 22 November 1992, Lieutenant General
The American government did concede the                    Robert B. Johnston, commanding general of I
United Nations should have a supervisory role.             Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) at Camp
However, it was anticipated the United Nations
                                                           Pendleton, California, had received indications
would send in a peacekeeping force to replace the
U.S.-led force as soon as practical.37 In these early      from Central Command he might have to form a
days, there was even some discussion the turnover          joint task force.39 On 27 November, by an oral
                                                           order, General Hoar designated I MEF as the
                                                           headquarters of Joint Task Force Somalia.40
could take place as early as 20 January 1993,
Inauguration Day.38

                                                                                                         DoD Photo
LtGen Robert B. Johnston, a veteran of Vietnam, Lebanon, and the Gulf War during which he served as chief of staff
of Central Command, commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force, the unit designated as the headquarters for the
joint task force as it had trained for this type of operation.
                                                                             THE WIDENING MISSION        13

    Fortunately, I MEF did not have to start entire-    forces at levels other than the task force head-
ly from scratch in developing such a headquarters.      quarters. For instance, the ground forces of the
During a recent exercise, CatEx 92-3, the expedi-       Marine Corps and Army would have to be placed
tionary force had already organized and run the         into a single ground combat element; the air assets
headquarters for a joint task force. In the exercise,   of the Marines, Army, Navy, and Air Force into a
the expeditionary force was tasked with acting as       single air combat element, and so on. But he saw
a "Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Joint Task Force           no need for a single commander for such ele-
... simulating bare base conditions in a nonper-        ments, and he knew each service component
missive environment."41 While it was admittedly         could be tasked to perform discrete missions.
difficult to describe all the requirements of such      Besides, the experience of Desert Storm had
an organization during an exercise, the work            proven it was reasonable to operate with such
helped validate the concept and defined some of         components, so this was the manner in which
the needs of such a force.42                            Joint Task Force Somalia would be organized.43
    The task force had an exceptionally capable            In building the headquarters staff, General
and qualified commanding general in Lieutenant          Johnston already had the I MEF staff to serve as a
General Johnston. Distinguished and inspiring in        nucleus. Of course, these Marines had already
appearance, he was also characterized by clarity        served and worked together, and this familiarity
of perception and speech rarely found in other          would be an added strength for the newly forming
individuals, regardless of rank. Trim and in excel-     staff. As General Hoar later wrote: "designating a
lent physical condition, he was able to meet the        component or element headquarters as the foun-
harsh demands of the equatorial desert and set a        dation of the mission ... allowed an established
high standard for his command. These character-         service staff to transition quickly to a [joint task
istics would serve both him and the joint task          force] with little need for start-up time."44
force well in the months ahead as he threaded his       However, the I MEF staff itself was not large
way through numerous political, humanitarian,           enough for the greater responsibilities that acting
and operational considerations. But for the initial     as a joint task force would entail. It would require
planning stages, the general's greatest strength        augmentation by other Marines and personnel
may have been his own experience as a Marine            from the other Services. For example, the need to
officer. He had led a battalion to Lebanon 10 years     expand the intelligence and operations sections
earlier and knew what it meant to be a peacekeep-       was immediately recognized; although the mis-
er in a land in the midst of civil war. More recent-    sion would be essentially humanitarian, the task
ly, he was on the staff of Central Command dur-         force would have to be prepared for an armed
ing the war in the Persian Gulf. He had served in       threat.
Saudi Arabia as the Central Command Chief of               The Service components at Central Command,
Staff. Many of the principles for organizing a joint    which would be providing the military units for
and combined staff, which he had seen used so           the force, also selected individuals who would
successfully in the Persian Gulf conflict, would        join the joint task force headquarters. General
help him in creating his own joint task force.          Johnston later said: "They sent their best play-

                   First Steps
                                                        ers. ... I got key people."45
                                                           By late November, military personnel across
                                                        the nation were receiving orders to join the joint
   General Johnston had to first decide on the          task force, or were preparing themselves for the
manner of organizing his new force. Since this          possibility. At Fort Hood, Texas, Colonel Sam E.
was to be a joint task force, he would need to          Hatton, USA, was serving as the deputy com-
effectively integrate personnel and units from the      mander of the 13th Corps Support Command. On
other Armed Services. He had two choices by             1 December 1992, he received orders to proceed
which he could accomplish this: organize along          as quickly as possible to Camp Pendleton,
functional lines, as with a Marine air-ground task      California, for assignment as the task force logis-
force, a concept familiar to all Marines; or organ-     tics officer. He immediately handed over his
ize the force as components, as had been done           responsibilities and closed out remaining tasks.
with the American forces during Desert Storm.           He also placed some fast telephone calls to asso-
General Johnston recognized the functional              ciates and acquaintances, many of which were
organization would require an integration of            now general officers and key personnel at the

                                                             change. After being apprised of the task force's
                                                             mission, he realized one of his first requirements
                                                             would be the production of area studies, which he
                                                             had but a short time to prepare. In the meantime,
                                                             I MEF intelligence section's organization was
                                                             expanded with members from the other Services
                                                             and augmented with personnel from national
                                                             intelligence assets.47
                                                                One other important member of the growing
                                                             staff was Marine Brigadier General Anthony C.
                                                             Zinni. His background and experience suited him
                                                             for a responsible position within the joint task
                                                             force staff; in recent years, General Zinni had
                                                             served as operations officer for the United States
                                                             European Command. In 1991, he was the Chief of
                                                             Staff and Deputy Commander for Operation
                                                             Provide Comfort, the Kurdish relief operation at
                                                             the end of the Persian Gulf War. Shortly after-
                                                             ward, he served as the military coordinator for
                                                             Operation Provide Hope in the Soviet Union.
                                                             Now, in late 1992, he was the deputy command-
                                                             ing general of the Marine Corps Combat
                                                             Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. He
                                                             quickly volunteered to provide assistance to the
                                                             joint task force. After reporting to both the
                                                             Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl
                                                             E. Mundy, Jr., and Lieutenant General Johnston,
                                                             he was selected to head the operations section.
                                                             General Zinni joined the I MEF staff at Central
                                      DVIC DA-SD-98-00361    Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, where
BGen Anthony C. Zinni, a veteran of Vietnam and sev-         he received briefs on the situation in Somalia.
eral humanitarian operations, provided assistance and        From there he left for Camp Pendleton.48
was selected to serve as chief of operations for the joint      The Surgeon General of the Navy personally
task force.                                                  chose the force surgeon, Captain Michael L.
Department of the Army, to gauge the situation in            Cowan, USN. Captain Cowan was the surgeon
Somalia. Proceeding to Camp Pendleton, Colonel               with Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, when he was
Hatton's first task was to organize his own sec-             told of his selection on 6 December. By the 9th, he
tion. Building on I MEF's logistics section, he              reached Camp Pendleton, where he began to work
checked the existing table of organization and the           on planning with a staff that "had just met." His
talent available to ensure "the right people were in         first priority was setting the medical evacuation
the right jobs."46                                           plan, which included establishing alternate routes
   Similarly, Colonel William M. Handley, Jr.,               to move the wounded out of the country.49
USA, was serving at Headquarters, United States                 The process continued until the entire staff of
Army Forces Command, at Fort Stewart, Georgia,               the MEF headquarters was transformed into the
when he received a call notifying him that he had            headquarters of a joint task force. Individuals of
been selected to head the joint task force intelli-          all ranks, be they officer or enlisted, who had any
gence section. He quickly discussed the situation            of the required knowledge or expertise, were
with the intelligence staff and received a briefing          selected from the various Services by the compo-
from the Third Army. After arriving at Camp                  nent commanders at Central Command. They
Pendleton, he met with Colonel Michael V. Brock,             were quickly integrated into the appropriate staff
the I MEF intelligence officer. Checking the                 sections. Within a short time the task force head-
organization of the section, he saw little to                quarters staff had developed a decidedly purple
                                                                                     THE WIDENING MISSION          15

                                                                                                   DVIC DN-SC-93-04559
A port bow view of the amphibious assault ship Tripoli (LPH 10) underway. The second ship to be named after the
battle of Tripoli in 1804, she was a veteran of the Gulf War during which she was damaged by an Iraqi contact mine.

complexion.* Marines accounted only for 57 per-                  arrive by ship. The joint task force could take
cent of the total.                                               advantage of the support provided by one of the

                Organizing Tasks
                                                                 Maritime Prepositioning Force squadrons. Also,
                                                                 one of the MEF's organic units, the 15th Marine
                                                                 Expeditionary Unit (MEU), already was
                                                                 embarked and in the Western Pacific and could
                                                                 quickly arrive in the area of operations.50
   Even as the staff was coming together, the task
organization of the force itself had to be config-
ured. Since I MEF was providing the cornerstone                     Commanded by Colonel Gregory S. Newbold,
of the task force headquarters, it would only be                 the 15th MEU had completed its special opera-
natural that the MEF subordinate elements (1st                   tions training, and was therefore officially a
Marine Division; 3d Marine Aircraft Wing; 1st                    Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence                   Capable), or MEU (SOC). An expeditionary unit
Group; and 1st Force Service Support Group)                      is one of the smallest of the Marine air-ground
should be heavily involved in the operation.                     task forces. Nonetheless, the 15th MEU carried
However, there also were sound operational rea-                  enough personnel and equipment to make it a for-
sons for selecting the Marines for a large role in               midable force in most situations. The ground
the mission. The Marine Corps provided its own                   combat element was formed around 2d Battalion,
special capabilities, not the least of which was its             9th Marines, reinforced by a light armored
amphibious expertise. As in Operations Desert                    infantry platoon, a combat engineer platoon, a
Shield and Desert Storm, initial supplies and                    platoon of amphibious assault vehicles, and a bat-
heavy equipment for Restore Hope would have to                   tery of artillery in direct support. The air combat
                                                                 element was Marine Medium Helicopter
* After the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of       Squadron (Composite) 164, nicknamed the
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, with its requirements        "Knightriders." The squadron contained a formi-
for the Services to work more closely together and its empha-    dable array of helicopters: Boeing CH-46E Sea
sis on joint operations, the term "purple" was unofficially      Knights, Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallions, Bell
adopted to signify the increasing cooperation of the Service
components. The color denoted a separation from the roles of     AH-1W Super Cobras, and Bell UH-1N Iroquois
                                                                 "Hueys." The combat service support element was
                                                                 MEU Service Support Group 15.51
the individual Services by implying a blending of their tradi-
tional colors.

                                                               With the decision for a United States-led force, it
                                                               made sense the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit
                                                               with the 15th MEU (SOC), already in the Pacific,
                                                               would be a part of the plan. They would also be
                                                               the first of the joint task force's components in
                                                                  The structure of the Marine forces assigned to
                                                               the operation had to be clearly defined. With
                                                               Lieutenant General Johnston, the commanding
                                                               general of I MEF, now designated as the com-
                                                               manding general of the joint task force, similar
                                                               command changes would occur in I MEF's subor-
                                                               dinate units. At first, it appeared General Johnston
                                                               would act as both the commanding general of the
                                                               joint task force and the commanding general of
                                                               the Marine component, Marine Forces Somalia.
                                                               But it was soon decided this component should be
                                                               formed around the 1st Marine Division, com-
                                                               manded by Major General Charles E. Wilhelm.
                                                               This in turn redefined General Wilhelm's rela-
                                                               tionships to the other subordinate units. The ele-
                                                               ments of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing and the 1st
                                                               Force Service Support Group assigned to Marine
                       USS Tripoli WestPac Cruise, 1993-1994
                                                               Forces Somalia would now be subordinate to
Capt John W. Peterson, USN, commander of                       General Wilhelm in his role as the component
Amphibious Squadron 3, was a graduate of Dartmouth             commander. In effect, Marine Forces Somalia
College and a naval aviator who had accumulated more
                                                               would work on the higher operational level of a
than 4,000 hours in three generations of carrier-based
                                                               Marine air-ground task force, with its own
attack aircraft.
                                                               ground, air, and combat service support ele-
   The MEU was embarked on the three ships that                ments.53 * This arrangement was unusual for a
comprised Amphibious Squadron 3, commanded                     Marine division staff, but it did have the advan-
by Captain John W. Peterson, USN. These ships                  tage of placing Marine Forces Somalia on a simi-
were the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), USS Juneau                      lar basis with Army Forces Somalia.
(LPD 10), and the USS Rushmore (LSD 47). To                       The unit chosen by Third Army's XVIII
provide more equipment and sustainability to the               Airborne Corps to be the Army's component was
MEU, one of the ships of Maritime Prepositioning
Squadron 3, the MV 1st Lt Jack Lummus (T-AK
3011), was assigned to the amphibious squadron.                * At its height, Marine Forces Somalia consisted of 7th
The MEU and the amphibious squadron made up                    Marines (-) Reinforced, composed of 1st Battalion, 7th
the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which already                Marines, and the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Battalion 11th
                                                               Marines, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, and 3d
was anticipating service in Somalia. In                        Amphibious Assault Battalion; Marine Aircraft Group 16,
September, the Marines of the 11th MEU (SOC)                   composed of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369
had assisted the United Nations by providing                   (HMLA-369), Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron 352
security to the 500 soldiers of the Pakistani                  (VMGR-352), Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363
Army's 7th Battalion, Frontier Service Regiment.               (HMH-363), a detachment from HMH-466, Marine Wing
                                                               Support Squadron 372 (MWSS-372), and a detachment from
This regiment established the United Nations                   Marine Aircraft Group 38 (MAG-38); the 1st Force Service
Organization Somalia (UNOSOM) in Mogadishu.                    Support Group (Forward), composed of Combat Service
The 11th MEU also provided security for United                 Support Group 1 and Brigade Service Support Group 7; the
States Air Force personnel who flew the                        30th Naval Construction Regiment, composed of Naval
Pakistanis into Mogadishu International Airport.               Mobile Construction Battalion 1 and Naval Mobile
                                                               Construction Battalion 40; and the 1st Combat Engineer
In November, it had appeared 11th MEU's suc-                   Battalion (-). At times, Marine Forces Somalia also had oper-
cessor, 15th MEU, might have to provide security
for the arrival of UNOSOM reinforcements.52
                                                               ational control of 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and some
                                                               of the coalition forces.
                                                                              THE WIDENING MISSION          17

the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry),                Naval Forces Somalia was quickly mustered
based at Fort Drum, New York. The division's             from task forces in the Central Command area of
commanding general, Major General Steven L.              operations, or which could be ordered to the area.
Arnold, USA, knew Lieutenant General Johnston            The Ranger carrier battle group consisted of the
from when he had served as the United States             aircraft carrier USS Ranger (CV 61), the aircraft
Army Central Command's operations officer dur-           carrier USS Valley Forge (CG 50), and the
ing Desert Storm. On the operational side, the           destroyer USS Kincaid (DD 965). There also was
division had recent experience in humanitarian           the Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, which carried
relief undertakings. Just a few months prior, in         the 15th MEU (SOC). The ships of Maritime
August 1992, the division had been sent to Florida       Prepositioning Squadron 2, consisting of the MV
to assist with the disaster caused by Hurricane          1st Lt Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003), the MV Pvt
Andrew. Also, the division was light infantry, and       Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), and the MV
therefore more strategically deployable than heav-       PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002) would join
ier, armored units in the Army. This meant the           these forces. Throughout the operation, other
division was able to rapidly "go from deployment         squadrons, groups and ships of the navies of the
to employment."54 Their light equipment also             United States and coalition partners would move
made this division a good match to the Marine            into the area of operations and become a part of
forces. As Brigadier General Zinni later said, they      Naval Forces Somalia. The position of
would complement the Marines, forming "an                Commander, Naval Forces Somalia was initially
agile, flexible force."55 Although designated light,     held by Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN,
such a division carries considerable firepower and       but would change hands five times during the
capability. The division's normal table of distribu-     operation.
tion and allowances included attack and transport           The Air Force's contribution to the joint task
helicopters, artillery, and hardened high mobility       force was highly important, but required fewer
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (humvees) mount-           personnel than the other Services. Air transport
ing antitank missiles, machine guns, or automatic        would be of tremendous significance to the oper-
grenade launchers.                                       ation. While ships would carry the greatest por-

                                                                                            DVIC DA-SC-93-00306
MajGen Steven L. Arnold, USA, right, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, discusses the Somalia deployment
of the division with U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, at Fort Drum, New York.

                                                        and logistics sections of the U.S. Transportation
                                                        Command, he arrived at the joint task force head-
                                                        quarters on 1 December and was designated as the
                                                        commander of Air Force Forces Somalia and the
                                                        mobility commander. Although there would be
                                                        only 500 Air Force personnel eventually working
                                                        within the theater itself, there would be literally
                                                        thousands aiding the operation at numerous sta-
                                                        tions along the air bridge.56
                                                           The smallest of all the components would be
                                                        the Special Operations Forces. This component
                                                        was initially under the command of Colonel
                                                        Thomas D. Smith, USA. In late November, he was
                                                        the director of operations for Central Command's
                                                        Special Operations Command, where he had
                                                        already received briefings on Somalia. He joined
                                                        the joint task force by 4 December, when General
                                                        Johnston briefed his concept of operations to all
                                                        component commanders. As planning progressed,
                                                        coalition warfare teams were formed to resolve
                                                        any operational problems between the various
                                                        Services and coalition countries. Teams of six
                                                        men were established to coordinate close air sup-
                                                        port and medical evacuations, coordinate opera-
                                                        tional boundaries, and to train some of the allies in
                                  JCCC DD-SD-00-00662   American operational techniques. Such teams
BGen Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, a squadron and         were requested by the joint task force for various
wing commander with more than 4,000 flying hours,       coalition forces, and eventually General Johnston
was chosen to command the Air Force component of        approved eight teams; one each for the forces
the joint task force.                                   from Pakistan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Belgium,
                                                        France, Botswana, Canada, and Italy. The teams
                                                        were sent to link up with these allied forces as
                                                        they deployed.57
tion of the heavy equipment, most of the person-

                                                                     Support Command
nel and much of the lighter cargo would be flown
directly into the theater. Control of all these move-
ments was critical, and so Brigadier General
Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, was chosen as the
commanding general of Air Force Forces                      There was only one exception to the compo-
Somalia. General Mikolajcik's background and            nent structure of the joint task force, but it was a
experience suited him for the mission. His assign-      very important exception. This special organiza-
ment at the time was as the commanding general          tion was Support Command for the joint task
of the 437th Airlift Wing, based at Charleston Air      force, which was formed as a functional element
Force Base, South Carolina. This unit's mission         rather than as a separate Service organization.
was the loading and airdrop delivery of supplies,       General Johnston recognized that logistics for this
equipment, and troops. It was tasked to support         operation would pose a critical challenge. Since
special and humanitarian relief operations world-       literally everything would come in from outside
wide. Receiving a call on 26 November to prepare        the theater, the general had to create a robust
for deployment, General Mikolajcik quickly put          logistics element to provide for this important
together an initial team of 70 airmen to cover          function. In the initial planning, it was recognized
inter- and intra-theater air movements. On the          that Marine Forces Somalia, which would arrive
29th he was told to proceed to Camp Pendleton, to       before the Army Forces Somalia, would have to
which he traveled after a quick stop at Scott Air       sustain the force with the assets of 1st Force
Force Base in Illinois for briefings. After dis-        Service Support Group and the supplies and
cussing mobility operations with the operations         equipment from the maritime prepositioning force
                                                                                      THE WIDENING MISSION          19

ships.* The Army Forces Somalia, as they arrived,                 assuming the theater role until 50 days into the
would carry their own logistics and support ele-                  operation. Until then, Marine Forces Somalia
ments with them, and originally it was expected                   would continue to carry the burden for this sup-
that Army Forces Somalia would assume the the-                    port, especially in the coordination of items com-
ater logistics role, with a specially task-organized              mon to all users. The commanding general of the
unit. However, Central Command also was work-                     Army Forces Somalia, Major General Arnold,
ing on the logistics issue, and their planners had                recognized his force also needed to deploy some
begun to build what would become Support                          of its own logistics assets quickly into the the-
Command of the task force.58 At Fort Hood,                        ater.60

                                                                               Coalition Partners
Texas, the 13th Corps Support Command
(CosCom) had already seen its deputy command-
er selected to head up the logistics section for the
joint task force. When the 10th Mountain Division                    The American elements of the force were com-
was selected as Army Forces Somalia shortly                       ing together rapidly. But there remained one
afterward, the 13th CosCom was notified that it,                  major portion that still had to be assembled. The
too, would have a role to play in the operation. It               United Nations had sanctioned a multinational
would provide command and control for logistics                   force for Somalia, and so the countries that chose
support in the theater. With the army planners at                 to be coalition partners with the United States now
Central Command identifying requirements and                      had to come forward and make their contribu-
resources available, the structure of Support                     tions. Central Command was the first line in
Command was built around the 13th CosCom                          determining which countries would be accepted
staff, commanded by Brigadier General Billy K.                    into this coalition, relieving the commander of
Solomon, USA. Appropriate units were selected                     this administrative burden. Offers were screened
from the continental United States and Europe.                    to ensure potential partners had self-sufficiency,
The major subordinate commands were the 593d
Area Support Group, the 62d Medical Group, and
the 7th Transportation Group.** These were aug-
mented in a building block concept in which
smaller units with specialties were selected and
assigned to Support Command. As the groups pre-
pared to deploy, General Solomon recognized that
his presence on the ground in theater would be
necessary early on, even before the majority of his
command would be prepared to arrive. On 14
hours notice, he prepared to leave with a small
advance party.59 Support Command would pro-
vide tremendous capabilities to the force.
However, it was not expected to be capable of

* It also was recognized this would greatly strain the capa-
bilities of Marine Forces Somalia and the Maritime
Prepositioning Force. A maritime prepositioning force
squadron carries enough rations, supplies, and equipment to
sustain a force of approximately 16,000 men for 30 days.
However, these assets had to stretch to cover a force that
would reach more than 23,000 by late December. For a
detailed discussion of the logistical structures for the opera-
tion, see Katherine McGrady's The Joint Task Force In
Operation Restore Hope, published by the Center For Naval                                           DVIC DA-SC-00-00063
Analyses.                                                         BGen Billy K. Solomon, USA, commissioned in
                                                                  Quartermaster Corps in 1966, served in battalion and
** Although composed entirely of United States Army units,        division support command positions before being
Support Command was not a part of Army Forces Somalia.
                                                                  assigned to lead III U.S. Army Corps' 13th Corps
It was a separate command on an equal basis with the Service
components.                                                       Support Command at Fort Hood, Texas.

mobility, and a "willingness to adhere to               dinating authority with the UNOSOM command-
American operational control and rules of engage-       er, Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen of the
ment."61                                                Pakistani Army.62
   The creation of a cohesive coalition was to             As units across the United States were prepar-
present General Johnston with what he called "a         ing for their share in Operation Restore Hope, the
real challenge." But he was aided in this task by       ministries of defense of many nations prepared to
the large contingents eventually sent by some of        give support to the United States-led effort. Some
the United States' traditional allies; countries such   nations, such as Canada, Australia, Belgium,
as France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Australia, and       Egypt, Nigeria, and Norway, already had made a
Turkey were all to be key contributors around           commitment to join UNOSOM and were prepar-
which the coalition could be built. These larger        ing to deploy forces as reinforcements.63 Those
forces could also be counted on to be operational-      who would be joining with the United States
ly capable and to bring some of their own support.      began to assemble forces and formulate plans,
Many other countries would soon join in, eventu-        often with their own names. Eventually, there
ally raising the total number of nations in the         would be French Operation Oryx, Italian
coalition to 23. While the general did not have         Operation Ibis, Australian Operation Solace, and
much latitude in the acceptance of any nation's         Canadian Operation Deliverance.
offer, he did recognize that even the smallest con-        How all of these allied forces could be worked
tingent could be put to effective use. In these early   effectively into the operation; how much logistic
stages, it was thought that General Johnston            support they would need; their operational effec-
would be the commander of the United Nations            tiveness; and when they would actually arrive
forces in Somalia, but the U.N. decided that its        were all questions on which General Johnston and
own UNOSOM commander would retain opera-                his staff would have to give very serious consider-
tional control over all U.N. forces. General            ation in the few days remaining before the start of
Johnston would have operational control over all        Operation Restore Hope; and in that short time
coalition forces assigned to him, and he had coor-      there was much other work to be done.
                                                        Chapter 3

                                        Plans and Preparations

    Working with Central Command                                 task force to know when it had established a
                                                                 secure environment and accomplished its mis-
   Training in amphibious warfare has taught                     sion? During these early planning stages, the end
Marines that planning for an operation is continu-               state was defined as "creation of an environment
                                                                 where U.N. and relief organizations can assume
                                                                 responsibility for security and relief operations."65
ous and concurrent. In late November 1992, as the
nascent joint task force staff met with the U.S.
Central Command staff at MacDill Air Force                       Unfortunately, this was rather vague. The need to
Base, Florida, there was a great amount of work to               more precisely define the operation's end state
be done in a short period of time to prepare the                 was to be an important but difficult question for
plans that would guide the operation. Throughout                 much of the joint task force's existence.
the next several days, the two staffs would work in                 The Central Command order described four
close cooperation to ensure the joint task force                 phases of the operation and set rules of engage-
plan would complement the one issued by Central                  ment. It also formally ordered General Johnston,
Command. Long hours and plenty of coffee were                    as commanding general of I Marine
the order of the day.                                            Expeditionary Force (I MEF), to assume duties as
   Central Command issued its order on 5
December. While the two staffs had worked close-
ly together in the development of the order, the
Central Command document gave Lieutenant
General Robert B. Johnston formal authority to
complete and issue the final joint task force order.
One of the most important points to be taken from
the Central Command order was the mission, to
"conduct joint/combined military operations in
Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key
installations and food distribution points, to pro-
vide open and free passage of relief supplies, pro-
vide security for convoys and relief organization
operations and to assist in providing humanitarian
relief under U.N. auspices." The "anticipated D-
Day" was set for 9 December, just four days
   General Johnston described the Central
Command order as "very broad," and he was quite
comfortable with it.64 Even as it was being writ-
ten, his staff had begged the United Nations to
identify implied tasks that would assist in accom-
plishing the mission. The most obvious of these
tasks was to establish some precise way to meas-
ure success. In other words, just how was the joint
* The time for preparation was even shorter when the time                                          Photo courtesy of the author
zone differences are taken into account. There are eight hours   Gen Mohamed Farah Aideed rose to become the
difference between Somalia and the east coast of the United
States. Thus, 0500 9 December in Mogadishu is 2100 8             leader of the formerly political, but now militant, United
December in Washington, D.C., or MacDill Air Force Base,         Somali Congress. He favored a military solution to the
Florida.                                                         problems the Barre government had brought about.

commander of Joint Task Force Somalia (JTF                Mahdi Mohamed]) roam the city with the
Somalia) and to establish the joint task force.           two opposing leaders ... exercising little con-
Johnston already had been doing precisely that for        trol over their activities. While Ali Mahdi
some days.                                                appears to welcome U.N. presence and
   But that was not all General Johnston had been         assistance in Somalia, General Aideed
concerned with during this time of intense activi-        opposes such presence and has threatened
ty. His newly assembled headquarters and staff            the 500-man Pakistani force and impeded
                                                          that unit from securing the port and airfield
sections were busy identifying needed informa-
                                                          in Mogadishu. Further, General Aideed has
tion, solving problems, and coordinating the              publicly stated that he will oppose any fur-
preparation of the joint task force order. The final      ther introduction of U.N. forces into
order was to contain myriad small, but important          Mogadishu.
details, and there were some concerns that were of
greater consequence than others that demanded a           Kismayo. The security situation in Kismayo
rapid understanding and resolution.                       is uncertain but less volatile than

             Somali Opposition
                                                          Mogadishu. Factional fighting occurs fre-
                                                          quently and the general population is known
                                                          to be armed. Random shootings and violent
                                                          incidents are frequent. The two factions
   Sound military planning begins with a consid-          claiming this area have formed a loose
eration of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and           alliance with about 3,000 troops, many of
time available. With the mission specified in the         whom were former Somali National Army
Central Command order, General Johnston and               soldiers, reasonably well-trained and experi-
his staff could now concentrate on the other ele-         enced with weapons. The apparent leader,
ments. The question of the enemy was a challeng-          Col [Ahmed Omar] Jess, appears to be min-
ing one, filled with political and diplomatic impli-      imizing his ties with General Aideed and has
cations. The various armed Somali factions were           indicated a willingness to have a U.N. con-
regarded as a great threat to the task force and its      tingent deploy to Kismayo.
mission, but their reactions could not be gauged in       Key Assumptions. The primary threat to
advance since internal Somali politics would              security will be armed lawlessness and
undoubtedly be involved. It was possible that one         armed looters.67
faction could welcome the joint task force, while         Some of these difficulties were further
its rival would oppose the coalition. There was a      expressed in a message regarding operations in
possibility that the force might have to fight its
way ashore.66
                                                       Somalia sent from Central Command in early
   The size of these factional, clan-based forces,        There does not appear to be any particular
in addition to the types, numbers, and condition of       center of gravity, no single leader or faction
their weaponry were critical elements of informa-         or army whose defeat will bring stability.
tion that had to be gathered. In a related matter,        Nor is there any geographical center of grav-
there was the existence of simple, but widespread,        ity, contrary to the politicians' views about
lawlessness. How was the joint task force to deal         Mogadishu. ... The most assailable center of
with that? In a commander's estimate of the situ-         gravity appears to be the warlords' control
ation dated 22 November 1992, General Joseph              over the food distribution, both in terms of
Hoar saw the threat as follows:                           amount and location. Therefore, any effort
   Over all, the security environment through-            on our part has to defeat their control over
   out Somalia is volatile. The situation may             food distribution, and force the warlords,
                                                          should they choose to fight, to fight us on
                                                          our terms.68
   deteriorate further because there is no cen-
   tralized governmental control of Somali fac-
   tions.                                              Both of these issues would be addressed in the
   Mogadishu. The security situation in                final joint task force order.
   Mogadishu remains uncertain. Large num-                The intelligence annex of the task force order
   bers of armed forces (estimated 5,000-              further described the factions and their possible
   10,000 aligned under General [Mohamed               capabilities. The United Somali Congress (USC)
   Farah Hassan] Aideed and estimated 5,000-           Aideed faction was estimated to have approxi-
   6,000 aligned under interim President [Ali          mately 20,000 fighters, and USC Ali Mahdi to
                                                                                   PLANS AND PREPARATIONS                  23

                                                                                     Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
Somali factional militiamen gather around a "technical," a pick-up truck with a modified antiaircraft artillery or heavy
machine gun mounted in the bed. Businesses, local officials, and foreign residents were forced to hire them for pro-
tection against extortion and kidnappings by freelance gunmen.

have between 15,000 and 30,000.* Both factions                  choose the time and place of any confrontation.
were known to possess artillery, tanks, and                     Also of importance was the knowledge these
armored personnel carriers. Mohamed Said Hirsi,                 fighters had of the terrain in their areas, and the
known as General Morgan, headed the Somali                      fact that any aggressive militias or clans would be
National Front (SNF) and was thought to have a                  indistinguishable from the local inhabitants. A
large number of the soldiers from the old national              psychological factor that could provide another
army of the Muhammad Siad Barre regime, total-                  strength to the factions would lie in their ability to
ing about 9,000 troops. It was also known to have               misrepresent the joint task force's mission and
seven T-54/55 tanks and eighteen 122mm artillery                actions as an invasion, thereby increasing the
pieces. The rival Somali Patriotic Movement                     aggressiveness and tenacity of their followers.
(SPM) faction under Colonel Jess was estimated                     Such strengths, however, were countered by
to possess 15,000 fighters, of whom 2,000 were                  several weaknesses. The average Somali fighter
trained. While well armed, they were thought to                 was very young, often still in his teens, and
be poorly disciplined.                                          described as "undisciplined, illiterate, and often
   There were strengths these factions were                     under the influence of the narcotic, khat." In spite
assessed to have. The first among these was their               of the seemingly large array of small arms and
extreme unpredictability and their ability to                   heavy weapons and vehicles, there were indica-
                                                                tions of shortages of ammunition and spare parts.
* The estimates of faction strength used in this history vary   Their ability to operate and maintain sophisticated
greatly over time and place. This probably reflects both the    weaponry also was questionably, and the weapons
difficulty of acquiring timely and accurate information and     systems of the Somalis were considered antiquat-
the actual changes that undoubtedly occurred within these
loose organizations.
                                                                ed and outclassed by those of the joint task force.

The factional leadership was known to be weak in               ment. The term "infrastructure" is frequently used
many areas, especially in command and control.69               to refer to all of those buildings, structures, and

                  Somali Terrain
                                                               systems that can be put to use. It was in this area
                                                               especially that knowledge of terrain was critical.
                                                               The joint task force would be very dependent
   The issue of terrain was equally important to               upon a transportation network that would have to
define. Some pieces of information were readily                bring all personnel, equipment, food, water, and
available, but others were, as yet, unknown. The               consumable supplies into the theater, and then be
land features and climate were known quantities.               able to move them rapidly and effectively to
The land was described as "undulating plains that              where they were needed.
are interrupted occasionally by areas of dissected                Intelligence gathering on this subject already
terrain and isolated hills. The Webi Jubba and                 had begun, but it did not present an optimistic pic-
Webi Shebelle are the only streams that flow year-             ture of what the task force would face. An early
round along most of their lengths." The climate                study performed by the Defense Intelligence
can be characterized as tropical, semiarid to arid,            Agency described Somalia's transportation infra-
with two short monsoon seasons. The southern                   structure in the following terms:
plains are hot all year, with average temperatures                Highways. Somalia's road system, which
ranging from 72 to 95 degrees Fahrenheit. The                     has only a few high-capacity modern routes,
rainy season varies by region and by year with fre-               has lapsed into disrepair. Of Somalia's
quent droughts. The annual mean precipitation is                  roughly 18,000 kilometers of roadway,
almost 1,000 millimeters in Mogadishu, while it is                about 3,000 are bituminous and another
much drier further inland. All of which is a way of               3,000 crushed rock. The remaining 12,000
stating that Somalia would present a hot, dry,                    kilometers are dirt roads or tracks. ... Surface
bleak desert environment that would test the                      quality has deteriorated because of the lack
strength and endurance of both men and equip-                     of maintenance during two years of unrest.
ment.                                                             Conditions ... are so poor that parallel trails
   But for a military planner, terrain encompasses                available along some stretches are frequent-
far more than just the ground. Of equal impor-                    ly used instead of the road itself. ...
tance are the man-made features that help to sup-                 Air transportation. Somalia has 40 air-
port a force in a hostile and unfamiliar environ-                 fields with usable runways of more than

                                                                                                   Photo courtesy of the author
The flat, featureless desert terrain to the west of Oddur, filled with scrub brush and thorn trees, is typical of the coun-
try's interior.
                                                                             PLANS AND PREPARATIONS               25

   1,969 feet. C-130s can land at only 10 of             ence of spores, which the boiling may not
   them. Three other airfields have been                 kill. The potential for cholera and related
   opened to C-130s but with restrictions. Six           problems from decaying cadavers is also
   of the 10 C-130-capable airfields can also            present.72
   accommodate C-141s. C-5 aircraft can land             An effective preventive medicine program
   only at Berbera and Mogadishu. ... Airport         would be necessary to safeguard the health of the
   infrastructure at Somali airfields is rudimen-     force.

                                                                         Specified Tasks
   tary at best. Few airfields have material-han-
   dling equipment or covered storage. Air traf-
   fic control is close to nonexistent. Although
   Mogadishu, [Bale Dogle], Hargeisa, and
   Kismayo have maintenance and service                  Disarmament was another important issue
                                                      relating to the mission of providing a secure envi-
                                                      ronment.* This topic was addressed in great detail
   facilities, no airfields have the maintenance
   capability to fully support modern aircraft.
                                                      in the Marine Corps' old Small Wars Manual.
   Seaports. The major ports of Mogadishu,            Many members of the joint task force staff were
   Berbera, and Kismayo ... can handle general
                                                      familiar with this interesting volume. It conveys
   bulk and small container vessels. The opera-
   tional status of petroleum offloading and          much of the extensive experience of the "Old
   storage equipment, mobile cranes, roll-            Corps" in "operations undertaken under executive
   on/roll-off facilities, and transit sheds at       authority, wherein military force is combined with
   each is uncertain. Relief ship crews must be       diplomatic pressure in the internal or external
   ready to use their ship's gear to unload sup-      affairs of another state whose government is
   plies. ...                                         unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the
   Railroads. Somalia has no railroads.70             preservation of life and such interests as are deter-
                                                      mined by the foreign policy of our Nation."73 This
   A final, but very important, effect the environ-   experience had been gained in such places as
ment might have on the operation was in the area      Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.
of health. The Horn of Africa presented medical       But, because the world had changed radically
planners with a wide variety of potential problems    since the book was written, and much of it was no
for which they would need to prepare the person-      longer valid, except as a general guide.** Also,
nel of the joint task force. These included a high    Somalia was a unique situation, and nothing could
potential for infectious disease, heat-related        be accepted as a matter of form. It was determined
injuries, and bites from several types of venomous    by General Johnston and his staff that there could
snakes and insects. Diseases were vector-borne,       be no attempt to disarm Somalia.74 Virtually every
such as malaria, or could be contracted from the      Somali male, to include teenagers, carried a
unsanitary conditions prevalent in the country. As    weapon. The personnel working for the humani-
was noted in the Soldier Handbook: "the major         tarian relief organizations hired Somalis as
infectious disease risks are from food and water-     guards, and many people kept arms for their own
borne diseases ... related to ... poor sanitation,    protection. Weapons would have to be controlled
indiscriminate disposal of waste and decomposing
corpses."71 The Central Command order was even
                                                      in some manner, but this was not the same as dis-
more explicit:
   Many of the deaths and much of the human           * Disarmament was initially assigned in general terms in the
   suffering in Somalia is directly attributable      original 5 December Joint Chiefs of Staff execute order to
   to endemic disease, which is merely magni-         Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command as: "provide a
   fied and made more virulent by famine.             secure environment: disarm, as necessary, forces which inter-
   Numerous diseases, some of which are car-          fere with humanitarian relief operations." This was deleted in
   ried by parasites (such as malaria), are pres-     a modification to the order, sent by a message from the Joint
                                                      Staff to Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command on 6
   ent in Somalia. Among them are AIDS                December 1992.
   [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome],
   tuberculosis, hepatitis, pneumonia, and
                                                      ** The Small Wars Manual, the last edition of which was
   measles. Dysentery and gangrene are com-           published in 1940, addressed such matters as civil-military
   mon and frequently lethal complications.           relations, the role of the State Department, creation of native
   Virtually all water is unsafe for drinking         police forces, disarmament of civilian populations, tactics,
   even when boiled due to the possible pres-         and logistics.

                                                             cover the abundance of small arms in the
                                                             hands of unstable persons and proliferation
                                                             of technical vehicles. The ability to deal suc-
                                                             cessfully with these and similar challenges
                                                             would require a solid foundation under inter-
                                                             national law."75
                                                             General Johnston and his Staff Judge Advocate,
                                                          Marine Colonel Frederick M. Lorenz, worked
                                                          with Central Command in developing rules of
                                                          engagement so those promulgated in the Central
                                                          Command order were ones that could be easily
                                                          incorporated in the task force order.76
                                                             The rules of engagement, as published, were
                                                          broad and focused on the protection of the force
                                                          and its mission. General Johnston later said these
                                                          rules were ones that "every commander would
                                                          want to have on such a mission."77 Essentially,
                                                          every member of the force had the right to protect
                                                          himself not only against a hostile act, but also
                                                          against the threat of such an act. Under such rules
                                                          it was not necessary for task force personnel to be
                                                          fired upon before taking action. A weapon aimed
                                                          in a threatening manner was sufficient cause to
                                                          fire on the individual holding it. Also, of particu-
                                                          lar interest in this operation, "technicals" and
                                                          crew-served weapons were considered to be
                                                          threats at any time, regardless of the actual intent
                                                          of their crews at the time encountered.78 * To
                                    DVIC DD-SD-00-00751
The flood of military assistance during the Barre years
meant an abundance of military hardware, weapons,         ensure that everyone understood his rights and
and ammunition for the warring clans to use. Weapons      responsibilities, cards were printed with the rules
ranged from World War II era .30-caliber machine guns     and distributed, and classes were held in which
and rocket launchers to Soviet-made AK-47 rifles and      they were explained. The cards carried the
U.S.-made M16s.                                           reminder that the United States was not at war,
                                                          that all persons were to be treated with dignity,
armament. The task forces' operation order would          and that minimum force was to be used to carry
have to address the problem clearly and effective-        out the mission.
                                                             Another important implied task for this opera-
    The joint task force's office of the Staff Judge      tion came from Brigadier General Anthony C.
Advocate was deeply involved in a related issue.          Zinni's recent experience. He knew that an opera-
In this operation, international law and opera-           tion of this sort would require the military to work
tional law would feature prominently in how the           closely with numerous humanitarian relief organ-
force accomplished its mission:
    As each I MEF section developed implied
    taskings in preparation for the development
    of the operation plan, it became clear that           * Technical vehicles, or "technicals," as they were more com-
    U.S. forces would be operating in an austere          monly known, were a bizarre form of homemade weapons
    environment where the rule of law had been            platform unique to Somalia. They were generally formed
    replaced by the law of the gun. Advice and            from the body of a pick-up truck or similar vehicle, with the
    innovative planning in a variety of nontradi-         addition of a heavy machine gun, antiaircraft weapon, or
                                                          some other crew-served weapon mounted in the bed. They
    tional functions and activities would be              were often encountered at roadblocks and were employed by
    needed as the ... commander entered                   all factions and many gangs. The term itself apparently
    uncharted waters. Clearly, specialized rules          derived from the euphemism used for hiring armed guards
    of engagement would have to be drafted to             for protection, or "technical assistance."
                                                                                  PLANS AND PREPARATIONS          27

izations.* The relief organizations were a signifi-            essary secure environment for the relief opera-
cant part of the overall humanitarian effort. Such             tions.81

                                                                        Psychological Operations
organizations were already working in Somalia,
providing food, medical assistance, and relief
services to the civilian population. But they would
have requirements of their own which would have                   Johnston was clear on the importance of psy-
to be provided by the military. In addition, the               chological operations and civil affairs to the suc-
work of both the military and these organizations              cess of the operation. He intended to use them to
required close coordination to ensure a unity of               assist in disarming technicals and bandits, and to
effort. In Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq,
                                                               create a "benevolent image" of coalition forces as
General Zinni had achieved this coordination
                                                               they were engaged in their humanitarian, peace-
                                                               making mission.82 In the task force order, psycho-
through a civil-military operations center. A cen-
ter definitely would be needed for Operation
Restore Hope.79                                                logical operations were intended to focus upon
                                                               presenting the image of a "strong U.S./U.N./
   The Central Command order set a specific mis-               Coalition presence, capable and willing to use
sion for the joint task force to conduct joint mili-           force to protect the international relief effort and
tary operations in Somalia to secure the major air             to allay fears about U.S./U.N./Coalition inten-
and sea ports, key installations, and food distribu-
                                                               tions." The psychological operation's themes and
tion points, and to assist in providing humanitari-
                                                               objectives were to assure all factions and groups
an operations and relief under U.N. auspices. The
order described the conduct of the operation in                of the impartiality of the conduct of the relief
four phases. It also formally ordered the com-                 operations, and to dissuade any groups or individ-
manding general of I MEF to assume the duties as               uals from interfering with the relief. Major themes
commander of JTF Somalia and to establish the                  were credibility of the joint task force in its abili-
joint task force.80                                            ty to carry out its goals and to meet force with
                                                               force if necessary, and neutrality in its dealings
   General Johnston had already begun this work.
                                                               with all groups in its humanitarian mission. The
In addition, his staff was working on completing
                                                               methods to be used to get the word out to the local
the task force's own order, which was issued the
day after the Central Command order, 6                         populace were to be "face-to-face communica-
December. The mission of the joint task force                  tions, radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, leaflets,
                                                               posters, coloring books, and other printed prod-
                                                               ucts."83 To perform this valuable work, a separate
remained basically the same as in the Central
Command order, with some minor changes in the
wording. The commander's intent made an impor-                 Joint Psychological Operations Task Force was
                                                               formed within the joint task force.

                                                                         Phases of the Operation
tant distinction: "JTF Somalia will focus on secur-
ing the lines of communication used for the
ground movement of relief supplies by U.N. and
[non-governmental organization] agencies to dis-
tribution sites. JTF Somalia will not be primarily                As in the Central Command order, the task
involved in transporting supplies, but will assist             force's concept of operations was set in four phas-
relief organizations by securing their operating               es. As in any properly prepared campaign, each of
bases as well as the ground transportation routes              these phases would lead to and set the conditions
to relief distribution sites." This statement clearly          for the next. In Phase I, the forces were to "estab-
kept the task force out of the business of actually            lish a base of operations and logistics in
feeding the hungry and concentrated on the more                Mogadishu," to "gain control over the flow of
appropriate military mission of providing the nec-             humanitarian relief supplies through the city," and
                                                               to introduce other U.N. forces throughout the
* Humanitarian relief organizations is a comprehensive term    country. Amphibious forces would secure the port
that includes non-governmental organizations, private volun-   and airfield at Mogadishu and establish a lodg-
tary organizations, and agencies of the United Nations and     ment for follow-on troops. A maritime preposi-
the International Commission of the Red Cross. During the      tioning force operation would follow. Once ade-
operation the term non-governmental organization usually
was used when referring to any relief organization, but the    quate security was established, additional forces
more appropriate organization will be used when discussing     would deploy into Mogadishu. A second airhead
the work of the Civil-Military Operations Center.              would be secured as soon as possible for the

deployment of additional forces, and the town of         effort," with a "gradual relief in place of JTF
Baidoa would also be secured. Phase II provided          forces."84
for the expansion of operations at the major inte-          The area of operations was divided into eight
rior relief distribution sites to include Gialalassi,    humanitarian relief sectors, so named in keeping
Bardera, Belet Weyne, Oddur, and others as               with the nature of the mission.85 Each sector was
required. Additional forces would expand opera-          centered on a major city that could serve as a dis-
tions to these interior sites and establish sufficient   tribution center; in fact, many of them had been
security to allow unimpeded relief operations. In        such centers during Operation Provide Relief. The
Phase III, operations would expand through the           other qualification for choosing these cities was
conduct of relief convoy security operations and         that each was located on a main road and had an
to additional ports and airfields, to include the        airfield capable of handling military cargo air-
port of Kismayo. The crucial Phase IV would be a         craft. The original humanitarian relief sectors
"transition from a U.S.-led to a U.N.-controlled         were Mogadishu, Bale Dogle, Baidoa, Bardera,
                                                                                   PLANS AND PREPARATIONS         29

Kismayo, Oddur, Gialalassi, and Belet Weyne.86                  Command (TransCom), headquartered at Scott
The boundaries for the sectors were not set with                Air Force Base, Illinois. A separate plan would
regard to clan or tribal affiliation, but by simple             have to be worked out to ensure the initial land-
grid coordinates.                                               ings could be made on time, that the follow-on
   Because of the close cooperation of Central                  forces could be brought into theater as required,
Command and joint task force staffs during plan-                and that enough logistical support for the force
ning, General Johnston was able to sign and issue               would be started on its way from the United States
the task force's order on 6 December 1992; only                 to reach Somalia in an orderly sequence. The
one day after Central Command issued its order to               detailed planning for this deployment called for
the joint task force. The completed document was                the movement of thousands of troops from their
thorough and detailed and recognized that some                  home bases to ports of embarkation for further
key elements, such as the forces to be offered by               transport halfway around the world. There would
the coalition partners, still had to be identified.*            have to be a sequenced timetable, employing all
D-Day was now only three days away.                             the assets available for the movement by ship and
                                                                airplane, of the cargo needed by the force. As a
   Another critical aspect, which joint task force
                                                                supporting command, TransCom had to tailor its
planners had been hurriedly working on, was the
                                                                plans to the requirements the joint task force pro-
development of the deployment timeline. With a
                                                                vided through Central Command. These were
known date for D-Day, planners were able to work
                                                                made known in a formal document called a time-
backward in time to determine when other critical
                                                                phased force deployment and development plan.
events would have to occur for the operation to
                                                                Such a system works best when there is an ample
begin as planned and continue in an orderly fash-
                                                                amount of planning time available, so force struc-
ion. A timeline published on 1 December set the
                                                                tures and logistical requirements can be estimated
initial actions for 4 December, with the establish-
                                                                in advance and contingency plans created. There
ment of the joint task force headquarters, and
                                                                was no such luxury with the preparations for this
worked forward 30 days, when the maritime
                                                                operation; TransCom would have to react quickly
prepositioning force offload was to be completed.
                                                                as the needs of the joint task force were deter-
                                                                mined and made known.88
The timeline called for the quick activation and
deployment of many units and detachments that
would have to be in place to support the impend-                   Since the majority of logistical support would
ing operation. These included the naval support                 be coming by ship, a subordinate organization of
element and the offload preparation party of                    TransCom, the Military Sealift Command, would
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, which had                   have the greatest capability to support the opera-
to link up with those ships at Diego Garcia. The                tion. Military Sealift Command divided its
Marine air-ground task force had to take its posi-              responsibilities into three phases, which it called a
tion in the area of operations, and many other                  "Trident of Sea Power." First, it would employ the
Marine Corps, Army, and Navy elements, and                      maritime prepositioning force ships that support-
advance parties had to be alerted for movement                  ed the Marine Corps and Army to bring in the unit
within a few days.87                                            equipment and supplies that would be immediate-

             The Flow of the Force
                                                                ly needed by the first troops coming ashore. Next,
                                                                it would employ fast sealift ships and chartered
                                                                vessels to fill the surge in shipping that would
                                                                bring in the heavy equipment and critical supplies.
   This work called for close cooperation with one              Finally, a sustainment phase would provide a
of the specified commands, U.S. Transpor-tation                 steady flow of logistical support. Because of the
                                                                long transit times (even the fast sealift ships
                                                                would take 14 days to reach Mogadishu from the
* Some countries had already offered forces as part of the      east coast of the United States), these assets had to
reinforcements to the U.N. Organization Somalia. Early
planning had prepared to use these units, but with the change
                                                                be identified and prepared as soon as possible.89
to a United States-led force, some of these offers were with-      Another TransCom subordinate was equally
drawn, while other countries came forward to assist. When       busy with its preparations to support the opera-
the order came for the joint task force, it had not yet been
determined when the various coalition forces would actually
                                                                tion. The Air Mobility Command had to establish
join the force. Some arrived concurrent with U.S. Forces,       the air bridge by which it would fly in most of the
some within a few days, and some took several weeks.            U.S. forces, as well as those of many of the coali-

tion countries. The command already had some           and created a plan for aerial refueling. These fac-
experience in this area, having established the        tors would decrease the flying time for individual
plan under which the aircraft carrying the relief      flights and minimize the wear on aircraft.90
supplies were being brought into Kenya for                By 6 December, the forces were ready; the plan
Operation Provide Relief. Now, however, it faced       was prepared and issued; the physical require-
a larger and more time-critical task. With the long    ments and equipment needed had been deter-
sailing times for the shipping, air transport would    mined and identified. With a few days left before
have to carry the considerable initial burden of the   D-Day, it was time to set the operation in motion.
earliest portions of the deployment. The com-

                                                                         Chapter 4

                                                                   Coming Ashore
mand's staff quickly provided for basing rights in
nearby countries, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
                                             Initial Landings
  All of the pieces of the operation came together in Somalia in the early days of December 1992.
Actually, some forces were already in place. Teams from Special Operations Forces, as part of Operation
Provide Relief, were providing security at airfields, as well as protecting the Air Force combat control

teams that were operating at them. These special-          toward the Persian Gulf. Commanded by Captain
ly trained teams also were a component of                  John W. Peterson, USN, the ready group moved
Provide Relief and were sent into the airfields to         into the waters off the southern Somali coast on 3
prepare the fields for subsequent air operations           December. Planning for the operation by the
and to control the aircraft. Also, on 7 December,          group began in earnest the week before, when a
members of Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Special            warning order was received. At about the same
Forces Group (Airborne) provided security and              time, Amphibious Squadron 5, commanded by
sniper support for America's special envoy when            Captain Brian Boyce, USN, based on the West
he arrived in Mogadishu.                                   Coast of the United States, received a warning
   The U.S. Navy and Marines were the first                order that it also would support the operation. In
underway. The Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group               addition, Captain Boyce would be the chief of
(ARG), composed of the USS Tripoli (LPH 10),               staff for Rear Admiral James B. Perkins III, USN,
USS Juneau (LPD 10), and USS Rushmore (LSD                 who would command the maritime prepositioning
47), left Singapore on 23 November and headed              force. Amphibious Squadron 5 would have the

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00656
Marines and sailors stand at the edge of the deck of the Tripoli (LPH 10). In the background are four Marine CH-46
Sea Knight helicopters scouting the area before the landings at Mogadishu.

                                                             ities of the port could not be determined until
                                                             coalition forces were on the ground. In the inter-
                                                             im, U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) teams from
                                                             the Tripoli ready group conducted beach and port
                                                             hydrographic and reconnaissance surveys of
                                                             potential landing sites.
                                                                 The amphibious group carried the 15th Marine
                                                             Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
                                                             (15th MEU (SOC)), commanded by Colonel
                                                             Gregory S. Newbold, which would make the ini-
                                                             tial landings scheduled for the early morning of
                                                             the 9th. The MEU had come under the operational
                                                             control of Central Command on 30 November. In
                                                             accord with the joint task force order, the MEU
                                                             "splashed tracks" from the Juneau at 0330 to meet
                                                             an H-Hour of 0500.92 Every available means of
                                  15th MEU, Westpac `92-93
                                                             landing was used. The SEALs swam in from off-
A Colorado native and the son of a career U.S. Air           shore and 170 Marines assaulted in 18 "Zodiac"
Force officer, Col Gregory S. Newbold commanded the          boats to secure the port facility. Amphibious
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, a force in the vanguard      assault vehicles carried the majority of the landing
of the American commitment.
                                                             force, followed by helicopters and air-cushioned
responsibility for maritime prepositioning ship              landing craft.93
operations and the offload.91 The condition of the               The initial landings were made at 0540. The
port was still a question for these officers, as was         Marines and SEALs landed across the beaches of
the infrastructure available. The ability to quickly         Mogadishu and came out of the dark surf where
offload, stage, and move equipment and supplies              they were greeted by the bright lights of television
would be critical to the operation, but the capabil-         cameras. Ignoring the disturbing presence of the

                                                                                                DVIC DN-ST-93-02668
A Marine 5-ton truck towing a 155mm M198 howitzer disembarks from an Assault Craft Unit 5 air-cushion landing
craft at Mogadishu.
                                                                                    COMING ASHORE        33

media as best they could, the reconnaissance par-       the first C-130 aircraft landed soon thereafter.96
ties pushed inland to their objectives, located at      The Air Force Lockheed C-141 carrying members
the port and the airfield. According to plan, the       of the task force headquarters touched down just a
prepositioning ship MV 1stLt Jack Lummus (T-            few minutes later.
AK 3011), which had arrived from Diego Garcia              The Marines quickly passed through the city to
the previous day, was brought directly to the pier      the United States Embassy compound, where they
to offload, expediting the movement of equip-
                                                        secured the chancery. By the end of the day, they
                                                        had established their forward operations com-
   Other than the illuminated landing, the initial      mand post at the airport.97
portions of the operation went quickly and                 In addition, the first of the coalition partners
smoothly. Colonel Newbold had stated he wanted          arrived and were incorporated into the defensive
to "accomplish our mission by overwhelming any          perimeter. This was a company of the 2d French
opportunity for forces to oppose us. ... This is a      Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, which
low intensity conflict environment requiring [a]        arrived by airplane from their base in Djibouti.98
dramatic show of force (to create the respect that      The company came under American operational
will minimize opposition), mind-numbing speed           control. The Legionnaires would soon be followed
(so that we maintain the initiative), and a willing-    by thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
ness to neutralize those who attack us (to deter
further violence)."95 The strength and speed he
                                                        Marines from 22 other countries.
                                                           As the coalition forces moved into Mogadishu
desired were in evidence as the forces moved
                                                        they encountered a city that had felt the ravages of
beyond their initial objectives and into the city. He
                                                        two years of civil war and anarchy. There was no
was able to declare the airport open at 1145 and

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00670
At Mogadishu airport, Marines stand guard in a light armored vehicle while cargo is unloaded from a U.S. Air Force
C-141B Starlifter aircraft.

electricity, no running water, and no functioning          added to the troops' list of concerns, especially
sanitation system. Law enforcement was nonex-              around the port area. While not causing casualties,
istent because there were no police or judicial sys-       the desultory fire was an annoyance and an indi-
tem. Public buildings had been looted and                  cation of what was to come.
destroyed and most private homes were severely                General Johnston flew into Mogadishu on 10
damaged; virtually every structure was missing its         December. The combined joint task force estab-
roof and had broken walls, doors, and windows.             lished itself inside the American Embassy com-
The commerce of the city was at a standstill.              pound, with the main headquarters in the chancery
Schools were closed and gangs of youths roamed             building. With the arrival of coalition forces, the
the streets. Crowded refugee camps seemingly               joint task force became a combined joint task
filled every parcel of open land, and new graves           force. Later, the title would change officially to
were encountered everywhere. The sound of gun-             Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF). In a sym-
fire could be heard throughout the city.                   bolic and emotional gesture for the Marines, the
    There had been no opposition to the landings or        flag raised over the compound was one that had
the subsequent movement of forces into the                 once flown over the Marine barracks in Beirut.
American Embassy compound. However, on this                The embassy compound itself was a shambles.
first day, the operation's first shooting incident         The buildings had literally been stripped to the
took place. A vehicle containing nine Somalis ran          bare walls; even the paving tiles had been pried up
a checkpoint manned by French Legionnaires,                and carried away. The floors of the chancery were
who opened fire at the fleeing automobile, killing
two and wounding seven.99 This incident was
                                                           buried in trash and debris a foot deep. Bodies
                                                           were found in some areas of the grounds. The staff
unfortunate but within the rules of engagement.            quickly went to work cleaning out work areas and
By running the roadblock, the Somalis had posed            living spaces to establish a camp.
a threat to members of the coalition, and the
Legionnaires had to react. Soon, sniper fire was
                                                                                                      COMING ASHORE             35

                                                                                        were built over time. While the
                                                                                        offload of the Lummus contin-
                                                                                        ued, on a selective basis, the
                                                                                        first priority was for engineer
                                                                                        equipment and materials.
                                                                                        Combat support vehicles and
                                                                                        weapons like tanks and
                                                                                        artillery were left on board.100
                                                                                           It was long and frustrating
                                                                                        work. A maritime preposition-
                                                                                        ing force squadron contains
                                                                                        enough equipment and sup-
                                                                                        plies for a Marine brigade of
                                                                                        16,000 men. To accomplish the
                                                                                        job smoothly and efficiently
                                                                                        there are several distinct units
                                             Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
                                                                                        that must participate. The first
A typical street in the Italian sector of Mogadishu crowded with pedestrians,
                                                                                        of these is the offload prepara-
vehicles, and market stalls.
                                                                                        tion party; a small group of
                                                                                        Marines who come on board
                                                                                        the ship while it is underway to

               Logistical Buildup
                                                                                        prepare the equipment for its
                                                                eventual offload and use. The next is the survey,
                                                                liaison and reconnaissance party, which flies into
   In the critical early days, all logistical support           the designated port to prepare it for the imminent
for the growing coalition forces came from what                 operation. The next is a U.S. Navy unit, the Navy
the 15th MEU was able to provide through its                    support element that undertakes the operation of
service support group, what the allies could bring              the offload of equipment and its movement
themselves, and from the maritime prepositioning                through the arrival and assembly area. Finally, the
force shipping. The offload of these important                  unit that will use the gear must arrive on time to
vessels was critical. The Lummus had arrived the                move offloaded equipment and supplies out of the
previous day and was ready
to begin its offload, which
was scheduled to last for four
days. But first, the port area
itself needed considerable
attention. There was no infra-
structure, not even wires left
on the light poles. Everything
had to be recreated while
mountains of filth and trash
needed to be cleaned out. To
make room for the arrival and
assembly area needed for the
prepositioning force shipping
to offload its equipment, old
warehouses had to be bull-
dozed. Eventually, 54 acres
were cleared for this purpose.
The U.S. Navy support ele-                                                               Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
ment brought in extra materi- The ravages of the civil war were evident in this neighborhood in the Italian sec-
als when it arrived, and new tor of Mogadishu. Many of the buildings had no roofs and all were severely dam-
barracks, galleys, and heads aged.

port to make room for what is coming off next. A          scene of considerable activity as more aircraft
miss in the sequence can mean congestion and              arrived, bringing in more of the UNITAF head-
delays. Also, during normal operations, the entire        quarters and elements of Marine Forces Somalia
ship will be offloaded, but Restore Hope was not          (MarFor). Once again, the conditions in Somalia
an ordinary operation.                                    caused problems for planners and operators. The
   Every commander must balance many require-             limited capacity of the Mogadishu airport meant a
ments, making the best use of limited resources.          strict schedule had to be maintained for arriving
In this case, the conflict faced by the commander         and departing aircraft. This in turn affected the
was to strike the proper balance between combat           scheduling of aerial refueling and the use of the
forces and logisticians, which had to compete for         intermediate staging bases the Air Mobility Com-
limited space on aircraft. So, in placing the prior-      mand had set up in Egypt and Yemen. Aircraft
ity for building up the force of fighters quickly,        could only be called from the staging bases once
the support troops had to wait. This in turn caused       there was a clear time slot at Mogadishu. Those
                                                          aircraft then had to hurriedly unload passengers
                                                          and cargo and depart quickly.101 In spite of com-
additional delays at the already burdened port.
The offloading of ships took longer than project-
ed because unneeded equipment had to be moved             plicated and hectic scheduling, the buildup of
repeatedly or back-loaded onto the ships.                 coalition personnel continued at a rapid pace.

                 Force Buildup
                                                             On 7 December, Major General Charles E.
                                                          Wilhelm, commanding general of the 1st Marine
                                                          Division, assumed MarFor commander duties. On
   Concurrent with the logistical buildup was the         10 December, he flew out of Camp Pendleton
arrival of the forces. The airport quickly became a       with a small battle staff and arrived at Mogadishu

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00804
This view of the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu shows the chancery building in the center surrounded by
its own wall. Another wall, in the background, enclosed the rest of the compound. By late December 1992, the area
to the top of the picture was filled with tents, mess halls, and other facilities for the UNITAF staff.
                                                                                      COMING ASHORE          37

                                                                                             DVIC DD-ST-00-00801
This aerial view of the port of Mogadishu shows three cargo ships and a number of large, medium, and small ves-
sels moored to the docks. The port played an important role during the relief effort.

the next day.102 MarFor would provide the basic          sion's "round-out" brigade, the 27th Brigade,
structure around which the task force would be           New York Army National Guard. The division
built. As other forces, American or coalition,           helicopters were readied for use in the deserts of
arrived in the theater, they would initially be          Somalia with the addition of particle separators
placed under the operational control of MarFor.          and global positioning system equipment. Desert
   The largest American force after the Marines          camouflage utilities (known as battle dress uni-
                                                         forms or "BDUs" to the Army) were procured and
                                                         issued.104 Troops were sent to the ranges to fire
was the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division
(Light Infantry), which would form Army Forces
Somalia. Because of the manner in which such an          and battle-sight their weapons, ironically often fir-
Army division deploys, its movement actually had         ing in the snows of a New York winter as they pre-
begun on 7 December, when the first of seven             pared for movement to equatorial Africa.
trainloads of equipment departed Fort Drum, New             The division was originally expected to start its
York, for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey. Over          deployment on 19 December. However, on 10
the next 10 days, 450 railcars were used to move         December, a decision was made by UNITAF that
more than 1,500 pieces of the division's equip-          Army Forces Somalia should begin its deploy-
ment to the military ocean terminal at Bayonne.103       ment much sooner. When General Wilhelm
There they were loaded on board ships for the            arrived in the theater, he immediately assumed
long journey to the Horn of Africa. The soldiers         operational control of the 15th MEU (SOC) and
were preparing for their deployment at the same          the French forces and focused efforts on securing
time. Classes were held on the country's history,        the port, the airfield, and the embassy compound.
culture, terrain, and problems soldiers could            With the arrival of 1st Marine Division's 1st
expect. Needed equipment was brought in to fill          Battalion, 7th Marines, MarFor was able to broad-
recognized shortages, some of it from the divi-          en the coalition's control to areas outside

                                                                                                  DVIC DD-SD-00-00747
Among the maritime prepositioning ships to dock at Mogadishu was the Algol class vehicle cargo ship, USNS Altair.
Onboard cranes unload the ship's cargo of military supplies and vehicles.

Mogadishu. This began at Bale Dogle, which                   These early successes led to criticism of
UNITAF had recognized early in its planning as            UNITAF by several members of the media.
an important location from which to extend the            Journalists openly questioned why UNITAF was
force into the interior of the country. The 15th          not pushing more quickly and aggressively into
MEU (SOC)'s Battalion Landing Team, 2d                    the interior, especially to the town of Baidoa,
Battalion, 9th Marines, supported by elements of          described as "The City of Death," where the
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, was                impact of famine and suffering were at their
given the mission, which it planned and accom-            worst. General Johnston, however, would not be
plished within 48 hours. The Marines seized the           pressured into hasty action. The responsibility for
airfield in a heliborne assault prior to the arrival of   the accomplishment of the mission and the safety
Army forces.105                                           of the members of the coalition force was his
   The first U.S. Army unit to deploy was                 alone, and he knew UNITAF was quickly building
Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry. The sol-          in strength and would soon expand into the other
diers and the battalion's tactical command post           planned relief sectors. He wanted this to be done
loaded on board three Lockheed C-141 Starlifter           in an orderly manner, without spreading the avail-
troop transport aircraft on 11 December for a             able forces too thinly over the ground. He
direct flight into the airfield at Bale Dogle, now        addressed the issue in a television interview,
                                                          explaining his reasons and laying the matter to
held by the newly arrived Marines. The soldiers
arrived within 24 hours and went immediately
from deployment to employment as they relieved
the Marines who had secured the airfield.106 * The
Army assumed full control for Bale Dogle airfield
on 15 December.                                           * Due to time zone differences, the soldiers actually arrived
                                                          on 13 December.
                                                                                            COMING ASHORE          39

   Meanwhile, the country began to show the                  20mm guns and missiles (the attack helicopters
coalition soldiers all the facets of its character.          carried tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-
Marines, sailors, and soldiers were generally                guided, or TOW, missiles), destroying two "tech-
greeted with smiles and waves from the Somalis               nicals" and damaging one American-made M113
they encountered on the streets, but there were              armored personnel carrier.108 Such immediate,
some who seemed determined to test the resolve               overwhelming, and deadly response was precisely
of UNITAF. Sniping became a routine part of                  what General Johnston set in his commander's
daily existence; seldom more than simple harass-             guidance as the best antidote for aggression by the
ment, it still provided an edge to the life and work         factions or bandits.
of the task force. Sniping was especially a prob-               Just as American forces were proceeding to
lem at the port, which was overlooked by an old              Somalia, so were the military contingents of sev-
prison the gunmen used to cover their activities.            eral coalition partners. One of the first of these
Marines quickly secured the prison area and                  forces to begin moving were the Canadians, who
ended the problem in the immediate location. But             had received their own warning order to partici-
throughout UNITAF's time in Somalia, sniping at              pate in the U.S.-led operation on 4 December.
convoys or into the various compounds would                  Originally, they had prepared to deploy their force
remain a daily occurrence.                                   as a part of United Nations Operation Somalia and
   The first direct attacks on UNITAF members                had sent the auxiliary oil replenishment ship
also took place during these early days. In two              HMCS Preserver (510) to Somalia. Under the
separate incidents on 12 December three aircraft             Canadian forces' Operation Deliverance, the ship
of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, one                arrived at Mogadishu on 12 December. The
Bell UH-1N Huey and two Bell AH-1W Super                     advance headquarters of the Canadian Joint
Cobras, were fired upon. The UH-1N Huey                      Forces Somalia landed at Mogadishu on 13
received damage to its rotors. In the second inci-           December and embarked on board the ship. Their
dent, the attack helicopters returned fire with              contribution to the forces on the ground was to be

                                                                                                   DVIC DD-SD-00-00805
The cargo from a U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy aircraft is unloaded on the flight line at Mogadishu airport while a Marine
UH-1N Huey helicopter flies overhead. Beyond the main runway is the Indian Ocean shoreline.

                                                                                                  DVIC DA-SC-94-00321
An M998 high-mobility multipurpose, wheeled vehicle (humvee) is loaded onto an Air Mobility Command C-141B
Starlifter at Griffis Air Force Base, New York, as equipment of the 10th Mountain Division is readied for shipment to

a Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, the              Brigade in what the Italian forces called
advance party of which arrived by U.S. Air Force            Operation Ibis.
Lockheed C-5 Galaxy aircraft at Bale Dogle on 14
                                                               Thousands of miles to the south, on 15
                                                            December, the Prime Minister of Australia, The
   The Italian contingent also began to arrive at           Right Honorable Paul John Keating, announced
about this time. Their force was initially com-             that his nation would contribute forces as well.
posed of two elements: two battalions of the                The Australian participation would be called
Folgore Airborne Brigade, a famed parachute                 Operation Solace and their force would be formed
unit; and the San Marco Battalion, a naval infantry         around a battalion group. The battalion selected
unit. The Italian forces were also supported from           was 1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment,
the sea by the Italian Navy's 24th Naval Group,             stationed in Townsville. This unit was the alert
which carried heavy equipment and supplies. The             battalion of the Australian Ready Deployment
first elements of the brigade, a small special              Force. The contingent of 930 soldiers included
forces reconnaissance element of 23 men led by              engineer and administrative support elements, as
Major Gennaro Fusco, left Italy on 11 December.             well as armored personnel carriers. The battal-
They arrived in Mogadishu on 13 December and                ion's artillery battery commander and forward
reoccupied the Italian Embassy on 16                        observers would act as liaison and provide civil
December.110 The brigade would arrive in full               affairs capabilities. The Australian reconnaissance
force by 24 December. On the 23d, the San Marco             party departed on 21 December and arrived in
Battalion arrived in Somali waters with the naval           Mogadishu the next day.111
group. Brigadier General Bruno Loi arrived on 20               Another of the United States' traditional allies
December and took command of the Folgore                    was preparing to send an important contribution to
                                                                                        COMING ASHORE           41

the coalition. The Turkish army created a special          with medical, engineer, and maintenance pla-
task force built around an existing mechanized             toons. Numbering up to 669 soldiers, the first
infantry company, 1st Company, 1st Battalion,              Saudis entered Mogadishu on 19 December, with
28th Mechanized Brigade, stationed in Ankara.              their forces fully in Somalia by the end of the
The company was strengthened with a quarter-               month.114 For the first time in its history,
master platoon, a transportation platoon, a signal         Botswana sent soldiers to serve outside its bor-
section, a medical section, and an engineer sec-           ders. Out of an army totaling only 5,500,
tion. In all, the reinforced company numbered 300          Botswana sent 300 soldiers in a composite com-
soldiers. The advance party left Ankara and                pany.115 Several other countries, such as Pakistan,
arrived in Mogadishu on 19 December. The                   the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Nigeria,
remainder of the Turkish force proceeded by rail           Tunisia, Morocco, and Zimbabwe, all sent liaison
to the port of Mersin beginning on 17 December.            officers and small advance contingents in prepara-
There, they boarded three Turkish Navy ships that          tion for larger contributions to be made late in
sailed on the 17th and brought them directly to            December or in January. To add to the strength of
Mogadishu on 2 January 1993.112                            the air forces, the German Air Force continued to
   By mid-December many other forces, large and            provide three C-160 Transall cargo aircraft that
small, were also proceeding to join UNITAF.                had been flying relief supplies out of Mombasa,
Several of these came from the Middle East and             Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Relief. The
Africa. They included a reinforced motorized rifle         British Royal Air Force did the same with two C-
company from Kuwait, an all-volunteer unit that            130 Hercules transport aircraft, which it also had
began arriving on 14 December.113 The Kingdom              been using in Provide Relief. The Royal New
of Saudi Arabia sent elements of its 5th Royal             Zealand Air Force sent three Andover transport
Saudi Land Forces Airborne Battalion, reinforced

                                                                                                DVIC DF-SD-97-02528
Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, unload their packs after boarding a C-141B cargo air-
craft, which will take them to Bale Dogle, Somalia.

aircraft from its Number 42 Squadron to fly trans-      to secure the city. Task Force Hope was formed
port within the theater.                                from the French 2d Foreign Legion Parachute

               Into the Interior
                                                        Regiment, and elements of the French Special
                                                        Operations Command and the 13th Foreign
                                                        Legion Demi-Brigade, and 15th MEU.116 The task
   The arrival of all these forces, and the promise     force left Mogadishu on 15 December and
of others to come shortly, gave General Johnston        secured the airfield the next day through a com-
the strength and flexibility to push into the interi-   bined ground and heliborne movement. There was
or. Bale Dogle, strongly occupied by coalition          no opposition. Relief convoys, escorted by coali-
                                                        tion forces, began bringing supplies to Baidoa that
troops, would be the springboard for the next step
into Baidoa.
   With the French forces already under the oper-          The Marines and French soldiers immediately
ational control of MarFor, UNITAF and MarFor            established security posts and started patrols of
planners decided to prepare a combined operation        the city. The presence of a large number of armed
                                                                                       COMING ASHORE        43

                                                              The system by which these operations were
                                                           ordered and controlled became fairly standard and
                                                           reflected how UNITAF functioned. A series of
                                                           daily fragmentary orders were issued, or more fre-
                                                           quently if necessary. The orders listed objectives
                                                           to be taken, forces to be employed, and dates for
                                                           accomplishment of the missions. Coordinating
                                                           instructions were provided as necessary and noted
                                                           any support that was required along with specific
                                                           force assignments. Each day, the next fragmentary
                                                           orders would contain more information, adjust
                                                           dates if necessary, and note the commanding gen-
                                                           eral's additional orders or guidance. UNITAF
                                                           headquarters operations section thus became a
                                                           scene of continuous work as liaison officers from
                                                           various U.S. units and coalition forces attended
                                                           planning meetings within the future operations
                                                           cell, run by Colonel Peter A. Dotto. All the while,
                                                           ongoing operations were monitored in the current
                                                           operations cell under Colonel James B. Egan.
                                                              Another critical part of each operation was to
                                                           prepare the local population for the arrival of
                                                           UNITAF forces. This task fell to Ambassador
                                                           Robert B. Oakley, who had been appointed by
                                                           President George H. W. Bush because of his expe-
                                                           rience in Africa as Special Envoy to Somalia.
                                                           Ambassador Oakley assisted the military in
                                     DVIC DN-ST-93-01388   understanding the Somali people and cultural
The day after American Marines and French soldiers         nuances. He also provided insight into the tangle
secured Baidoa, Marines of the 15th Marine                 that was Somali politics.119 For each operation,
Expeditionary Unit provide security for a convoy bring-    Oakley would travel to the particular city in
ing food to the "City of Death."                           advance of military forces to meet with the local
                                                           elders and leaders. He would explain in detail
men was quickly noted and was a source of some             what was about to happen to reduce the risk of
concern. On 18 December, Somalis fired from                confrontation. The following day, aircraft would
inside one of their compounds upon members of              drop leaflets over the city that repeated the peace-
Task Force Hope. The area was quickly surround-            ful intentions of the coalition members and its
ed and entered and all arms were confiscated.118           humanitarian purpose. They also would warn the
The incident highlighted a need, both inside the           people not to interfere with UNITAF forces or
relief sectors and throughout the area of opera-           operations. In this manner, the coalition forces
tions, for a policy concerning weapons control.            would find a soft landing at each objective.120

                                                                  Securing the Relief Sectors
   The rapid success of the Baidoa operation
brought the first phase of Operation Restore Hope
to a close. It also provided the basic framework by
which all other operations to secure objectives               With Fragmentary Order 7, UNITAF began
would be organized and executed. The push to the           planning to take the next objective: Kismayo. The
remaining humanitarian relief sectors would                Belgian forces' 1st Parachute Battalion had
involve the U.S. Marines or Army in a series of            arrived in Mogadishu on 13 December. Led by
joint and combined operations with coalition part-         Lieutenant Colonel Marc Jacqmin, the paratroop-
ners. Wherever possible, these operations would            ers would have responsibility for securing the
use the forces of the coalition nations that had vol-      Kismayo relief sector, then controlling it along
unteered to assume responsibility for the particu-         with elements of the Army's 10th Mountain
lar sectors.                                               Division. Kismayo lies approximately 200 miles

                                                                                          DVIC DD-SD-00-01031
American Special Envoy to Somalia, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, speaks to a group of Somalis. Behind him is
U.S. Army BGen Lawson W. Magruder III, commander of Task Force Kismayo.

south of Mogadishu, on the coast just below the        sance and surveillance of the beach and the
equator. It is the site of Somalia's second largest    Marines and Belgian paratroopers embarked on
port, after Mogadishu, and it had been an impor-       board the American ships.121
tant base for the Somali Navy. An airfield of              Because of the presence of two warring fac-
appropriate size for military cargo aircraft was       tions in the city, a preparatory political and diplo-
only a few miles outside the city. Holding this        matic maneuver was very important. On 17
area would provide another port for the receipt        December, contact was made with Colonel
and onward transport of relief supplies. The           Ahmed Omar Jess, leader of the Kismayo region's
Belgian forces were placed under the operational       Somali Patriotic Front faction, and Mohamed Said
control of MarFor for this operation. Because of       Hirsi, who was know as General Morgan and led
its location on the coast, an amphibious operation
                                                       an independent faction in the area, setting up an
was chosen to secure the city and its facilities.
                                                       agreement whereby Kismayo would be an open
Captain John Peterson, commander of the Tripoli
                                                       city. Jess and his troops would remain in the city,
amphibious group, was designated as the com-
                                                       and Morgan and his followers would move 20
                                                       kilometers to the north.122
mander of the amphibious task force and
Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin as the commander of
the landing force. The landing force was com-              The Belgians already had sound experience in
posed of Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines,         amphibious doctrine and the operation went
from the 15th MEU (SOC), and two platoons of           smoothly. On the morning of 20 December, the
Belgian paratroopers. The amphibious task force        Marines landed in amphibious assault vehicles
itself consisted of the Juneau and the Rushmore        while the Belgians came ashore in air-cushioned
from the United States Navy, and the French ship       landing craft and helicopters. There was no oppo-
FS Dupleix, an antisubmarine warfare guided mis-       sition to the landing and control was passed
sile destroyer. Captain Peterson transferred his       ashore within a few hours. Captain Peterson and
flag to the Juneau, U.S. Navy SEALs embarked           Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin went immediately to
on the Dupleix to perform pre-landing reconnais-       the center of the city, where they met with Colonel
                                                                                                COMING ASHORE          45

Jess, who protested the presence of the colonial
Belgians. Lieutenant Colonel Jacqmin quickly
quieted Jess's anger and made it clear the coali-
tion forces would not be intimidated.123 *
   By the end of that first day the overall strength
of the Belgian forces in Kismayo consisted of the
11th Company and the Close Reconnaissance
Squadron, equipped with Scimitar tracked recon-
naissance vehicles. With the arrival of additional
Belgian reinforcements, the U.S. Marine compa-
ny was released from tactical control and with-
drew from Kismayo the next day. By 30
December, the Belgians had 550 men in the
   The successful completion of the Baidoa oper-
ation made it possible for UNITAF to quickly plan
to secure another city notorious as a scene of suf-
fering and death; Bardera, located about 217 kilo-
meters southwest of Baidoa, at the end of a dry
and dusty track. With the arrival of more combat
units from the 1st Marine Division (notably the
remainder of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, fol-
lowed shortly thereafter by the lead elements of
3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and the headquarters of
the 7th Marines) there was enough power on the
ground to push on to this important inland city.
Colonel Emil R. Bedard, commanding officer of
the 7th Marines, departed Mogadishu for Baidoa                                                         DVIC DN-ST-93-01396
with his Marines on 22 December; only three and                     Members of Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, of
a half days after these units began arriving in the-
                                                                    the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, exit from a P-7A1
                                                                    amphibious assault vehicle after arriving to set up a
   Prior to leaving Mogadishu, the unit meshed                      checkpoint in Kismayo.
with the attachment of amphibious assault and
light armored vehicles. (The advance elements of
both the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion and the                    ing a key bridge and the river crossings over the
3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion had arrived                     Jubba, as well as the principal road junctions.
in Mogadishu on 19 December.) On Christmas                          Patrols were quickly sent out to provide security
Eve, after a long road march choked with dust, the                  for the task force as well as for the people of the
Marines secured the airfield at Bardera. The next                   city. Coordination was made with the local non-
day they controlled all access to the city by hold-                 governmental agency to get the relief food ship-
                                                                    ments moving in. Another early concern was to
                                                                    secure the market area in the center of town so it
* The issue of colonial troops was one that caused consider-        could again open for business.126
able anxiety and sensitivity in the UNITAF staff. Several of           The next two operations were originally
the coalition allies once had colonies in Africa. France and        planned to occur nearly simultaneously using
Italy once had colonies in Somalia itself. Where possible, use
of troops from these nations had to be done with considera-
                                                                    French and Italian forces to take control of the
tion of the feelings of the local populace. For instance, in late   humanitarian relief sectors that would become
December, plans to secure the city of Merka originally called       their responsibilities. Planning for the operations
for the use of Italian troops. When the local population            to Oddur and Gialalassi was ongoing at UNITAF
protested strongly about the return of the Italians, this opera-    headquarters by 16 December, concurrent with
tion was given to Army Forces Somalia as well as the
Italians. The issue of colonialism also was a handy rallying
                                                                    the planning for the Bardera operation.
call for the various factions when they organized protests             Oddur lies 260 kilometers northwest of
against the presence or actions of UNITAF.                          Mogadishu, 110 kilometers north of Baidoa, and

                                                                                                   DVIC DD-SD-00-00987
An estimated 30,000 Somalis inhabited the town of Bardera. It is one of the most populated towns in the otherwise
sparsely populated region of southwest Somalia.

close to the Ethiopian border. Its airport contains       from Mogadishu to Oddur. From there, they were
a 4,000-foot runway capable of handling C-130             quickly reassigned to outlying towns: the 13th
aircraft. It was noted in briefings there was a well-     Demi-Brigade had responsibility for Wajid; the
organized militia in the area, as well as some old        5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment for
Soviet military equipment.127 The task force for          Ceelgasass; and the Legion for El Berde, while
the operation would consist of elements of the            the headquarters, cavalry detachment (an aviation
French 5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment                unit), and support battalion, were at Oddur. On the
and the 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion,          29th, Major General Rene de l'Home, the com-
with logistic support, and Company C, 1st                 mander of French forces in Somalia, requested the
Battalion, 7th Marines, which was placed under            boundary of the relief sector be moved east to
the tactical control of the commander of the              include the town of Tiyegloo. Administratively,
French forces.128                                         the town had always been a part of the Oddur dis-
   UNITAF Fragmentary Order 8, issued on 18               trict, and it was therefore proper to include it in
December, called for the French forces to secure          that sector. The request was approved at UNITAF.
Oddur "on or about 24 December." Many of the              The French forces soon dispersed themselves
units to be involved, however, were still arriving.       throughout the relief sector, eventually occupying
                                                          21 platoon-sized advance posts from which
                                                          patrols could be made.129
Fragmentary Order 12, issued on the 21st,
rescheduled the date of the operation for
Christmas Day. On Christmas Eve, the same day
the Marines were moving to Bardera, French
forces began their road march to Oddur. They              * If the road to Bardera was dusty, the road to Oddur was
passed that day on the road and arrived in Oddur          even worse. The fine dust was like red talc in places, explod-
on 25 December.* Over the next few days, the              ing underfoot with each step or billowing in clouds behind
                                                          vehicles. It covered men and machines in a natural camou-
remaining French forces in Somalia were brought           flage.
                                                                                               COMING ASHORE               47

   As early as 16 December, Fragmentary Order 7               Italian forces still arriving, the date for the opera-
had tasked the Italian forces to secure Gialalassi.           tion was changed from 26 to 27 December.
Subsequent orders refined and amplified this ini-                By the 26th, the Italian forces were assembling
tial order. Gialalassi is about 115 kilometers north          at the port. Two companies of the Folgore
of Mogadishu, and is situated on the Webi                     Brigade, with headquarters, reconnaissance
Shebelle. In intelligence briefings, this city was            group, and mortar and antiarmor gun sections
described as being on dry, flat ground, with a                bivouacked in a warehouse, while motor transport
small forest to the north. There were two airfields,          and armored personnel carriers were assembled.
one of which was C-130 capable. Traveling on the              A convoy of relief trucks also staged at the port,
roads was expected to be slow. A United Somali                loading grain that had just arrived on a cargo ship.
Congress faction under Ali Mahdi Mohamed held                 That same day, a section of U.S. Army vehicles
the area and had a security force at the airfields            and a platoon of U.S. Army military police
with some recoilless rifles. Bandits were reported            mounted in hardened humvees armed with auto-
to be operating along the road.130 Fragmentary                matic grenade launchers also entered the port and
Orders 9 through 14, issued between 19 and 24                 joined up with the Italian forces.
December, assigned considerable force to the                     The operation began in the early morning of 27
operation. U.S. Air Force engineers were ordered              December. The convoy left the port area and head-
to provide support in inspecting and repairing the            ed north on one of the few hard-surfaced roads.
runway if necessary. Army forces would provide                This was the old "Strada Imperiale," or Imperial
convoy security and establish a forward arming                Way, built by the Italians during the 1930s. As the
and refueling point at the airfield. MarFor would             task force left the city, the light of dawn revealed
give helicopter, engineer, and medical evacuation             a verdant countryside where the road paralleled
support as necessary. Navy Forces Somalia would               the Shebelle. Armed sentries guarded large tracts
provide fixed-wing close air support. With the                of sorghum and other crops. Helicopter gunships

                                                                                     Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
Italian forces enter the town of Gialalassi on their way to secure the nearby airfield. One of the more flexible units of
the Italian military, the Folgore Brigade could operate by means of airdrops or as a light infantry brigade.

                                                                                                DVIC DD-SD-00-00700
Pvt Andrew Schnaubelt, USA, of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, takes a covering position on the airfield at
Belet Weyne, as a Canadian C-130 Hercules cargo plane from Canadian Forces Base, Petawawa, Ontario, lands.

would occasionally fly low over the length of the          around the town and oversaw the unloading of the
convoy. Interesting historical monuments were              grain supplies at the distribution center.131
located every 10 kilometers along the roadside;               The last of the originally planned relief sectors
these were markers of stone, bearing the Fascist           to be secured was Belet Weyne. Planning for this
insignia and noting the distance from the city. The        operation had initially called for Army Forces
condition of the road was as bad as had been               Somalia to have the responsibility for the mis-
reported. Years of neglect and battle damage from          sion.132 During this time, the Army troop build-up
the civil war had taken their toll. The road was fre-      was continuing. Major General Steven L. Arnold,
quently cratered from artillery rounds, and in             commanding general of Army Forces Somalia,
some places the paved surface was entirely gone            arrived on 22 December. At the same time, the
                                                           Canadian forces were also preparing to enter the
for long stretches. The convoy, already slowed by
                                                           theater in large numbers. Fragmentary Order 14,
the presence of the relief trucks, frequently had to
                                                           issued on 23 December, placed the Canadian
drive through rutted tracks on the side of the road.       forces under the tactical control of Army Forces
Speeds averaged only about 10 kilometers per               Somalia for the operation. Upon release from tac-
hour. By 1800, the assault forces in armored per-          tical control, the Canadians would assume respon-
sonnel carriers and trucks entered the town.               sibility for the entire sector. The date for the oper-
Crowds of waving, singing and smiling people               ation was set for 28 December.
greeted the remainder of the convoy. The Italian              The city of Belet Weyne is 320 kilometers
forces proceeded on to the airfield, setting securi-       north of Mogadishu, and only 32 kilometers from
ty around it for the night with the convoy in the          the Ethiopian border. It also is situated closest of
center, close to the landing strip. The next day,          all the relief sectors in the northern portion of
they set up platoon-sized defensive positions              Somalia, which were outside UNITAF's area of
                                                                                     COMING ASHORE         49

operations. For these reasons, a U.S. Special           departed for Bale Dogle, to prepare for another
Operations Forces team would also be a part of          mission.135
the operation. They would patrol along the bound-
ary to keep the competing factions apart.133 In
                                                           The successful completion of the Belet Weyne
                                                        operation on 28 December marked the end of the
staff meetings, the city was described as flat and      second phase of Operation Restore Hope.136 The
situated on the Shebelle River, which was the only      purpose of this phase had been to secure the
obstacle in the area. There were two bridges in         remaining five objectives as points from which to
town and one C-130 capable airfield. There was          provide security throughout the area of operations
only one road into the city, but it was assessed as     to allow the unimpeded distribution of relief sup-
good for handling traffic. The Hawadle clan con-        plies. This was four to six weeks ahead of sched-
trolled the city with a small security force armed      ule, reflective of the amount of fast paced work
with some crew-served weapons and antiaircraft
                                                        accomplished by UNITAF and component level
                                                        planners, and in execution by the multinational
   General Arnold gave command of the opera-            forces involved. It also was indicative of the flex-
tion to the 2d Brigade (Commando Brigade) of            ibility of the command in the ability to prepare
the 10th Mountain Division. The task force would        each operation even as forces were arriving in the-
be composed of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry,        ater. Logistics challenges were daunting and
and a battalion of the Canadian Airborne                required close monitoring of the time-phased
Regiment Battle Group. The plan was to seize the        force deployment data, but it worked.
airfield with an air assault. On the 28th, the Army        There was to be no letup in tempo and no time
flew the assault units on board Sikorsky UH 60A         for self-congratulation. As soon as the 2d
"Blackhawk" helicopters, while MarFor provided          Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrived back in Bale
additional support with four helicopters. Almost        Dogle, they were tasked with an additional mis-
immediately following the securing of the airfield,     sion: to secure the port of Merka, located about 70
Canadian C-130 aircraft began to land, bringing         kilometers southwest of Mogadishu. It was a
additional troops and vehicles. In less than two        place where a corrupt mayor was acting in concert
days, about 1,000 soldiers had been brought to          with local bandits to prevent relief supplies from
Belet Weyne. On 30 December, the Canadians              getting to the humanitarian relief organizations
assumed sole responsibility for the relief sector.      for distribution to outlying towns. The relief
The contingent from Army Forces Somalia                 organizations in the city had not received any sup-
                                                        plies for six months. For these reasons, and also to

                                                                                           DVIC DD-SD-00-00793
On 31 December 1992, soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, jump from a UH-60 Blackhawk helicop-
ter in an air assault to take control of the airfield at Merka.

secure another port, Merka was added to                main supply routes connecting the sectors. Each
UNITAF's objectives and an operation to secure it      was named for a different color. Subsequent
was planned.137                                        orders tasked particular forces with the inspection,
   The original plan called for an amphibious          clearance and repair of the roads. Of special con-
operation, using the San Marco Battalion of the        cern were landmines that were so often encoun-
Italian forces. The date was set for 27 December.      tered, thousands had been laid throughout the
Unfortunately, the only good landing beaches           country, and now they had to be found and
were 22 kilometers south of the city. Those near       removed from the roads.
the city were unsuitable, with a berm at the high-        The UNITAF structure was largely in place at
tide mark and rocky ledges on both flanks.138 The      the end of the second phase. Its rapid success was
lack of adequate landing beaches close to the          undoubtedly assisted by two factors. The first was
objective caused a change in the initial concept of    the heavy reliance on psychological operations
operations. By 28 December, Fragmentary Order          that General Johnston had emphasized in his ini-
19 directed the Italian forces to place the San        tial orders. The visits by Ambassador Oakley, the
Marco Battalion under the tactical control of          use of radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and the pub-
Army Forces Somalia for the operation, which           lication of a Somali-language newspaper all kept
was scheduled for the 31st. The operation would        the populace informed of what was happening and
be a combined ground and air assault with the          why. The second factor was the quiet reaction of
Italian forces proceeding in trucks while U.S.         Somali clan-based factions. While all claimed to
Army forces seized the airfield. The road leading      welcome the arrival of UNITAF, the coalition
to the city was described as poor and very dusty       forces' presence inserted an unknown quantity
with a possible travel time of four to six hours. In   into their political and military calculations. There
addition, there were at least five bandit-run check-   was some testing of UNITAF resolve in the early
points on the road, each generally watched by one      days, but those incidents were quickly and deci-
man armed with an AK-47 rifle; machine gun             sively resolved. The rules of engagement allowed
positions were also reported on the town mosque
and along the road.139
                                                       for protection of the coalition forces, and Somali
                                                       faction leaders would be presented with an unac-
   Control of the operation was again given to the     ceptable loss of men, arms, and prestige if they
10th Mountain Division's 2d Brigade. The multi-        provoked UNITAF security elements. Such les-
national task force was composed of one compa-         sons kept the Somali leadership relatively quiet
ny of the San Marco Battalion attached to the 2d       and receptive to the requests of UNITAF.
Battalion, 87th Infantry. Supported by the 10th           As the third phase of the operation began, it
Mountain Division's organic 10th Aviation              was recognized there was still much work to be
Brigade, the American soldiers conducted an air        done, and many more important decisions had to
assault to secure the airfield, and then immediate-    be made. In this phase, the operations were to
ly secured the port. They then linked up with the      expand the security of the interior of the country
Italian forces that were proceeding overland           through the use of convoy security and the cre-
escorting a convoy of relief supplies. The             ation of additional distribution sites. This phase
American soldiers and the Italians escorted the        would set the stage for the delicate hand-off to the
convoy to the outlying town of Qoryooley, the site
of a refugee camp where the food was needed.140
                                                       United Nations force, generally know as UNO-
                                                       SOM. As with a relay race, the smooth passing of
   Thus, by the end of the year, and barely within     the baton is critical to success, and this is no less
three weeks of the initial landings, all the human-    true in military operations other than war. The
itarian relief sectors had been secured by the         UNITAF staff wanted to ensure the baton was
coalition forces. Convoys were running smoothly,       passed without difficulty.

                                                                          Chapter 5
but there was already a need to improve commu-
nications between all the major cities. One answer

                                                           Politics, Peace Talks, and
to this was the establishment of an intra-theater
flight schedule. Another was to establish a road

network throughout the theater that could provide
for quicker movement of convoys bearing sup-
plies and troops. UNITAF Fragmentary Order 9,
issued on 19 December, set up a network of nine
                                  Military-Political Cooperation
   The military aspects of the operation were proceeding smoothly by the end of December 1992. The
long hours of planning, bringing together a staff, and forming the coalition were producing rapid suc-
cess. But there were considerations that went beyond occupying and controlling territory. There were

times when military commanders, as well as the          going to do something militarily that I needed
Marines and soldiers in the field, had to act as        diplomatic support. He [Ambassador Oakley]
diplomatists, negotiators, and statesmen. "I sup-       seemed to have the instincts of knowing what
pose if there is a blueprint for how the diplomatic     needed to be done up front. We talked a lot and
and political side should work with the military on     that was the important thing. It was a very coop-
an operation like this, it was perfect," noted          erative effort, helped a great deal by Mr. John
Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston. "We rec-         Hirsch, who was my political advisor, and de
ognized very early that this was a very, very com-      facto he became Ambassador Oakley's DCM
plex environment."                                      [deputy chief of mission]."144 Another important
    Carl von Clausewitz, a 17th century Prussian        task for the committee was to present a clear mes-
                                                        sage to the factions by ensuring the coalition
                                                        spoke with one voice.145 The faction leaders
soldier and philosopher, defined war as "merely a
continuation of policy by other means." While
Operation Restore Hope was not truly a war, as          would take advantage of any confusion in aims or
Clausewitz understood it, his maxim was nonethe-        methods.
less true. Even in this operation other than war, the      The two sides of the committee brought dual
commanding general and his staff officers had to        pressures against the factions. Diplomatic initia-
keep in mind that "the political object is the goal
... and means can never be considered in isolation
from their purpose."141 Matching military means
to political objectives drove much of what the
coalition did and how it continued to structure
itself. Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, the
operations officer, summed this up in an inter-
view: "Operations such as this become less clear
as far as military objectives. They become more
politically driven. The humanitarian needs force
the military to work differently. Terms must
change to suit the mission; military terms will not
work. Marines quickly and clearly moved to the
humanitarian side. The key to the operation is the
people; we must respond to their hope."142
    American Ambassador Robert B. Oakley rec-
ognized at the start that one of his greatest respon-
sibilities would be to assist the military com-
manders with the myriad political issues this oper-
ation brought. Accordingly, he and General
Johnston established a coordinating committee in
which they met daily or more frequently as neces-
sary. General Johnston saw the committee's role
was "to tie the diplomatic-political considerations
with our military power, which allows us to pres-
sure the factions to ... decrease violence."143 The
two sides of the committee got along very well,                                            DVIC DD-SD-00-00755
with their mutual work seeming to progress from         LtGen Robert B. Johnston, commander of the joint task
a quick understanding of each other's needs. "We        force, stands on the tarmac of Mogadishu airport with
simply ... didn't sit down and say `here is our joint   Ambassador Robert B. Oakley.
strategy.' It just seemed like I knew when I was

tives were begun to get the sides talking to resolve    mission was security of the force ... and clearly, it
their differences, while the military might of the      was required to disarm those elements that would
Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) made the            directly threaten our forces; i.e., the `technicals'
Somali factions take these steps seriously. To          that were in Mogadishu or Baidoa or Bardera or
reduce the violence and bring the nation together,      anywhere on the road map."147 In a meeting with
a series of reconciliation talks were scheduled in      Ambassador Oakley, the start of the weapons con-
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It was hoped these talks,        trol program was laid out. "There were so-called
held on neutral ground, would instill the faction       technicals in almost every block and this was
leaders with a sense of responsibility for the          obviously a serious threat to the Somali people. It
future of their country. Only those who were will-      is a significant threat to our forces and it symbol-
ing to put down their arms and control their fol-       izes the power of the warlords, both military and
lowers would take part in these talks; those who        political, in the eyes of the Somali people. We
did not would have neither voice in the talks nor a     decided the number one objective was to get these
place in the Somalia to come. As Ambassador             dangerous things out of town and at the first meet-
Oakley later said about General Morgan: "My             ing between [General Mohamed Farah Hassan]
officers and UNITAF officers have met with him          Aideed and Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] that took place
on several occasions and told him that the way          here with General Johnston and myself present we
Somalia is going today, the way to get into the ...     got them to agree and to issue a public statement
future is not by using the gun. As a matter of fact,    that they would remove their heavy weapons from
those who persist in taking the political power [by     Mogadishu."148 By 22 December, reports at staff
force] are losing out in the political future of        meetings noted the turn-in of technicals and heavy
Somalia. Nothing bars him from participating in         weapons was proceeding well; Aideed had
the peace process except his own behavior."146          already moved his, and Ali Mahdi was in the
Getting the faction leaders to accept their respon-     process of moving his to a site east of the city. The
sibilities and to give up their weapons would take      actual cantonment of all these weapons took many
a deliberate plan and a lot of coercion. Ultimately,    days to complete, but was undoubtedly hurried by
there was a long and logical process of thought         the knowledge that coalition forces would consid-
and action by which all of these ends were to be        er the weapons fair game.149
accomplished. It involved the issue of disarma-            This initial agreement by the two major faction
ment; defining the secure environment required          leaders was used by UNITAF as the lever to get all
by the mission; the use of overwhelming force           heavy weapons and technicals in the country out
when necessary; the assistance to the humanitari-       of circulation. The initial ceasefire agreement,
an organizations; the furtherance of the peace          signed by all faction leaders in early January,
process among the faction leaders; and the              specified these weapons would be voluntarily
rebuilding of Somali civil institutions. Each of        impounded in cantonments.150 The owning faction
these was a thread in a tapestry of peacemaking.

Weapons Control and the use of Force
                                                        would identify these cantonments for UNITAF so
                                                        movement of weapons into or out of them could
                                                        be monitored. These were known as authorized
                                                        weapons storage sites. There was a noticeable ini-
   One of the first points that had to be settled was   tial reluctance by some elements, especially
the issue of disarmament. As explained earlier,         Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess and Mohamed Said
disarmament of Somalia was neither a specified
part of the mission nor an implied task. However,
something had to be done to reduce the number of        * The correctness and efficacy of this decision for control as
arms. The program decided on was one of                 opposed to disarmament is made in Somalia Operations:
weapons collection or weapons control rather than       Lessons Learned by Colonel Kenneth Allard, published by
total disarmament.* Of course, from the point of
                                                        the National Defense University Press in January 1995. In
                                                        discussing UNITAF and its successor, UNOSOM II, Colonel
security, there were so many weapons in                 Allard states: "There is a basic conceptual difference
Mogadishu and elsewhere that their very presence        between arms control and disarmament. Removing or limit-
posed a threat. General Johnston turned his atten-      ing the major weapons of an inferior or defeated military
tion to this matter immediately on his arrival. "At     force can be thought of as a form of arms control, but to com-
                                                        mit military forces to the mission of forcibly disarming a
that point [11 December] we were trying to              populace is to commit those forces to a combat situation that
reduce any threat to the U.S. forces. My primary        may thereafter involve them as an active belligerent."
                                                                           POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE              53

Hirsi, known as General Morgan, in Kismayo, to                      The question of small arms thus came down to
participate. Eventually, even they complied,                     authorized versus unauthorized weapons. General
spurred on by pressure applied by Belgian para-                  Johnston recognized that with the elimination of
troopers and American soldiers in the city. These                the technicals and other heavy weapons, relief
coalition forces in Task Force Kismayo confiscat-                organizations' security personnel did not have to
ed several technicals, demonstrating the serious                 possess heavy machine guns or similar armament.
intent and strong resolve of UNITAF.151                          Rifles, such as the ubiquitous AK-47s, would now
   The actions against the heavy weapons and                     be adequate protection against the bandits, but
technicals soon noticeably decreased their num-                  would not give the guards so much firepower they
bers.* There was still, however, a large number of               would become a threat to others.
small arms available in the country that had to be                  A system of identity cards was developed.155
controlled. Again, there were no simple solutions                These were permits to carry firearms. Their pur-
to the issue. The sheer volume of weapons made                   pose was to ensure that only those who were
total disarmament impossible. There also were                    employed as guards could openly carry such
some legitimate organizations that needed to be                  weapons. The cards would be issued to the relief
able to protect themselves. In many towns and vil-               organizations, not to the Somalis who were in
lages, local militias were formed for the protec-                their employ. The card system went into effect on
tion of the populace from bandits. To disarm these               8 January 1993.
groups would leave them prey to the lawless ele-                    The first cards were colored pink, with no pro-
ments or rival factions. Also, as General Johnston               vision for photographs. This led to attempts to cir-
recognized, disarming them would convey the                      cumvent the system by some Somalis. A second
erroneous assumption that UNITAF would pick
up the burden of their security.152 He emphasized
                                                                 set of blue cards, with photographs, was put into
                                                                 place by late February. These cards provided
this point to his commanders in a meeting on 5                   greater access for the Somalis for whom they were
January, when Canadian forces in Belet Weyne                     issued, but there were still some problems.
voiced concern about taking weapons from a valid                 Soldiers or Marines who interpreted the rules too
militia brigade. General Johnston responded there                stringently sometimes still confiscated weapons
was no intent to disarm legitimate militias. The                 from legitimate guards, much to the discomfort of
weapons should be inventoried and local com-                     the relief staff and their guards. In April, UNITAF
manders should work with the militias, but                       addressed this problem by issuing a card to all
UNITAF could not undertake the full security
responsibility for the relief sectors.153
                                                                 coalition troops that explained the weapons con-
                                                                 fiscation policy and the identification card sys-
   Similarly, the various relief organizations had               tem.156
armed guards for the protection of their personnel                  The most effective instrument to get the faction
or work sites. These were often moonlighting sol-                leaders to cooperate with UNITAF's demands was
diers of one of the factions, which presented a                  the willingness to use force when necessary. From
source of extra income for the faction leaders.                  the earliest days of the operation, the coalition
Simply disarming these guards posed several                      partners demonstrated they would meet any
problems. First of all, to take away their rifles and            aggression or threat with an overwhelming
machine guns and dismiss them would cause                        response. UNITAF controlled the skies and the
relief personnel to be uneasy, as they could
become targets of their former guards.* Second,
                                                                 seas along the coast, and the patrols and convoys
                                                                 of its Marines and soldiers demonstrated a strong
the relief organizations did have legitimate securi-             and professional presence. Coalition leaders were
ty requirements in their work places and while                   therefore taken seriously, and if a local coalition
traveling. Finally, as with the local militias,
UNITAF did not have the resources to take up this
large security mission, not withstanding the polit-
ical pressure to protect these organizations.154 **
                                                                 * During the course of the operation there were instances of
                                                                 members of humanitarian relief organizations being wound-
                                                                 ed or killed by guards over disagreements about employment
                                                                 or pay.
* This was especially true in Mogadishu. There continued to
be reports, however, that technicals had been sent to outlying   ** UNITAF provided security to food convoys, coordinating
districts, where they were out of sight but ready for use as     such work with relief organizations. These actions were
needed.                                                          within UNITAF's explicit mission.

commander said he would take a certain action, he           The need to define this end state was recog-
was believed. This credibility allowed General          nized from the earliest days. If the mission was to
Johnston to implement the policy of arms control        produce a secure environment, how could that be
in a more gradual way than might have been oth-         measured? In the original Joint Task Force
erwise possible; as he later stated: "We have           Somalia operation order, issued 6 December, the
incrementally ratcheted up what we've been              commander's intent stated: "The end state desired
removing to get every weapon off the streets. To        is to create an environment in which the U.N. and
try to take them all right away was unrealistic. We     [nongovernmental organizations] can assume full
could have imposed this militarily, but it would        responsibility for the security and operation of the
have impaired the important role of getting the         Somali humanitarian relief efforts." As military
Somali people to take charge of their own sys-          forces spread throughout the area of operations,
tem."157 Ambassador Oakley also saw the advan-          UNITAF planners sought a quantifiable definition
tages of this system of credibility through             of security. General Johnston saw the definition
strength: "We've been remarkably successful             and refinement of the end state as an implied task,
because we come from a position of force. It's an       although a difficult one. As he said: "[We] now
area [in] which you have to figure what, in our         need a precise measure for success; how do you
                                                        know when a secure environment is established?
                                                        [We] need an objective measure."159 By Christmas
judgment is fair, and then tell them ... what they
should do. If you negotiate, you quite frequently
find yourself ending up at a disadvantage because       Day, the UNITAF staff was still searching for this
                                                        precise measurement of security, recognizing that
they're very good at negotiations, twisting it
around different ways."158
                                                        reducing the number of technicals and other arms
                                                        was certainly a contributing factor.160
   The diplomatic negotiations and the reduction
                                                            Discussion of the secure environment turned to
of weapons on the streets began to make Somalia
                                                        an appreciation of the relativity of the term. Some
relatively safer, but there was a need to be able to    members of the staff noted there were cities in the
say just how much more secure the country actu-         United States that had problems with violent
ally was. Nearly every Marine serving with              crime. Did that mean they were not secure? At
UNITAF had also served in Operation Desert              what point was violence at an acceptable level?
Storm: the same was true for many of the                When was any place secure for its citizens?
American soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and some        Taking that line of thought, could Mogadishu be
of the other coalition troops. A concept that had       considered secure if its level of violent crime met
become familiar during that earlier conflict was        that of a major American city, such as Detroit?
the definition of the end state. The internal exam-     Interesting as these discussions were, they led to
ination that had occurred in the American armed         the recognition that the problem in Mogadishu
forces during the 1980s reinforced the idea that        and throughout Somalia was unique in being
commanders had to know how an operation                 twofold. Here, violence was brought to the people
should come to its conclusion and what the result-      by both the warring factions and by renegade
ing dynamic between the opponents should be             criminal elements. The first could be controlled,
like. The Marine Corps' FMFM 1-1,                       because it was organized and its leaders had their
Campaigning, published in 1989, defined the end         own political goals that could be addressed. The
state as "the military conditions we must realize in    other was a problem of the greater society, and
order to reach that destination, those necessary        while that problem might be reduced, it would
conditions which we expect by their existence will      always exist. Ultimately, then, the end state of
provide us our established aim." It also stated: "in    establishing the secure environment would be
the main, the more general the conflict, the more       reached with the end of organized, as opposed to
predominant are the military factors, and the eas-      criminal, violence.161
ier it is to translate aims into military terms. But        By 7 January 1993, UNITAF planners, led by
the more limited the aims of conflict, the less pre-    Colonel Peter A. Dotto, had developed a transition
dominantly military is the conduct of the war, and      matrix, which included indicators of the stability
the more difficult it is to translate those aims into   of relief sectors. This matrix was presented to the
military conditions." UNITAF was engaged in one         commanders and published in a letter of instruc-
of these limited operations, with all of the uncer-     tion on the 15th. The indicators included quantifi-
tainty that could entail.                               able criteria in five categories. These were resist-
                                                                   POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE          55

                                                                                              DVIC DD-SD-00-00863
Representatives of the Magadishu clan leaders dismantle a roadblock along the "Green Line," the border that sep-

                                                                  Reconciliation Conferences
arated both the city's north and south sections and members of opposing clans.

ance, humanitarian relief, infrastructure, popu-
lace, and transition actions. The objective criteria
included such concepts as the numbers of techni-             The weapons control policies and the actions of
cals and crew-served weapons in the sector; the           the commanders in the relief sectors were some of
                                                          the building blocks to secure the environment.
numbers of roadblocks encountered and the visi-
                                                          The series of peace conferences was another. The
bility of weapons; breaches of agreements and             United Nations sponsored these with the support
actions against UNITAF; conditions of airfields,          of UNITAF leaders. If the faction leaders could be
ports, and main supply routes; the establishment          kept talking to each other, with a purpose of
of local councils and civil-military coordination         reconstructing their nation, they would be less
teams; food shortages and numbers of unescorted           inclined to fight each other. Of course, such a plan
convoys; and the state of security for relief ware-       presupposed the willingness of these leaders to
                                                          accept the diminution of their power to secure the
houses. With each sector commander reporting on
                                                          common good. Such a proposition was tenuous at
these indicators each week, UNITAF could take             best, as events eventually showed. Nevertheless,
an objective view of how its actions were aiding          the talks were necessary and proper if peaceful
the accomplishment of the mission.162                     progress was to be made.

   Only two days after the arrival of UNITAF           of the Countries of the Horn of Africa. Members
headquarters, General Johnston and Ambassador          of UNITAF and United Nations Organization
Oakley had already begun a first round of talks        Somalia (UNOSOM I) also attended. The setting
and achieved some agreements among the faction         in the capitol of Ethiopia was a good choice for
leaders. At that time, General Aideed and Ali          two reasons. First, it was close enough that partic-
Mahdi "met face to face for the first time, and        ipants could travel there quickly with UNITAF
reached an agreement to respect the ceasefire to       and UNOSOM support. Also, Ethiopia had just
which they had agreed earlier in the year, and to      come out of its own civil war, and its president,
remove their heavy weapons from the streets of         Meles Zenawi, was an advocate of the peace
Mogadishu."163 Two weeks later, in a dramatic          process. The talks would receive his strong sup-
and well-publicized event, these two leaders met       port.
along the "Green Line" that divided the city into         Three additional factions eventually joined
factional areas, pledging, "on this occasion the       these first rounds of talks.** Although intelligence
abolition of the artificial demarcation lines in the   assessments indicated not all faction leaders were
city that resulted from the civil war will be
                                                       enthusiastic about the talks, none wanted to be left
                                                       out. This was especially true of Aideed, who was
   To help with these kinds of issues, and to pre-     at first reluctant to attend because of a mistrust of
pare for the more formal talks that would come         the United Nations and Boutros-Ghali, but he
later at Addis Ababa, Ambassador Oakley and the        eventually realized the only way to further his
UNITAF staff formed two committees. The first          own aims and protect his political agenda was by
was strictly political. It was headed by Ambas-        taking part in the discussions.*** Perhaps because
sador Oakley himself, and was intended to bring        of mutual jealousy and mistrust, and perhaps part-
the faction leaders together so they could go over     ly from a desire by each faction to not be seen as
their differences point by point. In this manner,      the spoiler of national unity, surprising progress
they moved incrementally along toward a peace-         was made at these initial talks. Another factor was
ful political resolution. The second committee         American determination. "Most Somali factions
was for security. It was essentially a military-to-    appeared ready to take the disarmament process
military organization headed by General Zinni,         seriously, in large part because they understood
the UNITAF operations officer. Its members             the U.S. expectation that the process would move
included the leaders of the factional militias.        forward. At General Johnston's insistence, the
General Zinni described the committee's work:          U.N. organized and convened early February fol-
"We worked security issues and concerns. ... We
tried to prevent problems and confrontations. It
was our way of issuing ultimatums and that sort of
                                                       * The original invitees were Mohamed Farah Abdullahi of
thing. It was a good forum for military-to-military    the Somali Democratic Alliance; Mohamed Qanyare Afrah
kinds of issues. We were working toward a cease        of the United Somali Congress; Abdurahman Dualeh Ali of
fire, disarmament, cantonment of weapons, all          the United Somali Front; General Mohamed Farah Aideed of
that kind of thing ... and laying the ground work      the Somali National Alliance; Haji Mahmoud Barbar of the
for a bigger discussion."165                           Somali Democratic Movement; Mahmud Khalif-Shire of the
                                                       Somali National Front; Haji Aden Hussein Mohamed of the
   The bigger discussion was a series of national      Somali Africans Muki Organization; General Mohamed
reconciliation talks. On 11 December 1992, the         Abshir Musse of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front;
Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros       General Aden Abdillahi Noor of the Somali Patriotic
                                                       Movement; Ibrahim Meigag Samatar of the Somali National
Boutros-Ghali, formally invited 11 political fac-      Movement; and Abdi Dahir Warsame of the United Somali
tion leaders to "participate in an informal prepara-   Party.
tory meeting for a conference of national recon-
ciliation and unity in Somalia. This preparatory       ** These were Ali Ismael Abdi of the Somali National
meeting, which I will personally chair, will be        Democratic Union; Mohamed Ragis Mohamed of the Somali
held at the headquarters of the United Nations         National Union; and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess of the
Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa          Somali Patriotic Movement.
on 4 January 1993."166 * Also invited were repre-
sentatives of the Organization of African Unity,       *** Boutros-Ghali worked under a triple suspicion in the
the League of Arab States, the Organization of the     eyes of General Aideed; he was not only the Secretary
                                                       General of the United Nations, he also was Egyptian and a
Islamic Conference, and the Standing Committee         Coptic Christian.
                                                                    POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE                57

                                                                                Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz
Col Peter Dotto, UNITAF operations future plans officer, along the Green Line in Mongadishu during a route recon-
naissance for a food convoy.

low-up meetings in Mogadishu with representa-             on 15 January, provided specific agreements on
tives of all the factions, who were asked to identi-      disarmament. First, all heavy weapons under the
fy specific cantonment and transition sites and to        control of the political factions were to be handed
establish a time table for implementation."167            over to a ceasefire-monitoring group. The militias
   Between 8 and 15 January 1993 all participants         of the factions were themselves to be encamped in
signed three sets of agreements. These were               areas outside the cities and towns where they
broad, far-reaching, and significant. The first set       would not threaten the peace. There they would be
called for "an immediate and binding ceasefire in         disarmed, and with the help of the international
all parts of the country under the control of the         community they would be retrained in civilian
concerned warring factions;" for "the immediate           skills in preparation for demobilization. The
cessation of all hostile propaganda against each          ceasefire-monitoring group would be comprised
other;" for "cooperation with all international           of troops from UNITAF and UNOSOM and
organizations working inside and outside Somalia          would have a committee made up of representa-
to distribute humanitarian relief;" and for "the          tives of all the warring factions. Finally, in a sep-
free movement of Somali people throughout the             arate agreement, the factions agreed to establish
                                                          an ad hoc committee to prepare for the conference
                                                          in March.168
entire country as a measure of confidence-build-
ing." Of equal importance was the call for a
national reconciliation conference to be held in             There were some issues in these agreements
Addis Ababa on 15 March. The second set, signed           that would have a tremendous impact on

UNITAF. The ceasefire was not the first one the          in our area and happened so that they coincided
factions had agreed to; but it was the first in which    with our current mission we would be glad to
they had voluntarily agreed to disarm and demo-          accommodate within the system in doing
bilize.169 This was a large task to which UNITAF         them."174 UNITAF would not be monitoring the
and the United Nations were now committed as             ceasefire. That task would remain a mission of the
members of the ceasefire-monitoring group. The           United Nations, for which it would have to come
only United Nations presence in Somalia was the          in quickly to take advantage of the cooperative
500-man Pakistani brigade, so the work of prepar-        attitude evident at that time.175 As General Zinni
ing the plans for cantonment and encampment and          said in March, there was a window of opportunity
monitoring the factions' activities fell primarily to    for the United Nations that they could not afford
the UNITAF staff. Colonel Dotto explained                to lose, but getting the U.N. to act with resolution
UNITAF's participation in the planning: "General         and dispatch was an issue that would confront the
Johnston told Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen           UNITAF staff until May.176
[the commander of the UNOSOM I force, the                   The Addis Ababa talks needed more than a
Pakistani brigade] that he would provide his plan-       good sense of timing if they were to succeed.
ning cell, [that is] us, future plans, and we'd help     National reconciliation, like a fragile flower,
him in any way to come up at least with a plan to        required the careful nurturing of trust if it was to
go back to the U.N. with."170 As General Zinni           bloom. The United Nations would have to ensure
said: "Probably the vast majority of the work in         that trust among all players and be an impartial
this area is done by our staff since it was much         moderator itself. In the end, this was a major
more robust."171 The future plans section of             stumbling block.

                                                                     Somali Police Forces
Colonel Dotto's operations unit formed a cell
composed of four UNITAF planners, plus five or
six liaison officers from coalition countries and
two planners from UNOSOM. The cell was aug-                 While national reconciliation among the
mented by the arrival of Colonel Mark Hamilton,          numerous factions received great attention, the
USA, and Ms. Katie Sullivan, a political officer,        rebuilding of national structures was also impor-
both of whom had just come from El Salvador,
where a similar peace process had occurred.172 In
                                                         tant. Within a month of the initial landings,
                                                         UNITAF encouraged the rebuilding of the Somali
an effort to further the progress of the talks,          police force. Before the civil war, the Somali
General Johnston and General Shaheen issued a            police were a respected national force of 40,000
joint letter to all of the signees of the accords of 8   men and women.177 Since they were not aligned
January. The letter called upon them to "begin the       with any clan, they also were trusted to be impar-
disarmament process. ... [W]e request that you           tial. But the police had left their posts with the
provide the commanders of UNOSOM/UNITAF a                anarchy that came with the civil war and the rise
detailed list of all weapons heavy and light, under      of bandits who were often better armed than the
the control of your political movements. ...             police. A few did stay on at their precinct houses,
Additionally, to begin the planning for transition       usually to try to protect the property itself, but
of armed combatants to Somalian society, we              they performed no real police duties except in the
request the general geographic locations and num-        immediate area. Faction comrades usually liberat-
bers of all forces under your control." This letter      ed apprehended criminals from the Mogadishu
was issued on 8 February, and the information            prison.178
was requested by the 15th.173                               The arrival of UNITAF provided these officers
   The problem now faced by UNITAF was to                a chance to regain their positions and once again
determine how much of this work was within its           to serve a meaningful purpose. There was as yet
proper sphere. "We were asked if we could partic-        no government to back them, or even to pay them,
ipate in the disarmament process and we felt that        but the interest and desire to serve were still evi-
our participation could only be limited to conduct       dent. General Johnston used one telling example
of tasks that were within our mission statement          to illustrate this point. "Early in the game, this old,
and our mission constraints or parameters, and           gray-haired policeman showed up. ... He was
also within our area of operations. If cantoning         asked, `Who do you work for?' because we knew
weapons, if supporting transition sites, if picking      there was no government, no police force, nothing
up weapons, if all these sorts of things happened        in uniform. `I'm working for the government.'
                                                                             POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE       59

                                                                    its former reputation as an impartial agency. "The
                                                                    defined Security Committee ... came to see me
                                                                    and said the day after the first Marine had been
                                                                    killed [13 January 1993], `We want to assume
                                                                    responsibilities for our own security. You are all
                                                                    doing things in the city that we should be doing
                                                                    and we'd like to help.' I said `What kind?' "He
                                                                    said `We want some material assistance, but we
                                                                    want assistance in fending off the political and
                                                                    clan influences that would try to turn such a force
                                                                    into their [instrument] rather than something that
                                                                    is relatively independent and national.'"180
                                                                        This particular interest of some Somalis coin-
                                                                    cided with the interest of the leaders of UNITAF
                                                                    in the creation of a structure by which the Somalis
                                                                    could start to reclaim responsibility for their own
                                                                    security. The recreation of a police force would
                                                                    make it easier for UNITAF to accomplish its over-
                                                                    all security mission and prepare for the hand-off
                                                                    to the United Nations. Also, it would weaken the
                                                                    faction leaders. As General Johnston said: "We
                                                                    felt that [the recreation of a police force] was
                                                                    healthy to the extent that you can get somebody
                                                                    other than the warlords providing security, then
                                                                    you enfeeble the warlords. ... It is as effective as
                                                                    taking away their weapons, if there's another
                                                                    authoritarian figure that the Somalis recognize."181
                                     Photo courtesy of the author   Of course, this effect would also assist UNITAF
Two Somali policemen, wearing their old uniforms, vol-              by relieving the members of the coalition forces of
untarily returned to their posts to provide security at the         some duties. "We'd been around long enough to
airport in Kismayo.                                                 know that if you have a Somali who is a figure of
                                                                    authority, then he'll take care of the rock-throwing
`There is no government.' `Well, then I must be                     kids better than a Marine with a machinegun."182
working for the people.' So you could see some                          There were, of course, problems in the recre-
spontaneous interest on the part of the Somalis, of
trying to get hold of their own city again."179*
                                                                    ation of the Somali police that had to be addressed
                                                                    and resolved before any work on the project could
                                                                    begin. First, such an action was far beyond
   But it was more than just individual policemen                   UNITAF's mission. It clearly fell into the catego-
who wanted to resurrect the police force. The                       ry of nation building. This broad and vague term
security committee that worked closely with                         covered several kinds of projects that could easily
General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley also                         become long-term and expensive measures more
saw an opportunity to establish a police force with                 properly performed by the United Nations.
                                                                    However, it was recognized this project, so useful
                                                                    to all parties involved with Operation Restore
                                                                    Hope (UNITAF, United Nations, humanitarian
* In travels throughout the area of operations, the author also
noticed the emergence of the police. The first time was on a
                                                                    relief organizations, and Somali people) should be
trip to Kismayo in early January where two Somali police-           actively supported and encouraged. In a staff
men were on duty at the airport. The men were working with-         meeting held on 1 February, General Johnston
out official sanction but were highly visible in their khaki        described this as the "most important thing right
uniforms with blue berets and silver badges. When Army              now, even more important than the reconstitution
officers at Kismayo were asked about them, no one could say
much. They had simply shown up and kept away the crowds
                                                                    of the government."183
of curious and especially kept an eye on the adolescent boys            But how far could that support go? United
to ensure they did not cause trouble.                               States law was very explicit about assistance to

                                                                                  Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
An Italian soldier provides weapons training to a member of the Somali auxiliary security force in the Italian camp
at Balad.

foreign nations for the training and establishment         inal investigation division officers, and lawyers.*
of police forces. Section 2420, Chapter 32 of the          At these meetings, the subcommittee presented
United States Code, "Foreign Assistance;                   their views on the rebuilding of the police force;
Miscellaneous Provisions," states: "On and after           its size, transportation and communications needs,
July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to          logistics requirements, and pay and food allot-
carry out this chapter, and none of the local cur-         ments for the officers and their families. They also
rencies generated under this chapter, shall be used        took Lieutenant Colonel Spataro on a tour of all
to provide training or advice, or provide any              Mogadishu police stations and the prison. From
financial support, for police, prisons, or other law       them he learned about Somali police operating
enforcement forces for any foreign government or           procedures and the rules for the use of force.
any program of national intelligence or surveil-               Initially, the Somalis sought a national force of
lance on behalf of any foreign government within           6,000 to 7,000 men. Lieutenant Colonel Spataro
the United States or abroad." Even more specifi-           determined the national force was too difficult at
cally, the 1991 Appropriations Act prohibited a            that time, but that a 3,000-man auxiliary security
foreign military financing program or internation-         force for Mogadishu was an appropriate and
al military education and training programs for
Somalia, among other countries.184
                                                           workable start. He also noted their logistical
                                                           request was bare bones, listing only 15 trucks, 42
   Even as the UNITAF staff and Ambassador                 hand-held radios, two uniforms per man (two pair
Oakley worked to define the basic structure of             of trousers, two shirts, one pair of boots, one pair
support that could be provided under U.S. law,             of low-quarter shoes, two pair of socks, one pistol
contact was made with senior officers of the old           belt, canteen, handcuffs, beret with rank insignia,
national police. The coalition's representative was        and nightstick) and small arms. Lieutenant
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Spataro, USA,
UNITAF's provost marshal. By 27 January 1993,
he had met six times with the subcommittee of 10,           * A subcommittee of the Security Committee discussed ear-
an informal group of senior police officials, crim-         lier.
                                                                   POLITICS, PEACE TALKS, AND POLICE               61

Colonel Spataro noted the old Somali police were
"armed more like soldiers with rifles and in fact
called their personnel soldiers, NCOs [noncom-
missioned officers] and officers." He determined
that "we need to change that. Rifle carrying per-
sonnel connote soldiers not police officers or aux-
iliary forces. Probably need to look at giving rifles
to selected and trained personnel for very specific
    These meetings also provided information
about the judicial and prison systems. Two judges
were still working in Mogadishu, along with two
prosecutors. This rudimentary judicial system
took care of criminals unlucky enough to be
apprehended and actually brought to justice. They
were sent for incarceration in the prison by the
port, a facility described as "built around 1905-
1910, and is really in need of repair, however, it
was really kept well ... [and] operated very pro-
    With needs and basic structures recognized,
UNITAF could now get down to practical assis-
tance. The new force would be called an auxiliary
security force, and senior Somalis would vet the
officers applying for positions. There were sever-                                                DVIC DA-ST-96-01221
al criteria for appointment. Candidates must have       Two Somali military policemen man a roadside check-
been a member of the old force for two years prior      point near Buurhakaba. The men are armed with a vari-
to 26 January 1991, and would be reinstated at          ation of the AK-47 and FAMAS rifles.
their old rank. They had to be Somali nationals
and could not have been involved in any "tangible       auxiliary security force through liaison officers.
offenses against ... Somali society." They also had     Very specifically, there was no doubt about the
to be in good physical condition. Pay was a mat-        limits of American involvement with the force.
ter of some concern, and originally the new auxil-      "We're not commanding the police. We have nei-
iary force would be paid with food. This was more       ther the responsibility nor the authority to com-
practical than it might at first seem; in a land of     mand and control."187 *
famine, it not only provided sustenance for the
police and their families, but they could sell or          The work of Lieutenant Colonel Spataro and
barter any surplus to fill other needs.                 UNITAF proceeded quickly. By 30 January 1993,
                                                        3,000 officers were ready to work at 14 stations
    There was an advantage to working with an           around the city. Pending the final decision to start
international coalition with respect to establishing    the program, coalition engineers worked on
this auxiliary force. Foreign nations or organiza-      repairs to the stations and the auxiliary security
tions that did not have the same proscriptions as       forces were uniformed, equipped, and trained. It
the U.S. forces could provide what the Americans        was initially expected they would begin their
could not. Thus, the United Nations provided            duties by 14 February. These would be standard
most of the funds for the program; the World            police duties, such as would be found anywhere
Food Program gave the food that was the initial
pay; the Italians were among the most generous of
the allies, providing uniforms, money, and train-
ing in police duties. The Australians in Baidoa         * General Johnston emphasized this in a staff meeting held
also helped with training and created an excellent      on 1 February 1993. "We are facilitating, assisting and advis-
                                                        ing. We cannot, by law, train a national police force; there-
program with support from their lawyers. In             fore, we have oversight, not control. We are fulfilling this
Oddur, the French also participated by providing        role in UNITAF because there is no one else to take it up."
training. The Americans provided advice to the          (Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93.)

else in the world. Their mission was to protect      and were not without their own dangers; two
lives and property and maintain public order. This   police officers were killed in the line of duty with-
would be accomplished through basic law              in two weeks.188
enforcement, traffic and crowd control, neighbor-       By the end of February, UNITAF was making
hood patrols, and security at food distribution      great progress on several lines. The reconciliation
sites.                                               talks were taking place, the auxiliary security
   By the first week in February, the new officers   force was coming back into existence in
were receiving refresher training in the use of      Mogadishu, and weapons were being removed
force and how to handle their batons. Their first    from the streets. In the relief sectors, local
real test came when UNITAF and the humanitari-       UNITAF commanders were also successfully pur-
an relief organizations implemented a mass-          suing their own missions.
feeding program, whereby food would be dis-

                                                                        Chapter 6

                                                       Moving to the Third Phase
tributed at several sites throughout the city. The

                                                            Settling In and Daily Work
auxiliary security force was needed to provide
crowd control and these officers performed well.
The program was successful and was soon feed-
ing up to a million people a week, a number that
could not have been reached without the police          As the members of Unified Task Force Somalia
presence. Neighborhood patrols started soon after    (UNITAF) moved throughout the area of opera-
                                                     tions, they found themselves in a part of the world
that was at once foreign and exciting, forbidding and enticing. Except for some of the French soldiers
stationed in Djibouti or the members of the contingents from the African countries, nearly every one of
the coalition's Marines, sailors, airmen, and soldiers was a stranger to this part of the world.* In spite of
the harshness of the country, many were attracted by this unfamiliar landscape.

   When they traveled outside of Mogadishu,                   tions and gave welcome shade to the local inhab-
what they saw in equatorial Africa seemed to                  itants.
match the picture that existed in everyone's imag-               These areas were also the locations for larger
ination. Roads were often no more than tracks                 towns and cities. Here the buildings were of stone
across flat, barren terrain of dust and broken                or mud brick, plastered and whitewashed or paint-
stone. The beige colors of the land contrasted with           ed in pastel colors. As in Mogadishu, two years of
the deep blue of the sky, across which a few small,           civil war had relieved many of these structures of
stark, white clouds might wander.                             their roofs and windows. The main streets of these
   The monotony of the landscape was broken by                cities were usually tree-lined and shady and
an occasional grove of scrub bushes, thorn trees,             crowded with people. In the center of town, the
and acacias. Some of these trees grew to a height             markets were coming back into life, with vendors
of about 25 feet and spread their branches wide,              offering such wares as were available. Often these
providing shade for the passing herders or people             were limited to locally produced cigarettes, bits
walking along the roads. Convoys frequently                   and pieces of unrelated merchandise, fixtures sal-
passed herds of camels, cattle, or goats moving to            vaged from vehicles or buildings, small amounts
grazing lands or to market in some remote village.            of local farm produce, surprisingly large quanti-
   Donkeys pulled two-wheeled carts laden with                ties of laundry detergent, parts of rations from all
firewood or drums of water. In the early morning              of the coalition allies (the small bottles of Tabasco
hours, women would be interspersed with the                   sauce from the meal ready-to-eat packet were
pedestrian traffic, walking in small groups or by             especially popular), and numerous bolts of bril-
themselves and carrying large jugs of water or                liantly colored cloth. The women used these last
bundles of wood on their backs. Frequently they               items to make their colorful dresses. Vivid reds,
would be encountered miles from the nearest vil-              blues, greens, yellows, and other bright hues
lage, leaving one to wonder about where they                  splashing against the dull brown background
were coming from or going to.                                 made them look, as one Marine put it, "like exot-
                                                              ic birds." The women usually did not wear a veil.
   The villages themselves were often small col-
lections of huts fashioned of upright poles stuck in             But occasionally some women were seen who
the ground and covered with daub. The roofs were              kept their faces covered, leaving only their eyes
thatched, held in place with poles forming a sim-             visible, which only increased the attraction. The
ple dome. The huts might be round or square,                  men dressed much more plainly, with simple but-
depending on the traditions of the resident clan. In          toned shirts or tee shirts over trousers (often of
larger settlements, houses were bigger and more               military camouflage) or the traditional sarong-like
elaborate, often constructed of stone and plastered           skirt, called "ma-awis," extending from waist to
and painted in soft colors.                                   ankles. Leather shoes were sometimes seen, but
                                                              footwear was usually leather sandals or rubber
   Where the roads drew close to one of the rivers,           shower shoes. Local elders generally dressed tra-
farmlands were encountered, and the resultant                 ditionally, in the ma-awis with colorful shirts and
green of growing crops was a relief to the eyes.              headdress. They also wore beards, which the older
Large trees such as sycamores grew in these loca-             men dyed with henna.
                                                                 Inland, as water grew scarce, communities
* There were a few Marines who had been to Somalia before.    might center on ancient wells. There, women and
In the days of the Muhammad Siad Barre regime's ties to the   herdsmen would gather to draw up buckets of the
West, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit participated in      life-giving liquid for their families or thirsty ani-
Exercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area of
Geesalay. Other Marines who served in Somalia included        mals. Even farther afield, solitary houses might be
those attached to the embassy or who performed security       encountered. Zaribas enclosures made of inter-
inspections.                                                  woven branches of thorn trees and bushes protect-

                                                                                     Photo courtesy of Italian Armed Forces
Somali women, in typical brillantly colored dresses, carry firewood on a donkey cart. Traditionally, they play a pas-
sive role in both family and political spheres.
ed the houses and also were used as corrals for the         supposed to drink at least five liters of water a day.
herds. In these isolated places, deep pits were             When out on patrol, or doing heavy work, this
often dug to hold the precious rainwater from the           might have to be increased. Providing this much
wet seasons. After many dry weeks, these pits               bottled water to the thousands of Marines and sol-
were muddy enclosures containing pools of                   diers and allies scattered throughout the area of
green-topped liquid. Unappetizing as it appeared,           operations was one of the most important logistics
these bits of water were necessary for survival.            functions of UNITAF.
    Nomad camps were very simple. Zaribas were                 In contrast to the brilliance and heat of the days
quickly set up for the protection of herds and peo-         were the dark and cool of the nights. On a moon-
ple. The huts of these herdsmen and their families          less night the desert sky assumed a deep black that
consisted of structures about five feet in height,          was set off by the lustrous stars, giving them a
made of bent poles covered with hides or sheets of          brilliance rarely seen except at sea. Marines or
green plastic. Similar huts were seen in every              soldiers who had sweated while on patrol or while
refugee camp.                                               standing guard at some sun-beaten post would
    The climate was particularly harsh, and the             shiver when the desert sand gave up its heat after
native people had to be equally hard to survive in          sundown. This was especially noticeable at those
it. For the coalition's troops, the heat posed a real       sites near the coast, where there was a continuous
challenge, especially before they became accli-             sea breeze, which added to the cooling effect. In
mated. During the hot, dry months, the tempera-             the various tent areas, the constant blowing of the
tures climbed and the arid air sucked the moisture          wind also produced a steady flapping of canvas.
right out of the coalition soldiers. The sun at mid-        This rhythmic accompaniment to daily life
day felt, as one Marine later said, "like it was 10         became so much a part of existence that its
feet over your head." For safety reasons, soldiers          absence was noticeable and a cause for comment.
on patrol or other duty outside the compounds               The strong breezes kept tugging at the lines of the
wore their full utility uniforms with protective            tents, requiring the residents to pull them taut
vests, helmets and other gear. This increased the           every day, lest a sudden gust lift their canvas
dehydrating effects of the climate. Everyone was            homes off their poles. The same wind also
                                                                             MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE                65

brought an unending drift of sand, which infiltrat-         prove. Sniping and harassing fire continued, with
ed every nook and cranny of tents, bedding, and             compounds and convoys being the usual targets.
equipment. Weapons had to be cleaned two or                 The large cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo, in
three times a day to keep them in proper order.             particular, were especially troublesome, since
   Native animals were sometimes encountered                these were the scenes of frequent factional fight-
along the tracks or in the compounds. Dik-dik, a            ing and general banditry. The 1st Marine
tiny antelope, would occasionally be seen running           Expeditionary Force (I MEF) command chronolo-
through the brush. More rarely, gazelles or boars           gy for this period notes: "Mogadishu remained
might be spotted from convoys heading to the out-           volatile. The [Marine Forces Somalia] elements ...
lying relief sectors. Large storks would alight in          which moved into northern Mogadishu found
the villages near the rivers, standing with equa-           themselves constantly harassed by minor inci-
nimity close to the people passing by. In the pre-          dents of deliberate but inaccurate sniping and
dawn hours, flights of silver-colored ibis would be         spillover fire from factional fighting. These
seen noiselessly flying just a few feet overhead.           attacks were particularly frequent at the newly
                                                            occupied soccer stadium and along the 21 October
There were rare encounters with poisonous
snakes, such as the spitting cobra and the puff
adder. At night, a flashlight might freeze a tiny jer-         However, while these incidents were annoying,
boa, a small rodent, in its beam, or a scorpion             they were not the most serious threats.
might be seen scuttling across the sand.                    Occasionally, a grenade would be rolled into the
   This was the world in which UNITAF conduct-              path of a vehicle, causing casualties and damage
ed its daily work. For all its exotic attraction, it        and increasing the need for being always on the
was still a dangerous place, as events would soon           alert. As dangerous as these incidents were, in the

                                                                                              Photo courtesy of the author
The village chief of El Berde, Abdil Ugas Husen, poses with elders after meeting with French officers. Husen's inter-
preter, Abdil Kader Abdilahi Ali, is in the center.

                                                                                           Photo courtesy of the author
Hastily constructed for the protection of herdsmen and their herds of cattle, camels, or goats, zaribas were often
encountered far from any village.

early days of the operation the greatest threat was        tion. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston knew
more passive. During the civil war and resultant           he had to take strong and immediate action
factional fighting, land mines had been sown in            against such an egregious and violent threat.
scores of thousands all across the splintered coun-           Throughout the remainder of that day, a plan
try. These silent killers were placed on roads and         was developed by Marine Forces Somalia
tracks or in areas the unwary might stumble into.          (MarFor) and coordinated with the UNITAF staff.
Efforts to report and clear these weapons began               The plan was simple but effective, and by using
immediately. But they soon had their deadly                all the types of firepower available, it was also a
effect.                                                    dramatic demonstration of UNITAF power.
   The first two weeks of the operation had passed         Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and
with no fatalities, a happy circumstance for all.          Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, would
But this good fortune was offset by an unspoken            surround the two weapons storage sites. Light
question; how long would it last? It ran out on 23         armored vehicles from the 3d Light Armored
December. On that day, a UNITAF vehicle struck             Infantry Battalion were to screen the area, and
an old Soviet land mine near Bardera. Three peo-           snipers would be positioned to overlook the target
ple were injured and one was killed. Lawrence N.           areas. A reserve force was formed from a compa-
Freedman, a United States government civilian              ny of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
employee and retired U.S. Army sergeant major,             Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) and posi-
was the first member of UNITAF to be killed in             tioned at the embassy compound. The two rifle
the performance of duty.190                                companies (Team Alpha and Team Bravo) were

                                                           strengthened by the attachment of M1A1 Abrams
                                                           tanks and amphibious assault vehicles, as well as
                                                           high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles
   A more serious and direct threat to UNITAF              (humvees) mounting tube-launched, optically
personnel and mission accomplishment came two              tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles and heavy
weeks later. On 6 January 1993, a convoy moving            machine guns. Team Alpha, Company K, also had
through Mogadishu was fired on from two of the             four light armored vehicles. Seven helicopters
authorized weapons storage sites belonging to              were assigned to the operation, three AH-1Ws
General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's fac-
                                                                          MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE          67

with Hell Fire missiles and four UH-1Ns with               chose to resist. The helicopter crews and snipers
20mm guns.191                                              reported that one of the tanks in the compound
   At 2200, Colonel Michael W. Hagee of the                was manned and two Somalis were also preparing
UNITAF staff met with Brigadier General Ali                to fire a heavy antiaircraft machine gun. The com-
Mohamed Kedeye Elmi, one of Aideed's chief                 manding officer of the task force, Colonel Jack W.
subordinates.* Colonel Hagee informed General              Klimp ordered a sniper to shoot the crew of the
Elmi that because of the recent violations, the            machine gun. The sniper did so, and also fired a
authorized weapons storage sites were invalidated          round against the barrel of the weapon, rendering
and were surrounded by UNITAF troops. The                  it unserviceable. This opened the engagement,
Marines would enter the compounds at dawn of               which was short, sharp, and one-sided. Initially,
the next day, 7 January, and confiscate all the            the Marines came under a heavy volume of fire
equipment and weapons located there.192                    from recoilless rifles, machine guns, and small
                                                           arms, but this was quickly suppressed. At 0615,
                                                           the helicopters were cleared to fire their rockets
    By 2300, the two storage sites were surrounded         against targets in the compound. They continued
and kept under surveillance throughout the night.          to fire for about 30 minutes, interrupting their fire
Psychological operations teams from the U.S.               only once for another psychological operations
Army's Company B, 9th Psychological                        broadcast. At 0647, the tanks entered the com-
Operations Battalion, were attached to each of the         pound, followed 14 minutes later by the Marines
rifle companies. At 0553, they began to broadcast          of Company K.*
warnings to the Somali fighters that they were sur-
rounded, and that if they came out with their                 Resistance ended except some sporadic sniping
hands up, they would not be hurt. At about the             at the aircraft. The riflemen cleared the buildings
same time, the helicopters appeared in the sky.193         that had not been destroyed by the helicopters.
                                                           Major General Charles E. Wilhelm declared the
    The Somalis in weapons storage site Number 8           area secured at 0926, by which time additional
surrendered. But those in the other site, Number 2,        trucks were enroute to help carry off the confis-
                                                           cated weapons. In addition to numerous small
* At the time, General Aideed was in Addis Ababa for the   arms and ammunition, there were 4 M47 tanks, 9
preliminary reconciliation talks.                          howitzers of various calibers, 13 armored person-

                                                                                                   DVIC DN-ST-93-02880
Early in the multinational relief effort, Operation Restore Hope, Marines in a humvee patrol the streets of Mogadishu.

nel carriers, 3 antiaircraft guns, 11 mortars, and 1               This strong action did reduce the more blatant
recoilless rifle.194 All was accomplished at the cost          attacks against UNITAF forces by factional
of only one casualty, a corporal wounded by an                 forces, although the sniping continued at about the
accidental discharge.                                          same levels. The spot reports received every day
   The action was a blow to General Aideed's                   at the headquarters contained the tally of such
prestige and pride. At a staff meeting later that              incidents. Generally, these were just random shots
day, General Johnston mentioned that Aideed                    into compounds, most likely fired by individuals
"was embarrassed by his lack of control [over his              who were seeking to prove something. As
soldiers] and regrets what happened."                          Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni said: "I think
                                                               it's in the Somali nature to test you. I think it's
   The commanding general also told his staff that             part of the warrior ethic; maybe it's part of the
"[we] told Aideed we view his initiating clan                  proof of manhood and bravery, and of course for
fighting to be destabilizing. ... [We] want all to             two years around here the rule of the gun had gone
know how we regard what they do. ... We com-                   about unchallenged. I think that the [reduction of
municated with the faction involved. They accept               the cantonment] sent a strong message and
responsibility and we don't expect to see it again."           showed them that we weren't to be messed with
More importantly, UNITAF had demonstrated to                   and I think that test worked well in our favor."196
all factions that "our reach is long."195
                                                                   The streets remained dangerous, however, pre-
                                                               cisely because the threat was random. Marines or
* Colonel Klimp referred to this part of the action as a       soldiers on patrol or at checkpoints could never be
"bluff." The tanks had no ammunition for their main guns,      certain when they would walk into a factional fire-
although they did have rounds for their machine guns. It was
believed the armor of the M1A1 Abrams tanks would be           fight, come upon a violent criminal act, or just be
proof against anything the Somalis had, and the machine        a ready target for someone's need to assert his
guns would be firepower enough.                                authority or manhood. Such an incident occurred
                                                                       MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE                69

                                                                                              DVIC DD-SD-00-00737
As Marines take cover behind a wall, a UH-1N Huey helicopter supports the assault on one of Gen Aideed's
weapons storage sites.

on 12 January and resulted in the death of            city needed to be stabilized to carry out the over-
UNITAF's first serviceman. That night, a security     all security mission. He instructed Colonel Klimp
patrol was making a routine sweep along the           to devise an aggressive plan that would put
southwest border of the airport. At about 2147, the   MarFor ahead of the factions in terms of knowing
patrol was ambushed and engaged in a firefight        what was happening in the city and in prepared
with several Somalis. In the course of the fight      actions that may be necessary. Colonel Klimp
Private First Class Domingo Arroyo was hit by         came up with a four-phased plan in which each
small arms fire. He died of his wounds about two
hours later.197
                                                      phase would "turn at the same time" as the others,
                                                      like the gears in a clock, as opposed to being
   Private First Class Arroyo was a veteran of the    sequential. The first phase was for the collection
Persian Gulf War and was a field wireman with         of information; "information on the city; where
Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines,     are the different clans located, where are the
at the time of his death. His service on a security   gangs headquartered." The next phase established
patrol was in the Marine Corps' tradition of          MarFor presence by conducting foot patrols, man-
"every Marine a rifleman." Although a communi-        ning checkpoints, and basically getting into the
cator by military occupational specialty, he was      city and being seen by the people. The third phase
serving as a rifleman with Task Force Mogadishu,      was for direct action when necessary, such as
which had been formed specifically to provide
security within the city.*
   By the end of December, the MarFor com-            * The units participating in the seizure of the weapons stor-
mander, Major General Wilhelm, recognized the         age sites on 7 January were also part of Task Force

when an important target like a weapons cache              reducing the number of weapons on the streets by
was identified. The fourth phase was for the eval-         raiding the infamous arms markets operating in
uation of actions taken, assessment of new infor-          the city.
mation, and formulating new tactics.198 Task                  The word market cannot convey a true image of
Force Mogadishu was the instrument created to              what these bazaars were like. Set into crowded
undertake this stabilization mission. It was formed        sections of the city, the shops were little more than
at the beginning of January from the 3d Battalion,         huts of wood and corrugated metal inside a maze
11th Marines; 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion;             of twisting, unpaved streets and alleys.
3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion; Company C,               The ramshackle appearance of the business
1st Battalion, 7th Marines; and Company K, 3d              locations belied the richness of types and amounts
Battalion, 9th Marines. Colonel Klimp was                  of arms available. Rocket propelled grenades and
assigned as the commanding officer of the task
                                                           launchers and AK-47 assault rifles were the most
                                                           frequently encountered weapons. Machine guns,
   Task Force Mogadishu numbered about 2,000               mortars, missiles, and even rounds for a tank's
Marines. It moved to the sports stadium in the             main gun were available. Arms of every major
northern part of the city, where criminal activity         weapons-producing nation could be found there;
and fighting among factions were common, and               American, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, British,
soon began its operations. The main activity was           French, and Chinese weaponry were available.
patrolling, which helped Marines gather informa-           The two large markets in the city, the Argentine
tion from the local populace and provided the              and the Barkera, were soon targeted by Task
presence envisioned in Colonel Klimp's original            Force Mogadishu.* The truckloads of weapons
plan. Like a cop on a beat in the United States, this      confiscated in these sweeps were hauled away for
very presence helped reduce violence and reas-             destruction.
sured the majority of citizens of UNITAF's
benign intent.200 Another important task was
                                                              The first of these raids was against the
                                                           Argentine Market on 8 January, followed by a raid

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00731
Two Marines run for cover while being fired on by clansmen snipers protecting the weapons storage site. The Marine
in the foreground is carrying an M16A2 rifle with a M203 grenade launcher attached.
                                                                              MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE           71

                                                                                                  DVIC DD-SD-00-00736
Supporting the Marine assault, an M1A1 Abrams tank approaches the weapons storage site. Its main gun was
empty, but there was ammunition for the machine guns.

on the Barkera Market on the 11th. Although                    February, violent events in the Kismayo relief sec-
more than 1,500 weapons were confiscated, it was               tor were reflected in Mogadishu.
no secret that many others had been removed from
the markets before the arrival of the Marines.201
                                                                  When the Somali Patriotic Movement forces of
                                                               Mohamed Said Hirsi, known as General Morgan
Both markets, and other identified arms caches,                and allied to Ali Mahdi Mohamed, attacked the
were the targets of subsequent raids.                          followers of Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in a fierce
   The patrols, raids, and checkpoints did have an             fight for the control of Kismayo, General Aideed
effect. As the I MEF command chronology for                    was quick to respond in Mogadishu. On 23
this period noted, MarFor's increased presence                 February, the day after the attacks in Kismayo,
drove weapons off the streets, transforming                    Aideed used his own propaganda services, such as
Mogadishu into a much safer city.202 However,                  his radio station, leaflets, and loudspeaker broad-
there was still cause for concern and coalition sol-           casts to spread the story that Morgan had only
diers could not afford to drop their guard. In late            been able to succeed because of the complicity of
                                                               UNITAF. He also called upon his followers to
                                                               attack UNITAF forces in the city.
* Fortunately, these two markets were on opposite sides of        That evening, thousands of people took to the
the green line, which divided Mogadishu into sections loyal    streets, erecting barricades, starting fires, pelting
to Aideed or Ali Mahdi. A raid against one could be balanced
with a raid against the other, thus showing UNITAF's impar-    convoys with stones, impeding the progress of
tiality.                                                       UNITAF vehicles, and noisily demonstrating. As

                                                                                                 DVIC DD-SD-00-00729
Patrolling the mean streets of Mogadishu near a possible weapons storage area, well-armed Marines keep a sharp
watch from the bed of a 5-ton cargo truck.

annoying as these activities were, the crowds were       vide his men all possible support, Major General
made up mostly of women and children and rep-            Wilhelm ordered every available MarFor attack
resented no real threat to the coalition forces.         helicopter to provide reconnaissance and support
Nonetheless, as MarFor units attempted to clear          to the forces on the ground. He also requested,
the roadblocks and keep traffic lanes open, they         and received from Lieutenant General Johnston,
were subjected to rock throwing that seriously           permission to distribute CS riot control agents, a
injured several Marines, sailors, and coalition sol-     non-lethal tear gas. As an additional measure, he
diers. But the main roads were reopened and the          called out a P-19 aviation crash fire truck from the
city quieted down by about 2300.203                      air base at Bale Dogle. The truck's high-pressure
   The crowds were back the next morning.                hose would be useful in dispersing rioting crowds,
Again, roadblocks were put up and fires started.         if necessary. In the end, these extraordinary meas-
                                                         ures were not needed. The crowds dispersed by
                                                         about noon.204 But more trouble was brewing.
Again, Major General Wilhelm ordered MarFor to
keep the main roads open. On this day, the main
disturbances were centered near the United States           On 25 February, the K-4 traffic circle was again
Embassy compound and the important traffic cir-          the center of tension. There, at about 0900, some
cle known as K-4. This circle, at the intersection       Somalis began to fire at the most available
of two major roads, controlled traffic leading to        UNITAF targets: Marines and Nigerian soldiers of
UNITAF headquarters, the airport, and the port. It
was considered a key point and was the site of a
heavily manned checkpoint. Rocks and Molotov
cocktails were thrown at Marines in these areas.*
                                                         * These are gasoline-filled glass bottles, stopped with a
                                                         soaked rag as a wick. When thrown against a vehicle or in the
Two Somali auxiliary security policemen were             area of troops, the bottles break, spreading flames. They are
killed during the disturbances and three Marines         an inexpensive and easy to make incendiary device, named
                                                         for Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Commissar
and one Somali policeman were wounded. To pro-           during World War II.
                                                                               MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE          73

                                                                                                  DVIC DN-ST-93-02402
Marines man a checkpoint in Mogadishu on New Year's Day 1993. The presence of coalition troops often drew
crowds of curious Somalis, usually composed of young men and boys.

the 245th Reconnaissance Battalion who were                     area. Three Marines and two Nigerian soldiers
responsible for the security of the traffic circle and          were wounded during the action.205
surrounding area.* The Marines returned fire, and                  Valuable lessons were learned from these
the Nigerians also began to fire rocket propelled               events, and changes were made to better protect
grenades at the buildings where the Somali gun-                 coalition forces should anything similar occur
men were hiding. The heavy firing continued                     again. Some active measures, short of the use of
throughout the day. Major General Wilhelm                       deadly force, were put into place. While MarFor
ordered the area sealed off and swept within two                had received permission to distribute tear gas to
hours. A strong force of Marines and coalition sol-             its units, this riot control agent is non-specific,
diers was called out for the mission. With the                  blanketing an area and affecting the innocent as
Marines of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, and the              well as those engaged in hostile acts. It can also
Nigerians as a blocking force, two companies of                 linger. Cayenne pepper spray was determined to
the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and soldiers of the             be a better agent because it comes in an aerosol
Botswana Defense Force Contingent acted as the                  can and can be directed against a specific target.
maneuver element. Shortly after 1400, the                       Beginning on 1 March, pepper spray was issued to
Marines and Botswana soldiers began their sweep                 MarFor units, although control of its use remained
down three main approaches toward their com-                    with Lieutenant General Johnston and only per-
rades at the traffic circle, converging with them               sons trained in its use were to employ it. At about
shortly before sunset. The action had a salutary                the same time, two P-19 crash fire trucks were
effect: the firing ceased and quiet returned to the             moved to Mogadishu to support MarFor. One of
                                                                these was placed at the port and the other at the
                                                                stadium. A third truck was ordered for use in
* At the time, and later, Aideed claimed these gunmen were
bandits attempting to use the unrest of the past two days for   Mogadishu and was available by 10 March.
their own purposes, and that he had no control over them.

   More passive measures also were taken to pro-         city. Operations to clear the streets of traffic
tect troops from rocks and other thrown items.           obstructions and debris and distribute food were
Protective visors that attached to the Kevlar hel-       restarted as soon as possible after the February
mets were issued and combat service support per-         riots. When the forces of General Morgan and
sonnel created wire mesh shields to be attached to       Colonel Jess again clashed in Kismayo in the mid-
humvees to protect the windows and occupants.            dle of March, coalition units braced for trouble,
These resourceful Marines also created another           but nothing of significance occurred. Throughout
special piece of gear to attach to amphibious            the remainder of March and April, the efforts of
assault vehicles. During the February distur-            MarFor and coalition allies continued to stabilize
bances, crowds of Somalis had effectively stopped        the city. The demonstrations that took place dur-
these vehicles by simply lying down in front of          ing this time were described as peaceful and some
them. The drivers were naturally loath to run over       were even held in support of UNITAF. A good
these people and risk injuring or killing them.          indication of progress occurred on 24 March, the
Service support Marines made cowcatchers that            end of the holy month of Ramadan. For the first
attached to the front of the amphibious assault          time since the civil war the city was able to spend
vehicles and allowed them to move through                two days in celebration of this special holiday.
crowds or barricades with minimal harm to                Five days later, Somalis in the city peacefully held
demonstrators.206                                        a rally in support of the recent Addis Ababa meet-
   With these measures in place, MarFor                  ings.207
increased its activities in the city and the number         MarFor performed other important work in
of patrols was boosted to create a greater pres-         Mogadishu, not all of it related to patrolling or
ence. MarFor officers continued to meet regularly        manning checkpoints. When UNITAF forces first
with neighborhood representatives and a greater          arrived in the city the roads were choked with all
degree of order and safety was achieved in the           types of rubbish and the debris of war. Often only

                                                                                             DVIC DD-SD-00-00770
As Somali civilians watch, U.S. Marines walk single file down a small alley in the capital's Bekara Market. The
Marines swept the market looking for arms and munitions as part of Operation Nutcracker.
                                                                            MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE              75

                                                                                                 DVIC DN-ST-93-03819
A Marine prepares to load a box of weapons parts onto a truck filled with munitions confiscated during a patrol.

a single narrow lane existed for the passage of            bution specified areas throughout the city, more
traffic, and that would be thronged with pedestri-         people could be reached more efficiently. Also, by
ans. This was unacceptable to the military forces,         flooding the city with grain, the price of food
which needed to be able to move quickly through-           would be lowered and the black market for stolen
out the city and between the important facilities at       food would be undermined. MarFor had the
the port, airport, embassy, and elsewhere.                 responsibility of establishing the program with the
Operation Clean Street started on 28 December              relief organizations.209 The program was launched
with the aim of clearing the main roads and open-          in February in conjunction with the establishment
ing them for the fast-moving traffic of the coali-         of the Somali auxiliary security force. On 6
tion. Marine combat engineers and members of               February, the first mass food distribution was
the U.S. Naval Construction Battalion, the                 held. Eventually, there were 25 distribution sites
Seabees, performed the work. The operation con-            located throughout the city with Somali auxiliary
tinued until 6 January 1993 and was the first of           security forces providing control. Security for
several Clean Street operations that benefited             each site was the responsibility of MarFor units
UNITAF as well as the citizens of the city. As             and coalition forces guarded 18 of the 25 sites.210
soon as the roadways were opened to traffic, the              The work of the coalition in Mogadishu was
roadside markets began to come back to life, and           reflected, on a lesser scale, in most of the other
soon merchants, barbers, and tailors were operat-
ing from small stalls.208
                                                           relief sectors. But each sector was unique, and
                                                           people traveling outside Mogadishu saw a far dif-
   Another innovation used in Mogadishu was the            ferent side of Somalia than was apparent in the
idea of mass distribution sites. The large numbers         capital city. This was largely because each human-
of refugees, often scattered in settlements                itarian sector generally had one dominant clan,
throughout the city, made it difficult for humani-         which meant factional rivalry and fighting were
tarian relief organizations to effectively distribute      not as prevalent as it was in the capital. Also, the
food to those in need. By consolidating the distri-        cities and towns were not nearly so large or

                                                                American soldiers, however. By early January
                                                                1993, the soldiers of the Royal Moroccan Army
                                                                began to arrive, and by the 12th of that month they
                                                                were placed under the operational control of
                                                                Army Forces Somalia.211 The Moroccan forces
                                                                were composed of two infantry companies, a cav-
                                                                alry company, a medical section, and other sup-
                                                                port detachments of the 3d Motorized Infantry
                                                                Regiment, under the overall command of Colonel
                                                                Major Omar Ess-Akalli.* This force formed a
                                                                mobile intervention group of more than 1,000
                                                                men with 200 light vehicles equipped with crew-
                                                                served weapons, as well as light tanks, artillery,
                                                                and antitank missiles.212
                                                                    Their initial task was to ensure the security of
                                                                the airbase. Then, as more troops arrived through-
                                                                out Mogadishu, control was extended. By 28
                                                                January, the Moroccans were responsible for most
                                                                of the sector. On 1 March, they were placed
                                                                directly under UNITAF control and given respon-
                                                                sibility for the security of all of sector Bale
                                                                    Their light vehicles provided the Moroccans
                  Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 306-4-21   with flexibility and tactical mobility, which they
Combat artist Maj Burton E. Moore, a former member              used to patrol the sector and escort convoys. The
                                                                heart of their tactical mission, however, remained
                                                                the security of the important airbase.214 In addi-
of a Marine Corps scout/sniperteam, joined Jump Team
1, Recon Company, 5th Marines, atop the old U.S.
Embassy in Mogadishu as the team returned hostle fire           tion to being a major aerial port for the operation,
in 1993. Portrayed in his painting of the experience is         Army Forces Somalia established a firing range
(left) Sgt Charles A. Johnson, LtCol Edward J.                  for its AH-1 helicopters within the sector. The
                                                                range was a key factor in maintaining the accura-
                                                                cy of the weapons systems of the aircraft.215
Lesnowicz, Cpl Patrick B. Ward and Cpl Tim Richards.

crowded as Mogadishu. Still, each sector had its                    The Moroccans had yet another mission, one
own challenges. Some quickly became very qui-                   given to them by the King of Morocco himself.
escent, and others continued to have troubles with              The king wished to help the sick and distressed
factional fighting and bandits. The establishment               people of Somalia, and he extended the Moroccan
of the first three humanitarian relief sectors out-             humanitarian mission to include a large hospital
side Mogadishu provided experiences and lessons                 operating in support of the Somali people. The
that were used elsewhere. Bale Dogle, the impor-                hospital staff had many specialties, to include
tant airbase; Baidoa, the "City of Death;" and                  nutritionists, obstetricians-gynecologists, podia-
Bardera all benefited from the early attention they             trists, ophthalmologists, oral surgeons, and spe-
received as centers of UNITAF activities.                       cialists in digestive disorders and bone diseases.

                   Bale Dogle
                                                                There was also an engineering specialist for water
                                                                purification. Somali medical specialists and social
                                                                workers were hired to assist the Moroccan staff.
   The control of the first sector, Bale Dogle,                 The hospital quickly gained an excellent reputa-
passed quickly from the Marines to the soldiers of              tion among the Somali people and was seeing 400
the 10th Mountain Division. As these soldiers                   to 500 people of all ages and tribes every day.
flew directly into the airbase, they soon had
responsibility for its security and the Marines                 * This was a highly experienced regiment, which at that time
were able to move on to other cities. The respon-               had just come from spending several years fighting insur-
sibility for this sector did not remain long with the           gents in the Western Sahara.
                                                                              MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE            77

There were five to six major surgical procedures             accordingly, more violent incidents. Also, the
performed daily.216                                          political situation was more complicated. The
   The Moroccan contingent was intended to be                Marines who first occupied the sector were very
self-sufficient, which they were with food, water,           aggressive patrolling, conducting raids, and mak-
and fuel. In fact, the king ensured his men in               ing searches where threats were assessed. At
Somalia received fresh food every day; they car-             night, helicopters were used to extend the pres-
                                                             ence of the coalition forces into outlying areas and
                                                             to frighten off bandits.218
ried no prepackaged rations and cooked their
meals daily. But the light vehicles, which provid-
ed the force with its flexibility, also caused its              Even at this early period, Colonel Gregory S.
largest logistics problem. All maintenance and               Newbold, as the commander of the 15th MEU, the
repair on these vehicles had to be performed in              Marines who initially occupied the town, recog-
Morocco.217                                                  nized the difficulty, if not impossibility, of creat-
   The Moroccan unit was one of the largest non-             ing a secure environment in the relief sector if the
U.S. contingents in the coalition. With this strong          bandits were allowed to carry their arms openly.
and mobile force patrolling the sector, Bale Dogle           He, therefore, told the local leaders his forces
soon became one of the quietest in the area of               would seize any weapons seen on the streets of
operations, with few incidents reported.                     Baidoa. While the aggressive actions of the

                                                             Marines quickly decreased hostile acts against the
                                                             coalition, the policy of no weapons openly carried
                                                             had equally good results. As the power of the ban-
                                                             dits declined, the local elders could reassert their
   The next sector occupied, Baidoa, presented a             authority. They did so within the first few days of
very different aspect to the soldiers of the coali-          the Marines' arrival. Several Somalis approached
tion, and elicited different responses. There were
more lawless elements present in this sector and,

                                                                                                   DVIC DA-ST-96-01283
The centrally located K-4 traffic circle in Mogadishu was the site of several confrontations between local Somali fac-
tions and coalition forces.

the Marines and requested assistance in establish-       mixture per day. In addition, there was a hospital
ing a security council.219                               ward treating various illnesses, such as malaria,
                                                         cholera, tuberculosis, and other respiratory dis-
                                                         eases.222 * Such work was typical of what the
   Under the direction of Colonel Werner
Hellmer, the local civil-military operations team
provided the secure and neutral venue needed to          relief organizations were doing in all the sectors.
establish such a council. Relying heavily on             The civil-military teams provided coordination
humanitarian relief organizations, the team sought       with the military to ensure they received their
out the legitimate local leaders and elders. At the      relief supplies safely and answered other legiti-
same time, Colonel Hellmer and his small staff           mate needs.
recognized the importance of including represen-            By the middle of January 1993, the Marines
tatives of all major groups and clans. It was vital      were ready to hand over responsibility for the sec-
to the Marine mission and its image of neutrality        tor. At 2359 on the 16th, Baidoa was transferred to
that no one who should be a member would inad-           Army Forces Somalia, with the remaining
vertently be left out. Representatives from the          Marines placed under its control.223 However, this
State Department and United Nations Operation            situation was only intended to be temporary.
Somalia (UNOSOM) were also in attendance at                 During this same period, the Australian contin-
the beginning of this new security council. As
                                                         gent arrived by ship and airplane. By 8 January, a
throughout the area of operations, the idea was
                                                         portion of the advance party had already come to
that the Somalis would take care of their own
                                                         Baidoa to assess the quality of the water and
internal governance. Under the protection of the
                                                         determine if it could be purified. Company A,
Marine policies of "no openly carried weapons,
                                                         which had left on the Royal Australian Navy's
no crew-served weapons, and no technicals with
                                                         HMAS Jervis Bay (GT 203) on 24 December,
gun mounts," the weakening of the bandits, and
                                                         made port at Mogadishu on 12 January. By the
the strengthening of the elders, conditions in
Baidoa soon began to improve.220                         17th, the main body, composed of Company B,
                                                         half of Company C, and most of the battalion
   On 27 December, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines,            headquarters, flew straight to Baidoa on board a
relieved the 15th MEU of responsibility for              Quantas Airlines 747 passenger aircraft. The
Baidoa. They continued their predecessors' rou-          remainder of the Australian forces arrived the next
tine activities; protection of food convoys,             day. Company A, mounted in trucks off the ship,
patrolling in the sector, and mine clearing. The         motor marched to the town.224
civil-military operations team remained in place
working with the relief organizations and the local         The Australian force would soon be one of the
security council. By early January, Colonel              largest national contingents. It included
Hellmer believed they had made good progress.            Companies A, B, C, and D of the 1st Battalion, 1st
People were out on the streets again, the markets        Royal Australian Regiment, with their normal bat-
in town were open, and the local buses were run-         talion headquarters, plus support and administra-
ning. Fear no longer existed and people could            tion companies. Attached to this battalion group
sleep safely, some getting a full night's rest for the   were Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry
first time in years. The lingering problem that          Regiment, mounted in armored personnel carri-
Colonel Hellmer saw was what to do with those            ers; the battery commander's party, Headquarters,
who previously had made their living by banditry         6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment; and 17th
and stealing relief supplies.221                         Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat Engineer
   Another organization making life better in            Regiment. All were supported by a detachment of
                                                         the 103d Signals Squadron and the 1st Battalion
                                                         Support Group.225
Baidoa was Action Internationale Contre de Faim
(International Action Against Hunger). This relief
agency set up two camps, one for the most critical          The Australian force was intended to be as self-
refugee cases and the other for those who were           sufficient as possible. Therefore, when they
less serious. In the first, there were four servings     deployed, they tasked their support group for 30
per day of what was described as a very rich mix-
ture of food. This was intended to get these peo-
ple back up to strength and out of danger. Those         * Such diseases were rampant in the refugee camps through-
who were in better health were placed in the other       out the area of operations and were the result of poor sanita-
camp, where they were fed one meal of a regular          tion, crowded conditions, and unclean water.
                                                                            MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE                   79

                                                                      Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense
Australian soldiers move by convoy from the port of Mogadishu to Baidoa where they would relieve elements of the
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

days of supply and ammunition. The greatest con-          the flags of both nations were lowered and raised
cern was for water. The advance party found that          in reversed positions on the flagpole. At the same
the local water could be purified. Also, HMAS             time, appropriate music was played on a harmon-
Tobruk, which was also supporting the operation,          ica. "Waltzing Matilda," the Australian battalion's
could pump water into tankers that could then             quick march and the national song, is also the
make the overland journey to the relief sector. The       division march of the 1st Marine Division, so it
support group was a very capable organization,            was chosen and matched with "The Star Spangled
which contained fuel tankers and 8-ton cargo              Banner."* For the previous two days, Company A
trucks. It also had a medical section capable of          of the Royal Australian Regiment had been under
forming a regimental aid post. The maintenance            the tactical control of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines.
detachment included a field workshop for electri-         Now the situation reversed itself as Company L,
cal and general engineering maintenance, as well          3d Battalion, 9th Marines, was placed under the
as for vehicle and communications repair.226              tactical control of the Australian forces. The
                                                          Marines would retain this command relationship
                                                          until they departed Baidoa.228
   For requirements above the capabilities of the
support group, the Australian forces could use
UNITAF's logistics assets for water, fuel, rations,          By 23 January, all of the Australian force was
and other common consumables. These arrange-              present in Baidoa; 888 soldiers armed with 36
ments were set under cross servicing agreements           M113 armored personnel carriers and eight 81mm
signed between the United States and Australian           mortars. The Australians quickly settled into their
governments. Anything required that was not
available from UNITAF was either purchased in
Kenya, or flown in from Australia by the Royal            * In the author's interview with Major John Caligari, Royal
Australian Air Force on regularly scheduled C-            Australian Army, "Waltzing Matilda" was identified as the
130 Hercules flights.227                                  regimental march of the 9th Marines, and it is so identified in
                                                          the notes of the interview. Calls to the division actually iden-
   The handoff of responsibility for the sector was       tified it as the division's own march, adopted during World
completed on 19 January. At a simple ceremony,            War II.

mission, which, as elsewhere in the area of opera-          There were two intelligence gathering organi-
tions, was to control the sector and provide secu-       zations operating in the Baidoa sector. One was a
rity for the relief operations and the supply con-       three-man combat intelligence detachment of the
voys. The work was divided into three parts and          Australian force. These soldiers were responsible
rotated among the companies. One company                 for collecting human intelligence, checking the
guarded the airfield, while another patrolled in         populace, finding out who was in the area, and the
town. The third company patrolled in depth,              identification of the local clans and subgroups.231
throughout the sector, to establish presence, col-       There also was a team of American Special Forces
lect intelligence, and respond to any incidents.229      in the sector. This team was "used to conduct area
   About 80 kilometers from Baidoa on the main           assessments throughout the [humanitarian relief
road to Mogadishu was the town of Buurhakaba,            sector], especially in those areas where conven-
the second largest in the sector. A huge rock mas-       tional forces or relief agencies had not yet
sif that rose from the plain to a height of a few        arrived." The local commander used these assess-
hundred feet dominated the town. This area had           ments to plan operations in support of the human-
been the site of much bandit activity and was            itarian relief organizations that were providing
noted for the presence of several technicals. To         relief to these outlying areas. In addition, the
end these depredations, the Australians estab-           Special Forces team also provided intelligence
lished a permanent outpost at the town. This was         about criminal activities and sources of bandit-
occupied in company strength, with patrols               ry.232 With one of the companies always operating
extending out to other towns in the sector. The          in the sector in a random pattern of patrolling, the
other companies could be called for support if           Australians were able to respond whenever and
there were a need.230                                    wherever intelligence indicated that something

                                                                    Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense
LtGen Robert B. Johnston talks with an Australian soldier while visiting the Australian headquarters in Baidoa.
Behind LtGen Johnston is Col William J. Mellor, commander of the Australian army contingent.
                                                                                  MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE                  81

                                                                                     Marine Corps Combat Art Collection 119-9-51
During a 1993 deployment to Somalia, combat artist Col Donna J. Neary depicted this familiar scene of the inter-
national relief effort. In this piece, an Australian soldier is shown escorting a refugee convoy. After relieving the 3d
Battalion, 9th Marines, in Baidoa, "Diggers," the nickname adopted by Australian soldiers, took over relief escort
duties in that area.

was afoot. The company could quickly move into                     The Australian forces soon were stamping out the
the target area and remain for a few days.233                      banditry that had been so rife in the sector. When
   Baidoa was not terribly plagued by the pres-                    they discovered that the bandits had adopted the
ence of warring factions during this period.* There                tactic of attacking civilian traffic along the roads
were some instances of armed troops passing                        at night, the Australians became equally resource-
through the sector, but these were generally small                 ful. After dark, Australian vehicles with their
groups that were monitored closely as they moved                   lights off would follow the civilian trucks and
along. Lawlessness was another matter. By the                      buses. The drivers would use night vision goggles
end of January, the Australians had established the                to operate, and the troops would also use night
pattern by which they would operate for the next                   vision devices to scan the roadsides ahead to spot
few months. Finding the towns that were the cen-                   any ambushes. These ambush-busting operations
                                                                   were a very successful deterrent to the bandit
ters of criminal activity, they used a series of cor-
don and search or airmobile operations to find and
confiscate weapons and make their presence felt.                      The Australians were constantly busy during
                                                                   their four months as a part of UNITAF. The pace
                                                                   of operations was described as grueling. While the
* There was some factional activity in the sector, but it was      work was hard, harsh, and unrelenting, it did help
relatively minor. For instance, during the visit of the author     to keep the sector more quiet and secure than
to the Baidoa humanitarian relief sector in late January, a        some others. The success of the Australians' oper-
representative of the Somali Liberation Army had just              ations can be measured by the fact that bandits
appeared in town to recruit. The Australian's quick reaction       only engaged them on four occasions. They sus-
force planned to "pay him a visit" at his quarters to search for
arms and explain the weapons policy. He was not very suc-          tained no casualties while confiscating and
cessful in his recruiting efforts.

destroying almost 1,000 weapons and a vast quan-             Marines, the death toll soon dropped to less than
tity of ammunition and explosives.235                        10 percent of what it had been.236

                                                                After the success in Baidoa, Colonel Hellmer
                                                             moved quickly to Bardera, arriving in late
                                                             December. With Colonel Emil R. Bedard, the
    The Bardera relief sector differed from Baidoa           commanding officer of the 7th Marines, he set up
in several critical ways. First, it was a smaller sec-       another civil-military operations center. Colonel
tor. While the town of Bardera had been ravaged              Hellmer's team soon was assisting the legitimate
during the civil war, one clan, whose faction, the           elders of Bardera to establish a security council
United Somali Party, was led by General Abdi                 and reassert their own authority. Again, the
Dahir Warsame, inhabited it. Therefore, there was            Marines were there to provide security, not to
little of the factional fighting that had been so            govern. The elders took advantage of the opportu-
troublesome elsewhere, and it was far simpler to             nity to reestablish an effective local government,
stabilize the sector once UNITAF troops arrived.             enforcing laws, trying criminals, and meting out
Ironically, the presence of a single faction in the          justice to those convicted of crimes. By 7
town actually increased the effects of the famine.           February, an auxiliary police force was brought
Most of the starving people in the sector had come           back into existence, and the police were soon join-
from its outlying areas, and the inhabitants of the          ing the Marines at checkpoints. As a result of
town felt no obligation to assist those to whom              these efforts, the influence of local bandits waned.
they were not related. Those living in the town              Bardera was noted for being a quiet sector for the
were relatively well-off in comparison to the                next four months.237
refugees, who were crowded into an area called                  Still, there were some problems that beset the
the "Italian Village" to the south of the town. Here         relief efforts. The most notable of these was the
they were subject to starvation from the lack of             presence of mines along the main roads. Nearly
relief supplies, from disease due to crowded and             every road in the sector was mined, making it dif-
unsanitary conditions, and from the depredations             ficult to open the main supply routes into the inte-
of armed bandits. When the Marines arrived, as               rior.* Even though few mines were encountered,
many as 300 refugees were dying each day. With               the clearance operations had to progress slowly
the safe delivery of food and medicines to the               and thoroughly along every mile before they were
relief organizations and the presence of the                 safe for the passage of convoys. Even then, the

                                                                        Photo courtesy of the Australian Department of Defense
An Australian soldier uses a mine detector to search for hidden arms in the effort to stamp out banditry in the Baidoa
humanitarian relief sector.
                                                                           MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE         83

roads needed repair. As engineers worked on the             brought with them great experience in operating
roads, the helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 16          in this part of the world. Many of these French
lifted food and relief supplies to the humanitarian         soldiers and Marines had served in the neighbor-
relief organizations in outlying villages that other-       ing state of Djibouti, formerly known as French
wise could not have been reached.238                        Somaliland. They came, therefore, with knowl-
    Toward the end of January, the restructuring of         edge of the importance of clan and tribal alle-
                                                            giance in Somalia, and they tried to work within
                                                            that context in this sector.242 In addition, the
forces in the theater allowed Major General
Wilhelm to rearrange the Marine forces in a man-
ner he considered more in keeping with local con-           French forces in Djibouti had witnessed the civil
ditions. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which had          war that began there in 1991 between the Somali
originally occupied the Bardera sector, was                 Issas and the Ethiopian Afars.
recalled to Mogadishu, where its riflemen were                  By 28 December, the last elements of the
advantageously used in the urban environment. Its           French forces arrived from France and Djibouti,
place was taken by a new organization, Task                 and moved to Oddur through Mogadishu. By this
Force Bardera, formed around the 3d Amphibious              time, the French forces consisted of a command
Assault Battalion. This unit, with its greater              element, which included a special operations
mobility, was better suited to the open terrain in          company, a logistics support battalion, a military
the sector. On 24 January, the task force officially        intelligence detachment, and detachments of
began its duties in Bardera.239                             security forces, military police, and communica-
    While the sector was fairly quiet, there was still      tions. The ground forces were composed of one
the need for vigilance. This was especially true in         battalion from the 5th Combined Arms Overseas
late February when serious fighting erupted                 Regiment, one battalion from the 13th Foreign
among the factions in Kismayo, the humanitarian             Legion Demi-Brigade, and the 3d Company of the
sector bordering Bardera to the south. To ensure            2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. The 3d
that Bardera was not affected by the fighting, and          and 4th companies of the 2d Marine Infantry
especially to ensure that Colonel Jess' Somali              Regiment strengthened the other battalions with
Patriotic Movement forces did not enter the                 organic armored personnel carriers. These forces
Bardera sector, Task Force Bardera maintained               were supported by an aviation detachment from
reconnaissance elements north and south of the              the 5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, and the 3d
town. At the beginning of March, squad-sized                Company of the 6th Foreign Legion Engineer
patrols were sent along the Jubba River valley as           Regiment. All told, there were about 2,200 French
                                                            soldiers, Marines, and Legionnaires in the Oddur
far south as the town of Saacow. These patrols and
screens had the desired effect, and no disturbances
or significant presence of Jess' forces were noted              As in Bardera, the natives of Oddur were main-
in the sector.240                                           ly from one dominant clan, the Rahanweyne.
    By the end of April, the Marines were able to           However, that does not mean there was unity
turn over responsibility for a sector that was              throughout the sector. The Rahanweyne clan was
returning to peace and normalcy. As UNITAF pre-             described as "divided into a multitude of sub-
pared to hand off operations to the United                  clans opposed to each other and characterized by
Nations, Task Force Bardera was brought back to             opportunism and fragile alliances." Also, the peo-
Mogadishu to prepare for redeployment. On 18                ple living in the north and near the critical
April, the Botswana Defense Force contingent                Ethiopian border were members of the rival
relieved the Marines of responsibility for                  Ogaden clan. As in Bardera, the townspeople felt
Bardera.241                                                 little sympathy toward the refugees from the out-

                                                            lying districts who were not related to them. The
                                                            local leaders looked out for their own clan, but not
                                                            the others. The French would thus have to draw on
                                                            all their experience and skills in dealing with the
   As the French soldiers moved into the towns              native Somalis throughout this sector.244
from which they would operate in Oddur, they
                                                                The French forces were deployed in their tradi-
                                                            tional "oil spot" manner. The sector was first bro-
* Lawrence N. Freedman was killed when his vehicle struck   ken down into three sub-sectors centered on major
a mine in this sector.                                      cities or towns, which in this case were Oddur and

                                                                                         Photo courtesy of the author
French Foreign Legionnaires made their headquarters in an old Italian fort at El Berde, from which platoons and
squads were sent to villages and hamlets throughout the Oddur sector.

the Ethiopian border, Wajid, and Tiyegloo. One           feeding stations. The effectiveness of the organi-
battalion occupied each of these sub-sectors.            zations' work was significantly increased by the
From these, 10 towns or hamlets were occupied            arrival of the French Army, which controlled the
by company-sized forces, which then sent pla-            safe shipment and distribution of food and sup-
toons to other locations, for a total of 20 occupied     plies while leaving the humanitarian agencies to
sites. The French then were able to operate from         carry on with their own duties.246
these strongpoints, spread throughout the sector,           By 30 December, just days after their arrival in
show their presence, maintain a strong posture,          the sector, the French special operations forces
and conduct reconnaissance. In Oddur itself, a           pushed out along the axis Oddur-Ted-El Berde.
mobile reaction force supported by helicopters           The purpose of this initial operation was three
was kept ready to intervene in any situation.245         fold: first, it provided a surveillance line toward
   In the city of Oddur, the work of these coalition     the Ethiopian border; next, it opened the sector to
forces was very similar to what was going on in          these areas for the local humanitarian organiza-
the other sectors. The Somalis soon established          tions; and finally, the French presence there would
local committees for security, food distribution,        help to stop the heavy flow of refugees coming
                                                         into Oddur and other cities from the northern
                                                         towns which were hit hard by war and drought.247
school operations, and so forth. As was the case
elsewhere, the French recognized they had to get
the Somalis to take responsibility for their own            This area was very important to the entire oper-
welfare and governance. The French also estab-           ation because its northern limit stretched along the
lished their own team to work with the relief            Somali-Ethiopian border. The flow of refugees
organizations in town, notably Medecines Sans            across the ill-defined frontier brought with it the
Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) and                 possibility of armed forces from either nation
Concern. These organizations ran a hospital and          crossing into the other's territory. This, in turn,
                                                                              MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE          85

might cause an incident that could be difficult to             French presence. By the beginning of February,
contain. As early as 31 December, during a heli-               mine clearing operations had effectively been
copter reconnaissance in the vicinity of the town              completed throughout the sector. A police force,
of Yet, French troops came across four armed men               armed only with batons, was established, and a
in civilian clothing who were acting suspiciously.             weapons registration program was in place. This
The men were picked up, interrogated, and found                program allowed the French to confiscate unregis-
to be members of the Ethiopian Army. They were                 tered firearms and to arrest any armed individu-
quickly turned over to their own authorities.248               als.251 The French soldiers, Marines, and
   The presence of the Ogaden clan also served to              Legionnaires settled into a daily routine of patrols,
increase the volatility of this section of the border.         reconnaissance, ambushes, checkpoints, search-
The town of El Berde, located just a few kilome-               ing for arms caches, and seizing unauthorized
ters south of the border, was a case in point. Prior           weapons.
to the civil war, a modus vivendi was in place here,              During February, the French already realized
as elsewhere in Somalia where a smaller clan or                they could decrease and realign their forces with-
sub-clan had to coexist in an area dominated by a              out losing control of the sector, and the first
larger, stronger one. An effective police force was            French units began to rotate out of theater. The
active in the area and there were regional and dis-            battalion of the 5th Combined Arms Overseas
trict committees, on which the local chiefs served.            Regiment left, along with the engineers and one
In this way, good relations were maintained with               company of Marine armored personnel carriers.
the various national ministries and the governor at            Helicopter support also was decreased. To accom-
Oddur. With the coming of the war, however, clan               modate fewer troops, the number of towns and
was pitted against clan. The populace of the                   hamlets occupied was reduced to 12, but the
region around El Berde, about 8,000 people,                    amount of patrols was increased. By March, the
crossed into Ethiopia.* By early 1993, they were               French government decided that 1,100 men would
returning to find their homes and villages                     take part in UNOSOM II. During the remainder of
destroyed or damaged. They needed food, medi-                  March and April, the French forces continued to
cine, and humanitarian assistance. To compound                 realign themselves, rotating out some of the orig-
the situation here, the returning chief of El Berde            inal units while bringing in new ones to support
did not recognize the legitimacy of the new gov-               the United Nations mission.252

ernor of Oddur. Despite the internal strife, the
French were respected and were working with
both sides to effect reconciliation and an agree-
ment to bring back normal relations.249                           As the Italian forces settled in around
   The French tactic of spreading across the sector            Gialalassi, their responsibilities were soon
into hamlets and villages in platoon and squad                 extended beyond that sector. Having reclaimed
formations allowed them to cover maximum terri-                their embassy in Mogadishu early in the opera-
tory. With so many soldiers in the sector, they also           tion, the Italians kept a strong force in the neigh-
relied upon the mobility of their armored person-              borhood for its protection. It also made sense to
nel carriers and helicopters to move rapidly and               the Italian commanders that they should be given
establish control of the zone. By late January,                responsibility for some part of the city that includ-
their presence had created a reassuring effect on              ed the area where they were located. Of course,
the relief organizations, which were able to move              political and practical considerations were
about with greater security. The people also began             involved in determining how the Italian forces
to respond by gaining confidence, providing intel-             would be employed in the city.
ligence, and returning to their villages.250                      First, there was the question of how the
   The first contacts between the French and the               Somalis would accept the Italians, with their his-
native Somalis were described as excellent, and                tory as a colonial power. The issue was a delicate
the local elders and chiefs were satisfied with the            one, for the Italians were a strong presence who
                                                               brought distinct benefits to the coalition. Yet,
                                                               General Johnston did not want them to be placed
* The French estimated about 113 villages and hamlets in the   in a situation or position in which they would be
sector had been abandoned and roughly 40 percent of the        counterproductive if Somali anti-Italian reaction
local population (118,000 people) had become refugees.

                                                                                   Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
Italian soldiers on patrol in the Gialalassi humanitarian relief sector, which as later expanded to include the north-
ern half of Mogadishu.

was strong. He saw the older Somalis, who had                western portion of the city, which was territory of
lived in the period of Italian presence, would be            General Aideed. The Italian Embassy was in the
amenable to their return as a part of UNITAF. He             northeast part of the city, in an area claimed by the
was more worried about the younger Somalis,                  forces of Ali Mahdi. While this could be a coun-
who might make an issue of colonialism. General              terbalance, it was recognized that it was impera-
Johnston therefore followed a policy of gradual-             tive no favoritism be shown to either faction
ism by which the Italian forces were slowly                  leader by the coalition forces in the area. Since the
placed in the city and countryside and the reac-             Italian Embassy was nearly adjacent to the head-
tions of the Somalis were assessed. After the suc-           quarters of Ali Mahdi, General Johnston deter-
cesses of the Merka and Gialalassi operations, he            mined the Italian forces headquarters should not
decided the problem might have been overstated.              be established in that area. Instead, the Italians
Johnston soon decided to give the Italians respon-           were given responsibility for the northeast portion
sibility for a portion of the city.253                       of Mogadishu, with their sector extending into
                                                             Gialalassi. Their headquarters was then estab-
   Other political considerations had to be taken            lished in the town of Balcad, several kilometers
into account. MarFor and other coalition forces              out of Mogadishu along the main route heading
had occupied areas that were mostly in the south-
                                                                        MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE             87

north. The gradual manner in which this was            smallest force with 413 soldiers, was responsible
accomplished, along with the professionalism of        for Mogadishu. Charlie, the next largest task
the Italian soldiers, allayed any suspicions by the    force, split its deployment between Jawhar, with
Somalis of either neocolonialism or favoritism.254     180 soldiers, and Gialalassi, with 550 soldiers.
   The Italian soldiers were soon conducting           Task Force Bravo, the largest with 1,116 soldiers,
patrols, arms sweeps, and other civil actions with-    was at the so-called transitory base in Balcad,
in the city of Mogadishu. The situation there          from which it could deploy north or south as the
required close cooperation between all parties.        situation required.
"As activity in Mogadishu picked up, MarFor and           The threat to coalition forces differed in each of
Italian units began running into each other on         these places. As might be expected, Mogadishu,
patrols and during operations, creating confusion      with the presence of armed members of the two
and potentially dangerous situations."255 Although     main Somali factions, had the highest number of
the creation of distinct areas of responsibility was   incidents. Members of Ali Mahdi's Abgal clan
a major step toward solving the problem, direct        frequently clashed with those of the rival Habr
liaison between the coalition members was a            Gedr clan of General Aideed on the streets of the
necessity. For example, early in January, Italian      capital. These fighters also fired occasionally at
soldiers had been fired at by a sniper along a route   the Italian soldiers, or boldly threatened the local
in a section of the city called the Villagio Scibis.   populace, just as they did with American service-
To show their resolve, the Italian command             men and Somali civilians elsewhere in the city.
planned a major sweep through this area using          Bandits presented the main problem in outlying
about 540 men. The operation was to start at 0430      towns.
on 12 January. But when the liaison officer               The Italians quickly demonstrated their pres-
brought this to the attention of the UNITAF staff,     ence and strength throughout the sector with rou-
it was noted the MarFor also was planning to con-      tine patrolling and checkpoints. From their
duct an operation in a neighboring area at the         strongpoints, reconnaissance patrols protected the
same time. UNITAF postponed the Italian opera-         main supply route, weapons caches and markets
tion for 24 hours, when it was successfully com-
pleted without incident.256 Major General
                                                       were raided, arms were confiscated, and mines
                                                       were cleared. More importantly, the Italians
Wilhelm, the commanding general of MarFor, and         devised a series of operations that would take
Major General Gianpietro Rossi, the Italian com-       place throughout the sector. The size of the force
mander, also agreed on the conduct of joint oper-      used for each of these operations depended on the
ations in the city, beginning on 19 January. The       objective. Those at the highest levels were named
cooperation between the two coalition partners         "canguro" (kangaroo). They were planned and
resulted in the creation of Task Force Columbus,       directed by the Folgore Brigade headquarters and
composed of forces from the San Marco                  executed by its subordinate units. The next level,
Battalion, and the 571st Military Police Company,      named "mangusto" (mongoose) comprised opera-
a United States Army unit under the operational        tions undertaken by the 186th and 187th
control of MarFor. The task force conducted            Parachute Regiments of the brigade.* The lowest
patrols and provided security for humanitarian         level operations, meant for rapid reaction to
relief warehouses in the area of the Karaan
                                                       events or intelligence, were named "hilaac"
                                                       (Somali for lightning). These were executed by
   With such a wide and diffuse area of responsi-      the brigade's special forces and were generally
bility, the Italians had to align their units some-    conducted in Mogadishu.258
what differently than those in other sectors. They        A fourth type of operation was named "tam-
maintained a large force in their sector of            buro" (drum) and took advantage of the Italian
Mogadishu, around the Italian Embassy. They
also placed garrisons in the towns of Balcad,
Jawhar, and Gialalassi. These four strongpoints
controlled the main population centers in the sec-     * As with regiments in many other modern armies, these
tor and provided security along the main supply        units were not formed in the manner familiar to Americans.
                                                       Each was composed basically of one battalion, with a sepa-
route that ran from Mogadishu to Bulo Burti.           rate company-sized headquarters element through which the
Three task forces (Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie)          regimental commander provided command and control,
were assigned to cover these bases. Alpha, the         administration, and logistics support.

                                                                                                     DVIC DD-SD-00-00861
U.S. Marines in a light armored vehicle from the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion join Italian soldiers in a Fiat
OTO Melara 6614 armored vehicle at an intersection along the Green Line in Mogadishu.

force's large component of armored personnel                   The Italian command worked with Somali eld-
carriers and helicopters. The mobility and rapid            ers and leaders to establish local committees so
movement provided by these vehicles made them               order could be maintained and local governance
especially valuable in emergency situations, the            begun. They also were very actively involved in
primary goal of tamburo operations. These opera-            the establishment of the auxiliary security force in
tions also enabled the Italians to react to situations      Mogadishu and throughout the Gialalassi sector.
far from the city strongpoints, effectively control-        These forces worked in the main population cen-
ling the entire relief sector.259                           ters of Mogadishu, Gialalassi, Balcad, and
    The Italian soldiers were busy with civil activ-        Jawhar. The auxiliaries were soon accompanying
ities as well. In the Gialalassi sector, as elsewhere       the Italian soldiers on patrols and at checkpoints.
in the coalition's area of operations, the overall          Weapons control within the sector was accom-
success of the mission depended on the perception           plished through a series of actions. First, the car-
by the population that the coalition was there to           rying of arms in the sector was prohibited; citi-
assist the Somali recovery and to provide general           zens were requested to voluntarily turn in
security. The brigade engineer company cleared              weapons. Next, arms were confiscated during
mines from roads and villages, and detachments              sweep operations in areas known or suspected to
of soldiers provided security for relief convoys            contain weapons caches or havens for armed per-
moving throughout the sector. Relief organization           sons. These actions had results similar to those
warehouses and distribution points were kept                taken throughout UNITAF's area of operations.
                                                            Thousands of weapons and several tons of ammu-
                                                            nition were confiscated and destroyed.261
under surveillance to prevent attack or theft. The
Italians also provided direct medical aid to the
Somali people. An ambulance service carried
wounded or seriously ill civilians to the Italian
medical facilities.* There they were treated in
cooperation with Somali health and medical per-             * The Italian forces established one military hospital and one
                                                            surgical ward. Six infirmaries in the four strongpoint cities
sonnel. By the end of January alone, these med-
ical visits numbered more than 4,000.260
                                                            backed these up. They were staffed by 39 medical officers,
                                                            12 hospital corpsmen, and 170 troops.
                                                                         MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE            89

                                                                                              DVIC DD-SD-00-00864
An Italian soldier holding a 9mm Beretta 12S sub-machine gun patrols a heavily pockmarked section of the Green
Line, which separated the warring factions in Mogadishu.

   In addition to the work of the medical staff, the     resupply distance of Italy itself. The Italian offi-
Italians assisted the local population in several        cers' mess at Balcad was soon renowned for the
direct ways. Wells damaged during the civil war          quality of its fare; fresh pastas, meats and fish,
were cleared and repaired. Main roads were put           fruits and vegetables, and wine were all prepared
back into good order. Schools were reopened, and         and served daily.* Potable water for drinking and
local businesses were encouraged and given sup-          washing was a problem, as it was everywhere
port to help restart the local economy. A postal         else. This burden was relieved in large part by dig-
service between Somalia and Italy was estab-             ging two wells, one in Mogadishu and the other in
lished.262                                               Gialalassi. The combined capacity of the wells
                                                         was 14,000 liters of water per day, which could be
                                                         used for washing.264 This represented a tremen-
   The supply of this large force (about 3,200 sol-
diers) was an important issue for the Italian com-
mand. This was the Italian armed forces' first           dous boon because more of the water that was
major deployment since World War II. The                 hauled into the relief sector every day could be
Folgore Brigade had a related unit, the 46th             used just for drinking and cooking.
Aviation Brigade, which supported the operation
with three Aeritalia G222 utility transport air-
craft.263 These airplanes, along with 12 helicopters
assigned to a composite helicopter regiment, pro-        * General Order Number 1 prohibited the consumption of
vided ample intra-theater transportation for per-        alcohol. However, this applied only to American forces.
sonnel and supplies. The Italian forces were also        Americans traveling in the theater were offered wine in
                                                         Oddur and Gialalassi and beer in Belet Weyne, which they
fortunate in Somalia's location within easy air          had to respectfully, and usually reluctantly, decline.

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00849
A sampling of the small arms and crew-served weapons confiscated by the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, at checkpoint
Condor south of Merka.

   Through March and April, the Italians contin-           14 January when elements of Task Force 2-87
ued to suppress bandits and assist the local popu-         seized 500,000 rounds of small arms ammunition
lace. By the end of the latter month, as some of the       hidden at an airfield near the town of Afgooye.
UNITAF coalition partners prepared to depart, the          Ten days later, Task Force 3-17, the 10th
Italians were tasked to remain as a part of UNO-           Mountain Division cavalry squadron, uncovered a
SOM II. Their new area of responsibility would             large arms cache kept in eight half-buried conex
continue to include Gialalassi, with an expansion          boxes. In both instances, the arms and ammuni-
to the north to incorporate the neighboring relief         tion were quickly destroyed. Task Force 2-87 con-
sector of Belet Weyne.                                     tinued cordon and search operations throughout

                                                           the sector, especially near large towns such as
                                                           Kurtunwaarey, Baraawe, and Qoryooley.266 On 29
                                                           January, these operations uncovered two more
    The Italian forces also had been instrumental in       caches.267
establishing the Merka relief sector, but once the            Although it was originally outside the Merka
port and airfield had been secured and roads               relief sector, the town of Afgooye was a concern
opened into the interior, Army Forces Somalia              for the soldiers in this sector. Afgooye was locat-
was given responsibility for that sector. The unit         ed within the Bale Dogle sector, which also was
that was left for this mission, 2d Battalion, 87th         under the control of the Army Forces Somalia
Infantry, was a part of the 2d (Commando)                  during January and February, and American sol-
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division.265 Although a             diers could therefore be transferred between sec-
smaller sector than most of the others, Merka had          tors as needed. The problems in Afgooye centered
its share of challenges for the American soldiers.         on banditry. The town was at a key location on a
    Patrols uncovered some large arms caches dur-          main road to Mogadishu, and was therefore a
ing January. The first of these discoveries came on        magnet for bandits and lawless elements wanting
                                                                                    MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE                  91

                                                                 Regiment, which had arrived as part of UNOSOM
                                                                 II forces.270

                                                                                      Belet Weyne
                                                                    The Canadian presence grew quickly in the
                                                                 Belet Weyne sector after it was secured on 28
                                                                 December. The entire Canadian Airborne
                                                                 Regiment Battle Group had flown in by the first
                                                                 days of January 1993. Commanded by Colonel
                                                                 Serge Labbe, the battle group strength was 1,359
                                                                 soldiers at its height. The group was composed of
                                                                 three commandos, with a service commando and
                                                                 a reconnaissance platoon in support. The Royal
                                                                 Canadian Dragoons' A Squadron also was
                                                                 assigned for the mission, as were an engineer
                                                                 troop and a signal troop.271 *
                                                                    The Canadian forces were supported by
                                                                 Grizzly, Cougar, and Bison armored vehicles,
                                                                 which arrived by ship and were then driven over-
                                                                 land. ** Such vehicles were not normally part of
                    Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces   the regimental equipment. Due to the long dis-
Italian soldiers exhibit some of the arms confiscated            tances and the need for convoy protection, howev-
during sweep operations in areas known to harbor                 er, they were borrowed from other units specifi-
armed insurgents and contain weapons caches.                     cally for this operation.272 The Canadians con-
                                                                 ducted dismounted patrols until these vehicles
to extort payments from travelers going to or from               began arriving in the sector on 15 January. By
the capital city.                                                early March, the Canadian 93 Rotary Wing
   On 31 January, Commando Brigade conducted                     Aircraft Flight had provided six CH-135 helicop-
a large cordon and search operation at Afgooye.                  ters, which increased the force's mobility and
Task Force 2-87 conducted an air assault, while                  operational reach.273 ***
Task Force 3-17 and the 984th Military Police                       The Canadians divided their sector into four
Company held sectors in and around the town.                     security zones, each of which was assigned to a
The operation continued for several days. At its                 sub-unit of the battle group. They quickly began
conclusion, the 984th Military Police Company                    aggressive patrolling throughout the sector, both
was left in the town to provide a presence and
conduct stabilization operations. The operation
successfully curtailed violence and banditry in                  * In the Canadian forces, the term battle group is analogous
                                                                 to task force. In this instance, it represents the formation of a
this area, which allowed the people to reclaim
their town.268These operations continued in the
                                                                 battalion-sized unit specifically reinforced and formed for
                                                                 this particular mission. The commandos that make up the
Merka sector, which had become relatively quiet                  battle group are company-sized airborne infantry formations.
through February. A 60-man police force was                      The term does not imply special operations capabilities.
reestablished in the town and worked closely with
Army Forces Somalia by the end of January.269 On
                                                                 ** These are Canadian-made all-wheeled armored personnel
                                                                 carriers. The Grizzly has eight wheels and mounted a
1 March, as the Moroccans assumed control of the                 12.7mm machine gun and a 7.62mm machine gun. The
Bale Dogle relief sector, Afgooye was removed                    Cougar is a six-wheeled fire support vehicle armed with a
from that sector and incorporated into the Merka                 76mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted coaxially
                                                                 with the main gun. The Bison is an eight-wheeled armored
sector. The 984th Military Police Company                        personnel carrier mounting a 7.62mm machine gun.
remained in place. On 9 April, the 1st (Warrior)
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, relieved the 2d                 *** Until this time, traffic moving between Belet Weyne and
Brigade at Merka. On 28 April, the Merka relief                  the port of Mogadishu took five days for a round trip; two
sector was turned over to the Pakistani 6th Punjab               days each way and one day with overnight at the port.

dismounted and in the armored vehicles. Toward         Army had moved more than 500 men to the area.
the end of January, the Canadian command had           The Ethiopians disarmed any Somali who crossed
already assessed most of the humanitarian sectors      the border, but were refraining from attacking the
as generally quiet, making the patrolling of the       Somalis.276 UNITAF Special Operations Forces
large security zones safer for the soldiers. It was    had made contact with the Ethiopian commander
only to the north and east that friction was causing   at Fer Fer by 5 January, and kept regular contact
concern.274                                            with him.
   There, close to the Ethiopian border and the           The Special Operations Forces performed other
town of Matabaan, the political situation was          important functions in the sector as well. They
complicated. Most of the population within the         traveled to all the major villages to assess the atti-
sector was of the Hawadle clan, and the United         tudes of the local populations. They also noted
Somali Congress faction had a strong presence          which clans people belonged to, the extent of ban-
there. Some of these faction members were sup-         dit activities, sources of water, main crops grown,
porters of General Aideed. Colonel "John"              and other information about daily life and politics.
Hussein was one of Aideed's division command-          This information was passed to the coalition com-
ers. Aideed's first cousin, Colonel Omar Jaua, was     mander in Belet Weyne, Colonel Labbe. It was
the chief of staff of Aideed's 1st Division, which     then passed to UNITAF, where, combined with
operated in the vicinity of Galcaio (outside of        similar information from the other sectors, it was
UNITAF's area of operations). A local governor         processed as intelligence about the entire area of
named Harlane, in the town of Dharsamenbo,             operations.277
reported directly to General Aideed. However,             The Canadian forces soon established good
there also was a United Somali Congress faction        relations with the local populace and conducted
that declared itself independent of both Aideed        aggressive patrolling throughout the sector. They
and Ali Mahdi. The Somali National Front and the       also provided security for the convoys of relief
Somali Salvation Democratic Front also had             supplies coming into the sector, notably those of
strong factions in the area, and a faction of the      the Red Cross and Save the Children. These relief
Somali National Movement was situated along the
Ethiopian border.275
                                                       organizations took care of up to 45,000 people a
                                                       day just in the main city of Belet Weyne. From
   From the start Canadian forces and U.S.             that center, additional supplies were distributed to
Special Operations Forces in the area began to         outlying areas. Dependable stocks of food and
make contact with these groups. From these initial     regular feeding at the refugee centers brought the
talks, the coalition soldiers received information     famine under control. Toward the end of January,
about camps and the locations of cantonment            starving refugees were so far removed from dan-
areas, of which there were a large number in the       ger they only required one feeding per day. Yet,
sector, each guarded by 60 to 70 men. The coali-       even with food stocks available elsewhere, large
tion troops inspected and inventoried these camps      numbers of refugees stayed in the city because of
and cantonments. Just as important, this aggres-       the lack of water. Many wells had been destroyed
sive activity showed a strong coalition presence       or contaminated during the civil war. With the
throughout the sector and acted as a buffer            security provided by the Canadian soldiers, two
between the factions.                                  humanitarian relief organizations, Save the
                                                       Children and Oxfam Quebec, worked on restoring
                                                       wells and provided veterinary assistance.278 Such
   Of equal importance was the need to keep the
factions from causing trouble across the interna-
tional boundary with Ethiopia or beyond the lim-       measures allowed the people to return to their vil-
its of UNITAF's area of operations in Somalia.         lages.
The Belet Weyne sector adjoined both of these             The Canadian command encouraged Somali
critical areas. Coalition patrols along these areas    self-reliance through a series of councils. There
was enhanced by the personal contacts of               were separate ones established for local security,
Canadian and American soldiers with Ethiopian          relief, reconstruction, and political concerns.
and Somali leaders. In late December and early         Colonel Labbe, as the commander, met only with
January, the most volatile area was at the town of     the councils, not with individuals. This discour-
Fer Fer, which lay directly astride the Ethiopian-     aged any charges of Canadian favoritism. All fac-
Somali border. The Somali National Movement            tions and clans needed representation on these
had a strong presence there, and the Ethiopian
                                                                          MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE             93

                                                                                                DVIC DD-SD-00-00904
A soldier from the 10th Mountain Division points an M16 rifle into an enclosure while checking for weapons during
a sweep of the small village of Afgooye. The village was a haven for weapons and bandits.

councils and at major meetings to ensure their            engineers undertook the hazardous duty of clear-
respective interests were heard and protected.279         ing mines from roads and other areas.
   The Canadians also reached out to the Somali              Aside from the threat posed by potentially
people in more direct ways. As was happening in           volatile confrontations of the numerous armed
other sectors, they helped reestablish a police           factions, the major problem in the sector was sim-
force. These local policemen did not carry                ple banditry. This usually took the forms of loot-
weapons, but they were soon accompanying the              ing, sniping, and setting up roadblocks for the
Canadian soldiers on patrols. The Canadians               purpose of robbery and extortion. The Canadians
trained these officers in first aid and riot control      sought to control these activities through the pres-
procedures and even procured uniforms for them.           ence of their patrols. They also issued a strict
The education of Somali children also received            weapons control policy. All weapons in the sector
                                                          had to be registered, and none could be carried
                                                          openly.* Non-registered weapons were seized. In
attention. In the population centers of Belet
Weyne and Matabaan, several schools were
repaired and reopened with the help of the                this manner, small arms in the sector became less
Canadian soldiers. School supplies were procured          of a problem. Then, by working closely with the
through the United Nations Children's Fund and            various factions, the Canadians got the Somalis to
distributed to these institutions. Teachers were          agree to place their heavy weapons in canton-
                                                          ments. By 27 March 1993, the entire sector was
                                                          rated secure.281
recruited, tested, and given vocational training
and returned to their duties. The Canadians also
established a fund totaling $75,000 to pay for               In April, the Canadians prepared for the arrival
local laborers working on repair projects, such as        of UNOSOM II forces. Under the transition plan,
roads. These workers were employed and man-
aged through the local rehabilitation committee,
but the funds were controlled and disbursed by the
Canadians.280 As elsewhere in Somalia, military
                                                          * This allowed humanitarian relief organizations that had
                                                          legitimate security needs to maintain their protection.

the Belet Weyne sector was to be handed over to                  Just as MarFor had responsibility for stabiliz-
the control of soldiers from India. But the Indians           ing the capital, so Kismayo was the responsibility
would not arrive on time, and the Italians had to             of the Army Forces Somalia. Major General
temporarily extend their control into this sector.            Steven L. Arnold decided on 17 December to
   Lieutenant Colonel Carol J. Mathieu, com-                  deploy his 10th Mountain Division artillery tacti-
manding officer of the battle group, recognized               cal operations center staff to the city, under the
the sensitive position of his sector, which bor-              command of Colonel Evan R. Gaddis, USA. The
dered on both Ethiopia and the portion of Somalia             advance party of six officers and enlisted soldiers
                                                              arrived at Mogadishu on 12 December and were
that was not within the UNITAF area of responsi-
                                                              quickly informed about the situation, given their
bility. He foresaw that difficulties could arise from
                                                              mission, and told what was expected of them.
the presence of factional forces around Galcaio
                                                              They traveled to Kismayo by humvee and linked
and he recommended the extension of his sector,
                                                              up with the Belgian and U.S. Marine units that
something that was eventually done under UNO-                 had just secured the port and airfield.283 Task
SOM II.282 Fortunately, the Canadians brought                 Force Kismayo was created from the U.S. Army's
Belet Weyne quickly and skillfully under control,             3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and the Belgian 1st
and the possibility for violence never became real-           Parachute Battalion. The task force headquarters
ity. The humanitarian sector on the other flank of            was formed from the 10th Mountain Division
the coalition's area of operations, however, would            artillery staff, reinforced by other division assets
pose serious problems for UNITAF.

                                                              including an aviation detachment, a boat compa-
                                                              ny, a communications platoon, a psychological
                                                              operations team, a civil affairs team, and a support
                                                              element.284 Brigadier General W. Lawson
    After Mogadishu, Kismayo was the relief sec-              Magruder III, USA, the assistant division com-
tor that had the greatest number of incidents. That           mander for operations, was selected to be the task
city also caused the greatest concern because of              force commanding general.
the potential for inter-faction fighting. As in the              General Magruder moved quickly to impress
capital, these armed factions were ultimately tied            upon the faction leaders in the sector the power
by alliance to either Aideed or Ali Mahdi. Both               and determination of UNITAF. He also wanted to
groups wanted to control this important city,                 ensure they understood the coalition was neutral
which had been the scene of heavy fighting until              and was there only to assist the Somali people.
the arrival of UNITAF. To further exacerbate the              The task force began its security operations on 28
problem, the leader of the group loyal to Aideed,             December. The very next day, General Magruder
Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess, was suspected of hav-                hosted a meeting with Colonel Jess, local elders,
ing perpetrated a massacre among the followers of             clan members, and former police officers to form
General Said Hirsi "Morgan" just before coalition             an interim security council for the sector. Shortly
forces landed. Tensions were high in the city and             after this first meeting took place, two other
its environs, and the need to keep the two factions           important steps were taken. First, the local Somali
apart was critical. Morgan's Somali National                  police began to form as an auxiliary security
Alliance faction of the Somali Patriotic                      force. Soon they manned roadblocks with coali-
                                                              tion forces. The second step was to issue a "no
                                                              weapons policy" on 1 January.285 This was a com-
Movement numbered only about 1,000 men, but
many of them were well-disciplined veterans of
the old national army.* Jess' Somali Patriotic                prehensive policy that stated: "no one may carry a
Movement faction was about four or five times                 pistol, rifle, automatic weapon or transport a
larger, but was not nearly as well organized. Prior           crew-served weapon within the city limits of
to the arrival of UNITAF troops, Morgan had                   Kismayo." It also banned pedestal mounts for
moved his followers far up the Jubba River valley,            weapons on vehicles. The only exceptions were
near the Kenyan border. He began to move south                for legitimate bodyguards, and even they had to be
                                                              in possession of an authorized permit, and in the
again in January.
                                                              presence of their employer. Their weapons had to
                                                              be carried openly (in a holster or slung over the
* This is a conservative estimate of Morgan's strength.       shoulder with the muzzle pointed down.) This
Various sources put his numbers at two or three times this.   policy took effect on 9 January, and was enforced
                                                                          MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE               95

                                                                                          Photo courtesy of the author
Canadian soldiers mounted in a Bison light armored vehicle patrol the Belet Weyne sector to create and maintain a
secure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian work.

through a system of routine patrols, searches of          ment areas could be destroyed. General Morgan
vehicles and individuals, roadblocks, and mobile          disclosed the locations of his forces at four towns
checkpoints. Coalition forces and auxiliary secu-         in the sector. General Magruder replied that four
rity forces worked together to enforce the ban.286        sites were too many. Morgan stated he had already
   The coalition forces in Kismayo would soon be          told his forces not to engage coalition forces, and
at the forefront of one of UNITAF's major chal-           that he would avoid having his men on roads used
lenges. The ceasefire agreement on 15 January             for relief convoys if he was forewarned about
required all factional forces to remain where they        them. He also agreed, "not to initiate attacks
were on that date. Barely a week after the signing        against other factions." Finally, he stated he could
                                                          be contacted on 26 January to arrange another
                                                          meeting.287 In the end, however, this proposed
of the initial Addis Ababa accords, General
Morgan began moving his forces south from the
Kenyan border toward Kismayo. There was no                meeting was overtaken by other events.
doubt that General Morgan wanted a confronta-                General Morgan was one of the more interest-
tion with his rival Colonel Jess for control of the       ing characters in the Somali political landscape. A
city. General Magruder moved quickly and direct-          former Minister of Defense, he was a son-in-law
ly to end the possibility of fighting between the         of Siad Barre. He also had attended the United
factions and to warn General Morgan of the con-           States Army Command and Staff College at Fort
sequences of his actions. On 23 January, General          Leavenworth, Kansas. As U.S. Ambassador
Magruder met personally with General Morgan at            Robert B. Oakley said, this meant Morgan under-
the town of QoQaani. General Magruder                     stood how we think, "but we don't have the fog-
explained UNITAF's position on the cantonment             giest idea of how he thinks." Ambassador Oakley
of large weapons and technicals and told Morgan           did describe him as "very cunning and totally
that any such weapons found outside the canton-           untrustworthy."288 As if to prove the ambassador's

assessment, General Morgan's agreement not to                the opposing factions pulled away from each
attack his rivals did not last 24 hours.                     other. The Kismayo relief sector entered a period
   Some of Colonel Jess' soldiers were in a can-             of uneasy peace. Over the next few days, the
tonment at the town of Bir Xaani, located about              Belgian paratroopers aggressively sought out and
35 kilometers from Kismayo. Security was lax,                confiscated weapons, and American attack heli-
perhaps in part because these men thought                    copters destroyed technicals found outside the
UNITAF would protect them from attack.289 On                 compounds.292 General Morgan and his men,
24 January, General Morgan's fighters attacked               some of whom claimed a right to return to homes
the outpost as part of an attempt to move against            in Kismayo, remained a threat in the area. Colonel
the port city. In response, Colonel Maulin, one of           Jess' followers also caused troubles in the town
Jess' subordinates, made an unauthorized move                and lower Jubba valley. There were several inci-
against Morgan's forces.* UNITAF responded                   dents of sniping and of grenade attacks against
quickly with two radioed warnings to General                 coalition soldiers, particularly the Belgians. These
Morgan to desist in his aggression and to pull               increased in intensity through the middle of
back. When he paid no attention and continued                February. By that time, General Morgan and
with his intentions of reducing the Jess canton-             Colonel Maulin were probing each other. In the
ment, Task Force Kismayo was ordered to stop                 midst of this turmoil, Colonel Jess returned to
him by force.                                                Kismayo. UNITAF had placed a lid on the situa-
   The task force planned a combined operation,              tion on the southern flank, but it continued to sim-
with the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, providing air            mer.
assault elements and attack helicopters and the                 In late February, General Morgan was prepared
Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion forming the                  to move against Colonel Jess' forces in Kismayo
ground assault element. An aerial reconnaissance             once again. Taking advantage of the better disci-
of Bir Xaani located General Morgan's forces and             pline of his men, he infiltrated small groups into
warning shots were fired. After these were                   the city on 22 February. Again, Jess' men were
ignored, Cobra attack helicopters fired cannons              caught napping. In a short but intense action, sev-
and antitank rockets at the Somali technicals and
                                                             eral of Jess' fighters, as well as some civilians,
military equipment. The fire was described as
                                                             were killed and Jess and his followers fled the
"accurate and deadly." Belgian soldiers, soon on
                                                             city. This clash was to have serious consequences
the scene, captured several technicals, artillery,
and armored vehicles.290 This preventive opera-              for UNITAF.
tion was successful; although Morgan's soldiers                 Such a daring challenge could not go unan-
did return fire, they also pulled back quickly. The          swered. Both General Johnston and Ambassador
small, sharp engagement was important for two                Oakley immediately issued a strongly worded
reasons. It was the first time preemptive force had          ultimatum to General Morgan. "There can be no
been used against one of the Somali factions to              excuse or pardon for the deliberate, well-planned
enforce the Addis Ababa accords, signed only 10              actions of your forces and senior commanders in
days before. Second, as Ambassador Oakley said               attacking Kismayo on 22 February 1993.
in an interview, the attack was necessary to "teach          UNITAF condemns and holds you responsible for
Morgan a lesson. ... Cobra gunships went in and              killing innocent civilians and terrorizing the entire
took care of Morgan for not respecting the cease-            population, threatening to destroy all the progress
fire, continuing to move south after we told him to          toward [prosperity] and peace which has been
stop, and for general misbehavior."291 General               made in the region." UNITAF commanders then
Morgan had to withdraw his remaining vehicles                told General Morgan, "as a result of these inex-
35 kilometers from Bir Xaani, and his troops                 cusable, criminal actions and the breaking of the
seven kilometers from the town.                              ceasefire, all your forces and weapons must be
   The forceful reaction of UNITAF forces pro-               moved out [of] the lower Jubba valley to locations
duced an immediate effect. Fighting ceased, and              north of [Dhoble] no later than midnight 25
                                                             February. You must designate these locations to
                                                             UNITAF by 25 February. If any of your forces are
* Colonel Jess had gone to attend the talks in Addis Ababa
and had not returned. In fact, with the notoriety of the     found outside of these locations on 26 February or
                                                             thereafter, they will be engaged. Any weapons
                                                             located will be destroyed."293
December massacre in Kismayo, there was speculation he
might never return.
                                                                          MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE            97

   To give teeth to the ultimatum, Army Forces                But General Morgan was not done making
Somalia's quick reaction force was ordered to             trouble. With the start of the next round of peace
Kismayo. Other Army units were shuffled in the            talks scheduled to begin shortly in Addis Ababa,
theater to keep all humanitarian sectors secured.         there was concern violence might again erupt. On
Even as Morgan withdrew to the Dhoble area,               9 March, Colonel Frederick C. Peck, the public
Colonel Jess' forces were ordered to move out of          affairs officer, expressed UNITAF's views in a
the city, to the area of Jilib. These measures were       press statement: "We're going on intuition and
timely, effective, and balanced, but the damage           track record. We are concerned that someone
had been done.                                            might try to derail things or make a point or get a
   In Mogadishu, General Aideed claimed that              little bit better situation."295 After only two weeks
Morgan could not have succeeded at entering               of relative quiet, Morgan's forces again attacked
Kismayo unless he had the cooperation of                  Jess' followers on 16 March and tried to take over
UNITAF. He also told his followers that all of            the city. Jess' supporters fled to the north, and
UNITAF's actions were directed against his ally,          UNITAF recalled its quick reaction force to the
Colonel Jess, conveniently ignoring what the              city. This 500-man unit, under Brigadier General
coalition was doing to chastise General                   Greg L. Gile, USA, was backed with 13 attack
Morgan.294 Aideed's efforts at disseminating prop-        helicopters. The belligerents were quickly pushed
aganda succeeded in bringing his followers out            out of the city. To further emphasize UNITAF
onto the streets of Mogadishu for three days of           resolve to keep the factions from confronting each
disturbances.                                             other, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp
   In Kismayo, as the situation quieted down              (LHD 1) and three other ships carrying the 24th
again, the Army handed over responsibility for the        Marine Expeditionary Unit were stationed off the
sector to the Belgians on 5 March. About 150              city's coast on 25 March. The MEU landed the
Americans remained out of the original 1,000-             next day and conducted patrols to the west of the
man contingent. Their main mission was to work            port city. At the same time, 200 American soldiers
with the humanitarian agencies.                           and the Belgians pushed to the north, placing a

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00798
A Canadian soldier manning a machine gun in a bunker guards the entrance of Belet Weyne airfield as a U.S. Marine
KC-130 lands on the dirt airstrip.

strong cordon between the forces of Morgan and                was a tedious sameness to the daily round of
Jess.                                                         work, however, and shifts were long and often
   The Addis Ababa talks, which had begun on 15               monotonous with no days off. There also was an
March, continued through this period. With news               edge to life in the area of operations from the
of General Morgan's latest actions, Aideed threat-            occasional attacks or sniping incidents. Within a
ened to leave the talks, again charging UNITAF                month of the start of the operation, tension was
with complicity. Colonel Peter A. Dotto,                      mounting for those who patrolled the streets of the
UNITAF's future plans officer, was also the coali-            cities or the roads of the countryside, or who were
tion representative to the conference. He warned              riding in convoys. An official document stated the
Aideed that leaving the conference would only                 case clearly: "the strain of operating in an envi-
"play into the hands of his enemies."296 Aideed               ronment where a Marine on patrol might be met
refused to listen and left. But this time he had              by a waving, smiling crowd on one corner and
overextended himself. His people in Mogadishu                 gunfire on the next began to tell on the individuals
did not come into the streets as they had before.             in MarFor. Many Marines began to grow increas-
Also, several of his lieutenants disagreed with his           ingly impatient with the naturally curious
stubbornness and formed their own contingent to               Somalis, particularly when Somalis crowded
continue representation at the conference. Faced              them."298
with this unacceptable loss of support and prestige              This attitude was not peculiar to Americans or
from his own faction, Aideed decided his interests            Marines. In Baidoa, the Australians also noted:
were best served by returning to the negotiating                 The soldiers observed acts of corruption and
table. While Aideed's resentment undoubtedly                     exploitation among Somalis and Somali
continued, Kismayo settled into a period of quiet
for the remainder of UNITAF's time in Somalia.*
                                                                 Non-Government Organization staff. They
                                                                 became disillusioned. In many cases their
   Even as the city and the area of operations                   morale plummeted as they asked themselves
began to calm down near the end of March the                     why they were risking their lives in a remote,
events in Kismayo and their spillover in                         hot and dangerous country, hell bent on its
Mogadishu had two serious consequences. For                      own destruction. It was an immense chal-
General Aideed, loss of credibility would cause                  lenge for the commanders within the 1 RAR
him to seek some method to regain his stature                    Group to maintain morale, and prevent sol-
with his followers. For UNITAF, the Kismayo                      diers from allowing their disillusionment
troubles caused a reevaluation of the transition to              and anger to lead to overly-aggressive prac-
UNOSOM II and a rearrangement of the rede-                       tices. All of those who served in Baidoa had
ployment schedule.297                                            to dig deep to remain in touch with values

             Morale and Restraint
                                                                 and attitudes developed at home in
                                                                 Australia, while working under pressure in a
                                                                 brutalized society, stricken with corruption
                                                                 and violence.299
   During the third phase of the operation, the
work in Somalia could be rewarding for the sol-                  Such frustration was familiar to those senior
diers and Marines of the coalition. They could see            commanders and noncommissioned officers who
the results of their efforts, whether they were               had served in Vietnam. There the enemy often hid
engineers building a bridge, infantrymen on                   within, and was supported by, the civilian popula-
patrol, officers assigned to the civil-military oper-         tion. In Somalia, there was no enemy in the tradi-
ations teams, or air traffic controllers bringing in          tional sense, but it was just as difficult to discern
aircraft filled with supplies or troops. Each person          the intentions of a mob of people, or to spot with-
contributed to a situation that was noticeably                in a crowd the person who might pose a real
improving for the vast majority of Somalis. There             threat. Strong leadership at all levels was required
                                                              to keep soldiers and Marines focused on their mis-
* Kismayo continued to be a source of tension and conflict.      Major General Wilhelm recognized the creep-
On 6 and 7 May 1993, just two days after the departure of
UNITAF and the turn over of the operation to the United
                                                              ing tiredness and frustration of his Marines by
Nations, Colonel Jess attacked General Morgan's forces in a   mid-January, and he issued MarFor a "Thirty-Day
bid to retake the city. Belgian forces, then under the com-   Attitude Adjustment Message." In addition to call-
mand of UNOSOM II, repelled the attack.                       ing for a brief stand down of operations to allow
                                                                               MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE                99

                                                             coalition shot a Somali. The individuals involved
                                                             would either be upheld in their decision or recom-
                                                             mended for a court-martial. On 4 February, a
                                                             young Somali was shot and killed by a Marine
                                                             sergeant as he rushed toward the back of an open
                                                             vehicle while carrying a closed box. The box
                                                             turned out to hold nothing dangerous. This was a
                                                             very sorrowful event, causing grief to the boy's
                                                             family and deep remorse to the Marine involved.
                                                             But since the contents of the box were not known,
                                                             and since the boy's actions were deemed to pose a
                                                             possible threat, the sergeant was determined to
                                                             have acted in accordance with the rules of engage-
                                                             ment and did not face a court-martial.
                                                                But there were also some who did let their frus-
                                                             tration and anger get out of hand, with drastic
                                                             results. On 2 February, Gunnery Sergeant Harry
                                                             Conde, shot and wounded a Somali youth who
                                                             had approached his vehicle and stolen his sun-
                                                             glasses.* Gunnery Sergeant Conde shot the boy as
                                                             he was fleeing from the vehicle. The gunfire also
                                                             wounded another Somali. Since the boy did not
                                                             present any threat to the gunnery sergeant, he was
                                                             deemed to have used excessive force and was tried
                                                             by court-martial. He was found guilty of two
                              Photo courtesy of the author   counts of assault with a firearm with intent to
Belgian paratroopers stand guard at the port of              inflict grievous bodily harm, was fined, and was
Kismayo.                                                     reduced in grade to staff sergeant.
                                                                The most serious set of incidents occurred in
his Marines to gain some respite, he reminded                Belet Weyne. The Canadians had problems with
them that they needed to maintain good relations             Somali men and youths sneaking into their lines at
"with the 90 [percent] of the population who wel-
comed the American presence." As he noted, no
matter how frustrating the situation might                   * Riding in a convoy in the city of Mogadishu or in Kismayo
                                                             was always a tense time. Roads between major points were
become, the Marines "had to avoid alienating the
citizens of Mogadishu."300 In Baidoa, Lieutenant
                                                             kept clear by the Clean Street operations to allow for fast
                                                             movement, and routes were occasionally varied, but there
Colonel David W. Hurley adopted the motto of                 was always the chance of random sniping or a grenade
"firm, fair, and friendly" as the guide for the              attack. Also, Somali pedestrians frequently stepped in front
                                                             of vehicles to purposely separate them from their convoy and
Australian soldiers. He also made it clear that              slow them down or stop them. Then the vehicle could be
unnecessary violence would not be tolerated, and             mobbed as crowds of young men and boys rushed in to grab
that all actions must be within the rules of engage-         whatever they could get. Passengers in the vehicles were lit-
ment.301                                                     erally sitting targets if anyone wished to take advantage of
                                                             the situation. There was a need for constant vigilance in such
   The professionalism and discipline of coalition           situations, and coalition soldiers had to be able to protect
soldiers were essential in keeping down the num-             themselves and their property. On leaving a compound, a
ber of unfortunate incidents. Occasionally, some             magazine was inserted into one's personal weapon and a
                                                             round chambered with the safety on. Many also carried sticks
soldier or Marine would be confronted with a sit-            or the end poles from cots to rap the knuckles of those who
uation that called for a quick decision to use dead-         might attempt to steal. At one point it was noted that some
ly force, although these were rare. At such times,           soldiers, such as the Tunisians, were traveling with bayonets
the rules of engagement provided both a basis for            fixed to deter thieves, but this practice was stopped. It was
                                                             determined the very act of fixing bayonets provided a clear
action and protection for the soldiers involved if           message of the intent of the soldiers involved and could act
there was an obvious threat. An investigation was            as a deterrent that would not be possible if the bayonets were
held for any incident in which a member of the               already on the rifles.

                                                                                          DVIC DD-SD-00-00788
BGen Lawson W. Magruder III, USA, the 10th Mountain Division's assistance division commander and Task Force
Kismayo's commander, meets with Col Ahmed Omar Jess, the Somali faction leader in Kismayo.

night and stealing whatever they could. The thefts        Just a few days later, Major Anthony Seward,
were bad enough, but no one could determine the        the commanding officer of 2 Commando, passed
intentions of these intruders, and for that reason     on to his platoon commanders that any intruders
they posed a threat to the soldiers and a danger to    captured in Canadian lines were to be abused. The
themselves. Frustration and resentment mounted         intention of this poorly worded direction was that
against these thieves. Unfortunately, some junior      any Somali thieves should be taught a lesson that
leaders took matters into their own hands in a         would deter them, or others who might be con-
manner that was unjustifiable and deadly. On 4         templating such actions, from stealing from the
March, soldiers of the Reconnaissance Platoon          Canadians. Some officers passed this word on to
were ordered to augment security at the engineer-      their men. Unfortunately, some soldiers took it as
s' camp at Belet Weyne. That evening the pla-          a license to do what they could to anyone unfortu-
toon's commander, Captain Michael Rainville, set       nate enough to fall into their hands. On the night
in motion a plan to capture infiltrators by placing    of 16 March, a Somali teenager, Shidane Arone,
rations and equipment in a position that could be      was caught in the Canadian base at Belet Weyne.
seen by Somalis coming close to the compound.          He was bound and taken to a bunker that had been
Eventually, two unarmed Somali men were                used to hold such prisoners until they could be
observed entering the compound. They were chal-        turned over to proper authorities. There he was
lenged by members of the platoon and attempted         tortured and beaten to death by at least two sol-
to flee. Warning shots were fired, but they contin-    diers, Master Corporal Clayton Matchee and
ued to run. One of the Somalis was shot and cap-       Private Kyle Brown. Several noncommissioned
tured. The other continued to run inside the com-      officers had knowledge of the beating, although
                                                       they may not have known of its severity until too
pound until he, too, was struck by rifle fire,
knocking him to the ground. As he tried to get up,
he was shot twice again at close range and killed.
                                                                              MOVING TO THE THIRD PHASE            101

                                                                                                    DVIC DD-SD-00-00946
Two Belgian military police officers go through the possessions of a Somali taxi driver at a checkpoint at the entrance
into the compound at the port of Kismayo.

   Canadian authorities investigated both inci-              tion, they developed into a national scandal,
dents. The result tarnished the reputation of a fine         reaching into the highest levels of the Canadian
military establishment, which had received praise            Ministry of National Defense. A special
from General Johnston for "the humanitarian                  Commission of Inquiry was established in
focus of the Canadian troops. It has earned them             Canada, which worked on questioning all officers
enormous good will and they have properly por-               and soldiers connected in any way with either
trayed themselves as having come to Somalia for              incident. As a result of the investigation and the
[a] noble purpose."303 The careers of many sol-              scandal, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was
diers in the Airborne Regiment and in the                    disbanded. Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu was court
Canadian Ministry of National Defense were                   martialed; although acquitted he retired from the
ruined.                                                      service. Several other officers and noncommis-
                                                             sioned officers were also court martialed. Among
   The initial investigations began with a com-              the most significant was Major Seward, who was
manding officer's investigation immediately after            found guilty of negligent performance of duty and
the 4 March shooting, but this was not received at           received a severe reprimand, three months in
National Defense headquarters until 23 March.                prison, and dismissal. Captain Rainville was court
However, an investigation by Canadian military               martialed and found not guilty. Master Corporal
police began in late April, just days before the             Matchee attempted to commit suicide while in
redeployment of the UNITAF headquarters. The                 custody in Somalia, resulting in permanent brain
Canadian forces began redeploying in May and                 damage that rendered him incompetent to stand
continued to arrive back in Canada through June.             trial. Private Brown was court martialed, found
As word of the incidents began to emerge, along              guilty of manslaughter and torture, and sentenced
with allegations of withheld or altered informa-             to five years imprisonment and dismissal with dis-

grace.                                                 mand chronology for this period stated: "The dis-
   Among the 30,000 members of UNITAF, such            cipline of the Marines ensured that potentially
incidents of unwarranted violence and abuse were       explosive situations, instead of deteriorating, were
rare. Generally, the soldiers and Marines of all the   defused. Many a young Somali who could have
coalition partners were concerned with maintain-       been legitimately shot under the rules of engage-
ing their personal honor in a difficult situation,     ment owes his life to the restraint of MarFor per-
and with assisting the great majority of Somalis       sonnel."304 The great majority of the coalition's
who needed and welcomed their efforts. The work        soldiers displayed the same discipline.
was not always easy, and it often required
patience and forbearance. But as MarFor's com-
                                              Chapter 7

                               Drawing Down the Forces

              Naval Operations                          replenishment oiler Mowain (AOR A20), destroy-
                                                        er Tughril (DD 167), and fleet oiler and stores
   While their comrades on the ground were              ship Dacca (AOR A41); and the Indian Navy's
working throughout the theater, the coalition           guided missile corvettes Kuthar (FSG P46) and
sailors were busy in various activities off the         Khukri (FSG P49). Some of the transiting ships
Somali coast. The work at sea was characterized         were supply ships supporting their countries'
during the third phase by patrolling, training with     troops ashore, such as the Belgian command and
coalition partners, and shipboard routine.              support ship Zinnia (AGF A961), and the
                                                        Australian helicopter and logistic support ship
   Situation reports for this period are filled with    Jervis Bay (GT 203). Other ships represented the
the names of ships of coalition partners that           naval contingent of coalition allies that also pro-
entered the waters off the Somali coast and, for a      vided ground troops to the operation. In this cate-
time, became part of Navy Forces Somalia. Some,         gory were the Australian landing ship logistic
like the Indian offshore patrol vessel Sukanya          Tobruk (LSL L50); the Italian amphibious trans-
(OPV P51), were that nation's entire contribution       port dock San Giorgio (LPD L9892), mine coun-
to the coalition and remained as part of the force.     termeasures support ship Vesuvio (MCS A5384),
Others spent time in the area working with the          and guided missile frigate Grecale (FFG F571);
United States and other nations' vessels and then       the Turkish landing ship tank Ertugrul (LST
departed when their limited missions were done.         L401), depot ship Derya (AD A576), and guided
Examples of such ships were the Pakistani Navy's        missile frigate Fatih (FFG F242); and the

                                                                                          DVIC DN-SN-93-06061
An Alouette III SA-316B Chetak helicopter prepares to land on board the Indian Navy's Sukanya-class offshore
patrol craft Sharda (P 55), anchored off the Somali coast.

                                                                                                DVIC DN-SD-00-00795
A U.S. Marine KC-130 Refueler aircraft on the ground at Belet Weyne airfield, as a Marine AH-1 "Cobra" attack hel-
icopter flies overhead. The mission of the KC-130s was to refuel the Cobras, keeping them in the air to escort food

Canadian replenishment oiler Preserver (AOR                chant vessels in the Mediterranean. The Maria
510).                                                      was eventually reported as seized by the
    The daily work of all the vessels in the coali-        Seychelles Coast Guard in their national waters
tion was varied. There were the normal training            on 5 March. The ship was carrying 90 tons of
                                                           munitions and falsified registry papers at the
and drills, and underway replenishments were

                                                                            Air Operations
common, but the more important tasks were in
direct support of the operation. Naval air was a
key factor, and Navy Forces Somalia assumed the
air traffic control mission for the operation during
its early days. Aircraft performed road reconnais-            Air support was vital to every aspect of the
sance for convoys and stood ready for close air            operation. It provided a capability that offset the
support if needed. Logistics and tanker flights            tremendous distances of the area of operations
helped troops on the ground stay supplied, while           and served as an important and flexible supporting
forward infrared radar surveillance flights kept the       arm to troops on the ground.
commanders informed of movements within the                   Although a service component, the U.S. Air
theater. The ships also conducted coastal surveil-         Force was in some aspects similar to a functional
lance and intercepted and searched merchant ves-           organization. Its primary duty as the overseer of
sels entering the waters of the area of operations.        Air Force Forces Somalia was to provide mobili-
    This latter mission was very important in              ty, both into the area of operations and within the
ensuring more weapons were not smuggled into               theater. It was one of the smallest components of
the theater. In one notable example, an intelli-           the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), but
gence report indicated a cargo vessel named the            there was no shortage of airframes in the country.
Maria, a ship of Greek origin laden with arms and          Most of these came from the American forces, and
ammunition, was sailing from Serbia and suppos-            all four Services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and
edly heading for Somalia. The coalition naval              Marine Corps) contributed to the air armada that
forces kept a tight watch for this ship, which was         was sent to Somalia. Some of the coalition part-
nondescript and bore a name common to mer-
                                                                                DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES         105

ners also used their own aircraft for resupply or as                The calibration of weapons was important to
a contribution to the overall operation.                        the effectiveness of the aircraft. Marine Aircraft
   The aircraft were used for almost every tradi-               Group 16 (MAG-16) built a firing range five miles
tional mission of air power.* In the initial phases             northwest of Bale Dogle airfield where all avia-
of the operation, fixed-wing attack aircraft from               tion weapons could be properly checked. From 6
the carriers flew air patrols for detachments work-             January to 12 January, the group conducted a bat-
                                                                tle-sight zero range to sight all of its M16A2
ing at distant sites and were prepared for close air
support if necessary. Medical evacuation flights
and search and rescue flights were also significant                 Aircraft were also critical to the supply of
parts of the planning.** Later, Army and Marine                 forces in the field, especially in the operation's
Corps attack helicopters provided close-in fire                 early days. Working with the Air Force or air
support to operations against factions in                       mobility element, MAG-16 set up "spoke chan-
Mogadishu and Kismayo. Transport aircraft fly-                  nel" flights to the sectors of Bardera, Bale Dogle,
ing on the air bridge brought personnel and sup-                and Baidoa. Service began a few days before
plies into the country, and C-130 and C-141 intra-              Christmas. An average of four transport flights a
theater flights carried fuel and supplies to the sec-           day soon delivered vital cargo of rations, miscel-
tors.                                                           laneous supplies, and engineering equipment to
                                                                these areas. Lockheed KC-130 Hercules trans-
   The absence of traditional ground supporting                 ports from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport
arms (e.g., tanks and heavy artillery) during                   Squadron 352 delivered fuel, as did CH-53D/E
Operation Restore Hope was offset by the use of                 heavy lift helicopters from MAG-16. These heli-
attack helicopters. These aircraft filled an impor-             copters also transported personnel and carried
tant void in the organizational structure. With the             oversize cargo by external lift. The spoke channel
decision to leave howitzers on board the maritime               flights served Kismayo and other sectors with fuel
prepositioning force shipping, gunships assumed                 deliveries. Even the French forces at Oddur bene-
a vital supporting arms role. Marine Forces                     fited from these flights by driving the shorter dis-
Somalia (MarFor) used them successfully in the                  tance to Baidoa to pick up fuel and water deliv-
attack on weapons storage sites in Mogadishu,                   ered by air.309 As the New Zealand forces came
and the Army employed them frequently during                    into theater they set up scheduled "Kiwi flights"
troubles in Kismayo in February and March. The                  into the various relief sectors. Their light fixed-
Army's after action report claimed: "Attack avia-               wing Andover aircraft were used to deliver pas-
tion provided the discriminatory firepower                      sengers and light cargo on a regular basis.
required for this type of environment."306 Also, the                The peculiarities of the desert environment
Somalis displayed an evident respect for the capa-              affected aircraft as well as soldiers. The
bilities of these weapons. "[Their] presence also               omnipresent dust was extremely damaging to
provided a psychological effect that helped in                  equipment, especially to the machines' sensitive
intimidating potential threats. ... On several occa-            air intakes. Even the finest filters could not keep
sions, the mere presence of the attack helicopters              out all the powder-like dust. The aircraft at dirt
served as a deterrent and caused crowds and vehi-               airfields in the interior were particularly vulnera-
cles to disperse."307 These versatile aircraft pro-             ble to this problem, since every time an airplane or
tected convoys throughout the theater, performed                helicopter took off or landed at one of these fields
day and night reconnaissance missions, and                      it raised a storm of red or ochre dust, the color
accompanied coalition forces on the ground. They                depending on the location. One solution was to
added appreciably to the coalition mission to cre-              use dust palliatives that could be put down on the
ate a secure environment.                                       runways and adjacent surfaces to hold the parti-
                                                                cles in place. Another solution was to place AM2
                                                                interconnecting panels, a medium-duty, alu-
* The Marine Corps lists six functions of support provided      minum, landing mat capable of supporting both
by its air arm. These are offensive air support, antiair war-   fighter and cargo aircraft operations, on ramps
fare, assault support, aerial reconnaissance, electronic war-   and taxiways.
fare, and control of aircraft and missiles.
                                                                    Despite all the work to repair the runways and
** See Chapter 8 for a more detailed description of medical     keep them serviceable, problems developed rapid-
evacuations.                                                    ly. The traffic of the heavy Lockheed C-141 air-

                                                                                              DVIC DD-SD-00-00923
Using a John Deere road grader, U.S. Air Force SSgt Robert Chandler, along with other members of the Air Force's
Red Horse civil engineering team, smoothes out the ground at Oddur airstrip.

craft rutted or broke up the surfaces. In some            Airways DC-10, Kuwait DC-8 and C-5 on civilian
cases, such as at Bale Dogle, a main air base for         ramp. Military ramp saturated with civil and other
the operation, this meant the suspension of C-141         nations military aircraft." The next day, he noted
flights or the transfer of cargo to the smaller C-        that "[Mogadishu Airport] operating close to the
130 aircraft for delivery.                                limit." By early January, "the north ramp (old mil-
   The need for continuous maintenance of the             itary ramp where several non-flyable MiGs are
runways was distressing. So was another common            located) was saturated with a variety of traffic. ...
problem, foreign object damage. This was caused           Civilian, relief agency, coalition force and Marine
by small items, such as pebbles, screws, or trash         KC-130s are all using the ramp on a free flow
that could get onto an aircraft operating area and        basis. We even saw two African Airlines 707s."
cause damage to airframes or engines when blown           Colonel Lias was also very specific about the
around or kicked up. Damage from foreign                  cause of the crowding: a lack of what he called
objects was plentiful at Somali airfields. It often       visibility. By this he meant the air mobility ele-
                                                          ment had no knowledge of, or control over, the
                                                          arrival of many of these aircraft.310
came in the form of stones or small rocks that
were blown onto runways by propeller aircraft.
Airmen, soldiers, or locally hired Somalis                   Control and management of aircraft were long-
engaged in a never-ending struggle to keep the            running problems during the operation. There
operating areas clear and safe.                           were several causes. First, there were actually two
   Rocks, dust and debris weren't the only prob-          operations (and thus two headquarters) responsi-
lems at the airfields. Within a short time, the air-      ble for sending aircraft into Somalia. One of these
port at Mogadishu became the busiest on the Horn          was UNITAF. The other was the joint task force
of Africa, resulting in serious overcrowding.             for Operation Provide Relief, which was still
Colonel Dayre C. Lias, USAF, Air Force Forces             based at Mombasa. Establishing a chain-of-com-
Somalia deputy director of mobility forces, noted         mand and tracking authority between these two
on 18 December that there were a "World                   entities were some of the first priorities Air Force
                                                                                    DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES                107

Forces Somalia had to establish. Provide Relief                  control authority staff, published a memorandum
headquarters was willing to work with UNITAF                     to all "potential users of Somali airspace." It cited
man-to-man between the respective operations                     a United Nations Resolution 794 provision to
sections (through U.S. Central Command, their                    "take all necessary means" to establish the secure
common superior) using information passed in                     environment for relief operations. This was the
situation reports. This was a solution, but one that             basis to assume the airspace control authority for
was still fraught with difficulties.311                          Somalia by UNITAF, "effective the 9th day of
   Other internal problems existed. The operation                December 1992," and continuing until further
took place early in the joint era, when common                   notice. Having assumed this authority, General
command and communications systems were still                    Johnston enjoined "all countries ... to direct their
being formed. As the components came into the                    registered aircraft to strictly comply with all air-
area of operations, each brought their own sys-                  space control orders and applicable regulations
tems with them, and these were not always com-                   and conventions in place in Somalia. All aircraft
patible. There were "lots of software problems,"                 must strictly comply with established airspace
Colonel Lias noted. The Navy used the contin-                    control procedures to ensure effective procedural
gency theater automated planning system, while                   control. Violations of air traffic control directions
the Marines relied on fragmentary orders, and the                will be reported to the International Civil Aviation
                                                                 Organization, the U.S. Federal Aviation Agency,
                                                                 and other appropriate national agencies."313
Air Force employed the theater air mobility sys-
tem, all of which sought to manage complex air-
ground operations.312                                               Unfortunately, problems of airspace manage-
   The UNITAF method to manage and control                       ment and control continued. Not everyone saw the
the airspace was through an airspace control                     clear logic in the commanding general's memo-
authority, established within the Air Forces direc-              randum. At a meeting held in Nairobi on 7
torate of mobility forces.* Under normal circum-                 January 1993 between representatives of UNITAF
stances, a control authority is the responsibility of            and civilian agencies, the timely dissemination of
a sovereign nation, which, working with the                      Notices to Airman was identified as the main
International Civil Aviation Organization, can                   problem. But there were greater, related issues
publish and distribute Notices to Airmen to help                 brought up at the meeting. The International Civil
control the air traffic within its airspace. But, as             Aviation Organization did not accept the joint task
with so much in Somalia, there were no normal                    force's authority to issue Notices to Airman, nor
circumstances. No sovereign government existed                   did it acknowledge the task force's interpretation
to work with the international aviation organiza-                of U.N. Resolution 794 that it controls Somali air-
tion. Thus, the job fell by default to UNITAF.                   space except for military traffic, nor did it recog-
                                                                 nize task force air control orders where they con-
   Coalition commander Lieutenant General                        flicted with existing Notices. The civil aviation
Robert B. Johnston, working through his airspace                 organization and other participants at the meeting
                                                                 further asked to discuss precise technical issues
                                                                 such as air traffic control procedures over
* In most joint operations, a joint force air component com-
mander (JFACC) would be established. The commander is
                                                                 Somalia, communications frequencies, changes in
                                                                 Notices to Airman language, and the status of nav-
                                                                 igational aids.314 *
normally charged with developing the air campaign plan for
the theater, basing it upon the assets available to him. In a
war or combat situation, this plan would address four impor-
tant air functions: airspace management, airspace control, air
defense, and targeting. It was soon obvious the last two func-
tions were not of significance to Operation Restore Hope.
UNITAF did require the first two, however, and so the air-       * Other participants included the International Air Transport
space control authority was established. In the first few        Association, a trade organization that serves the commercial
weeks to the operation, Major General Harold W. Blot, com-       airline industry, and the National Geodetic Survey, a part of
manding general of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, held this        the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
position. In her study of UNITAF, Dr. Katherine A. W.            Among other missions, the National Geodetic Survey con-
McGrady of the Center For Naval Analyses explained the           ducts aerial photographic surveys of airports in the United
development of the authority and its functions. She also         States to locate the positions of obstructions and aids to air
notes the term "JFACC" was sometimes erroneously used.           travel. Since the survey agency does not function outside the
Part of this confusion may have unintentionally come from        United States, it is likely that some of its personnel may have
UNITAF itself, which listed Major General Blot as joint air      attended this meeting to provide information and expertise in
component commander on its early personnel rosters.              these matters.

                                                                                                DVIC DD-SD-00-00917
A variable omni-range, meteorological navigational aids system using an AN/FRN-44 site survey van with an omni-
range radio was set up at Mogadishu airport by the 485th Engineering Installation Group to assist civilian aircraft
into what became the busiest airport in the Horn of Africa.

   The tension created by the inflexibility of the         M. Lorenz, UNITAF's staff judge advocate,
civilian authorities was made clear by the joint           explained the legal basis for this position under
task force's airspace control authority when it            United Nations Resolution 794 and passed out
threatened to impound civilian aircraft if they "did       copies of the memorandum by which General
not start complying with the air control orders."          Johnston assumed this authority. Difficulties with
On the other side, international organizations             the dissemination and publication of Notices to
claimed they could not issue Notices to Airman             Airman were identified, and the air control order
based on the air control order language because
civilian operators could not understand them.315
                                                           process was explained. The meeting reconvened
                                                           the next day and again on the 16th.317
   In spite of the seeming impasse, both sides                One of the most important agreements reached
agreed "that safety is now the paramount issue in
the critically congested airspace over Somalia."316
                                                           on the 15th was that the International Civil
                                                           Aviation Organization recognized that the
This one point of agreement and the willingness            UNITAF commanding general served as the air-
of people to work to a common end were the                 space control authority "`on behalf' of the sover-
beginning of the solution.                                 eign state of Somalia." The distinction was noted
   Just one week later, on 14 January, representa-         as being academic, but it was sufficient to verify
tives of UNITAF, the International Civil Aviation          the UNITAF commanding general as the "sole
Organization, and other agencies met in                    authority for airspace procedures in the
Mogadishu for a technical meeting. The com-                Mogadishu [flight instruction region]." Progress
manding general of UNITAF was again designat-              that day and the next created a single airspace
ed as the airspace control authority "for all of the       control plan. UNITAF air control orders were
territorial airspace of Somalia." Colonel Frederick        reviewed, along with existing Notices and the
                                                                          DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES           109

international organization's plans. From this            agreements made at the beginning of March with
work, two Notices, controlling upper and lower           the adjacent flight instruction regions (Nairobi,
airspace, were circulated through the Kenyan             Addis Ababa, Aden, the Seychelles, and
Civil Aviation Authority. All future Notices to          Bombay.) The agreements covered such coordina-
Airman would be distributed "on behalf of                tion issues as radio frequencies, transfer of
Somalia at the request of the Commander, Unified         responsibility from one region to another, and
Task Force." A meeting was set between                   established routes, flight levels and separation
UNITAF's airspace control authority representa-          between aircraft, and the acceptance of messages
tive, Major John D. Reardon, and those of com-           and revisions. These agreements went into effect
mercial carriers flying out of Nairobi. The              on 31 March.319
International Civil Aviation Organization prom-             Management of military aircraft coming into
ised to provide plans for reconstructing airspace        the area of operations did not pose such drawn-out
control within the Mogadishu region and to hire a        problems, but it still had to be addressed. General
permanent organizational representative in               Johnston established his airspace control authori-
Mogadishu. Finally, requirements for the transi-         ty through the air mobility element's director of
tion of airspace control authority to the com-           mobility forces, Colonel Walter S. Evans, USAF.
manding general of United Nations Operation              By the end of December, as the tempo of air oper-
Somalia II (UNOSOM II) would be forwarded by             ations reached the maximum capacity for
the international aviation organization to               Mogadishu airport, Colonel Evans worked
UNITAF.318                                               through the United States Transportation
   These matters essentially cleared up the ques-        Command and Central Command to establish
tion of control of the civil aircraft coming into        time slot allocations for all aircraft coming into
Somali airspace. The UNITAF staff continued to           Mogadishu, including those of coalition partners.
work out other coordination problems. The most           At the same time, he worked with the various
significant of these were addressed by a series of       ground forces quartered in or near the airfield to

                                                                                             DVIC DD-SD-00-00889
A group of Maleel townspeople gather to await the deliver of wheat donated by Australia. The wheat was flown in
slung underneath a Marine CH-53 helicopter.

                                                                                          DVIC DD-SD-00-00794
MajGen Steven L. Arnold, USA, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division, meets with town elders, Red
Cross representatives, and other humanitarian relief works in Merka.

stop the growing number of near accidents caused       the remaining airspace control authority for
by unauthorized personnel and equipment on the         Somali airspace on 1 February, delegating it to
runways and taxiways.320                               Lieutenant Colonel William J. O'Meara, USAF.322
   With the establishment of these procedures and         Establishing air control and airspace manage-
organizational structures, UNITAF was able to          ment had been long, and at times it was very com-
look forward and plan for the ultimate transfer of     plex work within a thicket of military and interna-
air traffic services back to civil authorities. As     tional organizations and operational procedures.
early as 18 January, an initial plan for the transi-   But, as with many issues confronted by UNITAF,
tion of airspace control authority functions was       the problems were eventually resolved in a spirit
published. Under it, the authority could stand         of cooperation and mutual interest in the safety of
down on 22 January except for airspace manage-         all aircrews and the success of the overall mission.
ment functions and "aviation services ... still        The best indicator of the success of these efforts
required by JTF Somalia Components." On that           was that, in spite of the small and poorly equipped
date, Air Force Forces Somalia would be respon-        state of the Mogadishu airport, it was accident-
sible for publication of a "combined flight sched-     free even while operating as the busiest airport on
                                                       the Horn of Africa.

                                                                          End Game
ule for U.S. and coalition forces" and the air
mobility element was to incorporate into it all
fixed-wing airlift schedules of the components
and coalition partners. Provision also was made
for UNITAF's operations air section to eventually         The work performed during the third phase,
coordinate all air issues within the area of opera-    from the beginning of January to the end of
tions.321 Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, in       March, provided the basis for the transition that
his position as the director of operations, assumed    would occur in early May. Throughout this phase,
                                                                        DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES           111

Lieutenant General Johnston allowed his subordi-        soldiers provided medical care and worked with
nate commanders great discretion. As he said in a       the local populace to improve their lives by such
component commanders' meeting on 6 January:             projects as digging wells or improving roads.
"Every HRS [humanitarian relief sector] is differ-      More importantly, a secure environment, which
ent; commanders must be given broad missions.           was UNITAF's primary mission, was in place.
[They] will have to weave [their] way through a         This security allowed the delivery of food, medi-
broad fabric of village elders and others. I'm          cines, and other relief supplies. The United
pleased with what I see; commanders on the              Nations acknowledged the important effects of
ground taking initiative and doing a splendid           UNITAF's work during this period in its report on
job."323                                                Somalia:
   All the coalition partners set up similar struc-        The improved security conditions made it
tures in the humanitarian relief sectors, ensuring a       possible for United Nations agencies and
standard method of working throughout the area             NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] to
of operations: weapons control policies were in            strengthen their staff in Somalia, and numer-
place in every sector; civil-military operations           ous new [nongovernmental organizations]
teams coordinated the needs of each sector's relief        arrived. In addition to the WFPs [World
                                                           Food Program's] stepped-up food deliveries,
organizations and reported through the main civil-         UNICEF expanded its operations, providing
military operations center in Mogadishu; former            medicines and staff to 16 hospitals, 62 moth-
police were vetted into auxiliary security forces;         er-and-child health [centers] and 156 health
councils of local elders and clan leaders were             posts throughout Somalia by January 1993,
established to place responsibility for Somali gov-        and together with its [nongovernmental
ernance and security back into their own hands;            organization] partners, helped feed over
and patrols established the reach of UNITAF far            200,000 children a day. The World Health
into the countryside. Where possible, coalition            Organization opened a central pharmacy in

                                                                                           DVIC DD-SD-00-00785
Marines of 2d Platoon, Company C, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion provide security for a convoy of United
Nations trucks carrying food from Mogadishu to Baidoa.

                                                                                                  DVIC DD-SD-00-00845
Marines of 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 15th Expeditionary Unit, board an American Trans Air L-1011 for the flight back
to the United States.
   Mogadishu. Indeed, by January 1993, food                 done to make the deployment run more smoothly
   and medical supplies were getting through to             or alleviate the harshness of daily life for the sol-
   almost all the towns of southern and central             diers in the field.

                                                                Restructuring and Redeployment
   Somalia, with immediate and dramatic
   results. Although many hungry, weak people
   were still staggering into feeding [centers],
   most could now be saved. Deaths from star-
                                                               Before the end of December, General Johnston
   vation and disease fell sharply and, reflect-
                                                            was ready to take an objective look at the force to
   ing the greatly increased food supply, by
   March 1993, cereal prices had fallen to a                see how well it matched the mission in light of the
   third of their September 1992 level.324                  progress of the past few weeks. General Johnston
                                                            faced an interesting dilemma. With the success of
                                                            the first two phases, the continuing arrival of
    While coalition forces were acting so success-          capable coalition partners, and a less intense
fully in the field, UNITAF command in                       threat than had been originally anticipated,
Mogadishu was heavily engaged in two important              General Johnston had to decide if it still made
activities: shaping the force to meet the changing          sense to bring in the major portions of two
realities of the mission and preparing for the tran-        American divisions. If not, he had to determine
sition to United Nations control. By the end of             what sort of force structure there should be in the
December, with the end of Phases I and II and the           theater to ensure the accomplishment of the mis-
start of Phase III, there was an opportunity to             sion. As General Johnston later stated, it was a
oversee the development of the theater. The forces          good thing to have "the ability to refine your deci-
spreading out through the area of operations need-          sions that were made ... before you started; you've
ed attention and logistics support. There were              got to have the flexibility of not feeling like you
many things, small and great, which could be                can't change."325
                                                                              DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES         113

   Even before the end of 1992, the composition                assets. His guidance was that the force would
of the American forces within the coalition                    draw back to the Army and Marine brigades,
changed greatly from what had originally been                  which would mean reducing the current size of
anticipated. It was already clear there was no need            MarFor and the UNITAF headquarters as well. He
for a force incorporating armor and artillery. Also,           also directed that MarFor should plan to attain its
it was clear a smaller force could perform the mis-            light brigade size by 30 March.327
sion. Accordingly, MarFor cancelled its scheduled                  There were immediate changes at UNITAF
deployment of two of its subordinates; the 1st                 headquarters. General Johnston later said he knew
Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 1st Tank Battalion.            the headquarters was heavy to start, but that was
Thus, the last Marine unit to arrive was the 3d                needed during in the early phases when planning
Battalion, 11th Marines, on 31 December 1992.                  was critical. "But very quickly you don't need [a
But this artillery battalion did not even draw its             large headquarters staff.] Once you get into the
howitzers from the maritime prepositioning force               HRS [humanitarian relief sectors], I don't need all
ships. It operated instead as a provisional rifle bat-         that command and control. ... The guys on the
talion with assigned security duties in
Mogadishu.326 *
                                                               ground doing the sweeps, the convoys, didn't need
                                                               the headquarters anymore to plan all of these
   On 6 January 1993, General Johnston held a                  operations, so I was anxious to download head-
meeting with his commanders and staff to discuss               quarters."328 A joint personnel processing center
restructuring and redeployment of forces. He stat-             had already been established within the operations
ed the intent had always been to build up quickly              section by the end of December to take care of
to provide overwhelming force, and then to draw                non-unit line number movements out of theater.329
back. The question of how forces could be                      By the end of the year, personnel who could be
reduced while maintaining a balanced structure                 spared from the headquarters staff sections were
was freely discussed among the officers present.               returning home or to their former units. Out of an
General Zinni, the operations officer, remarked                initial headquarters of 1,008 personnel, 225 were
that the force did not need any more combat units.             identified by the staff sections as excess and were
In the ensuing discussion, it was recognized that              redeployed.330
with the scheduled redeployment of the 3d                          General Johnston had to convince some offi-
Battalion, 9th Marines, in about two weeks,                    cers in his chain-of-command that it was appro-
MarFor would be at about brigade size. Looking                 priate to scale back the size of UNITAF at this
at the Army Forces Somalia units that were com-                time. As he said: "there has been some uneasiness
ing in behind the Marines at that time, it was also            on the part of Joint Chiefs of Staff and even
recognized there could be a force composed of                  CentCom [Central Command] with this drawing
one Army brigade and one brigade of Marines.                   down." But, as he also made clear: "It obviously
From an initial heavy brigade structure, MarFor                takes more forces to impose the security environ-
could reduce its size to a light brigade, which was            ment that we have created than it does to maintain
about the size of the present Army Forces                      it." He saw the improving intelligence situation,
Somalia. Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA,                  and the ability to maintain mobility and firepower
commanding general of Army Forces Somalia,                     in the reconfigured force, allowed him to continue
voiced his concern that UNITAF should remain                   the security mission and prepare for the eventual
joint, both within its headquarters and in its organ-          turnover to the United Nations. He also knew,
ization. He saw the mix of a Marine Corps                      however, that "I had to keep selling and convinc-
brigade-sized force with light armored vehicles                ing people [to] trust me. I'm the guy on the
would work well with an Army brigade contain-                  ground and I know, talking to my commanders,
ing aviation assets. General Johnston foresaw that             what we can draw down to and still be able to han-
UNITAF headquarters would have to be drawn                     dle any kind of eventuality."331

                                                                        UNITAF Redeployment
back as well, but would have to remain fairly
robust to take advantage of national intelligence

* This was not unprecedented. In October 1983, during the        By 8 January, the UNITAF staff had developed
invasion of Grenada, H Battery, 10th Marines, as part of the   a three-phase plan for the reduction of the
22d Marine Amphibious Unit, did not land their howitzers       American forces. The first phase was to go from
and served as an infantry company.                             15 January to 5 February 1993, with MarFor and

                                                                                                 DVIC DD-SD-00-00874
A Marine 5-ton cargo truck is driven up the stern ramp of the MV Pvt Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004) at the port of
Mogadishu. By late January 1993, the operation had accomplished its mission well enough to allow the command
to reduce the size of UNITAF.

Army Forces Somalia each drawing back to their              for their continuing services. These important
heavy brigade configurations. This would leave              assets would be consolidated in an engineer group
the Marine brigade with the 7th Marines, Marine             or the naval construction regiment, both reporting
Aircraft Group 16, and a force service support              directly to UNITAF headquarters. In the final
group. The Army brigade would be composed of                phase, lasting from 21 February to 5 March, the
the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, Task Force                 ground forces would be reduced to MarFor or
Kismayo, an aviation battalion, a military police           Army Forces Somalia light brigades. The pro-
battalion, and a forward support battalion. Forces          posed Marine brigade would consist of the 1st
from the Navy and Air Force would be reduced as             Battalion, 7th Marines (three rifle companies, a
appropriate. Personnel from Operation Provide               weapons company, a tank platoon, a light armored
Relief, in Mombasa, would also begin to redeploy            vehicle platoon, an armored assault vehicle pla-
at this time. Special Operations Forces would               toon, an engineer platoon, and a truck detach-
remain at current strength. Also during this peri-          ment), Marine Aircraft Group 16 (consisting of
od, the Joint Task Force Support Command would              eight CH-53D helicopters, four UH-1Ns, and four
assume responsibility for the support of residual           AH-1Ws) and a combat service support group.
forces. The second phase was to begin on 6                  The Army brigade would comprise an infantry
February and last two weeks, until 20 February. In          battalion, an aviation battalion (consisting of 15
this phase, the UNITAF headquarters, Air Force,             UH-60s, 6 OH-58s, and 4 AH-1s), a military
and Navy Forces would continue reductions.                  police battalion of two companies, and the for-
Special Operations Forces would begin reductions            ward support battalion. UNITAF headquarters,
as appropriate. The Support Command would also              Air Force Forces Somalia, Navy Forces Somalia,
begin to draw back its strength, except for engi-           Support Command, and the remaining personnel
neer units since there was still a recognized need          of Operation Provide Relief would continue to
                                                                      DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES          115

reduce where possible. Some engineer units            was, therefore, loaded onto the 1stLt Jack
would redeploy, but others would remain to con-       Lummus (T-AK 3011) and the 1stLt Alex
tinue necessary support.332                           Bonnyman (T-AK 3003). Throughout these evolu-
    This plan was forwarded to Central Command        tions, any mission essential equipment was kept
                                                      ashore in support of the Marines still in the area of
for approval on 11 January. Five days later,
General Joseph P. Hoar gave his approval to the
concept, but denied approval for the timeline.           By the end of January, 15th Marine
General Hoar stipulated that units would redeploy     Expeditionary Unit also was putting its equipment
only at his direction and that redeployment would     through a rigorous maintenance effort, preparing
be driven by events, not a time schedule.             to embark on board the amphibious shipping. This
Specifically, such events would be in one of two      unit had earned well-deserved laurels in its work
categories; an American unit would be replaced        throughout the area of operations. At the begin-
by an arriving member of the coalition, or the unit   ning of February, these Marines, with pristine
would be no longer necessary to the operation, as     equipment, back loaded onto their ships. They
decided by the commanding general of                  departed the Somali coast on 3 February to con-
UNITAF.333                                            tinue their deployment in the Persian Gulf.338
    The MarFor staff immediately began work on           On 19 February, UNITAF ordered MarFor to
the redeployment plan. The concerns were two-         commence a reduction to the heavy brigade level.
fold. They had to reduce the size of the force        With the planning the Marines had already done,
while continuing to conduct operations, and they      and with the redeployments that had already
had to maintain a balanced force throughout each      occurred, this was easily accomplished. With
stage of the reduction. Major General Charles E.      most nonessential personnel already gone from
Wilhelm had told General Johnston he could con-       the theater, MarFor needed only to redeploy a
tinue to conduct his mission with about a third of    detachment of CH-53 helicopters from Marine
the current number of troops.334 The MarFor plan      Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 to reach the goal
called for a reduction to a heavy brigade of about    by the beginning of March.339
4,000 Marines and sailors by 31 January and to a         The first days of that month saw a continuation
light brigade of 2,000 troops by 1 March. In actu-    of departures as residual detachments and person-
ality, the dates were slipped in accord with cir-     nel not part of the heavy brigade left Somalia. At
cumstances, but the plan provided the basis for the   the same time, preparations went forward for
reductions as they occurred throughout the next
three months.335
                                                      reduction to light brigade strength. On 9 March,
                                                      MarFor began validating these movements, and
    The first unit to depart from Somalia was the     on the 13th the realignment of its forces between
3d Battalion, 9th Marines, which began boarding       Bardera and Mogadishu began. By 17 March, the
flights from Mogadishu airport on 19 January.         7th Marines, with its attached coalition forces,
MarFor then had to reconfigure its forces, partic-    had returned to the capital city while Task Force
ularly the 7th Marines, to take the place of their    Bardera remained in the city for which it was
departing comrades.336                                named. The same day, Colonel John P. Kline, Jr.,
    An important part of the retrograde was the       and his staff from Marine Aircraft Group 16,
return of equipment to the maritime preposition-      departed the theater, making Marine Light Attack
                                                      Helicopter Squadron 369 the MarFor aviation
                                                      combat element.340
ing force shipping. Two of the ships, the PFC
James Anderson, Jr. (T-AK 3002) and the Pvt
Franklin J. Phillips (T-AK 3004), were scheduled         On 21 March, the staff of the light brigade took
to return to the Blount Island rework facility.       over the watch schedules at the MarFor command
Since these ships were to depart soon, equipment      post. From that point on, in addition to their rou-
that needed repair was loaded onto them. (Work        tine of normal duties within Mogadishu and
progressed so quickly that the reloaded Anderson      Bardera, the Marines began to plan for the gradual
was able to sail on 7 February, easily making its     assumption of their security mission by coalition
scheduled arrival date.) Also complicating the        forces and for the transition of the operation to the
operation was the possibility the maritime prepo-     United Nations. The remaining staff of 7th
sitioning force ships might be needed to support      Marines performed operational planning, while
another contingency. Equipment in good shape          the residual MarFor staff worked on transition

                                                                                   Photo courtesy of the Turkish Armed Forces
Turkish soldiers with an armored infantry fighting vehicle, outfitted with a 25mm gun and machine gun, patrol their
sector of Mogadishu.

planning.341 Major General Wilhelm departed                was complicated because some Army units would
from Somalia on the 23d and Colonel Jack W.                remain in Somalia to support UNOSOM II. Army
Klimp assumed command of Marine Forces                     plans therefore had to account for residual organ-
Somalia.                                                   izations and establish a rotation schedule to allow
                                                           Army units to return home after four months in
                                                           theater.* Army planners were thus responsible for
   The size and structure of Army Forces Somalia
were also changed. A field artillery battalion, an
aviation company of CH-47 helicopters, and some            both the arrival and departure of units during this
subunits of the 710th Main Support Battalion left          phase. Reducing numbers while keeping up capa-
their major equipment on board ship, or had it             bilities was accomplished through "constant mis-
back loaded.342 Not all of these decisions went            sion analysis" to "continuously reassess each unit
unquestioned. The return of the CH-47s was a               and piece of equipment deployed."344
source of complaint by the United States Army                 The first Army units to rotate home were a mix
Europe, which had sent them. As General                    of organizations from both Army Forces Somalia
Johnston explained: "it seemed like a require-             and the Support Command, units that had either
ment, initially. But very quickly after we got here,       completed their assigned missions or had been
we began to say `Do we need 47s?' Because ...              replaced by coalition forces. These included two
we've got C-130 capable airstrips where we need
them to be, why do we need CH-47s? We're not
going to go and make massive vertical                       * The Army's four-month rotation was a self-imposed
assaults."343                                               requirement to facilitate transition planning and to provide an
                                                            orderly flow of units in and out of theater. Under UNOSOM
   The Army Forces Somalia staff also had to plan           II, Army units and personnel served tours of six months to
for the redeployment of their units, but their work         one year.
                                                                       DRAWING DOWN THE FORCES                  117

                                                                            Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz
Three armed Moroccan soldiers prepare to set up a defensive position on the grounds of the abandoned Somali
National University in Mogadishu.

signal battalion mobile subscriber equipment           USA, was formed to ease the rotation. This cell
companies; the 5th Battalion, 158th Aviation; the      continued to work in Somalia until the middle of
710th Main Support Battalion; and selected Army        April. During that time several other Army units
Forces Somalia staff. Later redeployments includ-      arrived, including the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry;
ed Task Force Kismayo; the 3d Battalion, 14th          the 3d Assault Helicopter Battalion; the 10th
Infantry; the 41st Engineer Battalion; and the         Forward Support Battalion; and the 4th Platoon,
511th Military Police Company.                         300th Military Police Company. As these units
    Under the four-month time limit in theater, the    came into the area of operations, they transferred
first rotation of units would begin in April. On 20    property from their departing counterparts. On 9
February, Army Forces Somalia requested that           April, the "Warrior Brigade" took full responsibil-
U.S. Army Central Command identify the organi-         ity for all Army Forces operations in Somalia, for
zation that would pick up responsibility for the       the theater's quick reaction force, and for the
Army's mission in Somalia. On 28 February, a           Merka relief sector.346

                                                                       Coalition Shifts
reconnaissance party for the 1st (Warrior)
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, arrived in
Mogadishu. The brigade advance party arrived on
30 March.345 Major General Arnold, the com-
manding general of Army Forces Somalia, had               The largest coalition forces assumed responsi-
returned to the United States on 13 March. A tran-     bility for all humanitarian relief sectors, but small-
sition cell, under the assistant division command-     er forces sent by many nations also were put to
er for support, Brigadier General Greg L. Gile,        effective use. These units were often only compa-

ny sized, but in the aggregate they formed a con-       nine kilometers north of Mogadishu, and also con-
siderable addition to UNITAF capabilities.              ducted patrols in Afgooye and Merka. Egyptian
   Many of these coalition units were placed            forces conducted patrols and provided security at
under the operational control of MarFor. These          the airport. Kuwaiti forces conducted mounted
units were from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,            and dismounted patrols and provided security for
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan,          the ammunition supply point. The Botswana
and the United Arab Emirates.347 After working          forces conducted security operations in the
with their Marine counterparts at first, they were      Bardera relief sector. Nigerian forces manned the
later given their own areas of responsibility. These    strongpoint at the K-4 traffic circle in central
areas were generally within the city of                 Mogadishu and conducted patrols. They also
Mogadishu, and often were at some key point or          manned strongpoints in the northern part of the
in the vicinity of the airport, which was where         city and worked with the Somali auxiliary securi-
most of them had their bivouacs. The Tunisian           ty force in the vicinity of the presidential palace.
forces worked directly with the Support                 By this time, United Arab Emirate forces were
Command at the university compound that                 under the operational control of the Italian forces
adjoined the grounds of the American Embassy.           and conducted security patrols at the New Port
   Toward the end of the operation, with the            and in the Villagio Bur Carole and Hamar Jab Jab
departure of MarFor and portions of Army Forces         areas of the city. The Greek force, a company of
Somalia, these small units were given greater           110 soldiers, arrived in early March and were
security duties. Situation reports for the last weeks   placed under the operational control of the French
                                                        forces at the Oddur relief sector to provide med-
                                                        ical support from their base in Wajid.348
of April and the first days of May show these units
at work throughout the city. To illustrate the scope
of their activities, the report for 1 May notes that       In this manner, all of the elements of the coali-
Turkish forces, which had previously been con-          tion helped maintain the secure environment,
ducting security patrols in the vicinity of the par-    which was the mission of UNITAF. Those mem-
liament building and presidential palace, were          bers of the coalition who were staying in Somalia
then providing security for the embassy com-            also were aligned within the humanitarian relief
pound. Tunisian forces were providing security at       sectors for their roles in UNOSOM II.*
the American University complex. Saudi forces
conducted night patrols and manned security posi-       * It should be noted that many of these coalition members
tions at the airfield. Zimbabwe forces manned two       were from African or Muslim countries. Many of these con-
strongpoints, conducted patrols in the northwest        tributions were made from a feeling of support for their reli-
part of the city, and established ran- dom check-       gious or ethnic brethren in Somalia. For some it was viewed
points. Pakistani forces (by that time composed of      as a distinct obligation and the United Arab Emirates contin-
                                                        gent used that very name for their unit. As Colonel Major
four battalions) conducted motorized security           Omar Ess-Akalli, the commander of the Royal Moroccan
patrols in the northwest part of the city and           forces told the author, Somalia was an African problem and
manned numerous checkpoints. They were                  it was only right that Africans should be taking part in assist-
responsible for security at the pump site located       ing in the solution.
                                                       Chapter 8

                                   Normality Begins to Return

                       Logistics                                service support assets available to the Army, this
                                                                command was organized around four specialized
   For the first few weeks of the operation, the 1st            groups: the 36th Engineer Group; the 62d Medical
                                                                Group; the 593d Support Group (Area); and the
                                                                7th Transportation Group.* In addition to the
Force Service Support Group from I Marine
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) provided outstand-
ing support to the Unified Task Force Somalia                   organic units belonging to these groups, the
(UNITAF) as a part of Marine Forces Somalia                     Support Command also had the 2d Chemical
(MarFor).349 However, by early January, the                     Battalion, the 720th Military Police Battalion, the
group's ability to continue its prodigious effort               240th Quartermaster Battalion, and a special sig-
was under a severe strain due to two develop-                   nal task force. This command also included per-
ments.                                                          sonnel and postal companies, ordnance detach-
                                                                ments, public affairs teams, and an air traffic con-
   The first was the growing size of UNITAF
                                                                trol team.
itself. By the middle of January, American forces
and coalition partners were approaching a total of                 When fully assembled in the theater, the
30,000 soldiers. Since most of the supplies they                Support Command could provide exceptional
needed were coming from maritime preposition-                   support and strength to UNITAF. The difficulty
ing force ships, of which four had been unloaded,               was in the amount of time it would take to bring
that figure was about 10,000 men more than what                 all of these soldiers and their equipment to
would normally be supported from these                          Somalia; plans called for the Support Command
sources.350 A related complicating factor was the               to become fully operational on 28 January 1993.
distance that separated some parts of the coalition.               Until that time, UNITAF was dependent on the
Transportation assets, such as trucks, fuel tankers,            capabilities of MarFor's service support group
and water trailers (commonly referred to as                     and the maritime prepositioning force. Although
"water buffaloes") were critical for the continued              stretched by great demands, these units were "per-
success of the operation. Those available were                  forming their support well and exceeding expecta-
being run hard on lengthy and rugged roundtrips                 tions."352 However, before the command was fully
to outlying sectors.                                            operational, it was necessary to task some service
   The other factor in the group's ability to con-              support assets from Army Forces Somalia to
tinue to support UNITAF was inherent in its very                assist UNITAF. Selected 10th Mountain Division
nature as an integral component of a Marine expe-               units were consolidated to perform such critical
                                                                logistics functions as water production and petro-
                                                                leum distribution.353 This support lasted from
ditionary force. When MarFor returned to the
United States, the support group would have to go
back as well. As Lieutenant General Robert B.
Johnston explained: "When you retrograde the                    * These units and the support systems they used were reflec-
[Marine Expeditionary] Force, you retrograde the                tive of the Army's structure and its need to provide support
FSSG [Force Service Support Group], because we                  to corps and army levels ("echelons above division").
were part of I MEF, a package."351                              Normally, a deploying Army division would be provided
                                                                with a slice of the corps' support elements and the division
   These difficulties had been foreseen. The                    would have its own structures to coordinate and work with
planned answer was in the creation of UNITAF's                  these higher levels. In Operation Restore Hope, however, the
one functional subordinate command, the Support                 entire 10th Mountain Division did not deploy, and the 1st
Command.* Relying on the significant combat                     Marine Division did not have the same structures in place to
                                                                work with the Support Command, as did their Army com-
                                                                rades. The Support Command also was responsible for pro-
                                                                viding some support to the coalition partners. The command
* The full name of this organization was the Joint Task Force   had to adjust their traditional methods of doing business to
Support Command, but it was sometimes referred to as the        meet the demands of the theater and of the UNITAF struc-
Joint Logistics Command.                                        ture.

                                                                                             DVIC DD-SD-00-00879
A Russian Antonov AN-124 Condor long-range heavy transport from the Aviation Industrial Complex, Ulyanovsk,
waits to unload at Mogadishu airport. The aircraft was chartered to carry a load of supplies for Brown and Root
Services Corporation, a U.S. Government contractor.

about the middle of January until the end of the         take up their duties, its staff looked to the future.
month.                                                   The command was to have another, longer lasting
   The Support Command's units began to arrive           mission than its support of UNITAF. It would
in theater in late December, along with the com-         become the main United States contribution for
manding general, Brigadier General Billy K.              United Nations Organization Somalia II (UNO-
Solomon, USA. Although his command was not               SOM II). As General Johnston explained in
expected to assume the entire theater logistics          March: "When you talk about the Joint Logistics
                                                         Command, we always saw ... our U.S. role in this
support mission until late that month, individual
                                                         thing as long term. Yes, we had a mission, but I
units assumed responsibility for their portion prior
                                                         don't think anybody ever believed that we would
to that date. For instance, on 15 January, the 7th       draw every American out of here: that we would
Transportation Group took responsibility for port        have something for UNOSOM II and really
operations from Navy Forces Somalia and
MarFor.354 By 28 January, when the Support
                                                         thought it would be in the form of logistics, strate-
                                                         gic lift, which is why we formed the Joint
Command assumed its total support mission,               Logistics Command that would come in to replace
responsibility for medical support, some food            the [Force Service Support Group]."356
supply (class I), water, and petroleum, oil, and            On 28 January, the Support Command com-
lubricant (class III) supply operations were             pleted its transition of responsibilities and fully
already performed by command units. Support              assumed the burden of combat service support in
Command and MarFor ran in-theater movement               the entire area of operations.357 By that time, the
control jointly.355                                      command had established its headquarters in the
   Even as the elements of the Support Command           American University compound, which adjoined
were deploying into theater and just starting to         the American Embassy grounds. Tunisian soldiers
                                                                           NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN        121

provided the security for the compound and the               center of such activity for UNITAF was the task
command's headquarters.*                                     force director of acquisitions. Under the original
   The most important function the command                   joint task force plan, MarFor contracting elements
would provide was transportation, the nerve cen-             were located in Kenya, from where they provided
ter for which was in Mogadishu. "Because most                goods services to their brethren in Somalia. Army
of the force equipment and nearly all of the sup-            Forces Somalia contractors were established in
plies had to flow through the Port of Mogadishu,             Somalia itself. As necessary, requirements could
                                                             also be forwarded to contracting elements in the
                                                             Middle East or in Europe.361
the port operations became the logistics center of
gravity. The design of the [echelons above divi-
sion] port support structure was critical to sustain-           Army contracting officers operated under a
ment operations."358 Although the port's size and            double handicap. The Somali economy could only
limited berthing space caused competition                    be described as sparse since there was little to be
between arriving humanitarian cargo ships and                gotten from local sources. There were also struc-
military prepositioned afloat stocks, the 7th                tural difficulties for them to work around. Army
Transportation Group was able to establish an                Forces Somalia had deployed its own field-order-
effective command and control system for the ter-            ing officers early in the operation, and these sol-
minal operations. The group not only operated the            diers were able to make small purchases of serv-
port, it also controlled the inland distribution of          ices and supplies for their units. The U.S. Army
the supplies.359                                             component of Central Command imposed strin-
   The 593d Area Support Group was prominent                 gent restrictions on its subordinates in Somalia,
in establishing the logistics distribution structure.        most notably for the contract of labor services. A
Once again, the long distances covered by                    waiver to these restrictions had been requested,
UNITAF were a determining factor. The area sup-              but was denied until the Army Central Command
port group was specifically strengthened with                contracting officer could confirm the needs.
additional trucks, and those of the 7th                      Unfortunately, this officer had not yet arrived in
                                                             the theater. Army Forces Somalia's judge advo-
Transportation Group were also available for mis-
                                                             cate reviewed the situation and determined the
sions. To ensure supplies reached their intended
                                                             ordering officers could make the necessary pro-
users quickly and efficiently, the support group
                                                             curements. Eventually, in coordination with Army
established a series of intermediate theater sup-
                                                             Central Command, an acquisition officer was war-
port bases. These bases complemented each of the
                                                             ranted as a contracting officer and deployed to the
American Army and Marine divisions' own sup-
                                                             theater. This officer had the authority to make pur-
                                                             chases up to $100,000.362
port facilities. This made the distribution of sup-
plies easier since security operations in the sectors
were also conducted out of these fixed locations.               Another contracting system, tried for the first
In addition, the system kept down the requirement            time during an active campaign in Somalia, was
for additional combat troops because the logisti-            the logistics civil augmentation program. The pro-
cians could rely upon security from the combat               gram contract with the civilian firm of Brown and
units in these outlying sectors. In this manner, the         Root was started in 1992 through the U.S. Army
Support Command was able to provide direct sup-              Corps of Engineers. These civilians, working
ply maintenance support to the Army's non-divi-              under contract, arrived in Somalia to perform
sional units and backup support to both the Army             logistics tasks that otherwise would have fallen to
and Marine divisional units, as well as provide              the soldiers and Marines themselves. For instance,
common item supply support and services to the               they provided laundry services by hiring local
units of the coalition partners.360                          Somali women to do the job. They dug wells and
                                                             operated cranes and worked at the port. They gen-
   In the austere Somali environment, the ability            erated power for the camps and they provided and
to contract for goods and services was important             cleaned portable toilets. Overall, the program was
for provisioning complete logistics support. The             regarded as a major help to the operation,
                                                             although that help was expensive.363 Of a total of
                                                             $33 million originally appropriated for the con-
* The Support Command Site Security Force was originally     tract, $7.5 million remained by 5 March, with $5
a Moroccan company (-), assigned to this duty on 4 January   million of that fenced against the contractor's
1993. The Tunisians assumed the mission a few days later.    demobilization and draw down costs. More

                                                                                                        DVIC DD-SD-00-00778
A tank truck is filled with fresh water from a desalinization plant for distribution inland. The U.S. Air Force's 823d Civil
Engineering Squadron, also known as Red Horse, set up the plant at Mogadishu airport.

money had to be requisitioned to keep these                     force had delivered a total of 845.5 thousand gal-
important services functioning.364 *                            lons of water to the collection points.365
   If transportation was a key logistics function,                 In those early days, when 1st Force Service
the most critical commodity supplied to the troops              Support Group was providing the logistics sup-
was water. Drinking water alone was rated at four               port, every means available was used to carry the
to five liters per man per day. Water also was nec-             water. For the 7th Marines' movement to Baidoa,
essary for basic hygiene and cleaning clothing.                 water trailers were used and supplemented by
There were no sources of safe, potable water in                 five-gallon "jerry" cans filled with water and
Somalia when UNITAF arrived, so the coalition                   placed "in every nook and cranny of every vehi-
had to take extraordinary measures to provide the               cle." This allowed the Marines to carry 8,100 gal-
precious liquid.                                                lons on that initial trip. By the end of December,
   At first, ships in the port manufactured potable             regular convoys were set for every other day,
water. This was pumped ashore for transportation                bringing 14,000 gallons of water to Baidoa and
to the soldiers and Marines in the field. The                   Bardera on each run.366 But this effort, coupled
importance of this source can be gauged from the                with the need to resupply Bale Dogle, "stretched
statistics in the situation reports of the maritime             to the limit MarFor's ability to make and distrib-
prepositioning force. On 15 January, for instance,              ute water." Fortunately, Army Forces Somalia was
the prepositioning ship MV 1stLt Jack Lummus                    arriving with its bulk liquid assets by that time. As
(T-AK 3011) pumped 13.5 thousand gallons of                     these units became operational, they provided
water ashore. By that date, the prepositioning                  relief to the burdens of the Marines.367
                                                                   Another important source of water was in the
* Brown and Root operated these logistics civil augmenta-       ground of Somalia. The native population had
tion support programs successfully in Haiti, Rwanda, and        long centered some of their towns on deep wells.
Bosnia.                                                         Army engineers and Navy construction battalions
                                                                                 NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN             123

                                                                                                         DVIC DD-SD-00-00777
A water truck fills a large bladder, part of a tactical water distribution system. The 823d Red Horse Squadron set up
the system and accompanying shower facility at Mogadishu airport.

had the equipment to dig new wells or improve                       Commercial bottled water provided another
those that already existed. The well water still had             source of drinking water. Veterans of Desert
to be treated before it was deemed potable, or                   Storm were familiar with the clear plastic liter
even usable for washing. To achieve this, reverse                bottles containing pure water that could be easily
osmosis water purification units were put into                   distributed to the troops with their rations.
operation. These specialized units used a series of              Palletized loads were unloaded from ships direct-
membranes, filters, and chemicals to purify the                  ly onto trucks for transport throughout the the-
water. They could produce potable water from                     ater.* Troops still carried canteens, but they were
fresh sources, brackish groundwater, or seawater.                commonly seen with bottles of water sticking out
The purified water was then stored in large inflat-              of cargo pockets or next to them in vehicles.
able bladders from which it could be pumped as                      The increase in water production and distribu-
needed. By setting these units up in outlying areas              tion had one other benefit for the soldiers and
with wells, additional water was provided to the
local troops.*
                                                                 Marines on the ground. By early January 1993,
                                                                 bath units arrived in the theater and set up mobile
                                                                 shower units. Even in the midst of the hottest day
                                                                 coalition troops could look forward to a few min-
                                                                 utes of refreshing cool showering in the evening.
* There was similar work to improve the lot of the Somali        To match the clean bodies, the contracts for laun-
people as well. For instance, members of the 593d Area Sup-      dry services provided clean clothing and saved the
port Group repaired 18 of 20 wells serving Afgooye, and
then improved the reservoir system of the city of Mogadishu.
The level of the reservoir was raised from eight inches to
more than two meters, increasing the total volume of avail-
able water from 100,000 gallons to more than 3 million gal-
lons. For the first time in two years, the people of Mogadishu   * There was one notable incident in which a cargo ship could
had running water. (593d Area Support Group, FY 93 Annual        not be unloaded properly and a human chain of Marines was
Historical Review, Fort Lewis: Washington, Dec93, p. 2.)         used to pass bottles of water one at a time.

                                                                                                    DVIC DD-SD-00-00779
A KC-130 Hercules aircraft from Marine Aerial Transport Refueler Squadron 352 homebased at El Toro, California,
delivers needed fuel through expeditionary distribution system at Kismayo airfield.

troops the burden of washing their uniforms by                       Fuel was often delivered to outlying sectors by
hand.*                                                            air. Early in the operation, Marine Corps and Air
   As water was necessary to the health of the                    Force C-130 aircraft were used to make daily
coalition soldiers, so fuel was necessary to run                  flights to deliver fuel and other cargo. But as the
                                                                  Support Command became fully operational, the
                                                                  need for air delivery declined dramatically.370
their machines and vehicles. Like water, petrole-
um had been identified very early in the planning
process as a critical class of supply. An offshore                   The Support Command's 593d Area Support
petroleum distribution system allowed this com-                   Group brought ample fuel transport vehicles for
modity to be brought to the theater by ships,                     the task of bulk petroleum distribution. The real
which did not have to use precious berthing space                 problem encountered was a shortage of trained
at the port. The ships could stand offshore and                   drivers in some of the units. Army Forces Somalia
                                                                  remedied this by providing assistant drivers for
                                                                  these line-haul operations.371
pump the fuel to a storage and distribution
point.368 By the middle of January, maritime
                                                                      Medical Care and Health Issues
prepositioning force ships had pumped ashore a
total of 470,300 gallons of JP-5 (jet fuel) and
517,000 gallons of MoGas (a motor gasoline fuel
that can be used in some aircraft).369                               Living in Somalia presented several serious
                                                                  threats to the health of the coalition soldiers, and
                                                                  UNITAF had to be prepared to deal with them all.
* This chore, when performed by the troops, was not only          As with nearly every other logistics function,
drudgery, it was often futile. In the early days of the opera-    there were two levels of support organizations at
tion there was not enough water to get clothing really clean
or to rinse it out properly. Leaving the damp utilities hanging
                                                                  work: the first provided the initial medical infra-
from the lines of a tent or the branches of a tree then exposed   structure and the second, within the Support
them to the fine blowing sand, which made them stiff, gritty,     Command, was meant to be the long-term solu-
and uncomfortable.                                                tion. At first, each of the American components
                                                                           NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN           125

had its own medical units providing first-line sup-         unit level, had to be aware of the condition of their
port. These worked under the overall guidance of            troops, constantly watching for signs of heat
the UNITAF surgeon, Captain Michael L. Cowan,               stress. An advisory issued to UNITAF soldiers
USN. In addition, many of the larger coalition              stressed that they should work on the "weak link"
forces had their own internal medical organiza-             principle; that when one soldier succumbed to
tions.                                                      heat injuries or showed symptoms, the others
   After the possibility of wounds, the greatest            would not be far behind. Regulating work periods,
threat to the well being of coalition soldiers came         resting, staying in the shade when possible, and
from the very country itself. The hot and arid cli-         forcing liquids were all recommended measures
mate of Somalia posed a serious threat to                   to prevent heat casualties.
UNITAF personnel. The intensity of the sun dur-                Another environmental threat came from the
ing the daytime and any physical exertion drained           creatures and organisms that lived there. Some of
troops of fluids and electrolytes. The greatest             these were obvious; venomous snakes, spiders,
safeguard against dehydration and heat casualties           and scorpions could inflict painful and dangerous
was a program of awareness. Leadership at all lev-          bites. Other threats were not so easily noticed.
els was necessary to ensure preventive measures             Mosquitoes carried malaria, dengue fever, yellow
were carried out. The first of these was the replen-        fever, and other diseases. The bites of sand fleas
ishment of water. But having water available                could cause fevers and sores. Ticks carried hem-
could do no good if it was not consumed in the              orrhagic fever, typhus, and relapsing fever. Fleas
proper amounts. Leaders, especially on the small            were vectors for typhus, plague, and relapsing

                                                                                                 DVIC DD-SD-00-00821
Lt Patrick Cosmajkl of the U.S. Navy's Environmental and Preventative Medicine Unit, Naples, Italy, examines a slide
under the microscope for confirmation of a suspected Malaria case in the 1st Medical Battalion Field Hospital in

                                                                                                DVIC DD-SD-00-00823
HM3 Anthony Pacino, USN, records a patient's vital signs in a ward of the 1st Medical Battalion Field Hospital. The
use of mosquito nets was required because of the prevalence of malaria.

fever. Mere contact with the ground or water               deploying. Required immunizations were immune
could make a soldier prey to parasites and dis-            serum globulin, tetanus-diphtheria, oral polio,
eases. Hookworms lived in the soil, as did mud-            influenza, typhoid, yellow fever, meningococcal,
worms and whipworms that could be ingested if a            and measles. For malaria, the prophylactic meflo-
soldier did not wash his hands before eating.              quine was given to the troops on a weekly basis.373
Tetanus from puncture wounds was the real men-                 Captain Cowan recognized the challenge he
ace. The worms carrying snail fever could enter a          faced in guarding the task force's health as its sen-
body from exposure to the water of streams,
                                                           ior surgeon. The time-phased force deployment
rivers, or ponds. Mud fever came from contact
                                                           caused shortages of mosquito nets and insect
with water or mud contaminated with infected
                                                           spray, which had to be made up quickly. Apprising
animal urine. Prevention for all of these included
such simple practices as avoiding areas where              General Johnston of the situation, Captain Cowan
                                                           received the support he needed to get these items
                                                           to the troops.374 He also began a campaign to edu-
snakes, spiders, or scorpions might be lying.
Clothing and boots were shaken out before put-
ting them on and all personnel were warned to              cate the soldiers and Marines about the benefits of
avoid sleeping on the ground (all American per-            so simple an act as washing one's hands frequent-
sonnel were issued cots) or walking barefoot.              ly. Lister bags and bars of soap were placed where
Keeping trousers bloused and sleeves rolled down           they were most needed, outside of latrines and
helped avoid contact with insects, and repellants          near the entrances to mess facilities.
containing DEET (N,N-diethyl-meta-toluamide)                   To combat the spread of disease, Captain
were issued. All personnel had mosquito nets for           Cowan had three epidemiological units assigned
their cots. If soldiers or Marines had to enter bod-       to him. These units had a sophisticated serology,
ies of water, they were warned to keep their               parasitology, and bacteriology laboratory. They
trousers bloused and to cover as much of their
bodies as possible.372
                                                           were responsible for monitoring the health of the
                                                           personnel of units in the field and going out to any
   Vaccines were available for the prevention of           battalion aid station on the first sign of an epi-
many diseases, and troops were inoculated before           demic to stop it before it could take hold. These
                                                                              NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN          127

                                                                                                   DVIC DD-SD-00-00835
Maj Eric Edwards, USA, head nurse of Intensive Care Unit 1, 86th Combat Support Hospital, tends a wounded
Somali who had been caught in a crossfire during a gunfight on a Mogadishu street. His left leg was severely wound-
ed and eventually required amputation.

medical specialists identified areas from which                 able to transport any casualty to Mogadishu with-
diseases were spreading, enlisted local command                 in two hours. To answer this need, MarFor heli-
emphasis for the preventive medicine programs,                  copters from the amphibious assault ship USS
and stopped the incidents. An outbreak of dysen-                Tripoli (LPH 10) were placed forward in such
tery was stopped in Mogadishu. In Bardera,                      areas as Bardera, and they never missed the time
occurrences of malaria and dengue were swiftly                  limit for a critical medical evacuation. A casualty
brought under control.* Infected soldiers were                  clearing company in Mogadishu was ready to sta-
brought from the outlying areas back to                         bilize patients and then forward them on. In the
Mogadishu for proper treatment, and in most                     early days of the operation, this meant going to
cases returned to duty in four days.375                         the Tripoli, which was the only medical backup
   Medical evacuation was another health con-                   available in the theater. The combination of the
cern. Again, the distances in the theater were a                pervasive dust and the old style tents caused prob-
factor. Specific helicopters were assigned to aeri-             lems for the sterility of the clearing company's
al medical evacuation and were required to be                   modern and sophisticated equipment. As Captain
                                                                Cowan said: "This great new state-of-the-art
                                                                [equipment] is in 19th century tents, full of dust.
                                                                [The corpsmen] did a good job, but ... this [kind of
* A Center for Disease Control study indicated the effective-
                                                                structure] is definitely wrong, not for this climate,
                                                                not for the desert."376
ness of the preventive medicine programs. Of the thousands
of American personnel in Somalia during the time of
UNITAF, there were only 131 incidents of malaria, of which         The answer to many of the captain's concerns
83 appeared after the troops had returned home. (Center for
Disease Control, "Malaria Among U.S. Military Personnel
                                                                was within the Support Command. The initial
Returning From Somalia, 1993," CDC MMWR Weekly,                 planning for medical support was based on the
16Jul93, pp. 524-526.)                                          expectation of large numbers of casualties. This in

turn dictated the structure of the medical unit, the        Mombasa because its length was too great for
62d Medical Group. In addition to an evacuation          the docks there. So the 86th Hospital had to wait
hospital, there were the three medical companies         for its equipment to be brought in by air. This
(one each for ambulance, air ambulance, and              required adjustments to the time-phased deploy-
clearing), two sanitation detachments, an epi-           ment that interrupted the scheduled airflow, but
demiology detachment, an entomology detach-              the operations section's movements unit worked
ment, two veterinary detachments, a dental               wonders in getting the equipment into the theater.
detachment, and one for combat stress control.           The hospital was up and running by 6 January
The group even contained its own medical logis-          1993. The hospital consisted of four operating
tics battalion. The mission of this large unit was to    rooms and more than 100 beds for patients, in-
provide "comprehensive care to all U.S. forces           cluding an intensive care unit with 12 beds. With
involved in the security and humanitarian mission        the establishment of the Army hospital, the Navy
and to provide limited support to other coalition        casualty clearing company was able to depart. The
forces in the theater (i.e., on an emergency-only        62d Medical Group picked up all UNITAF med-
basis)."377                                              ical responsibilities by 28 January.378
   One of the 62d Group's first challenges was              The number of American troops supported by
receiving its planned hospital equipment. The            the 62d Medical Group reached a peak by mid-
Army barge-carrier vessel Green Valley (TAK              January, then declined through the transition to
2049), which carried the 86th Evacuation                 the United Nations at the beginning of May. The
Hospital's gear, had too deep a draft for the port       number of combat casualties was not nearly as
of Mogadishu. Not could the ship offload                 great as initially planned for. So the group, like

                                                                                             DVIC DD-SD-00-00858
Hospital Corpsman James Brown, USN, applies topical ointment to the arms of a Somali infant as part of the med-
ical civic action program conducted in the streets of Mogadishu by medical personnel from MEU Service Support
Group 15.
                                                                          NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN          129

                                                                                               DVIC DD-SD-00-00697
U.S. Air Force 1st Mobile Aeromedical Staging Flight personnel carry a patient from a Marine CH-46 Sea Knight hel-
icopter at Mogadishu airport.

other units, was able to scale back its personnel          accommodating the long distances, and since ade-
and organization for the follow-on medical units           quate fixed medical facilities would not be avail-
that arrived in early May. The surplus capability          able in the country, the evacuation hospital also
meant the medical staff was able to provide some           remained. The continuing threat of disease dictat-
services for Somalis, although this was not part of        ed keeping a large preventive medicine capabili-
their mission. It was always expected, however,            ty.380 By early May, the 86th Evacuation Hospital
that the American medics would treat any Somalis           was replaced by the 42d Field Hospital, a smaller
injured by American forces. Doing so had the               facility with only 32 beds. In its time of support to
additional benefit of maintaining skills. There also       UNITAF, the 86th provided service to a large
was a humanitarian aspect, the desire to treat an          number of the force's soldiers and Marines: there
injured fellow human being. But there was a two-           were 4,914 outpatient cases with 971 Americans
fold problem in providing treatment to these               admitted for treatment.381
Somali civilians. First, they were taking up beds,             Air evacuation was one of the most important
facilities, and medical stocks that might be need-         parts of medical planning. Original estimates
ed should there be a sudden surge of American
casualties.379 Second, there was the ethical dilem-
                                                           were for 200 patients per week showing up at the
                                                           battalion aid stations per 1,000 soldiers. The vast
ma of how to provide care that exceeded that               majority of this estimate was expected to be for
which would normally be found within the coun-             disease and non-battle injuries, with a smaller por-
try at large. As Captain Cowan noted, "we can't be         tion for combat injuries; but preparations still had
the medical facility of Somalia." An answer lay in         to be made for the movement of these persons
assisting local doctors and care providers, and in         within and out of the area of operations. The U.S.
the use of the facilities of the hospitals provided        Air Force's 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron
by some of the coalition partners, such as the             was tasked to develop the evacuation system for
Swedes and the Moroccans.                                  patients to third and fourth echelon medical facil-
   Even with American casualties lighter than              ities. Two aerial evacuation crews supplemented
expected, the 62d Medical Group had to maintain            the squadron, one each from the 183d and 156th
certain capabilities as it reduced the size of its         Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons. The 1st
force. An air ambulance was retained to continue           Aeromedical Squadron was located with the Air

Force's air mobility element and was composed of             The debarkation ports for these movements were
an aeromedical evacuation coordination center, a             at Cairo West, Egypt, and Ramstein and Rhine
mobile aeromedical staging facility, and the                 Main air bases in Germany. In some rare
aeromedical evacuation liaison team. By 19                   instances, casualties were flown directly from
December, all aeromedical evacuation personnel               Somalia to Germany on board strategic airlift
had arrived in Mogadishu. A separate aeromedical             using aerial refueling support.383
evacuation operations team and six evacuation                   For the first 90 days of the operation, the
crews deployed to Cairo West Airport, Egypt, to
support transiting evacuation missions.382
                                                             squadron moved a total of 304 casualties. Of
                                                             these, 38 were sent out of theater. By 10 March,
   Since the battalion aid stations in the humani-           the size of the aeromedical evacuation system was
tarian relief sectors had only limited medical               reevaluated in consideration of the actual needs of
capabilities, the evacuation plan was set for                the operation. On 19 March, all remaining 1st
patients to be moved to the larger and better-               Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron personnel
equipped facilities in Mogadishu and Mombasa,                redeployed and the evacuation mission was turned
Kenya. At first casualties were taken to the                 over to U.S. Air Force Reserve component per-
Tripoli. Later, as the Army's 86th Evacuation                sonnel. The reserve airmen were stationed in
Hospital became operational, patients stayed at              Cairo West, and rotated into Somalia as
that facility in Mogadishu or the one in Mombasa.            required.384

Evacuation aerial ports of embarkation were
established in the theater at Kismayo, Bardera,
Gialalassi, Oddur, Belet Weyne, and Baidoa. The
aerial ports of debarkation for these flights were              UNITAF was provided numerous engineering
in Mogadishu and Mombasa. Serious cases need-                assets and capabilities. Some coalition members
ing even higher levels of treatment were sent out            brought their own engineer units, often specifical-
of theater. Embarkation ports for these evacuation           ly sent to clear mines and undertake local work
missions were established at Mogadishu,                      projects. In addition, each of the U.S. Armed
Mombasa, Djibouti, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.                Services had internal engineer units.

                                                                                               Photo courtesy of the author
A merchant ship carrying vital relief cargo arrives at the port of Kismayo shortly after coalition forces reopened that
                                                                   NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN          131

   The task force's engineer staff consisted of 34   oversaw the work of the various engineer units of
individuals from all Services. Under the leader-     the components, ensuring it all fit within the task
ship of Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA, the task     force's requirements. The UNITAF engineers'
force engineer, they were divided into two sec-      mission was to "protect U.S. and allied troops;
tions. The facilities section was responsible for    repair and maintain needed sea and air ports, other
real estate management and all related functions,    logistics facilities, roads and bridges, and com-
such as the location of the tent cities and bases,   mand and control facilities; and construct bases to
                                                     support coalition forces."385
hazardous waste storage, and coordination of
vehicle parks and wash down sites. This section
also managed critical engineer supplies such as         The first engineering task was to improve and
dust palliatives, plywood sheets, lumber, electri-   repair the theater infrastructure. Ports and airfields
cal, and concertina wire. The operations section     were given top priority. In Mogadishu, the engi-

neers cleared the port's docks and warehouses.           els for aircraft turnarounds, parking aprons, and
They also acquired additional adjacent space and         helipads. Similar work, but on a lesser scale, was
more warehouses to increase the port's capacity.         done at the airfields at Bale Dogle and Bardera. At
In Kismayo, engineer divers removed sunken               the former site, the Seabees worked alongside
hulks and prepared the port to receive shallow-          Marines of Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 to
draft vessels. As the area of operations expanded,       build landing and staging areas for CH-53 heli-
repairs and maintenance were performed at each           copters and taxiways and turnaround areas for C-
of the airfields.                                        130 aircraft.389
   As soon as the initial objectives were secured,          The Air Force also had specialized engineers
Marine engineer assets were quickly put to work          for airfield repair. These airmen belonged to an
at Mogadishu port and the airfield. As the opera-        organization called "Red Horse," an acronym for
tion moved inland, and as the coalition grew in          rapid engineer deployable heavy operational
numbers, these Marines brought their skills to           repair squadron engineer. Like the Navy Seabees,
new sectors. Soon they were helping build a bet-         these engineer specialists provided assistance in
ter quality of life for their comrades in the field.     base camp construction. But their larger, and more
They repaired roads and constructed base camps,          important, mission was to "perform heavy dam-
tent areas, heads, and mess facilities. Marine           age repair" to facilities and utilities in an expedi-
Corps explosive ordnance disposal personnel also         tionary environment. The austere setting and
destroyed confiscated ordnance and rounds and
mines discovered in the field.386
                                                         degraded infrastructure in Somalia made these
                                                         airmen key players in the operation.390 *
   The Navy supplied two mobile construction                They went to work early. On 10 December, a
battalions to the engineer effort. These "Seabee"        team was testing the airfield at Bale Dogle for
units were a part of the 30th Naval Construction         serviceability for C-141 aircraft. With an Air
Regiment. The first of the Seabees, a nine-man           Force combat control team on hand and Special
advance party, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 De-            Forces soldiers for protection at the remote loca-
cember and were immediately put to use repairing
the runway lights at the Mogadishu airfield.387
                                                         tion, the Red Horse team used a specialized piece
                                                         of equipment to check the runway surface. This
   The construction battalions' main mission was         was a large, weighted rod that could be dropped
to provide "vertical construction support" to the        from a set height. The weight was dropped on the
United States forces and coalition partners. This        runway surface and the depth of its penetration
translated to working on base camps in the relief        was measured.391 Of the 10,500-foot runway, the
sectors, to include building tent areas with wood-       first 4,500 feet were determined unserviceable
en decks and siding, latrines, showers, and mess         and repairs were quickly begun.
facilities. Like the Marines, the Seabees worked
                                                            The Army's 36th Engineer Group was respon-
on the main supply routes, grading shoulders to
                                                         sible for one of the operation's most important
widen the roads and making repairs to bridges.
They also drilled wells and installed a new water        construction projects. This was the repair of the
pump for a refugee camp on the banks of the              main supply network and the construction of what
Jubba River near Bardera. They joined their              became known as the "Somali Road."
Marine counterparts in the Clean Street operations          The task force staff recognized that improve-
in Mogadishu and prepared the site for the Army          ment of the road system would provide multiple
evacuation hospital.388                                  benefits for the entire operation. First, it would
   Both mobile construction battalions were heav-        enhance security by connecting all the humanitar-
ily involved in the repair and maintenance of the        ian relief sectors and reducing the travel time
airfields in the theater. Relief flights by C-130 air-
craft into Baidoa caused that airstrip to deteriorate    * Red Horse teams moved into each of the relief sectors as
early in the operation. Repairs involved removing        they were opened, often accompanying the troops. The
300,000 square feet of the runway's asphalt sur-         author watched one such team operating the morning after
face and pulverizing it. This material was then          the Italians secured Gialalassi airfield. When it was deter-
                                                         mined the dirt runway was not sturdy enough to take the
mixed with Portland cement and poured, graded,           wear of heavy aircraft, the Red Horse engineers discovered
and compacted to make a new surface. The                 an abandoned roller on a part of the field. They soon had it in
Seabees then put down 600,000 square feet of             repair and running across the field in an early attempt to
AM2 interconnecting aluminum landing mat pan-            compact and upgrade it.
                                                                          NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN           133

                                                                                                DVIC DD-SD-00-00891
Soldiers of Company A, 41st Engineer Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, celebrate the completion of a Bailey Bridge
they erected between Kismayo and Jilib. The bridge was named for Sean Devereaux, a UNICEF worker killed while
endeavoring to feed thousands of starving people in southern Somalia.

between them. This in turn would mean that fewer              Work began on 20 January 1993 and proceeded
forces would be required in theater to cover the           rapidly. Many difficulties were encountered but
same amount of ground. Rapid-moving convoys                overcome. Mine removal operations were neces-
could more efficiently deliver relief supplies. Safe       sary on some stretches to open the way to the inte-
and quick movement on the roads would also ben-            rior. Mines were a persistent problem throughout
efit the people of the interior by providing them          the entire area of operations and were not limited
with a means of getting their products from farms          to roadways, although they caused considerable
and herds to markets in the cities. Contracted             trouble there. Commander William F. Boudra,
labor would provide jobs for local Somalis and             USN, of the UNITAF staff described what the
boost the overall economy. Finally, the roads              engineers faced:
would give the factions an easy means to move                 Massive quantities of land mines and unex-
their forces and heavy weapons to transition sites            ploded ordnance dotted roads and the
and cantonment areas. The 36th Engineer Group                 Somalian landscape. Our forces encountered
was given the mission of working on the main                  a variety of mines and other munitions man-
supply routes and creating the Somali Road to                 ufactured by many different countries.
connect all the sectors.392 General Johnston,                 Because operational procedures called for
through his engineering staff, specified standards            marking and bypassing mines and unexplod-
for the road system: "All supply and resupply                 ed ordnance, we used minesweeping teams
routes were made to carry two-way traffic at mil-             frequently. Marking, however, had to be aus-
itary load class 30 and used soil stabilization               tere because any valuable materials would
where possible."393                                           certainly be stolen. We settled on painting

   mine warnings on rocks. Breaching mine                                      Communications
   and [unexploded ordnance] areas to open
   routes was required on numerous occasions.                        Another important method to link the area of
   Several methods were employed. Teams                          operations was effective communications. For
   equipped with metallic mine detectors were                    UNITAF, this responsibility fell to the communi-
   used but their value was limited because                      cations section, whose members had to work
   most mines and ordnance were non-metal-
   lic.* Therefore, we used field expedient mine
                                                                 closely with the components and with the forces
                                                                 of the coalition partners.
   rollers made from locally procured and mod-
   ified construction compactors pushed by                           Colonel Robert G. Hill faced a daunting task as
   armored combat vehicles. This method                          the UNITAF communications officer. In early
   proved very effective. Both explosive ord-                    December, as he was building his joint team
   nance detachments and Sappers were put to                     through the Central Command administration
   work on countermine and [unexploded ord-                      officer, he was planning his own concept of sup-
   nance] neutralization operations.394                          port for the overall mission and the courses of
   Other difficulties came from the condition of                 action. The communications section would be
the road surface in various stretches, requiring                 responsible for identifying and sourcing needed
decisions about whether these areas should be                    equipment, and then installing and operating it.
repaired or bypassed. Where available, locally                   The system had to link the commander to his staff,
procured surface aggregate was used to fill holes.               the components, and the coalition partners, and
                                                                 had to provide support for operations, intelli-
                                                                 gence, and personnel and logistics functions.397
In other cases, the roadways were patched with
mixtures of soil and cement, and dust palliatives
were put down throughout the routes. Bridges                     The communications network would have to work
were repaired or strengthened as necessary. In                   over long distances in theater and be able to reach
some areas, the road had to be entirely rebuilt.395              literally around the world when needed, and be set
The portion between Jilib and Bardera had to be                  up within the bare infrastructure environment that
laid down on a different route through new terrain.              affected every other aspect of the operation.
In the Kismayo sector, two Bailey bridges were                       Prior to deployment, the communications sec-
constructed and a third was set up in Bardera.                   tion worked with MarFor to set the basic commu-
   Five weeks of heavy, hurried labor completed                  nications plan. Communications nodes would be
the job. On 24 February, the Somali Road was fin-                established at each of the relief sectors as they
ished. The engineer group had constructed or                     were secured. These nodes would be "constructed
repaired more than 1,100 kilometers of roadways,                 around an AN/TSC-93 spoke terminal and would
connecting all of the humanitarian relief sectors.               consist of a switching capability, communications
The interior of the entire area of operations was                center, two high-frequency radios, two tactical
                                                                 satellite terminals, and a local area network serv-
opened to the movement of relief supplies, the
transportation of local produce, and the resettle-
ment of refugees. More importantly, driving time                     Equipment came from a variety of sources.
between sectors dropped dramatically. It had orig-               Colonel Hill knew I MEF's normal equipment
inally taken 26 hours to travel by vehicle from                  load could not meet the dual requirements placed
Mogadishu to Kismayo; now it took only 12.                       on it, to support both the new task force head-
Travel time between other sectors dropped by 50                  quarters and the 1st Marine Division acting as
to 75 percent. This major engineering feat was a                 MarFor. He therefore asked for augmentation of
great success, one that contributed to the security              satellite communications and single-channel radio
of the force and the completion of its mission.396               systems through the joint communications sup-
                                                                 port element, an organization under the control of
                                                                 the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The communications ele-
* In Oddur, the author saw a stockpile of several hundred        ment controlled a pool of equipment to support
cases of such antipersonnel mines. These were simply made        two joint task force headquarters; some of this
of wood with a hinged top for inserting the charge and a         was duly allotted for UNITAF's use. This equip-
small opening in one side for placing the detonator. These
devices could be placed in the ground with pressure-sensitive
                                                                 ment provided the connectivity from the task
detonators or rigged as booby traps with trip wires. With lit-   force headquarters to the components, which then
tle metallic content, they would have been difficult to find     supplied the necessary equipment on their end.
with traditional metal detectors.                                Internal support came from the 9th
                                                                         NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN               135

                                                                                                  DVIC DD-SD-00-00707
On a rise overlooking Mogadishu airport, TSgt Jack Richards, Sgt Derrick Hawkins, and A1C Charles Layne, of the
U.S. Air Force's 5th Combat Communications Squadron, conduct daily maintenance on the microwave dish of a
tropo satellite support radio system.

Communications Battalion and the communica-              using Air Force transmission systems, and Army
tions company of the 1st Marine Division.399             units were using Marine gear. Overall, however,
                                                         the ability to use whatever equipment was at hand
                                                         was judged to have worked well.401
   Communications with the outside world were
established early in the deployment. The task
force headquarters was connected to Central                  The need to be prepared to operate in a bare
Command in Tampa, Florida, by a single-channel           environment caused one noticeable problem. As
tactical communications satellite. Satellite com-        some units arrived they brought commercial satel-
munications also were established between Fort           lite equipment with them that would ensure reli-
Meade, Maryland, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.400            able communications anywhere in the world. By
                                                         attaching a STU-III, secure communications
                                                         could also be achieved.* Ironically, the conven-
   A communications support element van arrived
with limited telephone connectivity. This helped
to expand internal communications, albeit on a           ience of this equipment was also its greatest
small scale. As the coalition's forces moved into        weakness. This was a commercial system, and
the relief sectors, connectivity was provided to         there was an expensive cost to its use. Some units
keep the soldiers and Marines on the ground              had borrowed the equipment from their non-
linked to the headquarters at Mogadishu. An early        deployed comrades, creating an interesting dilem-
problem was encountered when some component              ma: who would pay the user fees, the owner or the
forces arrived before their command and control
assets. This led to borrowing of equipment among
                                                         * TacSat, InMarSat, and STU-III (secure telephone unit,
U.S. forces to ensure that all missions were prop-       third generation) are all communications systems and pieces
erly covered. As more equipment arrived, so too          of equipment. TacSat is a military satellite system that uses
did the opportunity to normalize things along            communication repeaters that work with the terminal equip-
Service lines. But, even by late January, there          ment of land, sea, and air forces. InMarSat is a commercial
were still anomalies. Because of the mix of units        satellite communications operator that provides telephone,
                                                         fax, and data transmission services to client ground, sea, and
and missions there, the American components at           air users. The STU-III is a voice encryption device that
the port and airfield at Mogadishu displayed a cor-      allows speakers to discuss classified matters over a telephone
responding mix of equipment. Marine units were           by scrambling the sound.

using unit? Colonel Hill soon recognized he had          classified information. For them, liaison officers
to get control of the number and use of these sets       were assigned. These officers accompanied the
in theater.402                                           partners in the field, and they carried the appro-
   Communications with the coalition partners            priate U.S. communications equipment.403 In this
presented some challenges. Where NATO mem-               manner, all units of the task force, no matter what
bers were operating there was no great difficulty        their size or mission, were linked through
because of the interoperability of equipment and         UNITAF headquarters.
procedures. For the other nations, all manner of            A greater difficulty was communicating with
communication issues had to be resolved.                 UNOSOM headquarters, even though it was
Frequency assignment was a concern, but direct           located less than a half mile from the UNITAF
contact with the UNITAF frequency manager kept           compound. Telephone landlines, which would
all partners on separate networks. Communica-            normally be an easy method of connecting with
tions security was another matter that had to be         U.N. forces, could not be used because the wire
addressed, both among the United States compo-           would have been stolen as soon as it was strung.
nents and the partners. It would be inappropriate        In addition, both headquarters used different radio
for every organization in theater to be receiving its    communications equipment. A solution was to
own secure communications deliveries. So a joint         issue hand-held radios, called "bricks," for both
communications security management office was            headquarters. Even then difficulties were encoun-
formed as a central point for the delivery and dis-      tered due to the different voltages of the battery
tribution of all such messages and materials. This       chargers each headquarters used. Such small mat-
office also was responsible for working with the         ters were difficult to foresee, but each was
Defense Courier System to ensure the proper              resolved as it was encountered through the appli-
receipt of all such materials. But the non-NATO          cation of a cooperative attitude and a desire to get
coalition partners were not cleared to receive such      the job done.404

                                                                                             DVIC DD-SD-00-00907
U.S. Air Force SSgt Rick Robinson of the 52d Combat Communications Squadron adjusts an SB3865 tactical tele-
phone switch at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. The squadron provided communications support for the Air Force's
Air Mobility element.
                                                                            NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN           137

                                                                                                  DVIC DD-SD-00-00791
A soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) hands leaflets to several Somalis on the streets
of Kismayo.

         Psychological Operations                           Psychological Operations Group (Airborne). The
                                                            nucleus of the task force came from the 8th
   Lieutenant General Johnston knew the success-            Psychological Operations Battalion and the
ful completion of his mission would be greatly              Product Dissemination Battalion. The 9th
helped by a well-run psychological operation                Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical)
effort. "Having understood the potential impact of          provided two brigade psychological operations
PSYOP [psychological operations], I was                     support elements and eight loudspeaker teams.
                                                            These last units were attached to the 7th Marines,
                                                            and the Army's 10th Mountain Division.406
extremely interested in having PSYOP up front
for this operation because I knew ... that it would
prevent armed conflict. ... You come in with tanks             The joint psychological operations task force
and people think you're there to hurt them.                 had the mission of providing information and
PSYOP worked well to convince [Somalis] that                coordinating communications to two target audi-
we were there with the military capability to take          ences. The first group included those persons and
care of the factions and their little armies--that          organizations General Johnston had to work
we were going to provide support and safety."405            closely with to accomplish the mission: the spe-
   To ensure this valuable support was planned              cial envoy, UNOSOM, United Nations agencies,
and integrated into the UNITAF operation, a joint           and the humanitarian relief sectors. The second
psychological operation task force was organized            group was the Somalis, comprised of the general
under the supervision of the director of opera-             Somali population, the leaders of the factions, eld-
                                                            ers from the clans and villages, religious leaders,
                                                            and professionals and intellectuals.407
tions, Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni. This
specialized task force, under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA, was                  The task force accomplished its information
formed from elements of the Army's 4th                      dissemination mission through a variety of prod-

                                                                                                 DVIC DD-SD-00-00792
On the streets of Kismayo, a soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion distributes copies of Rajo, the
Somali-language newspaper. The paper proved to be an effective tool in providing UNITAF information to the Somali
ucts. Leaflets were easily produced and widely              peace and reconciliation talks. Other features
distributed. These small sheets usually had a col-          dealt with public health information, articles
orful picture on one side and a related message in          about rebuilding the educational system and
Somali on the other. Themes ranged from an                  police forces, and interviews with relief staff
explanation of the purposes of the coalition forces         members. One other popular feature was a cartoon
to information about the dangers of mines and               featuring a Somali named Celmi and his camel
unexploded ordnance. These were distributed to              Mandeeq. The conversations between these two
target areas by aircraft. Throughout the operation          characters emphasized the themes of the coali-
several types of aircraft were used: Marine Corps           tion's mission and what current operations were
CH-53 helicopters; USAF and Canadian C-130                  accomplishing. The first copy of this paper was
Hercules airplanes; Army UH-60 and UH-1 heli-               published on 20 December 1992, and it soon had
copters; Navy S-3 Viking airplanes; and New                 a daily run of 15,000 to 28,000 copies, depending
Zealand C-748 Andover airplanes.408                         on the availability of paper. It was distributed to
   Another printed product was a Somali-lan-                every town and village in which UNITAF soldiers
guage newspaper named Rajo, the Somali word                 were deployed. The paper was apparently effec-
for hope. The staff of the paper included soldiers          tive in getting out UNITAF information to the
from the 4th Psychological Operations Group,                Somalis. As U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Robert
civilian area experts, and Somali linguists. They           B. Oakley later told the Rajo staff: "We are using
produced articles about military operations in              Rajo to get the correct information into the hands
Mogadishu and the other relief sectors, relief              of the Somali population and to correct distor-
operations, redevelopment, and analyses of the              tions. ... It has made a big difference. The faction
                                                                        NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN            139

leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every
once in a while [General Mohamed Farah Hassan]
Aideed or Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] or one of the
other faction leaders draws to my attention some-
thing that appeared in the newspaper. So they're
very, very sensitive to it and they know its
   In cooperation with the newspaper, UNITAF
established a Somali-language radio station, also
named Rajo. Radio Rajo offered the Somali peo-
ple a choice from the faction-controlled radio sta-
tions as a source of information. Twice a day, the
station broadcast a 45-minute program consisting
of news stories from the Rajo newspaper, world
events, readings from the Quran, readings of
Somali stories and poetry, and Somali music. The
broadcasts were designed to encourage the Somali
factions to settle their differences and rebuild their
country. There were several specific themes the                                                DVIC DD-SD-00-00812
station staff wove into the broadcasts. These were       A young Somali boy holds one of several leaflets pre-
to emphasize the neutrality of the coalition and         pared and distributed as part of UNITAF's psychologi-
ensure listeners that the rules of engagement            cal operations effort. The leaflet portrays a Somali man
would be applied fairly against all factions as nec-     shaking the hand of a U.S. soldier, thereby emphasiz-
essary; to highlight the capabilities of the coali-      ing that the United States was in Somali as a friend try-
tion and the work its members were doing, espe-          ing to help end the suffering.
cially those from African or Islamic countries; to
encourage disarmament and highlight the agree-           emphasis to the coalition messages in the Rajo
ments made by the faction leaders; to reinforce          paper and radio broadcasts by meeting with vil-
the idea that only the Somali people could resolve       lage elders and local religious leaders.412
their problems and encourage the rebuilding of
                                                            Psychological operations teams supported
the country's social infrastructure; to encourage
                                                         every UNITAF action from the very start of the
displaced people to return home and harvest or
                                                         operation. On 9 December, loudspeaker teams
plant crops; and to emphasize that there would be
                                                         accompanied the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
no change in the rules of engagement or capabili-
                                                         during the initial landings. A Marine CH-53 car-
ties during the transition from UNITAF to UNO-
SOM II.410
                                                         ried a team for the first leaflet drop over the city
                                                         of Mogadishu. After that, loudspeakers and leaflet
   The radio station was located at UNITAF head-         drops were a part of each movement of coalition
quarters in the U.S. Embassy compound. It broad-         forces into the relief sectors. Two to three days
cast on a combination of midwave and shortwave           before the arrival of UNITAF soldiers into a town,
frequencies. With extensive adjustments to the           the teams dropped special handshake leaflets that
transmitting antenna, the Rajo shortwave pro-            depicted a Somali and a coalition soldier shaking
grams could be received in every city and town in
each of the relief sectors.411
                                                         hands and explained the mission of the coalition
                                                         to assist the relief operations. While emphasizing
   One other method of getting out the UNITAF            the peaceful intent of the coalition, these leaflets
message was through loudspeaker teams.                   also clearly stated that UNITAF was prepared to
Accompanying troops during operations, these             take any necessary action: "We are prepared to
teams broadcast surrender appeals and gave               use force to protect the relief operation and our
instructions to crowds or to Somalis in arms mar-        soldiers. We will not allow interference with food
kets or at roadblocks. The team members helped           distribution or with our activities." After UNITAF
to distribute copies of the Rajo newspaper. They         forces moved into a sector other leaflets were
also worked closely among the people, gathering          dropped over the cities and villages and along the
important information and assessing the security         routes leading to it. These showed Somali people
environment. They gave an added, personal                waving to a guarded convoy of relief trucks, and

explained: "We are here to protect relief convoys."                Civil-Military Operations
They also warned: "Do not block roadways! Force
will be used to protect the convoys."413                     While most of the structures created by
   Loudspeaker teams were conspicuous during              UNITAF were internal, that is, created to assist its
the Marine assault against the weapons storage            own forces in accomplishing the mission, there
sites in Mogadishu in early January and in the            was one that looked externally, to the humanitari-
                                                          an relief organizations. These organizations,
Army's efforts against the forces of Mohamed
                                                          working directly with the people of Somalia, were
Said Hirsi (General Morgan) in Kismayo in                 the link between the military security mission and
February. They accompanied coalition forces on            the end of famine. They worked in a wide variety
sweeps of arms markets and during Clean Street            of areas, distributing food, providing medical care
operations. Special leaflets explained the intent of      and assistance, helping with agricultural and vet-
these operations and in February a very specific          erinary problems, assisting refugees and displaced
one was directed at the forces of General Morgan.         persons, digging wells for clean water and work-
The leaflet explained the ultimatum issued by the         ing on other small civil projects. They occupied a
UNITAF commander and told Morgan's men they               unique place in the mosaic of the operation;
must move by the deadline of 25 February, "or             manned by civilian staffs and controlled by indi-
risk destruction."414                                     vidual parent organizations, they were highly
                                                          independent. They also were an important part of
   These task force activities were of great value        the solution to Somalia's woes. They truly were
to UNITAF, clearly demonstrating a benign and             partners in the operation, and their needs had to be
neutral stance balanced with a will to use force if       considered and met.
necessary. Speaking of the loudspeaker teams,                The relationships with the relief organizations
Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, the MarFor              did not have to be created entirely from whole
commander, summed up the value of the psycho-             cloth. During his time in Operation Provide
logical operations efforts: "They reduced the             Comfort in Iraq, Brigadier General Zinni had seen
amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing             the value of establishing an entity to coordinate
Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight."415         civil and military efforts. He wanted to repeat the

                                                                                              DVIC DD-SD-00-00790
Soldiers from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion ride in a humvee broadcasting messages to local Somalis
gathered on a street in Kismayo. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division walk alongside providing security.
                                                                           NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN          141

process used in the Kurdish relief operation by              tions with specialty interests such as agriculture,
establishing a similar group in Somalia.416 Also,            sanitation, health, and education. The loose con-
the United States Government, through the State              nections of all these groups into one organization
Department, had created a number of organiza-                meant it had little real authority. The director
tions whose primary mission was to provide dis-              responded to the U.N., and the deputies to either
aster assistance and economic aid, as well as fur-           the Agency for International Development or
nish the structures by which these could operate in          UNITAF. The relief agencies were responsible to
foreign countries.                                           their parent organizations. The center was able to
   As early as August 1992, the United States                do one thing well; it established the forum for all
Government had been supporting the relief organ-             these organizations to discuss and coordinate their
izations in Somalia through these agencies. The              needs and efforts. The main center was estab-
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a part of the         lished with the U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu
                                                             on 11 December. Thereafter, a center was estab-
                                                             lished in each humanitarian relief sector.418
United States Agency for International
Development, had established a disaster assis-
tance response team for Somalia. Two disaster                   Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, a veteran of
response teams also operated in Nairobi and                  cyclone relief operations in Bangladesh, had been
Mombasa, as coordinating agencies for Operation              the chief of staff for Operation Provide Relief
Provide Relief.417 With the military intervention in         since August. He was, therefore, familiar with
December the requirement grew for closer coop-               many of the key players in the humanitarian oper-
eration among all parties.                                   ations community, whether they were United
   During Operation Provide Relief, humanitarian             States Government workers or relief organization
relief organizations had already begun to tax the            personnel. He was selected to be the military
military command with requests for assistance. To            deputy director of the humanitarian operations
                                                             center and head the main civil-military operations
                                                             cell in Mogadishu.419
reduce these direct requests and to coordinate the
military response to them, a humanitarian opera-
tions center was established. This center was                   As part of the operations center, the cell was
staffed with military officers, workers from the             the clearinghouse for requests of the relief organ-
Agency for International Development and some                izations for military support such as convoy
relief workers. This worked well for Provide                 escorts, security of facilities, space-availability on
Relief, and so a center was established in                   military flights, and technical assistance.420
Mogadishu for Restore Hope. The operations cen-              Colonel Kennedy saw his duties as working in
ter had a simple mission: to plan, support, and              two directions. The cell was the link for the relief
monitor the delivery of relief supplies; but it had a        organizations to the military of UNITAF and
complex organization, reflecting the mix of mili-            UNOSOM. He also had to work closely with
tary, governmental, international, and civilian              Ambassador Oakley and the UNITAF staff to
humanitarian aid members. The director was                   coordinate their support. He assisted the humani-
Philip Johnston, a United Nations official and a             tarian organizations to define their logistics
member of UNOSOM.* There were two deputy                     requests so they could get what they actually
directors; one, a civilian, was from the response            needed, such as the berthing of relief ships, the
team, and the other was a military officer from              staging of containers, and setting convoy routes
UNITAF. The center contained a standing liaison              and times. Colonel Kennedy saw the cell needed
committee, composed of members from UNO-                     to be an institution that continued beyond the life
SOM, UNITAF, the disaster assistance response                of UNITAF. He therefore worked with the
team, United Nations and Red Cross agencies,                 Japanese, Germans, Canadians, and others in the
and an executive committee to represent the non-             solicitation of funds. He also was involved in the
governmental organizations. A bloc called the                development and implementation of relief policy,
"Core Groups" represented those relief organiza-             working with the United Nation's 100-Day Plan,
                                                             and creating a similar plan through 1993 for pres-
                                                             entation at the Addis Ababa conferences.421
* Philip Johnston was then the president of CARE USA, and
                                                                The main cell in Mogadishu did not have a
had been appointed by United Nations Secretary General       large staff, but it was a busy organization. There
Boutros Boutros-Ghali to lead a 100-day action program for   were daily meetings to which all relief organiza-
accelerated humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

                                                                                   Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz
Representatives of the major humanitarian relief organizations gather for a daily meeting in the civil-military opera-
tions center in Mogadishu. Based on a similar organization established during the Kurdish relief effort in Iraq, the
center endeavored to coordinate the civil and military efforts.

tions were invited, along with representatives of            ability, and the repair and condition of the road
the United Nations and the disaster response                 system.422
teams. This was in keeping with Colonel Ken-                     Just as each relief sector had a humanitarian
nedy's desire to be inclusive. These meetings                operations center, each also had its own civil-mil-
were used to discuss upcoming humanitarian                   itary cell, which maintained contact with Colonel
operations, exchange information, and pass on                Kennedy's central organization in Mogadishu.
intelligence. The main cell also had a variety of            These small teams of Marine or Army officers
relief-related responsibilities. It promulgated and          worked closely with the sector commanders and
explained UNITAF policies to the relief organiza-            helped provided the same types of support to their
tions, and it worked closely with the UNITAF op-             local relief organizations. They also were given
erations section in conducting mission planning              latitude to work with the local security commit-
for requests that needed complicated support,                tees and councils.
required more than one military unit, or that in-
                                                                 Convoy escorts were probably the most visible
volved more than one organization. It chaired the
                                                             support the military gave the relief organizations.
Mogadishu port shipping committee to coordinate              When an organization was expecting to move a
access to the port and pier space. It maintained a           convoy of trucks loaded with relief supplies, they
24-hour watch to respond to emergency requests               filled out a standard request and submitted it to the
from relief organizations and coordinate them                operations cell at least 48 hours in advance. The
with the UNITAF staff. It also helped to create a            cell then tasked either a U.S. or coalition partner
food logistics system for the organizations. This            with escort duty. The relief organization and the
system monitored food stocks, tracked delivery               military unit then had authorization for direct liai-
dates, listed warehouse capacities, transport avail-
                                                                             NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN          143

son. The component or coalition partner control-               every place needed UNITAF protection every day,
ling the relief sector that a convoy was going to              there were times when threats, real or perceived,
was generally tasked with escort duty. Convoys                 made it appropriate to call for such assistance.
going to those sectors closest to Mogadishu                       At such times, staffs of the relief organizations
(Baidoa, Bardera, Merka, and Gialalassi) received              could call a "911-type" emergency number in the
security escorts all the way to their destinations,            civil-military operations center. The request was
but farther districts would split the responsibility.          then passed on to the UNITAF joint operations
For instance, if a convoy was going to Belet                   center, where it was assigned to a component or
Weyne, the Italians would escort it beyond                     coalition unit. Again, this was an easy process, but
Gialalassi, and the Canadians would meet them
and take it the rest of the way.423
                                                               it had its limitations. First, there were four levels
                                                               the request had to go through: the relief organiza-
   This was a rather simple process that worked                tion; the civil-military operations center; the joint
well. For the first 90 days of the operation,                  operations center; and then on to the military unit.
UNITAF averaged 70 escorts a month, with                       Response time was increased, therefore, by the
monthly averages of 700 trucks carry 9,000 met-                request moving along this chain, no matter how
ric tons.* Convoy security gave the relief organi-             quickly each entity tried to pass it on. Also, there
zations an additional benefit; they could use                  were numerous sites that might have to be guard-
trucks to move food to distant areas, so they could            ed. Mogadishu alone had 585, and there were
provide more food at less cost than they had been              more throughout the rest of the area of operations.
able to bring in by airplane. This security not only           Consolidation of facilities and spaces could have
allowed the World Food Program to bring in its                 eased this problem, but the relief sites remained
own fleet of trucks, but also increased competition            dispersed.426
among the local transportation providers, further
lowering costs.424
                                                                  In addition to simple security needs, the relief
                                                               organizations also required advice and, from time
   There were some difficulties. Coordination                  to time, direct assistance. Brigadier General
between relief organizations and military units                Zinni, in an assessment of the operation made in
was not always perfect. Occasionally an escort                 March, saw it proceeding on three tracks. There
unit was not informed of delays in the formation               were the obvious military and political portions.
and start times of convoys. Locally hired trucks               Then there was the humanitarian aspect, which he
were subject to breakdowns, often the result of                described as going beyond the "short-term sense
deliberate sabotage by their drivers who sought to             of getting food and emergency care to the people
obtain a portion of the shipment when the rest of              that are in jeopardy, but it's also the long-term
the convoy had to proceed without them. There                  reconstruction in terms of getting public services
were some days when there were simply not                      started: hospitals, public works, that sort of
enough assets to provide security for all the                  thing."427 He had praise for Philip Johnston and
requested convoys. Some would have to wait, but                his work with the United Nations in the humani-
eventually all convoys received an escort.425                  tarian operations center, and the establishment of
   Convoys were not the only humanitarian relief               the plan for the development of the country. But
organization assets that required security. The                providing the kind of actions envisioned was dif-
organization oversaw hundreds of offices, ware-                ficult.
houses, distribution centers, clinics, and housing                The problems with giving this kind of assis-
for their staff personnel. These facilities, located           tance were limitations under United States law of
throughout the country, often fell prey to bandits             what the military could provide and the obscure
since they contained food, medicines, and cash.                boundary between legitimate civil affairs-type
Many of the relief organizations hired armed                   activities and nation-building, which was to be
guards before the arrival of UNITAF. These mer-                left to the United Nations. Within this gray area,
cenaries were often unreliable and prone to resent             however, there was room for work to be done by
any attempt to fire them, in which case they                   the troops in the field. As Colonel Kennedy said:
became a threat to their employers. While not                  "the [Civil Affairs] program has been laissez-
                                                               faire; do it if you want to, do it if you can."428 The
                                                               money that could be legally spent on such projects
* These figures are only for convoys going out of
Mogadishu, and do not count the convoys traveling inside the
                                                               was limited (a small amount of operations and
city.                                                          maintenance funds), as was the ability to define it

                                                                                 Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz
UNITAF's chief engineer briefs humanitarian relief workers on new and ongoing projects at the civil-military opera-
tions center in Mogadishu.

as work that benefited UNITAF and thus assisted            its with security sweeps of the area between the
the overall security mission.429                           airfield and the port. These actions helped to sta-
                                                           bilize the neighborhood and make it safer for
                                                           UNITAF troops.430
   Out in coalition units, soldiers and Marines had
the desire to help the Somalis in more positive
ways than simply providing security. They had                 Later, MarFor in Mogadishu worked closely
another necessary asset; time in their off-duty            with local schools. The Marines saw two benefits
hours to volunteer for such work if they so                to these actions. Schools represented a piece of
wished. It was not long before commanders took             normality for the population, and they would keep
advantage of these attributes of their troops. On 24       children off the streets and away from trouble and
December, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold, com-                 harm. The Marines wrote to relatives and friends
manding officer of the 15th MEU (SOC), initiated           at Marine Corps Bases Camp Pendleton and
Project Hand Clasp, a program to assist schools,           Twentynine Palms, California, soliciting school
orphanages, and other organizations in the town            supplies. The United Nations Children's Fund
of Baidoa. Through these actions, Colonel                  provided special educational kits for teachers,
Newbold sought to maintain a benevolent image              school staff, and students. These were given to
of his Marines in the minds of local Somalis. The          schools close to the soccer stadium, a main
work had the added benefit of keeping up the               MarFor site, and one was sent on to Bardera. In a
morale of the MarFor personnel involved. In                particularly dangerous area of Mogadishu, which
January, these Marines began Operation                     warring factions claimed, the schools needed
Renaissance in Mogadishu. This civil affairs oper-         more than just supplies. The presence and activi-
ation combined medical and dental assistance vis-          ties of a MarFor civil-military operations team at
                                                                     NORMALITY BEGINS TO RETURN         145

these schools kept them from being attacked or            You could see them blossom. ... The shops
looted. The team also contacted the World Food            were open, the kids were in the street, chil-
Program on behalf of the teachers and staff and           dren were now taking the donkeys and water
procured supplies of corn, cooking oil, and               burros and getting [containers] filled without
sugar.431                                                 the adults there with them. You saw bicycles
                                                          on the street, kids playing soccer, children
   In the farther relief sectors things were happen-
                                                          carrying bags of rice, which they weren't
ing in much the same fashion. Colonel Werner              able to do several weeks before because they
Hellmer, the MarFor officer-in-charge of the civil-       got robbed. The storefronts, the signs were
military operations center, had established civil-        being painted. You saw electricity in Baidoa.
military operations teams in Bardera and Baidoa.          ... They were rebuilding places. The econo-
Working on the adage that actions speak louder            my was starting to thrive. The marketplace
than words, the Marines in these sectors, noted           was open. There was music. People in the
Hellmer, "get actively involved with the people ...       streets sitting in front of their houses now
one on one. ... We went out there and got involved,       without barricading themselves in the com-
saw what the people wanted, how we could help             pound. Those are just the changes we saw
them, and we did that."432 What they got involved         within thirty days.434
in was the provision of security to wells, protec-        During the third phase of the operation, suc-
tion of schools by visible patrolling, and assis-      cesses were observed throughout the theater.
tance to schools and orphanages. Repairing water       Coupled with the decrease of violence and the
mains, leveling of school grounds, repairing class-    improved security situation, many members of
room spaces, and other small maintenance proj-         UNITAF felt their part of the task of restoring
ects were coordinated with Marine combat engi-         Somalia to the community of nations was close to
neers and Seabees. Materials were not specifical-      an end. They hoped they might soon return
ly requisitioned for the projects; but in a land       home, but for that to happen the United Nations
where any building materials were scarce, scrap        ad to be prepared to accept the mantle of respon-
lumber was kept and used for such purposes.433         sibility.
   These experiences of the Marines were not

                                                                          Chapter 9

unique. They were repeated in all the other sec-             Transition and Return
tors, whether run by Army Forces Somalia or a

                                                             United Nations Relationship
coalition member. Within a short while, the secu-
rity operations, the work of the relief organiza-
tions, and that of the civil-military operations
teams all had their effect on the daily lives of the
Somali people. As Colonel Hellmer said of                 From the very beginning, United States mili-
Bardera and Baidoa:                                    tary and civil leaders maintained close ties to their
counterparts in the United Nations. Senior U.S. Government officials met with the U.N. staff "two or
three times each week" about the Somalia operation.435 By January 1993, military planners from U.S.
Central Command were in New York "to assist the undermanned U.N. Military Staff Committee in
developing its concept of operations and list of logistics requirements. Those planners remained avail-
able to the United Nations while it stood up a functional staff in Mogadishu in April."436

    It was much the same in the field. Iraq's Ismat        sition period. "The key to the fourth phase is the
T. Kittani, the special representative of the              U.N. structures to provide security and basic
Secretary General of the United Nations, met reg-          humanitarian needs. Nations of the world must
ularly with his U.S. counterpart, Ambassador               provide funding and forces. The presence of secu-
Robert B. Oakley. In particular, Kittani attended          rity forces will be needed for a while. The factions
the very first meeting between Ambassador                  must reconcile their differences and agree on how
Oakley, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston,             to restructure the government. The U.N. must help
and the faction leaders on 11 December.437                 with basic services and infrastructure to allow
Thereafter, the military and political sides of            them to be self-sustaining: [these are] growth and
Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) worked                 exports, security forces, police and militia, politi-
closely with the U.N. staff, most notably Lansana          cal development, humanitarian services."440
Kouyate of Guinea, the deputy U.N. special rep-                The difficulties facing the United Nations in
resentative, in establishing and running the Addis
Ababa conferences.438 On the military side,
                                                           fielding its UNOSOM II force reflected its differ-
                                                           ences from UNITAF in operational capabilities
General Johnston's staff maintained close cooper-          and goals. The operation in Somalia presented the
ation and exchanged liaison officers with                  U.N. with many challenges, and, as an interna-
Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen's United                  tional organization, it had to work its way through
Nations Organization Somalia (UNOSOM) staff.               them in accordance with its own structures and
The UNITAF operations staff was especially help-           diplomatic methods. As Secretary General
ful to UNOSOM by drafting the plans for disar-             Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, the operation in
mament and ceasefire that came from the initial            Somalia was distinct from nearly every other
Addis Ababa talks. Also, Marine Colonel Kevin              operation in which the United Nations had been
M. Kennedy, from the UNITAF civil-military                 involved.
operations cell, was the military deputy director of
the humanitarian operations center, headed by                  There was no precedent for the organization
Philip Johnston, a United Nations appointee.                   [U.N.] to follow as it embarked on this
                                                               course, no example but the one it was about
    This close cooperation would be strained as                to set, and there were many unanswered
time went on. By early March, UNITAF had                       questions about the undertaking to which the
accomplished much in terms of creating security,               international community had committed
ending famine, and helping to encourage reconcil-              itself. Would member Governments con-
iation and the reconstruction of social structures.            tribute sufficient troops, including the neces-
The members of UNITAF also knew they were                      sary logistics elements, and place them
never intended to be the long-term solution to                 under the command of the United Nations?
Somalia's problems; that work fell more appropri-              Would these forces be deployed in time for a
ately to the United Nations. Unfortunately, the                smooth transition from UNITAF? Would the
U.N. was slow in coming. Brigadier General                     troop-contributing countries follow through
Anthony C. Zinni summed up the general feeling                 on an enforcement mission if hostile action
at this time: "I think the process [of reconcilia-             by one or more of the factions led to casual-
tion] is well along the way. I think the faction               ties among their troops? And would member
leaders and the Somalis are ready to begin the                 states be willing to pay for what would
process. Frankly, I don't feel the U.N. is prepared            inevitably be an ex-pensive operation at a
at this point ... though I feel they've got to deal rel-       time when the United Nations peace-keep-
                                                               ing budget was growing faster than at any
                                                               point in its history?441
atively quickly because they cannot lose this win-
dow of opportunity when everyone appears very
cooperative."439 General Zinni also was clear                  The United Nations did not have a readily
about what was necessary for the U.N. to be suc-           available body of troops, nor did it have command
cessful in taking over responsibilities in this tran-      elements from which it could draw to construct its

new UNOSOM II force. These would all have to                heavy weapons to parts of Somalia where
be solicited from member states, and this would             the task force had not been deployed and
take time.                                                  bide their time. The problems of reconcilia-
   Even more important to the United Nations                tion, disarmament, and demobilization were
were the conditions it saw as necessary to be in            national in character and thus required
                                                            UNITAF's presence throughout the coun-
place for the transition. The question of building
organizations and military systems was the easier
of the U.N.'s two hurdles in taking over the oper-          This was very different from UNITAF's per-
ation. The second, and more difficult, concerned         ception of its mission. As General Johnston stated
specific aims for UNITAF. In a letter to President       in February 1993: "I had specific guidance ... that
George H. W. Bush on 8 December, the Secretary-          our mission was focused on an area that required
General emphasized two conditions, which he be-          humanitarian relief. Quite frankly, disarmament
lieved to be important for a successful transition:      was only required for us to conduct our humani-
   The first was that UNITAF, before its with-           tarian mission."443 At the next level of the chain-
   drawal, should ensure that the heavy                  of-command, General Joseph P. Hoar, the com-
   weapons of the organized factions were                mander in chief of Central Command, agreed with
   brought under international control and that          General Johnston's assessment: "Disarmament
   the irregular gangs were disarmed. The sec-           was excluded from the mission because it was nei-
   ond essential condition for a successful tran-        ther realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for
                                                         the core mission of providing a secure environ-
                                                         ment for relief operations."444
   sition, I believed, was for UNITAF to exer-
   cise its mandate throughout Somalia. ...
   Countrywide deployment was indispensable
   as the militias could simply withdraw their

                                                                               Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz
On 3 April 1993, representatives of the 16 Somali factions meet at the United Nations headquarters in Mogadishu
to discuss disarmament. At the head of the table is BGen Imtiaz Shaheen, Pakistani Army, UNOSOM I military com-
                                                                            TRANSITION AND RETURN          149

   Ambassador Oakley stated the United States          ment delayed high-level approval for shipping
Government's position in even more detail a few        units out of Somalia.446
years later:                                              The draw down was also affected by events in
   The United States was convinced that                the area of operations. The confrontations
   despite its own military superiority, the           between factional groups under Mohamed Said
   Somalis would fight rather than give up all         Hirsi (known as General Morgan) and Colonel
   their weapons under external coercion.              Ahmed Omar Jess in Kismayo in February and
   Complete disarmament of all the factions            March were handled quickly by UNITAF, but they
   would have required at least a doubling of          were indications the situation was still volatile. To
   the UNITAF personnel and, almost certain-           U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali "the events
   ly, would have resulted in substantial casual-      in Kismayo were a serious violation of the cease-
   ties, as well as a disruption of humanitarian       fire and a setback to hopes that the factions would
   operations.                                         hand over their heavy weapons. Action by just one
   The United States was prepared to support           faction was enough to risk unraveling the progress
                                                       made in Addis Ababa and jeopardize the delicate
                                                       stability established by UNITAF."447 UNITAF did
   and assist the United Nations on the broader,
   long-term issue of beginning a systematic
   program of voluntary demobilization and             not see the situation as being so delicate as did the
   disarmament under United Nations auspices,          U.N., but these actions did delay the return of
                                                       some U.S. Army units from Kismayo and slowed
                                                       the overall reduction of units.448
   but not willing to accept formal responsibil-
   ity for this long-term, major program. Its
   UNITAF partners agreed with this proposal              With the slower pace of the reductions and the
   and were prepared to participate. The United        wait for the arrival of UNOSOM II, UNITAF con-
   Nations, however, refused responsibility.           tinued its work from February to May. One addi-
   Consequently, the program was not under-            tional aspect, on the political side, was to support
   taken.445                                           the next round of talks in Addis Ababa in March.
   This wide gulf continued throughout February,          Lansana Kouyate led this important confer-
March, and April, and it would affect the eventual     ence, sponsored by the United Nations. The talks
transition. The result was a dilemma for both          opened on schedule on the 15th and continued for
sides. For the U.N., the difference between its ear-   12 days. All factions were represented except the
lier peacekeeping missions and this one of peace       Somali National Movement, which controlled the
enforcement meant it had to have a military            northwest portion of the country it declared to be
organization of comparable size and strength to        the independent nation of Somaliland.* By 27
UNITAF working under similar rules of engage-          March, the representatives had adopted a unani-
ment. The time required to assemble a staff and        mous "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First
build a force was lengthened by U.N. reluctance        Session of the Conference on National
to assume responsibility before its conditions         Reconciliation in Somalia." This agreement com-
were met by UNITAF. The coalition partners were        mitted all factions to ending their armed conflict
frustrated because they had fulfilled their own        and to a peaceful reconciliation of differences.
missions, and were providing the U.N. with exact-      The agreement also set a two-year transition peri-
ly the window of opportunity of which General          od for a new central government that would come
                                                       into being in March 1995. All parties recognized
Zinni spoke.
                                                       the need for local governments, district and
   UNITAF restructuring also caused concern.           regional councils, and a national police force. Of
While General Johnston had no doubts about the         concern for UNITAF was the provision by which
ability of UNITAF to do its job as it drew back to     the factions agreed to a "complete and simultane-
its two light brigades, not everyone shared his        ous disarmament" throughout the country.
optimism. In his mind, the two actions of reduc-       UNITAF and UNOSOM were asked to assist in
tion and transition were separate issues. He also      this process by accepting the weapons of the fac-
knew he had to keep his superiors comfortable          tions. The turn-in process was to be completed
about what he was doing. As he put it, he wanted
to "de-link" the two actions in the minds of those
at Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command.          * The Somali National Movement did send observers to the
That was difficult, because the lack of U.N. move-     conference.

within 90 days. These two organizations were also         don't want to make decisions on where the
asked to react strongly against those who might           cantonment areas are, where the resettle-
violate the ceasefire.449                                 ment areas are, because I won't be here.
   Despite the impressive cooperation by the fac-         General Bir is going to have to execute, and
tions expressed in the wording of the agreements,         should have been here to do the planning. ...
                                                          We are only now, in the first few days of
success depended on the willingness of all parties
                                                          March ... seeing the blue hats starting to
to make the accords work. No one was fooled into          form in here. ... The U.N. still does not have
an unrealistic sense of optimism, yet the next sev-       a staff.451
eral weeks remained a quiet time throughout the
area of operations. It was during this period the         General Johnston also was busy pushing his
U.N. forces began to arrive.                           superiors, within the bounds allowed him as a mil-

      Slow Transition to U.N. Control
                                                       itary officer, to bring pressure on the United
                                                       Nations to move more quickly. "Ambassador
                                                       Oakley was very useful in doing that. I mean, he
                                                       came on publicly. I came on in message traffic.
   UNITAF and Central Command had begun to             Some of them were [in the form of] daily tele-
plan for the transition as early as 23 December        phone calls to the [Commander in Chief of
1992. On that date, a point paper was issued set-      Central Command] saying, `We need some help.
ting very broad guidance for the transfer of           Who is pushing the U.N.?'"452
responsibilities, the establishment of a quick reac-
                                                          While the United Nations was not moving as
tion force, and the residual support the United
                                                       quickly as it might have, it had chosen the com-
States would provide to UNOSOM II. It even
                                                       mander of its new UNOSOM II force. Lieutenant
included a notional U.N. peacekeeping organiza-
                                                       General Cevik Bir was a Turkish officer,
tion. While some points of this paper eventually       described by General Johnston as having "a good
changed, this was a start for planning. The pro-       operational background, good reputation."453 He
posed plan required UNITAF to maintain control         was chosen to be the commanding general of
over the entire area of operations until it was        UNOSOM II because of his military background
secure; suggested that coalition partners remain-      and his religion. Placing a Muslim in charge was
ing under UNOSOM II be emplaced in the                 a bow to the sensibilities of the vast majority of
humanitarian relief sectors they would eventually      the Somali people. It was hoped this would estab-
control; and called for the UNITAF staff to grad-      lish a bond between the populace and the new
ually work with and give responsibility to the
UNOSOM II staff.450 But such a broad plan left
                                                       United Nations presence.
many specifics to be worked out on the ground,            General Bir had been on one brief inspection to
actions considered to be appropriate to the UNO-       Somalia in late February. Unfortunately, the tim-
SOM II staff, and this planning would fall by          ing of this visit was poor. He had arrived at the
default to UNITAF. General Johnston expressed          time of the troubles in Kismayo and Mogadishu,
some of the anxiety felt by UNITAF members             and the UNITAF staff's attention was not focused
who had to do this work on their own in January,       on the general who would lead their replacements.
February, and March:                                   As noted in a Navy Forces Somalia situation
                                                       report: "The unfortunate timing of these clashes
   I could see all of these frustrations that          near the American Embassy compound has
   affected our mission, of things that we knew        caused the curtailment of briefings for Gen Bir.
   had to be done by UNOSOM II in the big              [General] Johnston has concluded it is difficult to
   picture [reconstitution of the police force,        focus on briefings with this activity nearby."454
   working with the humanitarian relief organ-
   izations, civil-military operations, refugee           General Bir returned on 15 March, but his com-
   resettlement, disarmament, and canton-              mand was still in an embryonic stage. Members of
   ment], not just our limited mission. You            the UNOSOM staff came in individually or in
   know, professionally, you take some pride in        small groups at this time. The UNITAF staff did
   looking ahead and saying what needs to be           its best to accommodate and inform them about
   done. ... But for the last month at least ... I     the operation and the duties they would fulfill. On
   have been making decisions for him                  11 March, for instance, UNITAF held a meeting
   [Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, the          for the UNOSOM II chief of staff, Brigadier
   incoming UNOSOM II commander]. ... I                General James S. Cox, Canadian Army, who had
                                                                                  TRANSITION AND RETURN       151

arrived a few days before. He met with the deputy              ognized the new UNOSOM II organization need-
commanders of the chiefs of staff of all those                 ed to be very strong to match this mandate.
forces that would participate in UNOSOM II.                    Boutros-Ghali proposed to the Security Council
Three days prior, General Cox and UNOSOM II                    that UNOSOM II have 28,000 troops, including
communications personnel had moved into the                    8,000 in logistics roles. Logistical support was to
embassy compound with their equipment. That                    come primarily from UNITAF troops already in
same day, the UNITAF operations staff officially               Somalia. This meant the Support Command
started their transition to UNOSOM II. Less than               would continue to be a major contributor. Also,
a week later, on the 14th, General Johnston                    the United States was asked to provide a quick
approved UNITAF's final transition plan. The                   reaction force. On 26 March, the Security Council
next day, UNOSOM II staff members began to                     adopted Resolution 814, which provided a man-
integrate with the UNITAF operations watch cen-                date for UNOSOM II and included all the condi-
ter in a process called "twinning."455 General                 tions Boutros-Ghali had asked for.458 A tentative
Johnston described this twinning process as "sit-              transition date was set for 1 May.
ting counterparts next to our counterparts, and                   Following these actions, personnel began arriv-
we'll work with them ... until they're ready to take           ing in Somalia to prepare for the transition. Two
the hand-off."456                                              important additions to the United Nations staff
   On 3 March, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali                 were both Americans. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral
reported to the U.N. Security Council, "the effort             Jonathan T. Howe was appointed as the new
undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure envi-               Special Representative of the United Nations
ronment is far from complete and in any case has               Secretary General, and Major General Thomas
not attempted to address the situation throughout              Montgomery, USA, was selected as the UNO-
all of Somalia."* Following the advice given to                SOM II deputy force commander.
him by United States officials as early as 18                     General Montgomery's appointment revealed a
December, Boutros-Ghali sought a new mandate                   strange dichotomy in the force structure. Not only
for UNOSOM that would change it from peace-                    was he UNOSOM II deputy commander, he also
keeping to peace enforcement. UNOSOM II                        was the commanding general of the United States
should, in his words, "cover all of Somalia ... and            Forces in Somalia for UNOSOM. These forces
include disarmament."** To ensure the success of               were split along two chains-of-command. Most of
this mission, he sought a mandate for the new                  the U.S. troops were part of the logistics support
force that would achieve several goals: to monitor             to the operation as well as part of the United
all factions with respect to the ceasefire agree-              Nations force. There was also the 1,100-man
ments; to prevent resumption of violence, using                quick reaction force for UNOSOM II, the 10th
force if necessary; to maintain control of the fac-            Mountain Division "Warrior Brigade," which had
tions' heavy weapons; to seize the small arms of               been filling the same role for UNITAF. It also
unauthorized armed groups; to maintain the secu-               reported to General Montgomery. But others
rity of all ports, airfields, and lines of communi-            reported through their own chains-of-command.
cations; to protect the lives of United Nations and            These included a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit,
relief organization personnel; to clear mines; and             which would remain on call as the theater reserve.
to assist refugees.457                                         In August, another United States unit independent
                                                               of U.N. control was sent to Somalia. This was
   With the exception of the extension of the mis-
                                                               Task Force Ranger and was composed of Army
sion to "all of Somalia" and the emphasis on total
                                                               Rangers and Special Forces. Major General
disarmament, none of this was different from                   William F. Garrison, USA, commanded the force,
what UNITAF had been doing for months. The                     which reported directly to Central Command's
document did, however, show that the U.N. rec-                 commander, General Hoar.
                                                                  Several of UNITAF's coalition partners would
* This was written less than one week after the Kismayo-       remain to participate in UNOSOM II, which made
Mogadishu disturbances of late February, which likely influ-   the United Nations' search for contributing
enced the Secretary General's perception.
                                                               nations easier and enabled the transition to
** UNOSOM II's area of responsibility eventually extended      progress more rapidly. Pakistan, already present
farther north than that of UNITAF, but only to the city of     in UNOSOM I and UNITAF, sent two additional
Galcaio.                                                       battalions, creating an infantry brigade. Several

                                                                              Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz
Leaders from U.S. Marine Forces Somalia, from left, Col Jack W. Klimp, Marine Forces deputy commander, Col Emil
R. Bedard, Task Force Mogadishu commander, and Col Werner Hellmer, staff judge advocate and head of the
Marine Forces civil-military operations team, wait to meet Somali elders.

other nations made commitments. India, Ireland,          the next day and then return to Mogadishu. On the
Norway, Bangladesh, Nepal, Romania, Republic             11th, the task force completed this movement and
of Korea, and Malaysia eventually sent troops.           redeployed from Somalia. The 10th Mountain
Many of these forces were slow to join UNOSOM            Division's main command post was on the same
II. At the time of the official transition, the force    flight, and its commander, Major General Steven
was still 11,000 soldiers short of its goal.             L. Arnold, departed two days later.459 On 9 April,
    UNITAF had been realigning forces to ensure          the Warrior Brigade, which would stay as part of
those remaining would be in place and operating          UNOSOM II, assumed all responsibility for
in their designated relief sectors by the time of the    Merka sector, the quick reaction force, and all
transition. These included the French, Italians,         remaining Army operations in Somalia. This flex-
Belgians, Australians, Moroccans, Pakistanis,            ible brigade was composed of the 1st Battalion,
Botswanans, and Turks. At the same time, United          22d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 25th Aviation; 10th
States forces continued their redeployment sched-        Forward Support Battalion; and other support
ules. Army and Marine Corps units withdrew               detachments. When the Merka sector was turned
from the field and moved back to Mogadishu prior         over to the Pakistani forces on 28 April, the
                                                         Warrior Brigade moved into new quarters at the
                                                         university complex and airport in Mogadishu.460
to embarkation. Both Army Forces Somalia and
Marine Forces Somalia (MarFor) were down to
light brigade strengths by late March and early             The Marines continued their redeployments
April.                                                   leading to the light brigade level, and by the 13th
    On 4 March, Army Forces Somalia directed             they had realigned their forces between Bardera
Task Force Kismayo to prepare to turn over full          and Mogadishu. By 17 March, the 7th Marines
responsibility for the relief sectors to the Belgians    had consolidated in Mogadishu, and Task Force
                                                                                TRANSITION AND RETURN                153

Bardera remained in that city for the time being.          members of the UNOSOM II and UNITAF staffs,
On 21 March, the light brigade staff "assumed all          members of the Somali auxiliary security force,
watches in the MarFor CP [Command Post],"                  and representatives of all the remaining coalition
while the staff of the 7th Marines moved from the          forces. Remaining MarFor elements began rede-
soccer stadium to the embassy compound. Two                ploying the next day.461
days later, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm left             By the beginning of May, the work of UNITAF
for Camp Pendleton. Colonel Jack W. Klimp                  was done. In five months of unrelenting effort it
replaced him as MarFor commander. Over the                 had formed itself from four branches of the
next few weeks, the focus of the remaining                 American Armed Forces and 22 coalition nations;
Marines was to work with coalition forces to turn          deployed rapidly to Somalia; worked through a
over responsibilities. In Mogadishu, these were            number of complex issues while conducting
Pakistani soldiers and those of the United Arab            demanding military operations; succeeded in its
Emirates. In Bardera, the task force worked with           security mission; and prepared the way for its
the Botswanans. On 9 April, Colonel Klimp                  replacement, UNOSOM II. On 4 May, in a cere-
returned to the United States and Colonel Emil R.          mony held at the embassy compound, Lieutenant
Bedard, commanding officer of the 7th Marines,             General Johnston passed responsibility for opera-
assumed duties as commander of MarFor. On 18               tions in Somalia to Lieutenant General Bir.
April, the Botswanans assumed responsibility for           Shortly after, General Johnston and the remaining
Bardera sector. In Mogadishu, the Marines passed           members of his staff boarded an airplane for the
operational control of the United Arab Emirates            long flight home.
forces to the Italians on 15 April. On the 24th,
                                                              They arrived in Washington the next day. There
MarFor ceased patrolling in the city and turned
over their principle areas of interest to the              the new U.S. president, William J. Clinton, met
Pakistanis. On the 26th, the MarFor Marine                 them in a special ceremony on the south lawn of
Aircraft Group 16 made its last flights and ceased         the White House and thanked them for all they
operations. That day, MarFor formally turned over          had done and accomplished. In his remarks, the
all its responsibilities to the Pakistani forces of        President summed up what had been done in a
UNOSOM II during a ceremony attended by                    short time:

                                                                                Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces
LtGen Robert B. Johnston transfers responsibility for operations in Somalia to Turkish LtGen Cevik Bir at a formal
ceremony held in May 1993 at the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu.

                                                                 Photo courtesy of the Clinton Presidential Library (P3276-04)
President William J. Clinton welcomes LtGen Robert B. Johnston to the White House, where he presented him with
the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. "I'm receiving the medal," LtGen Johnston said, "but a lot of 18 and 19-
year-old men and women in uniform demonstrated enormous discipline, good judgment, and a good deal of
patience in performing a rather unique mission."

  You represent the thousands who served in                  To understand the magnitude of what our
  this crucial operation--in the First Marine                forces in Somalia accomplished, the world
  Expeditionary Force, in the 10th Mountain                  need only look back at Somalia's condition
  Division, aboard the Navy's Tripoli                        just six months ago. Hundreds of thousands
  Amphibious Ready Group, in the Air Force                   of people were starving; armed anarchy
  and Air National Guard airlift squadrons,                  ruled the land and the streets of every city
  and in other units in each of our services.                and town. Today, food is flowing, crops are
  Over 30,000 American military personnel                    growing, schools and hospitals are reopen-
  served at sometime in these last five months               ing. Although there is still much to be done
  in Somalia. And serving alongside you were                 if enduring peace is to prevail, one can now
  thousands of others from 20 nations.                       envision a day when Somalia will be recon-
  Although your mission was humanitarian                     structed as a functioning civil society.462
  and not combat, you nonetheless faced diffi-               After the ceremony, the former members of
  cult and dangerous conditions. You some-                UNITAF continued their journey home to resume
  times were subjected to abuse and forced to             their lives and various duties, and the Unified Task
  dodge rocks and even bullets. You saw first-            Force dissolved back into its individual units.
  hand the horror of hunger, disease, and                    In Somalia, the forces of UNOSOM II did not
  death. But you pressed on with what you set
                                                          wait long to be tested. On 6 and 7 May, the forces
  out to do and were successful. You have
  served in the best tradition of the Armed               of factional leader General Mohamed Farah
  Forces of the United States.                            Hassan Aideed's ally, Colonel Omar Jess, clashed
                                                                                      TRANSITION AND RETURN             155

with the Belgians while trying to retake the city of          dent on 12 July, missiles fired from helicopter
Kismayo. This was the precursor to bloody fights              gunships burst into a house at which leaders of
in June, July, and October.                                   Aideed's United Somali Congress faction and eld-

                                                              ers of Aideed's Habr Gedr clan were holding a
                                                              meeting. Many Somalis were killed, some esti-
                                                              mates of the number dead reached as high as 70.
   On 1 March 1995, Lieutenant General Anthony                Many previously neutral Somalis believed they
C. Zinni returned to Mogadishu as the command-                had to defend their homes and their land against
ing general of a combined coalition task force.               the United Nations and joined Aideed's camp.
Seven nations provided ships and amphibious                   Although lightly armed, these soldiers were aware
forces for Operation United Shield.* The mission              of American tactics and conformed their own to
was to protect the last UNOSOM II forces,                     make the best use of what was available. On 25
Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers, as they with-             September, a militiaman shot down a helicopter
drew from Somalia. Earlier that day, 1,800 U.S.               with a rocket-propelled grenade, a highly unusual
Marines of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit                 feat. Having proven it could be done, Aideed's
(Special Operations Capable) and 350 Italian                  forces awaited their next opportunity, which came
Marines landed and set up a defensive perimeter.              on 3 October.
The operation was completed 73 hours later.                      That day, Aideed was to attend a meeting with
   The intervening two years since the departure              some of his chief lieutenants. The site for the
of UNITAF had not been kind to either the United              meeting was identified and a task force of U.S.
Nations forces or to the Somalis. Shortly after the           Rangers and Special Forces was sent to capture
departure of the Unified Task Force, a subtle but             him. The mission ran into trouble even as the hel-
important change in the mission came about that               icopters carrying the assault force approached the
had profound effects on UNOSOM II and the par-                target building. A rocket-propelled grenade struck
ticipation of the United States in the operation.             one helicopter, forcing it to land close to the tar-
                                                              get. Another was shot down shortly thereafter,
   General Aideed had not forgotten the incidents             also by a rocket, and crashed a few blocks away.
of late February 1993 in Mogadishu and Kismayo.               The mission then turned from one of capturing
On 5 June that year, in a bold and confrontational            Somali leaders into one of also rescuing the sur-
move, his forces attacked a contingent of                     vivors of the downed aircraft and bringing out the
Pakistani troops, killing 24 of the UNOSOM sol-
diers.* This challenge to the United Nations was
                                                              force. The Rangers were soon surrounded by hun-
                                                              dreds of Somali militiamen firing on them with
answered by trying to destroy Aideed's power                  small arms and rocket-propelled grenade. The
structure. He was declared a criminal and UNO-                reaction force, composed of soldiers of the 10th
SOM II, with the support of the Clinton adminis-              Mountain Division, had to fight its way through
tration and United States forces, began to actively           the streets of the city, which were now filled with
seek to capture him to bring him to justice. This             thousands of militiamen and civilians trying to
action may have appeared appropriate, but it over-            kill as many UNOSOM troops as they could.
looked the fact that Aideed was still a respected             After 15 hours of fighting, the convoys returned to
and influential figure to a large number of his               the base at the airport, bringing the survivors and
countrymen. This act also tore the fabric of neu-             most of the dead. The price was 18 Americans
trality by singling out Aideed as a specific target,
which fed his propaganda machine. Finally, it
placed UNOSOM troops in direct confrontation
with Aideed's strong political faction, and its mili-         * The Pakistani soldiers were on an operation to inspect one
                                                              of General Aideed's compounds in Mogadishu. During
tia forces in the city.                                       Operation Restore Hope, these inspections were announced
   American forces, notably Task Force Ranger,                shortly before they would take place, but not with enough
tracked down and captured several of Aideed's                 lead time for the factions to move or hide anything. The
high-ranking subordinates. In an unfortunate inci-            inspections were thus not a total surprise to the factions, and
                                                              they knew why they were taking place. Unlike such inspec-
                                                              tions under UNITAF, this one was unannounced. The com-
                                                              pound also adjoined the site of Aideed's Radio Mogadishu
* Nations participating in Operation United Shield were the   transmitting station. Claiming the United Nations soldiers
United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Malaysia,        were there to shut down the station, Aideed was able to rally
Pakistan, and Bangladesh.                                     his followers in a deadly attack.

                                                                                           DVIC DD-SD-00-00884
Somali men carry bags of wheat delivered by a Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Medium
Helicopter Squadron 363.

killed and 78 wounded. The cost, along with the         Hussein, who had served with UNITAF as a
pictures of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged            United States Marine Corps corporal and transla-
through the streets by gloating Somalis, was more       tor, returned to Somalia and took over his father's
than the administration was willing to pay.             position. Somalia is still divided. The northern
   A decision to withdraw American forces from          portion claims its independence as Somaliland,
Somalia was made shortly after. With the most           although it is not, as yet, recognized. In the south,
powerful member state of UNOSOM II leaving,             the area of Operation Restore Hope, the fighting
other nations followed suit. By the beginning of        and dying continues. Cities and towns change
1995, the United Nations announced that UNO-            hands, and a few humanitarian relief organiza-
SOM II was to end on 31 March. Operation                tions still try to bring some assistance. The talks
United Shield was actually conducted weeks              between the factions continue amid reshuffling
before that date. As the final U.N. troops were         alliances. The State Department still issues
ready for their withdrawal from Mogadishu,              strongly worded warnings about travel in
Marines were ordered to provide security for the        Somalia, and the country is listed as one of the
operation. The last U.N. and American forces left       world's most dangerous places.
the country on 4 March.                                    But, in spite of such results, some good came
   After the U.N. departure from Somalia, things        from Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF did suc-
continued as they had before. Aideed and Ali            ceed in ending the famine and holding down the
Mahdi Mohamed still vied for power and blood-           violence during its time in Somalia. Some
shed continued unabated, along with suffering of        accounts claim more than 200,000 lives were
innocent people. All this happened as if a curtain      saved by the efforts of UNITAF in getting relief
had descended around the country's borders.             supplies through. As the Joint Meritorious Unit
What occurred in Somalia received little attention      Award citation to UNITAF states:
in the world press. Only unusual news came out.            Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the
For instance, General Mohamed Farah Aideed                 delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief
was killed in a gun battle in Mogadishu on 1               supplies to the starving population, disarmed
August 1996. Shortly afterwards, his son,                  warring factions, fostered a ceasefire, and
                                                                             TRANSITION AND RETURN           157

   restored police and judiciary systems.              Kosovo. In any situation characterized by civil
   Through the intervention and leadership of          war and the destruction of civil institutions and
   Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of       structures, the successful completion of the mis-
   over 60 different aid and relief organizations      sion will depend in some part on the reconstitu-
   and the support of 23 nations were coordi-          tion of those agencies. What is appropriate in one
   nated and focused to reverse a human                case may not be in another. In Somalia, the intent
   tragedy of famine and disease that was              of UNITAF was to encourage the Somalis to take
   claiming the lives of thousands each day.           responsibility for their own governance and inter-
   Operation Restore Hope, along with its prede-       nal security. In Bosnia, the active assistance with
cessor Operation Provide Comfort, opened a             civil structures and economic development was
decade of humanitarian relief and peacemaking          more deliberate. Again, the responsible com-
                                                       mander will have to determine how much support
operations. The experience of each has con-
                                                       to provide without entangling his unit or his gov-
tributed to the success of the next, and many of the   ernment in the affairs of a recovering nation.
issues that were of importance during Restore
                                                          The reconstitution of police forces was another
Hope have remained through subsequent opera-           issue that first became important in Somalia and
tions. They are part of the current military world.    then came up elsewhere. The United States-led
   One of the operation's greatest strengths was       intervention in Haiti quickly worked with an inter-
the close relationship that existed between the        national police component to recruit, train, and
military and the political sides. The cooperation      deploy police forces throughout the country. If
between the commanding general and the special         this latter case was more successful, it was
envoy was seamless and presented a united front        because of the recent experience in Somalia.*
to the Somali factions. It also ensured the mem-          The long wait for the United Nations to field its
bers of the coalition were working toward goals        UNOSOM II force tried the patience of UNITAF.
established for UNITAF. The support that               The fact that the United Nations might have an
Lieutenant General Johnston and Ambassador             agenda that differed from that of the United States
Oakley provided to each other set a standard for
future joint task forces assigned to such humani-
tarian missions.
   The idea of force protection continues to per-
meate military planning at the beginning of the
new century. In a humanitarian or peacekeeping
role, how many casualties are Americans willing
to tolerate? This question was forcefully answered
for the specific instance of Somalia in October
1993. However, with each new operation com-
manders must consider how success depends on
keeping their soldiers safe and casualties within
acceptable limits. The measures taken to ensure
this safety can range from permissive rules of
engagement which allow individual soldiers to
take action against perceived threats to the wear-
ing of protective vests and helmets at all times.
These latter measures especially can impose a
burden on soldiers or Marines working in tropical
or desert climes. Equally important, they can
become a physical reminder to any opposing force
of the unacceptability of loss to Americans. This                                             DVIC DD-SD-00-01026
can become a weakness in itself, if only in per-       Two Somali men load large bags of Australian wheat on
ception. Finding the proper balance is a comman-       the back of a truck for transport to the village of Maleel.
der's responsibility.                                  The distribution was a cooperative effort of U.S.
   Nation building is another term that has been       Marines, who provided the helicopter support, and the
heard referring to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and         Australian Army, which secured the delivery perimeter.

and its coalition partners was hardly surprising,           civil-military operations structure that extended
but it foreshadowed the vast difference in mission          throughout the country. While relations with some
that would come after UNITAF turned over                    of the humanitarian relief organizations or their
responsibility. The nature of the relationship              staff members proved difficult at times, it was rec-
between the U.N. and those U.S. forces assigned             ognized they had legitimate concerns, they were a
to it was also fraught with difficulty, because the         source of valuable information, and they were
United States tried to keep a course, which                 important to the successful completion of the
allowed it to maintain its national objectives while        operation. The civil-military structures in each
concurrently serving as part of a larger peace-             succeeding operation have improved based on the
keeping force. The split between United States              experience of Somalia, and the need to work
and United Nations forces may have been a con-              cooperatively with these organizations is now
tributing factor in the clash of 3 October 1993.            incorporated into service and joint doctrine.
The experience of Somalia was helpful in Haiti,                Each military operation is unique. The condi-
where the United Nations force came in more                 tions that existed in Restore Hope have not been
quickly and better prepared for its mission.                duplicated exactly in the campaigns that followed.
   While the original mission was seemingly very            Each of these has been a beneficiary of the ideas,
straightforward, it soon was necessary to deter-            structures, and solutions that were so carefully
mine the bounds of what was acceptable to                   thought out and implemented for the first time in
accomplish that mission. The term mission creep             the deserts and cities of Somalia. The legacy of
was invoked as a check for every extra action               Operation Restore Hope lies in these: the exam-
UNITAF was asked to perform. The repair of                  ples of the good work of the Unified Task Force in
roads, building of bridges, and other physical              difficult and dangerous conditions; the restraint
improvements were permissible if they would aid             and good order of its personnel; and the mainte-
the task force mission. The internal operation of           nance of its political balance and neutrality.
the country was to be left to the Somalis, with                The men and women, Marines, soldiers,
encouragement from UNITAF. Full disarmament                 sailors, and airmen who served in Restore Hope
was never an option for UNITAF, but with the                were challenged to replace anarchy and fear with
transition to the United Nations, the definition of         order and security. They faced situations that were
what was appropriate began to change. From the              then novel, but have since become familiar. Their
initial goal of providing a secure environment, the         efforts made them the first of General Zinni's new
forces under the United Nations were drawn more             thinking American military.
and more into the internal affairs of Somalia, and

eventually lost the neutrality maintained with such
rigor under UNITAF.
   The experiences of the staff of I Marine
Expeditionary Force creating a joint task force

                                                                                  Chapter 1
headquarters and bringing together a coalition
force have been incorporated into several mis-
sions that followed. Provisions for standing joint
task force headquarters, and the recognition of the
needs and capabilities of coalition partners, are              There have not been many books available on
now a part of the joint warfare doctrine of the             Somali history and culture until recently. Even the
                                                            most current books deal mainly with the events of
United States.
                                                            October 1993, and give only a cursory view of how
   Relations with civilian organizations were               Somalia came to its condition of 1992. However, there
important during Restore Hope. Working from the             are a few official sources that deal with these topics in
recent experience of the Kurdish relief operation,          some detail. Headquarters, Department of the Army,
the staff of UNITAF quickly built an effective              publishes a series of area studies for the nations of the
                                                            world. The one for Somalia was published in 1982
                                                            (third edition) and updated in a fourth edition in 1993.
* This operation had some of the same troops as well. The   These books provide information about Somali culture,
ground component for Operation Restore Democracy was        clan affiliation, political and military structures, terrain
formed around the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division.       and climate, and the important history of this nation.
                                                            These are important sources for anyone researching the
history of Somalia prior to the 1990s. At the start of Operation Restore Hope, the United States Army Intelligence
and Threat Analysis Center published a small volume entitled Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada: Soldier Handbook.
This handy guide was intended for troops deploying to Somalia, and provided basic information about climate and
terrain, diseases and preventive medicine, weapons of the factions, and a lexicon of basic Somali words and phras-
es. More importantly, it described the Somali clans, identifying the armed factions and their leaders. Adam B.
Siegel wrote an excellent monograph study of Operation Eastern Exit for the Center for Naval Analyses. It was

used extensively for the portion of this chapter relating   30. Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing
to the evacuation of the American Embassy in                    U.S. Policy in Somalia (Naval Institute Press:
                                                                Annapolis, Maryland, 1995), pp. 4-7.

                                                                                 Chapter 2
Mogadishu in January 1991.

1.    "Marine Heads Somalia Relief Efforts," Marine
      Corps Gazette, Oct92, p. 4.
2.    Department of the Army, Somalia: A Country                Much of the material for this chapter was taken
      Study, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing         from notes the author made during interviews with
      Office, 1982), pp. 8-9, 81-92, hereafter DA,          officers of the joint task force, which also were record-
      Somalia: A Country Study.                             ed on videotape by members of the Joint Combat
                                                            Camera Team. The policy at that time was for the tapes
3.    Ibid., pp. 9, 82.
                                                            to be sent to the main combat camera office in
4.    Ibid., pp. 12-17.                                     Washington, D.C. Many of these tapes are unaccount-
5.    Ibid., pp. 14, 17-19.                                 ed for. Therefore, the author's notes have been used
6.    Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm-The         here. The information in this chapter is from interviews
      Second World War, vol 1, (Boston: Houghton            with: LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston-
      Mifflin Co., 1948), pp. 133-134, 165-168.             Mroczkowski intvw; Col Sam E. Hatton, hereafter
7.    Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance-The          Hatton-Mroczkowski intvw; Col William M. Handley,
      Second World War, vol 3, (Boston: Houghton            Jr., hereafter Handley-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen
      Mifflin Co., 1950), p. 80.                            Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski
8.    Ibid., pp. 80-86.                                     intvw; Capt Michael L. Cowan, hereafter Cowan-
9.    DA, Somalia: A Country Study, pp. 24-27.              Mroczkowski intvw; MajGen Steven L. Arnold, here-
10.   Ibid., pp. 27-31.                                     after Arnold-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen Thomas R.
11.   Ibid., pp. 31-33.                                     Mikolajcik, hereafter Mikolajcik-Mroczkowski intvw;
12.   Ibid., pp. 33-38.                                     Col Thomas D. Smith, hereafter Smith-Mroczkowski
                                                            intvw; and Col Robert W. Tanner, hereafter Tanner-
13.   Ibid., pp. 38-40.
                                                            Mroczkowski intvw.
14.   Ibid., pp. 43-45.
15.   Ibid., pp. 45-46.
16.   Ibid., pp. 52-57.                                     31. Bruce W. Nelan, "Taking on the Thugs," Time,
                                                                14Dec92, p. 29, hereafter Nelan, "Taking on
17.   Ibid., pp. 58-59.
18.   Ibid., pp. 60-62, 225-227.
                                                            32. Ibid.
19.   Ibid., p. 52.                                         33. David Binder, "Bush Ready to Send Troops to
20.   United States Army Intelligence and Threat                Protect Somalia Food," The New York Times,
      Analysis Center, Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada:          26Nov92, p. A1.
      Soldier Handbook (Dec92), p. 6, hereafter Soldier     34. James Kitfield, "Restoring Hope," Government
      Handbook.                                                 Executive, Feb93, p. 20.
21.   Adam B. Siegel, Eastern Exit: The Noncombatant        35. "UN-Mandated Force Seeks to Halt Tragedy:
      Evacuation Operation (NEO) From Mogadishu,                Operation Restore Hope," UN Chronicle, Mar93,
      Somalia, January 1991, (Alexandria, Virginia:             Vol. XXX, No 1, p. 1-13.
      Center for Naval Analyses, Apr92), p. 7.              36. Ibid., p. 13.
22.   Ibid., PP. 8-9.                                       37. Nelan, "Taking on Thugs," p. 29.
23.   Ibid., pp. 8,11.                                      38. Ibid., p. 13.
24.   Ibid., pp. 11-12.                                     39. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
25.   Ibid., pp. 12-13, 16-18.                              40. I MEF ComC, 27Nov92 to 28Feb93, Sec 3,
26.   Ibid., pp. 17-19.                                         "Chronological Listing of Significant Events";
27.   Ibid., pp. 18, 22-25.                                     U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource
28.   Ibid., pp. 28-34.                                         Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December
29.   Soldier Handbook, pp. 6-7.                                1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope

      (Washington, D.C., U.S. Army Center of Military     65. Briefing papers, "Joint Task Force Somalia
      History, 1994), p. 105.                                 Relief," dtd 921203.
41.   General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, "A CinC's             66. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
      Perspective," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn        67. USCinCCent mss, dtd 22Nov92, subj,
      1993, p. 56, hereafter Hoar, "A CinC's                  Commander's Estimate of the Situation.
      Perspective."                                       68. CentCom AC/S G-3 to CG I MEF msg,
42.   Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.                             195611Nov92, subj, Somalia Ops.
43.   Ibid.                                               69. JTF Operation Order, 6Dec92, Annex B.
44.   Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 58.                70. DIA to DIACUPIntel msg, 262333ZNov 92, subj,
45.   Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.                             Somalia: The Logistic Setting.
46.   Hatton-Mroczkowski intvw.                           71. Soldier Handbook, p. 113.
47.   Handley Mroczkowski intvw.                          72. CinCent Operation Order for Operation Restore
48.   Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.                                Hope.
49.   Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw.                            73. United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual
50.   Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.                                (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1940), p. 1.
51.   Capt David A. Dawson, USMC, Restore Hope            74. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
      manuscript, pp. 6-7.                                75. Col Frederick M. Lorenz, USMC, "Law And
52.   ComUSNavCent msg 061908zNov92, subj:                    Anarchy In Somalia," Parameters, Winter 93-94,
      Concept For Support Relief Operations In                p. 28.
      Somalia, hereafter ComUSNavCent msg, Relief         76. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
      Operations in Somalia.                              77. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
53.   Katherine McGrady, The Joint Task Force in          78. JTF Somalia Operation Order. 6Dec92.
      Operation Restore Hope, (Washington, D.C.:          79. Zinni-Cureton intvw.
      Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), pp. 115-116,      80. CentCom Order, 5Dec92.
      hereafter McGrady, Restore Hope.                    81. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92.
54.   Arnold-Mroczkowski intvw.                           82. Ibid.; Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
55.   Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.                            83. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92, Annex C.
56.   Mikolajcik-Mroczkowski intvw.                       84. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92.
57.   Smith-Mroczkowski intvw.                            85. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.
58.   10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), U.S.       86. JTF Somalia Operation Order, 6Dec92.
      Army Forces Somalia, 10th Mountain Division         87. Briefing papers, "JTF Deployment Timeline," dtd
      (LI): After Action Report Summary (Fort Drum,           921201.
      New York: 10th Mountain Division (Light             88. "The Military Sealift Command in Operation
      Infantry) and Fort Drum, Jun93), p. 68, hereafter       Restore Hope," pp. 11-16.
      10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
                                                          89. Ibid., pp. 6-6A.
      Somalia; McGrady, Restore Hope, p. 52.
                                                          90. Kent M. Beck and Robert deV. Brunkow, Global
59.   Tanner-Mroczkowski intvw.
                                                              Reach in Action: The Air Mobility Command and
60.   10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces                the Deployment to Somalia (Office of History, Air
      Somalia, p. 67.                                         Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base,
61.   Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 61.

                                                                             Chapter 4
                                                              Illinois: 15Feb94), pp. xi-xxiii.
62.   Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.
63.   ComUSNavCent msg, Relief Operations in

                     Chapter 3
                                                             This chapter is based mainly on information taken
                                                          from interviews conducted by the author in the field.
                                                          These were with Capt John W. Peterson, USN, here-
   The information for this chapter was taken from        after Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt J. W. Perkins,
official sources. Oral history interviews used were       USN, hereafter Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt
between the author and LtGen Robert B. Johnston,          Brian Boyce, USN, hereafter Boyce-Mroczkowski
hereafter Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen                intvw; Col Les van den Bosch, Belgian Army, hereafter
Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski             van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Thulagalyo
intvw; and BGen Anthony C. Zinni and LtCol Charles        Masisi, Botswana Defense Force, hereafter Masisi-
H. Cureton, hereafter Zinni-Cureton intvw.                Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M. Taylor, hereafter
                                                          Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Ailen Pietrantoni,
64. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.                           French Army, hereafter Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski
                                                          intvw; LtCol Emanuel Spagnuolo, Italian Army, here-
                                                                                               NOTES      161

after Spagnuolo-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Carol J.       111. Col William J. Mellor, Royal Australian Army,
Mathieu, Canadian Army, hereafter Mathieu-                   "The Australian Experience in Somalia,"
Mroczkowski intvw; and Maj Lelon W. Carroll, USA,            Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, Hugh
hereafter Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw. The author also         Smith, ed. (Australian Defense Studies Center,
used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski        Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra:
journal with appropriate date citations.                     1993), pp. 59-60.
                                                        112. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource
91.  Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw.                              Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December
92.  Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw.                             1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope
93.  Ibid.                                                   (Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center of Military
                                                             History, 1994), pp. 185-186.
94.  Peterson-Mroczkowski           intvw;    Boyce-
     Mroczkowski intvw.                                 113. Intvw with Capt Mosa al Anzi, Kuwaiti Army,
                                                             LtCol Charles H.Cureton, USMCR, and Maj
95. 15th MEU (SOC), Command Chronology,
                                                             Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, 22Feb93.
     1Dec92-3Feb93, sec 4, Supporting Documents,
                                                        114. Intvw with Col Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Army
     hereafter 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC.
                                                             and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, 22Feb93.
96. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, sec 2, Narrative
                                                        115. Masisi-Mroczkowski intvw.
     Summary, p. 2-2.
                                                        116. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en
97. Ibid., p. 2-3.
                                                             Somalie, "Chronologie."
98. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises
     en Somalie, Compte Rendu de L'Operation            117. I MEF, ComdC, p. 4.
     `Oryx' (9 decembre 1992-12 avril 1993), sec II,    118. Ibid.; Commandement Francais des Forces
     "Chronologie,"      hereafter     Commandement          Francaises en Somalie, "Chronologie."
     Francais des Forces Francaises en Somalie,         119. Intvw of Ambassador Robert B. Oakley with
     "Chronologie;" Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw.           LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K.
99. Ibid.                                                    Wright, Jr., USAR.
100. Perkins-Mroczkowski intvw.                         120. Intvw of LtGen Robert B. Johnston with LtCol
101. Kent M. Beck and Robert deV. Brunkow, Global            Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr.,
     Reach in Action: The Air Mobility Command and           USAR.
     the Deployment to Somalia, vol. 1 (Office of       121. Mroczkowski-Peterson intvw.
     History, Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force     122. van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw.
     Base, Illinois, 15Feb94), p. xix.                  123. Peterson-Mroczkowski intvw.
102. I MEF, ComdC, 27Nov92 to 28Feb93, sec 2,           124. van den Bosch-Mroczkowski intvw.
     Narrative Summary: Command, Operations, and        125. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; I MEF, ComdC.
     Training, p. 2, hereafter I MEF, ComdC.            126. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw.
103. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces           127. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 21Dec93.
     Somalia, pp. 18, 66.                               128. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises
104. Ibid., p.17.                                            en Somalie, "Chronologie;" I MEF, ComdC, sec
105. I MEF, ComdC, p. 2.                                     3, Chronological Listings.
106. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces           129. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw; Comman-
     Somalia, p. 18.                                         dement Francais des Forces Francaises en
107. Intvw with LtGen Robert B. Johnston on "Meet            Somalie, "Chronologie."
     The Press," 13Dec92.                               130. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 23Dec92.
108. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, sec 3, Sequential           131. Spagnuolo-Mroczkowski intvw, trans by Lt
     Listing of Significant Events, p. 3-2; I MEF,           Umberto Albarosa, Italian Army.
     ComdC, sec 3, Chronological Listing of             132. UNITAF FragO 7, dtd 16Dec92.
     Significant Events, pp. 2-3.                       133. Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw.
109. 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report         134. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 23Dec92.
     Operation Deliverance Somalia Dec 92-Jun 93,       135. 10th Mountain Division, US Army Forces in
     dtd 4Nov93, Annex A, Part One, Background, p.           Somalia, p. 20; Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw.
     A-3/7.                                             136. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 31Dec92.
110. Claudio Graziano, Operazione Somalia: 1992-        137. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92.
     1994,        "Lineamenti        E     Consuntivo   138. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 24Dec92;
     Dell'Operazione;" Conversation between LtCol            UNITAF FragO 12, dtd 21Dec92.
     Daniel M. Lizzul, Liaison Officer to the Italian
                                                        139. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92.
     Forces and LtCol Gennora Fusco, Italian Army, as
     reported to the author.                            140. 10th Mountain Division, US Army Forces in
                                                             Somalia, p. 22.

                    Chapter 5                              162. CJTF Somalia J-3 msg, 151701ZJan93, subj:
                                                                HRS Transition Matrix LOI; Dotto-Mroczkowski
    The information for this chapter was taken primari-         intvw; Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2.
ly from interviews conducted in the field by the author    163. United Nations Department of Public
and other historians. Those by the author were with             Information, The United Nations and Somalia,
LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston-                   1992-1996, United Nations Blue Book Series,
Mroczkowski intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter             Volume VIII (United Nations, New York: 1996),
Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw; Col Peter A. Dotto, here-              p. 38, hereafter U.N. Public Information, United
after Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw; and LtCol Donald C.              Nations and Somalia.
Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw.      164. Msg to American Embassy, Mogadishu, dtd
A second interview between the author and LtGen                 27Dec92, subj: Security of the Peace Rally,
Zinni was conducted on 14 May 1994, hereafter Zinni-            signed by Hussein Sheekh Ahmed, Chairman of
Mroczkowski intvw 2. Interviews conducted by LtCol              the Political Reconciliation Committee of the
Charles H. Cureton, USMCR, and Maj Robert K.                    North Side and Ali Mohamed Ali, Chairman of
Wright, Jr., USAR, were with LtGen Robert B.                    the Political Reconciliation Committee of the
Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw;              South Side.
Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, hereafter Oakley-             165. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2.
Cureton-Wright intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, here-         166. U.N. Public Information, United Nations and
after Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw; and Col Peter A.              Somalia, p. 221.
Dotto, hereafter Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw. The           167. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia
author also used his personal journal, referred to as           and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on
Mroczkowski journal with appropriate date citations,            Peacemaking and Peacekeep-ing, (Washington,
and his field notebook, referred to as Mroczkowski              D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press,
field notebook, which contained copies of many of the           1995), pp. 94-95.
interviews.                                                168. Ibid., pp. 241-244.
141. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton               169. U.N. Public Information, United Nations and
      University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1984), p.        Somalia, p. 39.
      87.                                                  170. Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw.
142. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.                              171. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.
143. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; Johnston-Cureton-         172. Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw.
      Wright intvw.                                        173. Ltr from commanders of UNITAF/UNOSOM to
144. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.                             Chairman, United Somali Front, dtd 4Feb93, with
145. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.                                   copies to the signees of the Addis Ababa
146. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.                               Agreement of 8Jan93.
147. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.                        174. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.
148. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.                          175. Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw.
149. Mroczkowski journal, entries dtd 21-22Dec92.          176. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.
150. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.                          177. LtCol Stephen M. Spataro, USA, UNITAF
151. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93;                     Provost Marshal: memorandum from PM for J-3,
      Mroczkowski        field    notebook;     Spiece-         subj: Auxiliary Security Force, dtd 27Jan93, p.
      Mroczkowski intvw.                                        1.
152. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.                        178. Ibid., pp. 3, 5.
153. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 5Jan93.                179. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.
154. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.                        180. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93.
155. Ibid.                                                 181. Ibid.
156. Johnathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with         182. Ibid.
      Humanitarian          Relief      Organizations:     183. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 1Feb93.
      Observations from Restore Hope, (Alexandria,         184. Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-227,
      Virginia: Center For Naval Analyses, Oct93), pp.          The Army Lawyer, Nov91, p. 14.
      28-32.                                               185. Spataro, op. cit., p. 3.
157. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.                           186. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
158. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw.                          187. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93.
159. Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw.                           188. Ibid.
160. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 25Dec92.
161. Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw.
                                                                                                NOTES     163

                    Chapter 6                             197. CJTF Somalia to USCinCCent, msg,
                                                               130055ZJan93, subj: Death of USMC Member.
   This chapter was based mainly on interviews the        198. Klimp-Dawson intvw, 11Jan93.
author and other historians conducted in the field.       199. Ibid.
Those by the author were with BGen Anthony C. Zinni,      200. Sgt B. W. Beard, "Marines Relieve Suffering In
hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2; Colonel Major             Somalia," CMC News Release, 222001ZJan93.
Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army, hereafter           201. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2: "Narrative Summary:
Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M. Taylor,            Command, Operations, and Training," p. 10.
hereafter Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; Col. Werner           202. Ibid., p. 10.
Hellmer, hereafter Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw; Maj         203. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
John Caligari, Royal Australian Army, hereafter           204. Ibid.. p. 16.
Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Ailen Pietrantoni,      205. Ibid., pp. 16-17; Andrew Purvis, "In the
French Army, hereafter Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski                 Crossfire," Time, 8Mar93, p. 47.
intvw; Maj Daniel M. Lizzul, hereafter Lizzul-            206. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30 Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative
Mroczkowski intvw; Maj Leland W. Carroll, USA,                 Summary," p. 2-2.
hereafter Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw; SFC Kenneth
                                                          207. Ibid., pp. 2-3 to 2-4.
W. Barriger, USA, hereafter Barriger-Mroczkowski
intvw; Capt Geoff Kyle, Canadian Army, hereafter          208. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 6.
Kyle-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Carol J. Mathieu,           209. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 20Jan93.
Canadian Army, hereafter Mathieu-Mroczkowski              210. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.
intvw; and LtCol Donald C. Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter         14, 18.
Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw. Many of these interviews        211. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
were copied in the author's field notebook, cited as           Somalia, p. 23.
Mroczkowski field notebook. Interviews made by other      212. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
historians included in this chapter were by LtCol              Mroczkowski field notebook.
Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr.,         213. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
USAR, with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, hereafter              Somalia, p. 23.
Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; LtGen Robert B.              214. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw;             Mroczkowski field notebook.
and BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Cureton-       215. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
Wright intvw. Also used was the oral history inter-view        Somalia, p. 62.
between Capt David A. Dawson and Col Jack W.              216. Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
Klimp, hereafter Klimp-Dawson intvw. The author also           Mroczkowski field notebook.
used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski     217. Ibid.
journal with appropriate date citations. He was also
                                                          218. Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
provided a copy of the personal journal of Col Dayre
                                                               Mroczkowski field notebook; Gary Ramage and
C. Lias, USAF, hereafter Lias journal, with appropriate
                                                               Bob Breen, Through Aussie Eyes: Photographs of
date citations.
                                                               The Australian Defense Force in Somalia 1993
                                                               (Canberra: Department of Defense, 1994), p. 52,
189. I MEF, ComdC, 7Dec92-28Feb93, sec 2,                      hereafter Ramage and Breen.
     "Narrative Summary; Command Operations and           219. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.
     Training," p. 9, hereafter I MEF, ComdC.                  4, 37-38.
190. UNIATF, "Memorandum For Correspondents,"             220. Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
     dtd 24Dec92; transcript of NBC "Today" intvw              Mroczkowski field notebook; I MEF, ComdC, sec
     with Col Fredrick C. Peck, "Spokesman in                  2, "Narrative Summary," pp. 37-38.
     Somalia," dtd Thursday, 24Dec92.                     221. Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
191. I MEF, ComdC; Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd              Mroczkowski field notebook.
     7Jan93; Memo from ComMarFor to CJTF                  222. Personal observations of refugee camp in
     Somalia, subj: Operations Summary for the                 Mroczkowski field notebook.
     Period 062300CJan 93 to 071750CJan 93, here-         223. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 16January93.
     after ComMarFor Memo.
                                                          224. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
192. I MEF, ComdC.                                             Mroczkowski field notebook.
193. ComMarFor Memo; Klimp-Dawson intvw.                  225. Handwritten note provided to the author by Maj
194. ComMarFor Memo.                                           John Caligari, Royal Australian Army.
195. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 7Jan93.               226. Ibid.; Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
196. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93.                      Mroczkowski field notebook.
                                                          227. Ramage and Breen, p. 102.

228. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in             251. Ibid., sec C, Consolidation: Domaine
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                              Operationnel, p. 1; Mroczkowski journal, entry
229. Ibid.                                                    dtd 1Feb93.
230. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in             252. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en
     Mroczkowski field notebook; Ramage and Breen,            Somalie, "Chronologie," sec C, Consolidation:
     p. 78.                                                   Domain Operationnel, p. 1, and sect D, Passage A
231. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in                  Oryx 2, p. 1.
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                         253. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 16Mar93.
232. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces            254. Ibid.; Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23Feb93.
     Somalia, p. 32.                                     255. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.
233. Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in                  12.
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                         256. Lizzul-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
234. Ramage and Breen, pp. 78-79.                             Mroczkowski field notebook.
235. Ibid., p. 79.                                       257. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.
236. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.             13.
     38.                                                 258. Il Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 142-150; Briefing notes,
237. Ibid., pp. 9, 12, 14, 38; I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-            Commander Italian Forces to Commanding
     30Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-3;             General UNITAF, undated (about 29Jan93).
     Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in               259. Il Volo Dell'Ibis, p. 148.
     Mroczkowski Field Note Book.                        260. Briefing notes, Commander Italian Forces to
238. I MEF, ComdC, section 2, "Narrative Summary,"            Commanding General UNITAF, undated (about
     p. 9.                                                    29Jan93).
239. Ibid., p. 12; I MEF, ComdC, sec 3,                  261. Ibid.
     "Chronological Listing Of Significant Events," p.   262. Ibid.; Il Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 104-115.
     15.                                                 263. Il Volo Dell'Ibis, pp. 135-136;U.S. Army Center
240. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sec 2, "Narrative            of Military History, Resource Guide: Unified Task
     Summary," p. 2-3.                                        Force Somalia December 1992-May 1993
241. Ibid., p. 2-10.                                          Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.: U.S.
242. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in               Army Center of Military History, 1994), p. 174.
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                         264. Briefing notes, Commander Italian Forces to
243. Commandement Francais des Forces Francaises              Commanding General UNITAF, undated (about
     en Somalie, "Chronologie," pp. 1-3; U.S. Army            29Jan93).
     Center of Military History, Resource Guide:         265. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
     Unified Task Force Somalia December 1992-May             Somalia, p. 22.
     1993 Operation Restore Hope (Washington D.C.:       266. Ibid., p. 23.
     U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994), pp.    267. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 29Jan93.
                                                         268. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
244. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en            Somalia, pp. 23-24.
     Somalie, "Chronologie," sec B, Domaine
                                                         269. Mroczkowski journal, entry dated 21Jan93.
     Operationnal, p. 2.
                                                         270. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
245. Ibid.
                                                              Somalia, p. 26.
246. Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
                                                         271. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource
     Mroczkowski field notebook.
                                                              Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December
247. Commandement Francais de Forces Francaises en            1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope
     Somalie, "Chronologie," p. 4.                            (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military
248. Ibid.                                                    History, 1994), pp. 169-170.
249. Mroczkowski Field Note Book: intvw with Chief       272. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
     Abdi Ugas Husen of El Berde, interpreted by              Mroczkowski field notebook.
     Abdil Kader Abdilahi Ali. Also Pietrantoni-
                                                         273. 1st Canadian Division, After Action Report,
     Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski
                                                              Operation Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.
     field notebook.
                                                         274. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
250. Commandement Francais des Force Francaises en
                                                              Mroczkowski field notebook.
     Somalie, "Chronologie," sec B Securisation:
     Domaine Operationnel, p. 2.                         275. Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
                                                              Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian
                                                              Division, After Action Report, Operation
                                                              Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.
                                                                                                 NOTES      165

276. Mroczkowski journal, entries dtd 25Dec92 and       298. I MEF, ComdC, sect 2 "Narrative Summary," p.
     5Jan93; Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in          10.
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                        299. Ramage and Breen, p. 109.
277. Barriger-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in            300. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                             10.
278. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in             301. Ramage and Breen, p. 110.
     Mroczkowski field notebook; Kyle-Mroczkowski       302. The Honorable Art Eggleton, Minister of National
     intvw, recorded in Mroczkowski field notebook.          Defense, Report of the Somalia Commission of
279. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in                  Inquiry, (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Government
     Mroczkowski field notebook; Mroczkowski jour-           Publishing Directorate, 1997).
     nal, entry dtd 21Jan93.                            303. Ltr from LtGen Robert B. Johnston to Adm
280. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 20Jan93;                 Anderson, Chief of the Canadian Defense Staff,
     Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in                  dtd 1May93, as quoted in the Report of the
     Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian                Somalia Commission of Inquiry.
     Division, After Action Report, Operation           304. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.

                                                                            Chapter 7
     Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-4/7.                          18.
281. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in
     Mroczkowski field notebook; 1st Canadian
     Division, After Action Report, Operation
     Deliverance, 4Nov93, p. A-3/7.                     305. CJTF Somalia SitRep 093, dtd 081535Mar93.
282. Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in             306. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                             Somalia, p. 61.
283. Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw, recorded in              307. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                        308. Marine Forces Somalia Air Combat Element
284. Briefing papers: "Operation Restore Hope, Task          ComdC, 9Dec92-19Mar93, sec 2, "Narrative
     Force Kismayo," dtd 7Jan93.                             Summary," p. 2.
285. Task Force Kismayo, unpublished paper "Task        309. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.
     Force Kismayo: 10th Mountain Division                   26-27.
     Operation Restore Hope," undated (probably         310. Lias journal, entries dtd 18-19Dec92 and 5Jan93.
     early Jan93), p. 2; 10th Mountain Division, U.S.   311. Ibid., entries dtd 5, 15Dec92.
     Army Forces Somalia, p.22.                         312. Ibid., entry dtd 16Dec92.
286. Task Force Kismayo, "Gun Control in the Jubba      313. Memo for the record, from Commander (Unified
     Valley," undated.                                       Task Force Somalia) to Potential Users of Somali
287. Task Force Kismayo Somalia to ComMarFor,                Airspace; subj: Control of Somali Territorial
     msg, subj: BGen Magruder Meeting with Gen               Airspace, undated.
     Morgan, 232324ZJan93.                              314. American Embassy Nairobi to Secretary of State,
288. Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw, 23June93.                  msg, 111337ZJan93, subj: JTF Liaison with
289. Ibid.                                                   ICAO.
290. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces           315. Ibid.
     Somalia, p. 23.                                    316. Ibid.
291. Diana Jean Schemo, "U.S. Copters Attack Rebel      317. Memo for the record, Air Control Representative
     Force in Southern Somalia;" The New York Times,         to International Civil Aviation Organization, subj:
     26Jan93.                                                Results of ICAO/UNITAF Technical Meeting, dtd
292. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 25Jan93.                 15Jan93.
293. Ultimatum from United States Special Envoy to      318. Memo for the record, Air Control Authority
     Somalia and Commander, Unified Task Force               Representative to International Civil Aviation
     Somalia, 23Feb93.                                       Organization, subj: Results of ICAO/UNITAF
294. Oakley-Cureton-Wright       intvw;    Johnston-         Working Group Sessions, dtd 18Jan93.
     Cureton-Wright intvw.                              319. International Civil Aviation Organization, Eastern
295. "Troops Fear Disruption of Somali Peace Talks,"         and Southern African Office: "Informal ATS
     Associated Press, 10Mar93.                              Coordination Meeting for Air Operations in
296. "U.S. Sends Troops Back to Kismayu,"                    Mogadishu FIR (Nairobi, 3-5Mar93)."
     Associated Press, 18Mar93.                         320. Memo, AME/DirMobFor to WOC Mombasa/For
297. Johnston-Cureton-Wright        intvw;     Zinni-        all Aircrews, subj: Operations at Mogadishu
     Mroczkowski intvw.                                      Airport, dtd 31Dec92; USTransCom/CAT to HQ

     Airspace; subj: Control of Somali Territorial         339. Ibid., p. 15; I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sec
     Airspace, undated.                                         2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-3.
314. American Embassy Nairobi to Secretary of State,       340. Ibid., pp. 2-3-2-4.
     msg, 111337ZJan93, subj: JTF Liaison with             341. Ibid., p. 2-4.
     ICAO.                                                 342. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
315. Ibid.                                                      Somalia, p. 26.
316. Ibid.                                                 343. Johnston-Cureton-Wright Intvw, 12March93.
317. Memo for the record, Air Control Representative       344. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
     to International Civil Aviation Organization, subj:        Somalia, p. 26.
     Results of ICAO/UNITAF Technical Meeting, dtd         345. Ibid.
     15Jan93.                                              346. Ibid.
318. Memo for the record, Air Control Authority            347. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sec 1,
     Representative to International Civil Aviation             "Organizational Data," pp. 1-1, 1-2.
     Organization, subj: Results of ICAO/UNITAF

                                                                               Chapter 8
                                                           348. CJTF Somalia SitRep 147, dtd 011455Zmay93.
     Working Group Sessions, dtd 18Jan93.
319. International Civil Aviation Organization, Eastern
     and Southern African Office: "Informal ATS
     Coordination Meeting for Air Operations in
     Mogadishu FIR (Nairobi, 3-5Mar93)."                      This chapter was based upon information obtained
320. Memo, AME/DirMobFor to WOC Mombasa/For                through interviews conducted by the author and other
     all Aircrews, subj: Operations at Mogadishu           historians in the field. Those by the author were with
     Airport, dtd 31Dec92; USTransCom/CAT to HQ            Capt Michael L. Cowan, USN, hereafter Cowan-
     AMC TACC, msg, subj: Evaluation of Air Traffic        Mroczkowski intvw; Col Robert G. Hill, hereafter Hill-
     Flow into Mogadishu Airport, dtd 1943/01Jan93.        Mroczkowski intvw; and Col Kevin M. Kennedy, here-
321. CJTF Somalia to USCinCCent, msg, subj:                after Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw. Interviews by
     Transition of Airspace Control Authority              other historians were with LtCol Charles H. Cureton,
     Functions, dtd 181910ZJan93.                          USMCR, and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, with
322. Memo of Introduction, dtd 1Feb93.                     LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston-
323. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93.                Cureton-Wright intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, here-
324. United Nations Department of Public                   after Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw; and between Capt
     Information, The United Nations and Somalia,          David A. Dawson and Col Werner Hellmer, hereafter
     1992-1996, The United Nations Blue Book               Hellmer-Dawson intvw. The author also used his per-
     Series, Volume VIII. (New York: The United            sonal journal, hereafter Mroczkowski journal with
     Nations, 1996), p. 35.                                appropriate dates.
325. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.
326. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2 "Narrative Summary," p. 7.        349. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
327. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93.                     Somalia, p. 11.
328. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.               350. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6January93.
329. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 30Dec92.               351. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.
330. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force in      352. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 6Jan93.
     Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:             353. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
     Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 110.                  Somalia, p. 11.
331. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.               354. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 170600ZJan93.
332. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force in      355. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 280600ZJan93.
     Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:             356. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.
     Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), pp. 95-96;
                                                           357. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 290600ZJan93.
     "Drawdown Concept Paper" prepared by the
     UNITAF staff, dtd 11Jan93.                            358. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
333. Katherine A. W. McGrady, The Joint Task Force in           Somalia, p. 67.
     Operation Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:             359. Ibid., p. 69.
     Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 96.              360. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
334. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw, 12Mar93.               361. Ibid., p. 71.
335. I MEF, ComdC, pp. 10-11.                              362. Ibid.
336. Mroczkowski journal, entry dtd 16Jan93.               363. Ibid.
337. I MEF, ComdC, pp. 32-33.                              364. JTFSC SitRep, dtd 050600ZMar93.
338. Ibid., p. 14.                                         365. CMPF Somalia SitRep, dtd 151700ZJan93.
                                                                                                               NOTES     167

366. I MEF, ComdC, sect 2, "Narrative Summary," p.                      392. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
     26.                                                                     Somalia, pp. 64-65.
367. Ibid., p. 27.                                                      393. Cdr William F. Boudra, USN, "Engineers Restore
368. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 60.                                    Hope," The Military Engineer, Jul93, p. 7.
369. CMPF Somalia SitRep, dtd 151700ZJan93.                             394. Ibid.
370. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces                           395. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
     Somalia, p. 67.                                                    396. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
371. Ibid., pp. 68-69.                                                       Somalia, p. 24.
372.;                          397. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw.                          398. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," p.
373. Ibid.                                                                   34.
374. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw, as recorded in                            399. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw; I MEF, ComdC, sect 2,
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                                             "Narrative Summary," p. 34.
375. Ibid.                                                              400. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw.
376. Ibid.                                                              401. Ibid.
377. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for                    402. Ibid.; 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
     Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance                            Somalia, p. 38.
     (Santa Monica, California: The Rand                                403. Hill-Mroczkowski intvw.
     Corporation, 1996), p. 53.                                         404. Ibid.
378. Cowan-Mroczkowski intvw, as recorded in                            405. Unified Task Force Somalia, Psychological
     Mroczkowski field notebook.                                             Operations in Support of Operation Restore Hope,
379. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for                         9Dec92-4 May93, p. 3.
     Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance                       406. Ibid., pp. 1,2.
     (Santa Monica, California: The Rand                                407. Ibid., p. 3.
     Corporation, 1996), pp. 80-81.                                     408. Ibid., p. 4.
380. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces                           409. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
     Somalia, pp. 68-69.                                                410. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
381. Lois M. Davis, et al., Army Medical Support for                    411. Ibid., p. 10.
     Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance                       412. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
     (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corpora-
                                                                        413. Ibid., pp. 3,4,5.
     tion, 1996), pp. 58, 65.
                                                                        414. Ibid., pp. 14-20.
382. 1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, Operation
     Restore Hope After Action Report, 15Jun93), pp.                    415. Ibid., p. 6.
     1-2.                                                               416. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93.
383. Ibid., pp. 1-4.                                                    417. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with
384. Ibid., pp. 2,6.                                                         Humanitarian         Relief      Organizations:
                                                                             Observations from Restore Hope (Washington,
385. Cdr William F. Boudra, USN, "Engineers Restore
                                                                             D.C.: Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 14-
     Hope," The Military Engineer, Jul93, pp. 4-5.
386. 15th MEU (SOC), ComdC, 1Dec92-3Feb93, sec
                                                                        418. Ibid., pp. 17-20.
     2, "Narrative Summary," p. 2-5; I MEF, ComdC,
                                                                        420. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with
     sect 2, "Narrative Summary," p. 29.                                419. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw.

                                                                             Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Obser-
387. Keith B. Richburg, "U. S. Envoy Tells Somalia's
                                                                             vations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:
     Warlords Not to Interfere," The Washington Post,
                                                                             Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 19-20.
     8Dec92, p.2; Naval Mobile Construction
                                                                        421. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw.
     Battalion 40, NMCB Command History;

                                                                        422. Ibid.; Col Kenneth Allard, USA, Somalia

                                                                             Operations: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.:
     tm, p. 2.

                                                                             National Defense University Press, Jan95), pp.
388. Naval Historical Center, Seabee History:
     Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm,

                                                                        423. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with, p. 5

                                                                             Humanitarian         Relief      Organizations:
389. Ibid.
                                                                             Observations from Restore Hope (Washington,
390. Capt Brenda Campbell, USAF, "Red Horse
                                                                             D.C.: Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), p. 22.
     Celebrates                35th                Anniversary,"
                                                                        424. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
     w w w. a f . m i l / n e w s / s e p 2 0 0 0 / n 2 0 0 0 7 2 8 -

                                                                        425. Ibid., pp. 22-24.
     00152.shmtl, p. 1.
391. Lias journal, entry dtd 10Dec92.

426. Ibid., pp. 24-25.                                 443. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.
427. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw.                       444. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 58.
428. Kennedy-Mroczkowski intvw.                        445. Robert B. Oakley, "Somalia: A Case Study," Two
429. Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with           Perspectives on Intervention and Humanitarian
     Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Obser-              Operations, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., editor
     vations from Restore Hope (Washington, D.C.:           (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute,
     Center For Naval Analyses, 1993), pp. 26-27.           Jul97), p. 13.
430. I MEF, ComdC, sec 2, "Narrative Summary," pp.     446. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.
     5-6, 41.                                          447. Department of Public Information United
431. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar93-30Apr93, sec 2,                   Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,
     "Narrative Summary," pp.2-6, 2-7.                      Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia
432. Hellmer-Dawson intvw, 28Feb93.                         1992-1996 (New York, New York: United
433. Ibid.                                                  Nations, 1996), p. 39.
434. Ibid.                                             448. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.
                                                       449. Department of Public Information United
                   Chapter 9                                Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,
                                                            Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia
                                                            1992-1996 (New York, New York: United
    The information for this chapter was based on a
                                                            Nations, 1996), pp. 46-47.
variety of sources written by participants. These
include the comments of United Nations Secretary       450. CentCom Point Paper, subj: "Proposed Transition
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in the United Nations        from Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to United
Blue Book Series, Volume VIII, The United Nations           Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II),"
And Somalia 1992-1996. Also used was the author's           dtd 23Dec92.
interview with BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter        451. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.
Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw, and the interview between     452. Ibid.
LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright,     453. Ibid.
Jr., USA, with LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter     454. ComNavFor Somalia SitRep, dtd 252000ZFeb93.
Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.                         455. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource
                                                            Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December
435. Department of Public Information United                1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope
     Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,          (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military
     Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia            History, 1994), pp. 155-157.
     1992-1996 (New York, New York: United             456. Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw.
     Nations, 1996), p. 33.                            457. Department of Public Information United
436. Hoar, "A CinC's Perspective," p. 62.                   Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,
437. Robert B. Oakley, "Somalia: A Case Study," Two         Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia
     Perspectives on Intervention and Humanitarian          1992-1996 (New York, New York: United
     Operations, Earl H. Tilford, Jr., editor               Nations, 1996), pp. 42-43.
     (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute,   458. Ibid., p. 43.
     Jul97), p. 5.                                     459. U.S. Army Center of Military History, Resource
438. Department of Public Information United                Guide: Unified Task Force Somalia December
     Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,          1992-May 1993 Operation Restore Hope
     Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia            (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military
     1992-1996 (New York, New York: United                  History, 1994), pp. 154-157.
     Nations, 1996), p. 46.                            460. 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army Forces
439. Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw, 11Mar93.                   Somalia, p. 26.
440. Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw.                          461. I MEF, ComdC, 1Mar-30Apr93, sect 2,
441. Ibid., p. 44.                                          "Narrative Summary," pp. 2-3 to 2-5, 2-8, and sec
442. Department of Public Information United                3, "Chronological Listing of Significant Events,"
     Nations, The United Nations Blue Book Series,          p. 3-4.
     Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia       462. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
     1992-1996 (New York, New York: United                  "Remarks by the President to General Johnston
     Nations, 1996), pp. 40-41.                             and Staff," 5May93.
                                        Appendix A

                Unified Task Force Somalia Organization

           Command and Staff                             Battalion Headquarters
                                                         Alpha Company
Commanding General: Lieutenant General Robert            Bravo Company
B. Johnston                                              Charlie Company
Special Envoy: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley               Delta Company
Deputy Commanding General: Major General W.              Support Company
D. Moore, USA                                            Administration Company
Joint Force Air Component Commander: Major           1st Battalion, Support Group
General Harold W. Blot                                   Battalion Headquarters
Chief of Staff: Colonel Billy C. Steed                   Transport Troop
Political Advisor: Mr. John Hirsch                       Field Supply Platoon
Administration (J-1): Colonel L. Rehberger III           Medical Platoon
Intelligence (J-2): Colonel W. M. Handley, USA           Dental Section
Operations (J-3): Brigadier General Anthony C.           Field Workshop
Zinni                                                B Squadron, 3d/4th Cavalry Regiment
Logistics (J-4): Colonel Sam E. Hatton, USA          Battery Commander's Party, 107th Field
Plans and Policy (J-5): Colonel John W. Moffett      Battery
Command, Control, Communications (J-6):              17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat
Colonel Robert G. Hill                               Engineer Regiment
Executive Assistant (J-8/EA): Colonel Michael        Detachment, 103d Signals Squadron
W. Hagee
                                                  Naval Contingent
Joint Information Bureau: Colonel Frederick C.
Joint Visitor's Bureau: Colonel R. J. Agro           HMAS Jervis Bay
Civil-Military Operations Center: Colonel Kevin      HMAS Tobruk

M. Kennedy
Unified Task Force Surgeon: Captain Michael L.
Cowan, USN
Unified Task Force Engineer: Colonel Robert B.
Flowers, USA                                      Commanding Officer
Headquarters Commandant: Major Eric C. Holt          Colonel Marc Jacqmin, Belgian Army
Joint Combat Camera Detachment: Lieutenant
Commander James P. Kiser, USN                     1st Parachute Battalion (Reinforced)

          Coalition Forces
                                                      Headquarters Company
                                                      Support Company
                                                      11th Company
                                                      13th Company

                                                      21st Company
                                                      Reconnaissance Company
                                                      Engineer Platoon
Commanding Officer                                    Supply Platoon (Reinforced)
   Colonel William J. Mellor, Australian Army         Surgical Team
                                                      Signal Platoon
1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment          Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team
Battalion Group                                       Aviation Detachment
    1st Battalion, The Royal Australian               Judge Advocate General Team

Naval Contingent
   HMS Zinnia                                Composite Reinforced Company
                                                1st Platoon (Light Armored)

                                                2d Platoon (Light Armored)
                                                Logistics Platoon
                                                    Medical Section
Commanding Officer                                  Engineer Section
   Lieutenant Colonel Thulanganyo Masisi,           Maintenance Section
   Botswana Defense Force                           Logistics Section

Composite Reinforced Company
   Command Section
   1st Platoon (Mechanized)
   2d Platoon (Light Infantry)               Commanding General
   3d Platoon (Light Infantry)                  Major General Rene Delhome, French Army
   4th Platoon (Light Infantry)
   Special Forces Troop                      Command Element, 9th Marine Infantry Division
   Mortar Platoon                            Battalion, 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade
   Medical Section                           Battalion, 5th Combined Arms Overseas
   Transportation Section                    Regiment
   Signals Section                           3d Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment
   Stores Section                            4th Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment
   Messing Section                           3d Company, 6th Foreign Legion Engineer
   Central Arms Depot                        Regiment
   Engineer Section                          Detachment, 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment
                                             Detachment, Special Forces

                                             Detachment, Logistics Support Battalion

                                             Naval Contingent
                                                Frigate Georges Leygues
Commanding Officer
                                                Light Transport La Grandiere
   Colonel Serge Labbe, Canadian Army
                                                Amphibious Ship Foudre
                                                Tanker Var
Canadian Joint Force Somalia

   Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group
       1 Commando
       2 Commando
       3 Commando
       Service Commando                      Commanding Officer
       DFS Platoon                              Lieutenant Colonel Meitzner, German Air
       Reconnaissance Platoon                   Force
       A Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons
       Engineer Troop                        The German contingent consisted of three
       Signal Troop                          Luftwaffe C-160 Transall aircraft operating from
       Aviation Detachment                   Mombasa, Kenya, as a part of Operation Provide

Naval Contingent

   HMCS Preserver

                                             Commanding Officer
                                                Colonel Spilitios, Greek Army
Commanding Officer                           Infantry Battalion (-)
   Colonel Al-Fakhrani, Egyptian Army
                                                                           APPENDIX A     171

                    India                       Logistics Section
                                                Communications Section
Commanding Officer                              Military Police Section
   Commodore Sam Pillai, Indian Navy            Post Exchange Section

Naval Contingent
                                                Public Affairs Section

   Tanker INS Deepak
   Amphibious Landing Ship INS Cheetah
   Frigate INS Kuthar
                                             Commanding Officer

                                                Colonel Major (brigadier general equivalent)
                                                Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army

Commanding General                           Base Section
   Major General Gianpietro Rossi, Italian   3d Motorized Infantry Regiment
   Army                                         Infantry Company
                                                Infantry Company
Headquarters Element                            Cavalry Company
Folgore Parachute Brigade                       Air Defense Artillery element
    Headquarters Regiment                       Medical Section

                                                            New Zealand
    186th Parachute Regiment
    187th Parachute Regiment
    9th Assault Parachute Battalion
    Logistics Battalion
    Armored Vehicle Company                  Commanding Officers
    Engineer Company                            Colonel Dunne, Royal New Zealand Air
    Tank Company                                Force, 9 December 1992 to 18 March 1993
Field Hospital "Centauro"                       Wing Commander Duxfield, Royal New
Surgical Detachment                             Zealand Air Force, 18 March 1993
San Marco Battalion (Marine Infantry)
Composite Helicopter Regiment                Detachment, 42 Squadron (Three Andover trans-
Detachment, 46th Aviation Brigade            port aircraft)

Naval Contingent
   Frigate ITS Grecale                                          Nigeria
   Logistical Landing Ship ITS Vesuvio
   Landing Ship Tank ITS San Giorgio         Commanding Officer

                                                Lieutenant Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola,
                                                Nigerian Army

                                             245 Reconnaissance Battalion
Commanding Officers                             Battalion Headquarters
   Lieutenant Colonel Mohamad al-Obaid,         Administration Company
   Kuwaiti Army                                     Company Headquarters
   Major Al Muzien, Kuwaiti Army                    Quartermaster Platoon
                                                    Engineer Troop
Composite Reinforced Motorized Company              Light Aid Detachment
   Company Headquarters                             Signals Section
   Armored Car Platoon                              Mobile Shop
   Scout Platoon                                 Company A (Mechanized Infantry)
   Scout Platoon                                Company B (Mechanized Infantry)
   Medical Section                               Company C (Reconnaissance Company)
   Engineer Section                              Company D (Reconnaissance Company)

(Note: Does not include Pakistani forces in                            Tunisia
Somalia as part of UNOSOM I)
                                                  Commanding Officer
Commanding Officers                                  Lieutenant Colonel Sharif, Tunisian Army
   Colonel Asif, Pakistani Army
   Lieutenant Colonel Tariq S. Malik, Pakistani   Infantry Battalion (-)


6th Battalion, The Punjab Regiment
    Battalion Headquarters
    Company A                                     Commanding Officers
    Company B                                        Colonel Huseyin Erim, Turkish Army, 9
    Company C                                        December 1992 to 25 March 1993
    Company D                                        Major Haldun Solmazturk, Turkish Army, 25
    Support Company                                  March 1993
        Company Headquarters
        Signals Platoon                           1 Company, 1 Battalion Mechanized, 28 Brigade
        Administrative Platoon                       Headquarters Section
             Transport Section                       1st Platoon (Mechanized Infantry)
             Administrative Section                  2d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry
             Assault Engineer Platoon                3d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry
             81mm Mortar Platoon                     Fire Support Platoon
7th Battalion, Frontier Forces                       Quartermaster Platoon
10th Battalion, Baluch Regiment                      Transport and Maintenance Platoon
1st Battalion, Sind Regiment                         Signal Section
                                                     Medical Section

                Saudi Arabia
                                                     Engineer Section

                                                  Naval Contingent
Commanding Officer                                   Landing Ship Tank Ertugrul
   Colonel Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Land           Logistics Ship Derya
   Forces                                            Destroyer Fatih

                                                             United Arab Emirates
5th Royal Saudi Land forces Airborne Battalion
    Headquarters Company
    1 Company                                     Commanding Officers
    2 Company                                        Lieutenant Colonel Alkefbi, United Arab
    3 Company                                        Emirates Army, 9 February 1993
    Combat Service Support Element                   Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Ketbi, United
        Medical Platoon                              Arab Emirates Army
        Engineer Platoon
                                                  Al Wajeb Battalion

        Maintenance Platoon
                                                     Headquarters Company
                                                         Services Section
                                                         Combat Engineer Platoon
Commanding Officer                                       81Mm Mortar Platoon
   Lieutenant Colonel Lars A. Hedman,                Reconnaissance Company
   Swedish Army                                      2d Company (Mechanized Infantry)
                                                     3d Company (Mechanized Infantry
1st Field Hospital
                                                                               APPENDIX A     173

             United Kingdom                              E Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry
Commanding Officer                                       Scout Platoon, Headquarters, 1st
   Wing Commander Humphrey, Royal Air                    Battalion, 87th Infantry
   Force                                             Aviation Brigade (Falcon Brigade)
                                                         3d Battalion (Assault), 25th Aviation
The United Kingdom contingent consisted of two               Headquarters Company
Royal Air Force C-130 aircraft flying out of                 Company B
Mombasa, Kenya, as part of Operation Provide                 Company C
Relief.                                                      Company D
                                                     3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry

               United States
                                                         Headquarters Troop
                                                         A Troop

Air Force Contingent
                                                         B Troop
                                                         C Troop
                                                         D Troop
Commanding Officers                                  10th Mountain Division Support Command
   Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik,               210th Support Battalion (Forward)
   USAF, 9 December 1992 to 29 March 1993                    Headquarters and Company A
   Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 9 March 1993                        Company B
                                                             Company C
Air Force Forces Somalia                                 710th Support Battalion (Main)
    Air Force Forces Somalia Staff, Mogadishu                Headquarters and Company A
    437th Tactical Airlift Wing                              Company B
    5th Combat Communications Group                          Company C
    823d Civil Engineering Squadron                          Company D
    Mogadishu Airfield Tactical Airlift Control              Company E, 25th Aviation
    Element                                              10th Signal Battalion
    Mogadishu Airfield Support                               Headquarters Company
    Deployed Tactical Airlift Control Element

Army Contingent
                                                             Company A
                                                             Company B
                                                             Company C
Commanding Generals                                      41st Engineer Battalion
   Brigadier General William Magruder III,                   Headquarters Company
   USA                                                       Company A
   Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22                   Company B
   December 1992 to 13 March 1993                        110th Military Intelligence Battalion
   Brigadier Greg L. Gile, USA, 13 March to 4                Technical Control And Analysis
   May 1993                                                  Element
                                                             Military Intelligence Support Team
Army Forces Somalia                                          Counter Intelligence Team
10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)                      Ground Surveillance Radar Team
    2d Brigade (Commando Brigade)                            Long Range Surveillance
        3d Battalion, 14th Infantry                          Detachment
            Headquarters Company                         10th Military Police Company
            Company A                                    Battery B, 3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense
            Company B                                    Artillery
            Company C                                    Detachment, Battery A, 3d Battalion,
        2d Battalion, 87th Infantry                      62d Air Defense Artillery
            Headquarters Company
            Company A                             Joint Task Force Support Command
            Company B                             Commanding General
            Company C                                 Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA
        A Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry

36th Engineer Group                                    360th Transportation Company
    43d Engineer Battalion                             710th Transportation Company (Provisional)
        Company A                                      (Boat)
        Company B                                      870th Transportation Company
        Company C                                      22d Transportation Detachment
        Direct Support Maintenance Unit                160th Transportation Detachment
    63d Engineer Company (Combat Support               169th Transportation Detachment
    Equipment)                                         329th Transportation Detachment
    642d Engineer Company (Combat Support              491st Transportation Detachment
    Equipment)                                         Military Traffic Management Command
    74th Engineer Detachment (Diving)                  "Tiger" Team
    95th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)       2d Chemical Battalion
    520th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)      720th Military Police Battalion
    597th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)          511th Military Police Company
    33d Finance Battalion (Provisional) (FSU)(-)       571st Military Police Company
    602d Maintenance Company                           978th Military Police Company
    Detachment, 514th Maintenance Company              984thMilitary Police Company
62d Medical Group                                      Military Police Criminal Investigation
    32d Medical Battalion (Logistics)                  Element
    86th Evacuation Hospital                       240th Quartermaster Battalion
    159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)              110th Quartermaster Company (POL)
    423d Medical Company (Clearing)                    267th Quartermaster Company
    514th Medical Company (Ambulance)                  18th Quartermaster Platoon
    61st Medical Detachment (Preventive                26th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU
    Medicine Sanitation)                               Barge Team)
    73d Medical Detachment (Veterinary)                30th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU
    224th Medical Detachment (Preventive               Barge Team)
    Medicine Sanitation)                               82d Quartermaster Detachment
    227th Medical Detachment (Epidemiology)            22d Quartermaster Laboratory
    248th Medical Detachment (Veterinary)              Detachment, 54th Quartermaster Company
    257th Medical Detachment (Dental)                  (Graves Registration)
    485th Medical Detachment (Preventive           Task Force Thunderbird (Signal)
    Medicine Entomology)                               209th Signal Company
    528th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress            516th Signal Company
    Team)                                              Company C, 327th Signal Battalion
    555th Medical Detachment (Surgical)                Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters
    Detachment 513th Military Intelligence             Company, 11th Signal Brigade
    Brigade                                            Detachment, 63d Signal Battalion
593d Support Group (Area)                              Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment,
    4th Support Center Material Management)            86th Signal Battalion
    548th Supply and Services Battalion                Detachment, 19th Signal Company
    62d Supply Company                                 Detachment, 69th Signal Company
    266th Supply Company (Direct Support)              Detachment, 385th Signal Company
    364th Supply Company                               Detachment, 505th Signal Company
7th Transportation Group                               Detachment, 521st Signal Company
    49th Transportation Center (Movement               Detachment, 526th Signal Company
    Control)                                           Detachment, 593d Signal Company
    6th Transportation Battalion                   10th Personnel Services Company
    24th Transportation Battalion                  546th Personnel Services Company
    24th Transportation Company                    129th Postal Company
    57th Transportation Company                    711th Postal Company
    100th Transportation Company                   Detachment, Company B (Air Traffic Control),
    119th Transportation Company                   1st Battalion, 58th Aviation
    155th Transportation Company                   Task Force 5-158 Aviation
                                                                             APPENDIX A    175

13th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)                      24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
60th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)                      Operations Capable)
542d Ordnance Detachment (EOD) (Control                 Headquarters, 24th Marine
Team)                                                   Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
27th Public Affairs Team                                Capable)
28th Public Affairs Team                                Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion,
                                                        2d Marines
Joint Psychological Operations Task Force               Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
Commanding Officer                                      263 (Composite)
    Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA            Marine Expeditionary Unit Service
                                                        Support Group 24
8th Psychological Operations Battalion              1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and
Product Dissemination Battalion                     Intelligence Group
9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical)       Headquarters Company, 1st Surveillance,

Marine Corps Contingent
                                                        Reconnaissance and Intelligence
                                                        Group (-)
Commanding Officers                                     1st Intelligence Company (-)
   Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, 9              1st Force Service Support Group
   December 1992 to 23 March 1993                       Headquarters, 1st Service Support Group
   Colonel Jack W. Klimp, 23 March 1993 to 9            (Forward)
   April 1993                                           Headquarters and Service Battalion (-)
   Colonel Emil R. Bedard, 9-28 April 1993              7th Engineer Battalion (-)
   Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, 28 April 1993            7th Motor Transport Battalion (-)
   to 4 May 1993                                        1st Landing Support Battalion (-)
                                                        1st Supply Battalion (-)
Marine Forces Somalia                                   1st Maintenance Battalion (-)
1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)                    1st Medical Battalion (-)
    Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division         1st Dental Battalion (-)
    (-) (Reinforced)                                Marine Aircraft Group 16
    7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)                        Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 16
         Headquarters Company, 7th Marines              Marine Light Attack Helicopter
         1st Battalion, 7th Marines                     Squadron 369
         3d Battalion, 9th Marines                      Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363
         3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-)                 Marine Aerial Transport Refueler
         (Reinforced)                                   Squadron 352
         3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-)        Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter
         (Reinforced)                                   Squadron 466
         3d Amphibious Assault Battalion (-)            Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron
         1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-)              38 (-)
         Reconnaissance Company, 5th Marines                 Detachment, Headquarters and
         Company C, 1st Tank Battalion (-)                   Headquarters Service Squadron
         (Reinforced)                                        Detachment, Marine Wing
    15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special                  Communications Squadron 38
    Operations Capable)                                      Detachment, Marine Air Traffic
         Headquarters, 15th Marine                           Control Squadron 38
         Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations              Detachment, Marine Air Support
         Capable)                                            Squadron 3
         Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion,               Detachment, Marine Air Control
         9th Marines                                         Squadron 1
         Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron                   Detachment, Marine Wing Support
         164 (Composite)                                     Squadron 1
         Marine Expeditionary Unit Service                   Detachment, Marine Aviation
         Support Group 15                                    Logistics Squadron 16
                                                    30th Naval Construction Regiment

          Headquarters, 30th Naval Construction                Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron
          Regiment                                             4
          Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1                Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 37
          Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40               Fighter/Attack Squadron 27
      9th Communications Battalion                             Fighter/Attack Squadron 97
      1st Radio Battalion                                      Tactical Electronic Warfare
      1st Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-)                    Squadron 134
      MAGTF Integration Instruction Team                       Attack Squadron 52
      National Intelligence Support Team                       Marine Detachment

Naval Contingent
                                                               Detachment, Explosive Ordnance
                                                               Unit 3
Commanding Officers                                        USS Leahy
   Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19-               USS W. H. Standley
   28 December 1992                                        USS Sacramento
   Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19-28                USS Tripoli
   December 1992                                           USS Juneau
   Rear Admiral (LH) James B. Perkins III,                 USS Rushmore
   USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 1993        CTF 156
   Captain J. W. Peterson, USN, 15 January             USS Tripoli
   1993 to 1 February 1993                             USS Juneau
   Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February         USS Rushmore
   1993 to 5 March 1993                                USS Niagara Falls
   Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, 5-23             CTF 155
   March 1993                                          Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 2
   Commodore Pyle, USN, 23 March                       Wasp Amphibious Ready Group
                                                   CTF 156
Naval Forces Somalia                                   Amphibious Squadron 2
Ranger Battle Group                                TF 156
    Cruiser Destroyer Group 1                          USS Wasp
    Destroyer Squadron 7                               USS El Paso
        USS Ranger                                     USS Louisville
            Carrier Air Wing 2                         USS Nashville
            Fighter Squadron 1                         USS Barnstable County
            Fighter Squadron 2                     Naval Beach Group 1
            Attack Squadron 145                        Assault Craft Unit 1
            Attack Squadron 155                        Beachmaster Unit 1
            Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 38             Amphibious Construction Battalion 1
            Tactical Electronic Warfare                Cargo Handling Group 1
            Squadron 31                            Military Sealift Command Office, Mogadishu
            Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron     Patrol Squadron Special Project Unit
            VAW 116                                Special Operations Contingent
            HSL 47 Detachment 2                    Commanding Officers
            HC 11 Detachment 10                       Colonel Thomas Smith, USA
        USS Wabash                                    Lieutenant Colonel William L.
        USS Valley Forge                              Faistenhammer, USA, after 20 January 1993
Kitty Hawk Battle Group
    Cruiser Destroyer Group 5                      1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group
    Destroyer Squadron 17                              Company B
        USS Kitty Hawk                                     ODA 526
            Carrier Air Wing 15                            ODA 54
            Fighter Squadron 111                           ODA 543
            Fighter Squadron 51                            ODA 546
            VAW 114                                        ODB 560
                                                                        APPENDIX A     177

        ODA 561                            S Company, 42 Infantry Battalion (Reinforced)
        ODA 562                               Headquarters Section
        ODA 563                                   Administration
        ODA 564                                   Operations
        ODA 565                                   Signals
2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group            Engineering
    Company A (Operation Provide Relief)          Public Affairs
    Company C                                     Electrical and Mechanical

                                              1st Platoon
                                              2d Platoon
                                              3d Platoon
Commanding Officer                            81mm Mortar/Antitank Platoon
   Major Vitalis Chigume, Zimbabwe Army       Medical Platoon
                                        Appendix B

       Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling

AAV        Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACA        Airspace Control Authority
ACE        Air Combat Element
ACO        Air Control Order
AES        Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron
AFFor      Air Force Forces Somalia
AMC        Air Mobility Command
AME        Air Mobility Element
APOD       Aerial Port Of Debarkation
APOE       Aerial Port Of Embarkation
ArFor      Army Forces Somalia
ARG        Amphibious Ready Group
ASG        Area Support Group
ATF        Amphibious Task Force
AWSS       Authorized Weapons Storage Site
CA         Civil Affair
CentCom    U.S. Central Command
CinC       Commander in Chief. In the United States military, used as the title of a commander of a
           specified or unified command, as in CinCCent, the commander in chief of the United
           States Central Command.
CJTF       Combined/Joint Task Force Somalia. One of the names given to the organization respon-
           sible for Operation Restore Hope, when it included both United States Armed Forces and
           coalition partners (thus making it a combined and joint force). Note that this acronym is
           sometimes also used for Commander Joint Task Force Somalia, especially in message
           traffic. See also JTF and UNITAF.
CMOC       Civil-Military Operations Center
CMOT       Civil-Military Operations Team
CoSCom     Corps Support Command
CSSE       Combat Service Support Element
CWT        Coalition Warfare Team
FIR        Flight Information Region
FSS        Fast Sealift Ship
FSSG       Force Service Support Group
GCE        Ground Combat Element
Humvee     High Mobility Multiwheeled Vehicle
HRO        Humanitarian Relief Organization
HRS        Humanitarian Relief Sector
ICAO       International Civil Aviation Organization
I MEF      I Marine Expeditionary Force
JTF        Joint Task Force Somalia. The original name given to the organization that would conduct
           Operation Restore Hope. As a joint task force, it referred only to the organization when it
           was composed of United States forces. It was changed over time to CJTF Somalia and to

JTFSC     Joint Task Force Support Command. Sometimes referred to as the Joint Logistics
          Command, or JLC
LCAC      Landing Craft Amphibious Cargo
MarFor    Marine Forces Somalia
METT-T    Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available
MEU (SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
MPF       Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS       Maritime Prepositioning Squadron or Ships
MSSG      MEU Service Support Group
MSR       Main Supply Route
NavFor    Navy Forces Somalia
NGO       Nongovernmental Organization
NoTAm     Notice to Airmen
OpCon     Operational Control. It is defined as a level of command authority used frequently in the
          execution of joint operations. It is the command authority, which may be exercised by
          commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be del-
          egated or transferred. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over sub-
          ordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning
          tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish
          the mission.
PhibRon   Amphibious Squadron
PsyOps    Psychological Operations
PVO       Private Voluntary Organization
RoE       Rules of Engagement
ROWPU     Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
SNA       Somali National Army
SNF       Somali National Front
SPF       Somali Patriotic Front
SPM       Somali Patriotic Movement
SOCCent   Special Operations Command, Central Command
SOFor     Special Operations Forces
SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
SYL       Somali Youth League
TaCon     Tactical Control. It is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or com-
          mands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the
          detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to
          accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TaCon may be delegated to and exercised by com-
          manders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TaCon is inherent
          in OpCon.
TransCom  The United States Transportation Command
TPFDD     Time phased force deployment data
ULN       Unit Line Number. A number assigned to a unit, with its personnel and equipment, which
          is to be shipped as an entity. The ULN is used to tell units when to be prepared to load
          onto transport. It also informs the receiving headquarters when they can expect the arrival
          of a unit in theater. It can also be used to track the unit while it is enroute.
UNITAF    Unified Task Force Somalia. The name given to the organization responsible for Operation
          Restore Hope, encompassing the headquarters, the United States Armed Forces compo-
          nents, and the coalition partners.
                                                                                        APPENDIX B     181

                                    Notes on Somali Spelling

   There was no standard written form of the Somali language until the 1960s. Fortunately for those in
the West, the government decided to adopt the Latin alphabet as the basis for the written form. However,
the exact spellings of place and personal names vary from one source to another, depending on the under-
standing of the phonetics by the individual transliterating. To further complicate matters, the major clans
often speak different dialects. There are also differences between Italian and English forms of the sounds
and words.
   For the sake of clarity, a standard of spelling for the most common names has been used in this vol-
ume. However, where a name or word is quoted, the spelling used in the quotation may have been kept.
The following is a list of these names, with alternate spellings as they may be found in other sources,
atlases, or histories.

Afgooye; Afgoi
Aideed; Aidid
Baidoa; Baydhabo
Balcad; Balad
Bale Dogle; Bali Dogle; Baali Doogle
Bardera; Baardheere
Beer Hanni; Bir Xanni; Bir Hane
Buulobarde; Bulo Burti; Buulo Berde
Buurhakaba; Buurhabaka (note transposition of the k and b); Bur Acaba; Buur Hakaba
Belet Weyne; Beled Weyne; Belet Uen; Belet Huen
Djibouti; Djibuti
Dhoble; Doble; Dhooble
Fer Fer; Ferfer; Feer Feer
Galcaio; Galkayo; Gaalkacyo
Gialalassi; Jialalaqsi; Xialalaksi
Habr Gedr; Habir Gedirh; Habr Gidr
Hargeisa; Hargeysa
Hawadle: Xawaadle
Hussein: Huseyn
Jawhar; Giohar; Johar
Jilib; Gelib
Jubba; Juba; Giuba
Kismayo; Kismayu; Cismayo; Chisimayu; Chisimaio; Kismaayo
Merka; Marka; Merca
Mogadishu; Mogadisho; Muqdishu
Mursade; Murasade; Mursida
Oddur; Huddur; Xuddur
Shabele; Shabeele; Shabeelle; Shebelle; Shebeli; Scebeli
Tiyegloo; Tayeeglow; Tigieglo; Tayeegle
Webi: Uebe
Wajid; Waajid; Wadjid
Yet; Yeet; Yeed
                                        Appendix C

                   Chronology of Events and Operations

26 June 1960         British Somaliland receives independence.
1 July 1960          British Somaliland joins with the Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic.
15 October 1969      President Shermarke is assassinated.
21 October 1969      Siad Barre takes over the government of Somalia in a military coup.
July 1977            Somali Army invades Ethiopia.
November 1977        Barre abrogates Somali treaties with the Soviet Union.
1978                 Somalia signs an agreement with the United States allowing U.S. military
                     access to Somali military facilities.
1980                 An agreement is signed between Somalia and the United States. In return for
                     military aid, the United States receives use of the port and airfield at Berbera.
1988                 Armed opposition to the Barre government begins with a rebellion in the north
                     of the country.
1990                 Three main opposition groups are fighting against the Barre regime. These are
                     the Somali National Movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United
                     Somali Congress.
December 1990        Fighting nears Mogadishu. Civil order breaks down in the city.
5 December 1990      U.S. Ambassador James K. Bishop orders the evacuation of all non-essential
                     United States Embassy personnel.
30 December 1990     All remaining Americans are brought into the United States Embassy com-
31 December 1990     The commander of U.S. Naval Central Command orders his staff to prepare for
                     an evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu.
1 January 1991       Ambassador Bishop requests permission from the State Department to evacuate
                     the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu.
2 January 1991       The State Department grants permission for evacuation of the embassy.
2 January 1991       Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an execute order for Operation Eastern Exit.
2 January 1991       Four ships carrying Marine forces get underway from the Persian Gulf to con-
                     duct noncombatant evacuation of the embassy.
5 January 1991       Ships arrive off the coast of Mogadishu. Operation Eastern Exit begins. First
                     helicopters leave the ships at 0345; the last helicopters return at 2323. The oper-
                     ation is declared complete at 2340.
22 January 1991      Siad Barre flees Mogadishu
May 1992             Barre's forces are defeated and he flees Somalia. Fighting between the factions
                     for control of the country begins.
17 November 1991     Fighting and civil disorder force United Nations staff to evacuate Somalia.
18 August 1992       President George H. W. Bush orders the airlift of 145,000 tons of food to
                     Somalia in Operation Provide Relief.
23 November 1992     Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), carrying the 15th Marine
                     Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU (SOC)), departs
                     Singapore enroute to the Persian Gulf.

25 November 1992     President Bush announces to the United Nations that the United States was pre-
                     pared to provide military forces to assist in the delivery of food and relief sup-
                     plies to Somalia.
27 November 1992     Commanding general of Central Command (CentCom) designates I Marine
                     Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as the headquarters of Joint Task Force (JTF)
29 November 1992     United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the U.N.
                     Security Council would consider authorizing an operation by member states.
1 December 1992      Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a warning order to the commander in chief of Central
                     Command (CinCCent).
2 December 1992      Joint Chiefs of Staff order the commander in chief, Pacific, to assign I MEF to
3 December 1992      The United Nations Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 794,
                     authorizing military intervention in Somalia. CinCCent issues deployment to I
                     MEF. Tripoli ARG arrives off southern Somali coast.
4 December 1992      JTF Somalia headquarters established. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston
                     briefs his concept of operations to component commanders.
5 December 1992      CentCom issues its operation order for Restore Hope. CinCCent assigns com-
                     manding general I MEF as commanding general, JTF Somalia.
6 December 1992      JTF Somalia issues its operation order for Restore Hope.
7 December 1992      First trainload of Army equipment departs Fort Drum for the port of Bayonne,
                     New Jersey.
9 December 1992      At 0330, landing vehicles carrying Marines and Navy Sea, Air, Land personnel
                     (SEALs) are launched from the ARG for initial landings and arrive at
                     Mogadishu at 0540. By 1145, the Mogadishu airport is declared secure and the
                     first military aircraft lands. One company of the 2d French Foreign Legion
                     Parachute Regiment joins the JTF in Mogadishu.
10 December 1992     General Johnston arrives in Mogadishu. Headquarters for Combined JTF
                     Somalia is established in the United States Embassy compound. Unified Task
                     Force Somalia (UNITAF) decides to move up the deployment of Army forces,
                     originally scheduled to begin on 19 December, by eight days.
11 December 1992     Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, commanding general of Marine Forces
                     Somalia (MarFor) arrives in Mogadishu. General Johnston and Ambassador
                     Robert B. Oakley begin talks with faction leaders. General Mohamed Farah
                     Hassan Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed agree to respect the ceasefire and to
                     remove heavy weapons from the city. United Nations Secretary General
                     Boutros Boutros-Ghali invites 11 political faction leaders to a preparatory meet-
                     ing for a conference of national reconciliation.
12 December 1992     Three helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 are fired on by
                     Somalis in two separate incidents. The helicopters destroy two "technicals" and
                     damage one M113 armored personnel carrier. HMCS Preserver arrives at
                     Mogadishu port, beginning the Canadian Operation Deliverance. First Army
                     unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrives at Bale Dogle.
13 December 1992     Bale Dogle secured by Marines of the 15th MEU (SOC). First Army unit,
                     Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry arrives in Bale Dogle. The Belgian 1st
                     Parachute Battalion arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of the Italian Folgore
                     Brigade, a reconnaissance unit, arrive in Mogadishu.
14 December 1992     Advance party of Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group arrives in
                     Mogadishu. First elements of Kuwaiti force arrive in Mogadishu.
15 December 1992     Army forces assume control of Bale Dogle sector from Marines.
                                                                                  APPENDIX C     185

16 December 1992    Turkish advance party arrives in Mogadishu. Task Force Hope, composed of
                    elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and French forces, secures the airfield at
                    Baidoa. Italian reconnaissance unit reoccupies the Italian Embassy. Phase I of
                    Operation Restore Hope is completed.
19 December 1992    Turkish reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of Saudi
                    Arabian force arrive in Mogadishu.
20 December 1992    Kismayo port and airfield are secured by elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and
                    the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion.
22 December 1992    Australian forces reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. Major General
                    Steven L. Arnold, commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, arrives in
23 December 1992    A mine near Bardera kills Lawrence N. Freedman, a U.S. Government civilian
                    employee. Mr. Freedman is the first member of the Unified Task Force to die in
                    the performance of duty. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl
                    E. Mundy, Jr., arrives at the embassy compound in Mogadishu for a formal visit.
                    The San Marco Battalion arrives with the Italian Naval Group.
24 December 1992    Bardera is secured by elements of the 7th Marines. Task Force Kismayo is
                    formed from the Army forces under the command of Brigadier General Lawson
                    W. Magruder, III, USA. Main body of Italian Folgore Brigade arrives.
25 December 1992    French forces secure Oddur.
27 December 1992    Italian forces secure Gialalassi. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi meet on the
                    "green line" dividing Mogadishu, declaring it abolished. 3d Battalion, 9th
                    Marines, relieves the 15th MEU (SOC) of responsibility for Baidoa sector.
28 December 1992    Elements of Army Forces Somalia and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle
                    Group secure Belet Weyne, last of the originally planned relief sector. Phase II
                    of Operation Restore Hope is completed. Operation Clean Street begins in
                    Mogadishu, continuing until 6 January 1993. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi
                    meet in Mogadishu and agree to dismantle the "green line" separating the city.
31 December 1992    Merka port and airfield are secured by elements of Army Forces Somalia and
                    the Italian San Marco Brigade. President Bush arrives in Mogadishu, visiting
                    units in the city and aboard ship.
1 January 1993      President Bush visits units in Baidoa and Bale Dogle.
2 January 1993      Main body of Turkish forces arrives in Mogadishu.
4 January 1993      First reconciliation conference begins at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 14 factions are
6 January 1993      Commanding general issues guidance for the draw down and restructuring of
                    the force. Members of General Aideed's faction fire on a UNITAF convoy trav-
                    eling through Mogadishu. A plan is developed for the seizure of the weapons
                    storage areas involved.
7 January 1993      In a dawn assault, the two weapons storage areas are seized by Marines of Task
                    Force Mogadishu.
8 January 1993      Identification card system for weapons control goes into effect. Task Force
                    Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Argentine arms market. Australian
                    forces advance party arrives in Baidoa.
8-15 January 1993   All participants to the Addis Ababa conference sign a series of agreements, call-
                    ing for a ceasefire, the cessation of all hostile propaganda, cooperation with
                    international organizations, free movement of the Somali people, and specific
                    agreements on disarmament.
11 January 1993     Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Barkera arms market.

12 January 1993      Private First Class Domingo Arroyo is killed by small arms fire while on patrol
                     in Mogadishu. Private Arroyo is the first uniformed member of UNITAF to be
                     killed in action. Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the operational con-
                     trol of Army Forces Somalia.
13 January 1993      Somali Security Committee in Mogadishu approaches UNITAF about the
                     reestablishment of the Somali National Police Force.
16 January 1993      Baidoa sector transferred to Army Forces Somalia.
17 January 1993      Main body of Australian forces arrives in Baidoa.
19 January 1993      Australian forces assume responsibility for Baidoa sector.
30 January 1993      3,000 Somali auxiliary security force personnel are reported as prepared to start
                     police duties.
8 February 1993      General Johnston and Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen send a joint letter to all
                     signatories of the 8 January Accords calling on them to begin the disarmament
23 February 1993     Supporters of Aideed begin rioting in Mogadishu as a result of incidents in
24 February 1993     Rioting continues in Mogadishu, especially in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic cir-
25 February 1993     U.S. Marines and Botswana soldiers conduct clearing operations in the vicinity
                     of the K-4 traffic circle. Calm returns to Mogadishu by the evening.
2 March 1993         Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the direct control of UNITAF and
                     given responsibility for Bale Dogle sector.
4 March 1993         Members of the Reconnaissance Platoon, Canadian Airborne Regiment, shoot
                     two unarmed intruders in the engineer compound in Belet Weyne, killing one of
16 March 1993        Two Canadian soldiers torture and beat to death a Somali teenager caught infil-
                     trating the Canadian compound in Belet Weyne.
24 March 1993        The final day of Ramadan, and the start of two days of celebration. This is the
                     first time in two years the citizens of Mogadishu have been able to celebrate this
                     religious feast day in peace.
4 May 1993           UNITAF turns over responsibility for operations in Somalia to the United
                     Nations forces, under the command of Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, Turkish
                     Army. The last of UNITAF headquarters staff depart Somalia.
5 May 1993           President William J. Clinton welcomes General Johnston and his staff back to
                     the United States in a special ceremony on the White House lawn.
                                            Appendix D


              Joint Meritorious Unit Award Unified Task Force Somalia


   Unified Task Force Somalia, United States Central Command, distinguished itself by exceptionally
meritorious service in Operation RESTORE HOPE from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. During this
period, the Unified Task Force organized and deployed the largest humanitarian assistance mission in
history, a joint and combined task force of over 38,000 personnel. Rapidly establishing security in eight
Humanitarian Relief Sectors in war-torn and famine-raged Somalia, they effectively neutralized warring
factions that had paralyzed and devastated the country. Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the delivery
of over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies to the starving population, disarmed warring factions, fos-
tered a cease fire, and restored police and judiciary systems. It accomplished a major infrastructure
rebuilding effort, restoring roads, airfields, seaports and public utilities that had been destroyed by two
years of civil war. Through the intervention and leadership of Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts
of over 60 different air and relief organizations and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and
focused to reverse a human tragedy of famine and disease that was claiming the lives of thousands each
day. Under the stability provided by Unified Task Force Somalia, the process of reconciliation and
rebuilding began. The successes of the members of Unified Task Force Somalia in the accomplishment
of national security objectives, and their exemplary performance of duty have brought great credit to
themselves, their Services, the United States Central Command, and to the Department of Defense.

  Given under my hand this 29th day of June 1993

                                 Colin L. Powell
                                 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


Abdulrahman Ali Tur, 3                                 2d Chemical Battalion, 119
                                                       2d (Commando) Brigade, 10th Mountain
Abu Taalib, 2
                                                          Division, 90
Addis Ababa, 6, 52, 56-58, 75, 95-98, 109, 130,        36th Engineer Group, 119, 132-133
142, 147, 149                                          3d Assault Helicopter Battalion, 117
                                                       3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 94, 117
Aden, 2-3, 56, 109
                                                       3d Battalion, 25th Aviation, 153
Afgooye, 90-91, 118, 181                               3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 96
                                                       41st Engineer Battalion, 117, 133, 173
Aideed, Gen Mohammed Farah Hassan, 3, 8, 21-
                                                       42d Field Hospital, 129
22, 52, 56, 66-69, 71-73, 86-87, 92, 94, 97-98,
                                                       4th Platoon, 300th Military Police Company,
139, 155-156
AIDS, 25, 107-108                                      4th Psychological Operations Group
                                                          (Airborne), 137-138
Air Force Commands and Units
                                                       511th Military Police Company, 117
   Air Force Forces Somalia, 18, 104, 106, 110,
                                                       571st Military Police Company, 87
                                                       593d Area Support Group, 19, 121, 123-124
   156th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129
                                                       593d Support Group (Area), 119
   183d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129
                                                       5th Battalion, 158th Aviation, 117
   1st Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 129-
                                                       62d Medical Group, 19, 119, 128-129
                                                       710th Main Support Battalion, 116-117
   437th Airlift Wing, 18
                                                       720th Military Police Battalion, 119
Air Force Forces Somalia, 18, 104, 106, 110,           7th Battalion, Frontier Service Regiment, 16
114                                                    7th Transportation Group, 19, 119-121
                                                       86th Evacuation Hospital, 128-130
Air Mobility Command, 29, 36, 40
                                                       8th Psychological Operations Battalion, 137
American University, 118, 120                          984th Military Police Company, 91
                                                       9th Psychological Operations Battalion
Aqiil, 2
                                                          (Tactical), 137
Argentine Market, 71                                   Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 38
                                                       Company B, 9th Psychological Operations
Army Commands and Units
                                                          Battalion, 67
  Army Forces Somalia, 16, 18-19, 37-38, 48-
                                                       Product Dissemination Battalion, 137
     50, 76-78, 90-91, 94, 97, 113-114, 116,-
                                                       Third Army, 14, 16
     119, 121-122, 124, 145, 152
                                                       U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 121
  10th Aviation Brigade, 5010th Forward
                                                       United States Army Forces Command, 14
     Support Battalion, 117, 153
                                                       XVIII Airborne Corps, 16
  10th Mountain Division, 17, 19, 37, 40-41,
     44, 48-50, 76, 90-91, 93-94, 100, 110, 117,    Arnold, MajGen Steven L., USA, 17, 19, 48-49,
     119, 133, 137, 140, 151-152, 154, 156,         94, 113, 117, 152
                                                    Arone, Shidane, 100
  13th Corps Support Command, 13, 19
  1st (Warrior) Brigade, 10th Mountain              Arthur, VAdm Stanley R., USN, 6-7
     Division, 91, 117
                                                    Australia, 20, 40, 79, 98
  1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, 117, 153
  240th Quartermaster Battalion, 119                Australian Commands and Units
  245th Reconnaissance Battalion, 73                  103d Signals Squadron, 79
  2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 38, 49-50, 90, 114     17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat

     Engineer Regiment, 79                           Boyce, Capt Brian, USN, 32
  1st Battalion Support Group, 79
                                                     Britain, 3-4, 155
  1st Battalion, 1st Royal Australian Regiment,
     40, 78-79                                       British Commands and Units, 42
  6th Field Battery, 4th Field Regiment, 79             British Royal Air Force, 42
  Australian Ready Deployment Force, 40
                                                     British Somaliland, 2-4
  HMAS Jervis Bay (GT 203), 78
  HMAS Tobruk, 79                                    Brock, Col Michael V., 14
  Royal Australian Air Force, 79
                                                     Brown and Root, 120-122
  Squadron B, 3d Battalion, 4th Cavalry
     Regiment, 78                                    Brown, Pvt Kyle (Canadian Forces), 100-101
Baidoa, 3, 8, 28, 38, 42-43, 45-46, 52, 61, 76,      Bulo Burti, 87
77-82, 98-99, 105, 111-122, 130, 132, 143-145
                                                     Bush, President George H. W., 1, 9, 11, 43, 148
Balcad, 87-89
                                                     Buurhakaba, 80
Bale Dogle, 25, 28, 38, 40, 42, 49, 73, 76-77, 90-
                                                     Cairo West Airport, Egypt, 130
91, 105-106, 122, 132
                                                     Camp Pendleton, California, 12-14, 18, 37, 144,
Bangladesh, 141, 152, 155
Baraawe, 90
                                                     Canada, 18, 20, 101
Bardera, 3, 28, 45-46, 52, 66, 76, 82-83, 105,
                                                     Canadian Commands and Units
115, 118, 122, 127, 130, 132, 134, 143, 145, 153
                                                       93 Rotary Wing Aircraft Flight, 91
Barkera Market, 71                                     Airborne Regiment, 9, 40, 49, 91, 101
                                                       HMCS Preserver (AOR 510), 104
Barre, Gen Mohammed Siad, 3, 5-8, 21, 23, 26,
                                                       Ministry of National Defense, 101
63, 95
                                                       Royal Canadian Dragoons, 91
Battle of Adowa, 3
                                                     Ceelgasass, 46
Bedard, Col Emil R., 45, 82, 152-153
                                                     Central Command, 6, 11-14, 17-19, 21-22, 25-
Belet Weyne, 1, 9, 28-29, 48-49, 53, 89-95, 97,      27, 29, 32, 107, 109, 113, 115, 117, 121, 134-
100, 104, 130, 143                                   135, 147, 149-150, 152
Belgian Commands and Units                           Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina, 18
  11th Company, 45
                                                     Civil-Military Operations Center, 27, 82, 111,
  1st Parachute Battalion, 44, 94, 96
  Close Reconnaissance Squadron, 45
Belgium, 18, 20, 155
                                                        Darod, 2-3
Berbera, 6, 25                                          Digil, 2
                                                        Dir, 2-3
Bir, LtGen Cevik (Turkish Forces), 96, 150-151,
                                                        Habr Gedr, 3, 87, 155
                                                        Hawadle, 49, 92
Bishop, American Ambassador James K., 6-7               Hawiye, 2-3, 6, 8
                                                        Issaq, 2-3
Bombay, 109
                                                        Majertain, 3
Borchini, LtCol Charles, USA, 137                       Ogadeni, 3
                                                        Rahanweyne, 2-3, 83
Bosnia, 122, 157-158
                                                     Clausewitz, Carl von, 51
Botswana, 18, 41, 73, 83, 118
                                                     Clinton, President William J., 154-155
Boudra, Cdr William F., USN, 133
                                                     Conde, GySgt Harry (Canadian Forces), 99
Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General Boutros, 11,
56, 141, 147, 149, 151                               Conference on National Reconciliation, 150
                                                                                       INDEX       191

Cowan, Capt Michael L., USN, 14, 125-126,           2d Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, 33,
127, 129                                               42, 83
                                                    2d Marine Infantry Regiment, 83
Dacca (AOR A41), 103
                                                    5th Attack Helicopter Regiment, 83
Defense Courier System, 136                         5th Combined Arms Overseas Regiment, 46,
                                                       83, 85
Defense Intelligence Agency, 24
                                                    6th Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment, 83
Derya (AD A576), 103                                French Special Operations Command, 42
Dharsamenbo, 92                                   French Somaliland, 2, 83
Djibouti, 2, 5, 34, 63, 83, 130                   Fusco, Maj Gennaro (Italian Forces), 40
Doctors Without Borders, 84                       Gabiyu, Col Aden, 3
Dotto, Col Peter A., 43, 55, 57-58, 98            Gaddis, Col Evan R., USA, 94
Doyle, Col James J., Jr., 7                       Galcaio, 92, 94, 151
Egal, Prime Minister Ibrahim, 5                   Garrison, MajGen William F., USA, 152
Egan, Col James B., 43                            German Air Force, 41
Egypt, 20, 30, 36, 41, 118, 130                   Gialalassi, 28-29, 46-47, 85-90, 130, 132, 143
El Berde, 46, 65, 84, 85                          Gile, BGen Greg, L., USA, 97, 117
Elmi, BGen Ali Mohamed Kedeye, 67                 Grecale (FFG F571), 103
Emperor Haile Selassie, 6                         Green Line, 55-57, 71, 88-89
Eritria, 3                                        Green Valley (TAK 2049), 128
Ertugrul (LST L401), 103                          Guam (LPD 9), 7
Ess-Akalli, Col Omar (Moroccan Forces), 76,       Hagee, Col Michael W., 67
                                                  Haiti, 25, 122, 157-158
Ethiopia, 3-6, 52, 56, 85, 92, 94, 130
                                                  Hamar Jab Jab, 118
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army, 6, 85,
                                                  Hamilton, Col Mark, USA, 58
                                                  Hancock, RAdm William J., USN, 17
European Command, 138
                                                  Handley, Col William M., Jr., USA, 14
Evans, Col Walter S., USAF, 109
                                                  Hargeisa, 25
Fatih (FFG F242), 103
                                                  Harlane, 92
Fer Fer, 92
                                                  Hatton, Col Sam E., USA, 13-14
Flowers, Col Robert B., USA, 131
                                                  Hellmer, Col Werner, 78, 82, 145, 152
Fort Drum, New York, 17, 37
                                                  Hill, Col Robert G., 134, 136
Fort Hood, Texas, 13, 19
                                                  Hirsi, Mohamed Said (Gen Morgan), 3, 23, 44,
Fort Meade, Maryland, 135
                                                  52-53, 71, 74, 94-98, 140, 149
Fort Stewart, Georgia, 14
                                                  Hoar, MajGen Joseph P., 11-13, 22, 115, 149,
France, 3-4, 18, 20, 83                           152
Freedmann, Lawrence N., 66, 83                    Horn of Africa, 1-3, 11, 25, 37, 56, 106, 108,
French Commands and Units
   13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion, 42,   Howe, Adm Jonathan T., USN, 151
      46, 83

Hurley, LtCol David W. (Australian Forces), 99    Kenya, 1, 4-5, 7, 30, 42, 79, 121, 130
Hussein, Col John, 56, 92, 156                    Khukri (FSG P49), 103
I'Home, MajGen Rene (French Forces), 46           Kincaid (DD 965), 17
Imam Mohamed Ibn Abdullah, 3                      Kismayo, 3-4, 22, 25, 28-29, 43-45, 53, 59, 65,
                                                  71-72, 74, 83, 94-101, 105, 114, 117, 124, 130,
India, 94, 152
                                                  132-134, 137-138, 140, 149-152, 155
International Action Against Hunger, 78
                                                  Kittani, Ismat T., 147
International Civil Aviation Organization, 107-
                                                  Klimp, Col Jack W., 67-70, 116, 152-153
                                                  Kline, Col John P., Jr., 115
International Red Cross, 1, 9, 27, 92, 110, 141
                                                  Kosovo, 157
Ireland, 152
                                                  Kouyate, Lansana, 147, 149
Islamic Unity, 3
                                                  Kurtunwaarey, 90
Italy, 3-4, 18, 20, 40, 45, 89, 125, 155
                                                  Kuthar (FSG P46), 103
Italian Commands and Units
   186th Parachute Regiment, 87                   Kuwait, 41, 106, 118
   187th Parachute Regiment, 87
                                                  Labbe, Col Serge, 91-92
   24th Naval Group, 40
   46th Aviation Brigade, 89                      League of Arab States, 56
   Folgore Brigade, 40, 47, 87, 89
                                                  Lias, Col Dayre C., USAF, 106-107
   San Marco Battalion, 40, 50, 87
                                                  Libutti, BGen Frank, 1
Jacqmin, LtCol Marc (Belgian Forces), 44-45
                                                  Loi, BGen Bruno (Italian Forces), 40
Jaua, Col Omar, 92
                                                  Lorenz, Col Frederick M., 26, 108
Jawhar, 87-88
                                                  Magruder, BGen W. Lawson, III, USA, 44, 94,
Jenkins, MajGen Harry W., Jr., 7
                                                  95, 100
Jervis Bay (GT 203), 103
                                                  Mahdi, Ali (Mohamed), 3, 8, 22, 47, 52, 56, 71,
Jess, Col Ahmed Omar, 3, 22-23, 44-45, 53, 56,    86-87, 92, 94, 139, 156
71, 74, 83, 94-98, 100, 149, 155
                                                  Malaysia, 152, 155
Jilib, 4, 97, 133, 134
                                                  Marine Corps Commands and Units
Johnston, LtGen Robert B., 12-14, 16-18, 20-22,     I Marine Expeditionary Force, 12-16, 21, 26-
25-27, 29, 34, 38-39, 42, 50-54, 56-61, 66, 68,        27, 65, 71, 119
72, 74, 80, 86-87, 96, 101, 107-109, 111-113,       Marine Forces Somalia, 16, 18-19, 36, 65-66,
115-116, 119-120, 126, 133, 137, 141, 143, 147,        105, 116, 119, 152
149-151, 153-154, 157                               1st Battalion, 1st Marines, 113
                                                    1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 38, 45-46, 66, 70,
Johnston, Philip, 141, 143, 147
                                                       73, 83, 114
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6, 11, 25, 113, 134, 149     1st Force Service Support Group, 15-16, 18,
                                                       119, 122
Joint Task Force Somalia, 12-13, 22, 54
                                                    1st Marine Division, 15-16, 37-38, 45, 79,
Jubba, 4, 24, 45, 83, 94, 96, 132                      134-135
                                                    1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and
Jubba River, 4, 83, 94, 132
                                                       Intelligence Group, 15
Juneau (LPH 10), 16, 31-32                          1st Tank Battalion, 113
                                                    2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 15, 38, 44-45
K-4 traffic circle, 73, 118
                                                    3d Amphibious Assault Battalion, 16, 45, 70,
Kennedy, Col Kevin M., 141-142, 144, 147               83
                                                                                       INDEX     193

  3d Battalion, 11th Marines, 69-70, 73, 113       33-34, 36-38, 40-42, 44-47, 49, 52, 54, 56-58,
  3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 16, 45, 66, 70, 78,   60-63, 65-66, 69-72, 74-76, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87-
     80-81, 112-113, 115                           89, 91, 94, 97-99, 105-106, 108-113, 115, 117-
  3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, 45, 66,     118, 121, 127-128, 130-132, 134-135, 138-145,
     70, 88, 111                                   147, 150, 152-153, 155-156
  3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 15-16, 107
                                                   Mombasa, Kenya, 1, 42, 106, 114, 128, 130, 141
  4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 7
  7th Marines, 38, 45-46, 66, 70, 73, 82-83,       Montgomery, MajGen Thomas, USA, 151
     114-115, 122, 137, 153
                                                   Morgan, Gen (See Hirsi, Mohamed Said)
  9th Communications Battalion, 135
  11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special          Moroccan Commands and Units
     Operations Capable), 16                         3d Motorized Infantry Regiment, 76
  13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special            Royal Moroccan Army, 76
     Operations Capable), 155
                                                   Morocco, 18, 41, 76, 77
  15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
     Operations Capable), 15-17, 32, 35, 38,       Moser, Capt Alan B., USN, 7
     42-45, 67, 77-79, 115, 139, 144
                                                   Mowain (AOR A20), 103
  24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
     Operations Capable), 63, 97                   Mundy, Gen Carl E., Jr., 14
  Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 46,
                                                   Muslim Brotherhood, 3
     66, 70
  Company G, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, 44-45      MV 1stLt Alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003), 17, 115
  Company K, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 66, 70
                                                   MV 1stLt Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011), 16, 33, 35,
  Headquarters Battery, 3d Battalion, 11th
                                                   115, 122
     Marines, 69
  Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron        MV PFC James Anderson, Jr. (T-AK 3002), 17,
     352, 105                                      115
  Marine Aircraft Group 16, 83, 105, 114-115,
                                                   MV Pvt Franklin J. Phillps (T-AK 3004), 17,
  Marine Corps Combat Development
     Command, 14                                   Nairobi, Kenya, 7, 107, 109, 141
  Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, 115
                                                   North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 136
  Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron
     369, 115                                      Navy Commands and Units
  Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron                  Navy Forces Somalia, 17, 47, 103-104, 114,
     (Composite) 164, 15, 38-39                         120, 151
  Marine Wing Support Squadron 372, 16, 132          30th Naval Construction Regiment., 75, 132,
  MEU Service Support Group 15, 15, 128                 145
                                                     Amphibious Squadron 3, 16
Masirah Island, 7
                                                     Amphibious Squadron 5, 32
Matabaan, 92-93                                      Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2, 17, 29
                                                     Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 3, 16
Matchee, Master Cpl Clayton (Canadian Forces),
                                                     Military Sealift Command, 29
                                                     Naval Forces Central Command, 6
Mathieu, LtCol Carol J., (Canadian Forces), 9,       Naval Surface Forces, Pacific, 14
94, 101                                              Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Teams, 7, 32-33, 44
                                                     Surgeon General of the Navy, 14
Maulin, Col, 96
                                                     Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, 31, 154
Menelik II, 3                                        Tripoli Amphibious Task Unit, 16-17
Merka, 49-50, 86, 90-91, 117-118, 143, 153         Nepal, 152
Mikolajcik, BGen Thomas R., USAF, 18               New Port, 118
Mogadishu, 4, 6-8, 11, 16, 22, 24-25, 27-29, 31,   New York Army National Guard, 27th Brigade,

37                                                 Prophet Mohamed, 2
New Zealand, 42, 105, 138                          QoQaani, 95
New Zealand Commands and Units                     Qoryooley, 50, 90
  Number 42 Squadron, 42
                                                   Rainville, Capt Michael (Canadian Forces), 100-
  Royal New Zealand Air Force, 42
Newbold, Col Gregory S., 15, 32-33, 77, 144
                                                   Rajo, 138-139
Nigeria, 20, 41, 118
                                                   Ranger (CV 61), 17
Norway, 20, 152
                                                   Reardon, Maj John D., 109
O'Meara, LtCol William J., USAF, 110
                                                   Republic of Korea, 152
Oakley, Ambassador Robert B., 43, 50-52, 54,
                                                   Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 135
56, 59-60, 95-96, 139, 141, 147, 149-150, 157
                                                   Romania, 152
Oddur, 28-29, 46-47, 61, 83-85, 105, 118, 130
                                                   Rossi, MajGen GianPietro (Italian Forces), 87
Ogaden, 6, 83, 85
                                                   Rushmore (LSD 47), 16, 31, 44
                                                   Sab, 2
     Clean Street, 75
                                                   Samaal, 1-2
     Deliverance, 20, 40
                                                   San Giorgio (LPD L9892), 103
     Desert Storm, 6, 54
                                                   Saudi Arabia, 6, 13, 18, 30, 41, 118, 135
     Eastern Exit, 6
                                                   Saudi Arabia Commands and Units
     Ibis, 20, 40
                                                     5th Royal Saudi Land Forces Airborne
     Oryx, 20                                            Battalion, 41
     Provide Comfort, 14, 27, 141, 157-158         Save the Children, 92
     Provide Hope, 14                              Scott Air Force Base, 18, 29
  Provide Relief, 1, 9, 28, 30-31, 42, 106, 114,   Seward, Maj Anthony (Canadian Forces), 100-
141                                                101
     Renaissance, 144                              Seychelles, 104, 109
  Restore Hope, 1, 3, 9, 20, 27, 43, 49, 51, 59,   Seychelles Coast Guard, 104
105, 156-157, 158
                                                   Shaheen, BGen Imtiaz (Pakistani Forces), 20, 58,
     Solace, 20, 40                                147
     United Shield, 155, 156                       Shebelle River, 49
Organization of African Unity, 56                  Shermarke, President Abdirashid Ali, 5
Organization of the Islamic Conference, 56         Smith, Col Thomas D., USA, 18
Oxfam Quebec, 92                                   Solomon, BGen Billy K., USA, 19, 120
Pakistan, 18, 41, 118, 152, 155                    Somali Democratic Movement, 3, 56
Pakistani 6th Punjab Regiment, 91                  Somali National Alliance, 56, 94
Peck, Col Frederick, C., 97                        Somali National Army, 22
Perkins, RAdm James B., III, USN, 32               Somali National Front, 23, 92
Peterson, Capt John W., USN, 16, 31, 44-45         Somali National Movement, 3, 6, 56, 92, 149
Project Hand Clasp, 144                            Somali Navy, 44
                                                                                         INDEX   195

Somali Patriotic Front, 44                          Turkish Commands and Units
                                                      1st Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Mechanized
Somali Patriotic Movement, 3, 6, 23, 56, 71, 83,
                                                          Brigade, 41
                                                    21 October Road, 66
Somali Road, 132-134
                                                    U.N. Security Council, 11, 151
Somali Salvation Democratic Front, 3, 56, 92
                                                    U.S. Federal Aviation Agency, 107
Somali Youth League, 4
                                                    U.S. Transportation Command, 18, 29
Somalia Youth Club, 4
                                                    Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF), 34, 36-
Southern Somali National Movement, 3
                                                    39, 41-43, 45-47, 49-50, 52,-70, 72-76, 79, 82-
Soviet Union, 4-6, 8, 14                            83, 86-90, 92, 94-98, 101-102, 104, 106-115,
                                                    118-122, 124-125, 128-131, 133-134, 136-147
Spataro, LtCol Stephen M., USA, 60-61
                                                    United Arab Emirates, 41, 118, 153
Special Operations Forces, 18, 31, 40, 49, 80-81,
84, 88, 92, 114, 132, 152, 155                      United Nations, 4, 9, 11-12, 16, 19-21, 39, 50,
   Company C, 2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces      55-56, 58-59, 61, 78, 83, 85, 93, 107-109, 111-
      Group (Airborne), 31                          113, 115, 120, 128, 137, 141-145, 147-152, 155-
                                                    156, 158
Standing Committee of the Countries of the
Horn of Africa, 56                                  United Nation Organization Somalia (UNO-
                                                    SOM), 16, 20, 50, 56-58, 78, 85, 90-91, 94, 98,
Strada Imperiale, 48
                                                    109, 116, 118, 120, 136-137, 139, 141, 147-156,
Sukanya (OPV P51), 103                              158
Sullivan, Ms. Katie, 58                             United Nations Children's Fund, 93, 144
Support Command, 13, 18-19, 114, 116, 118-          United Nations Economic Commission, 56
121, 124, 127, 151
                                                    United Somali Congress, 6, 22, 47, 92, 155
Task Forces
                                                    United Somali Party, 56, 82
  2-87, 90-91
                                                    United States Agency for International
  3-17, 90-91                                       Development, 141
  Bardera, 83, 115, 153                             United States Embassy, 33-34, 72, 118, 120, 139,
  Bravo, 87
                                                    Valley Forge (CG 50), 17
  Columbus, 87
                                                    Vesuvio (MCS A5384), 103
  Hope, 42-43
                                                    Vietnam, 98
  Kismayo, 53, 94, 96, 114, 117, 152
                                                    Villagio Bur Carole, 118
  Mogadishu, 69-71
                                                    Villagio Scibis, 87
  Ranger, 152, 155
                                                    Wajid, 46, 84, 118
Tiyegloo, 46, 84
                                                    Warsame, Gen Abdi Dahir (Somali Forces), 82
Tobruk (LSL L50), 103
                                                    Wasp (LHD 1), 97
Trenton (APD 14), 7
                                                    Webi Jubba, 24
Tripoli (LPH 10), 16, 31, 127
                                                    Webi Shebelle, 24, 47
Tughril (DD 167), 103
Tunisia, 41                                         Western Somali Liberation Front, 6

Turkey, 20, 118                                     Wilhelm, MajGen Charles E., 16, 37-38, 68-69,

72-73, 83, 87, 98, 115-116, 140, 153
World Airways, 106
World Food Program, 1, 61, 111, 143, 145   Zimbabwe, 41, 118
World Health Organization, 111             Zinni, BGen Anthony C., 14, 17, 26-27, 51, 56,
                                           58, 68, 110, 113, 137, 141, 143, 147, 149, 155,
Yemen, 36                                  158
Zenawi, President Meles, 56                Zinnia (AGF A961), 103
The device reproduced on the back cover
is the oldest military insignia in continu-
ous use in the United States. It first
appeared, as shown here, on Marine
Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the
stars changed to five points, the device
has continued on Marine Corps buttons
to the present day.

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